The central question of this thesis examines how Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore learned and adapted successful terrorist disengagement programs and policies; through their unique and non-military rehabilitation programs. The methodology is a comparative case study analysis of Malaysia and Singapore. In order to understand how the countries of Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore adapted a colonial-era counter-insurgency program to disengage Communist Terrorists into a program that now rehabilitates radicalized Islamist Terrorists, an analysis of the periods of the Malayan Emergency and the post-Cold War era of Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore is necessary. The argument presented in this thesis contends the colonial framework and policies of the Malayan Emergency had a positive impact on Malaysia and Singapore; which both countries have further developed and learned as a foundation for their successful terrorist disengagement programs and policies to counter radical Islamist groups and individuals. The hypothesis is that successful counter-insurgency operations must include disengagement programs, rather than purely military solutions or strategies to ensure countries success in counter-insurgency operations and strategies. The Malaysian counter-insurgency disengagement program and the Singapore counter-insurgency disengagement program can provide lessons for modern day counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism programs and policies.

When we looked at different issues in terrorism such as definitions, descriptions and motivations, groups and supporters, tactics, strategies, and victims of terrorists and terrorist activities, we see that terrorism is an issue that can occur at any time, and in any place, and it seems that the terrorism threat will still exist in the future. It is almost impossible to stop all terrorist activities all over the world, but it is possible to formulate an anti-terrorism policy that can keep terrorist activities at a minimum level and prevent planned terror activities by a well developed intelligence network. It seems that to establish a good intelligence collection system an approach in which HUMINT and TECHINT are interdependent with each other is necessary. By using a combination of human and technical intelligence collection methods, intelligence agencies can become more effective and efficient against terrorism.

Hensikten med denne oppgaven har vært å belyse de utfordringer vi står overfor når det gjelderå bekjempe den internasjonale terrorismen. Dette har blitt gjort gjennom å sammenligne USAsog EUs strategier mot terrorisme etter den 11. september 2001. Michael Manns IEMP modell(Ideological, Economical, Military, Political) har blitt benyttet for å kunne ”dele opp” strategieni flere naturlig avgrensede områder eller kategorier, for deretter å sammenligne de enkeltedelene hver for seg.Det er mange likheter, men også betydelige forskjeller mellom USAs og EUs strategier motterrorisme. Både USA og EU er enige om at kampen mot terrorisme på lang sikt handler om en”kamp om idéer”. Tilsynelatende hersker det likevel en ulik oppfatning om situasjonen, derUSA i større grad enn EU anser seg for å befinne seg i en ”krigstilstand”. Dette kommer tiluttrykk blant annet gjennom en mer offensiv og aggressiv språkbruk.De største forskjellene mellom USAs og EUs strategier finner vi blant de militære og depolitiske maktmidlene. USA viser en betydelig mer aktiv og offensiv innstilling både når detgjelder diplomatisk press og bruk av militærmakt, og de tar åpenlyst på seg en lederrolle iverden. De går heller ikke av veien for å aksjonere på egen hånd om nødvendig, uten å væreavhengig av FN eller andre land/organisasjoner. USA fremstår altså som mer ”unilaterale”,mens EU fremstår som mer ”multilaterale”. For begge er imidlertid et bredt internasjonaltsamarbeid en nøkkelingrediens, samtidig som begge strategiene fremhever betydningen av en”comprehensive approach”, der militærmakt bare utgjør en del av helheten. / The purpose of this thesis has been to explore the challenges we are facing todayconcerning the fight against international terrorism. By comparing the counterterrorismstrategies of the US and the EU after 2001, different views on how toapproach this problem can be discovered. Michael Mann’s IEMP model(Ideological, Economical, Military, Political) has been used as a tool to dividethe strategies into 4 areas or categories, and then a comparison has beenconducted within each of these areas.There are many similarities, but also substantial differences between the US andEU strategies for combating terrorism. They both agree that the fight againstterrorism in the long term is about a “struggle for ideas”. Nevertheless, it seemsthey have a different view on the situation, where the Americans considerthemselves to be more in a state of war. This is expressed in several ways, oneof them being through more aggressive language.The biggest differences between the US and EU strategies can be found in themilitary and political areas. The US is displaying a substantially more active andaggressive attitude, both in terms of diplomatic pressure and the use of militaryforces, and they are openly taking the lead in the world community. They willact alone if necessary, independent of the UN or other organizations/nations. Tosummarize, the US appears more unilateral and the EU appears moremultilateral. However, broad international cooperation is a key ingredient forboth of them, and both strategies emphasize the importance of a comprehensiveapproach, where the use of military force is only a part of the solution. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 04-06

No description available.

A fundamental driving factor to contemporary international terrorism is the role of religion. Since the 1980s, there have been not only a rise in the number of Islamist terrorist incidents but also of a more globalized and intense dimension. The casualties have risen to unprecedented levels. Africa, and the Horn of Africa, in particular, has experienced its fair share of terrorist activities. For instance, in December 1980 terrorists sympathetic to the PLO bombed the Norfolk Hotel, owned by an Israeli, in Nairobi, Kenya, killing sixteen people and injuring over a hundred. The 7 August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were more deadly: 240 Kenyans, 11 Tanzanians and 12 Americans died, with over 5,000 Kenyans and 86 Tanzanians injured. There was yet another terrorist attack on another Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and an attempt on a passenger plane on the runway at the Mombassa International Airport, Kenya. Both incidents happened in November 2002. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 1998 and 2002 attacks. With rising terrorism in the Horn of Africa and the reality of the Somali state failure, there is a growing concern that the Somali environment is supporting terrorist activities in the region. The activities of the al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and later the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Somali Islamist fundamentalist organizations, with their feared international connections and the security implications, are of concern not only to the region but also to global security monitors. There is not much debate regarding the level of collapse of the Somali state and the possible security implications of the territory as a congenial terrorist safe haven. Most experts have presented Somalia as a clear example of a completely failed state. Rotberg (2002:131) describes Somalia as “the model of a collapsed state: a geographical expression only, with borders but with no effective way to exert authority within those borders". Jhazbhay (2003: 77) quoted Ali Mazrui as saying that "the situation in Somalia now is a culture of rules without rulers, a stateless society‟. Menkhaus (2003: 27) has singled out protracted and complete state collapse, protracted armed conflict and lawlessness as aptly representing the Somali situation. “Somalia‟s inability to pull together even the most minimalist fig-leaf of a central administration over the course of twelve years places the country in a class by itself. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

After the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001, on American soil, a plethora of norms that enable military forces to shoot-down hijacked civil aircraft have been passed in several countries. Although these laws, decrees and executive orders are grounded on security reasons and they are allegedly aimed to protect people and vital interests on ground, this assertion does not emasculate the main difficulty they face in legal terms, which is the existence of an international provision that forbids the use of force against civilian aircraft. This thesis contains a detailed list of such domestic norms and conducts an analysis of their validity from the perspective of Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention and the right of self-defense granted to states by the Charter of the United Nations.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 330-356). / Also available by subscription via World Wide Web / viii, 356 leaves, bound 29 cm

A dearth of pre-existing research in the field prompted this thesis on whether traditional econometric analyses of war deterrent alliances are applicable to modern alliances for counter terror purposes. Apparent foundational and contextual differences between the two types of alliances and the costs and benefits member nations derive from each lead the author to theorize that factors contributing to the formation of each alliance are fundamentally similar. Multiple types of statistical models are used to measure variables from the Correlates of War and Polity datasets combined with custom variables in a new dataset concerning major transnational terrorist attacks and the resultant alliances in testing the effect of traditionally contributing formation factors on alliances against terrorism. The results indicate that some contributing factors are similar, extant analysis tools have utility and that further investigation is justified.

No description available.

This thesis is a critique on contemporary counterterrorism and peacebuilding. It uses a single case study approach to answer the question: How can we, by studying the Mindanao conflict - which has characteristics of both ‘new wars' and ‘new terrorism' - find a juncture between peace and conflict studies and terrorism studies that could help us to better understand terrorism and thereby create more efficient frameworks and tools for countering terrorism, and addressing the root causes of intrastate conflict in order to build a lasting peace? In addressing this question the thesis aims to contribute to International Relations and more specifically the emerging literatures of ‘critical terrorism studies' and ‘critical peace and conflict studies'. Ontologically, the thesis is positioned in between the two subfields, peace and conflict studies and terrorism studies, of International Relations and draws on theories from both literatures and the more recent ‘critical' turns of each sub-discipline; critical terrorism studies and critical peace studies. The case study of the Philippines and in particular the Mindanao conflict is relatively under-researched and functions as a comparative element as it, arguably, represents a microcosm of almost every type of conflict. It is the understanding of the thesis that there is a need to understand local realities and grievances in order to build a lasting peace in Mindanao where the root causes of the conflict is being addressed. Hence, the thesis seeks to understand the root causes of the conflict by focusing on Filipino history of governance and conflict. The roots of conflict is found to be the grievances of being deprived of self-rule, autonomy, and independence and of the right to its ancestral domain after centuries of various levels of oppression as well as corruption within the embedded, archaic power structures of Filipino political dynasties. Furthermore, the thesis tests the theoretical frameworks on the on-going peace process suggesting that the institutions and ‘one size fits all approaches' in liberal peacebuilding can be found in the embedded power structures in the social, political and economic levels of the Philippines. The main contribution the thesis aims to achieve is to apply post-liberal peacebuilding theories to the Mindanao conflict by identifying and assigning the role of the liberal institutions to local elites. Therefore, the main argument of the thesis is that the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF is merely reshuffling the power within the archaic power structures of governance and political, economic and social life within the Philippines, without addressing the root causes of the conflict. Consequently, this will not lead to a long-term lasting peace in the Philippines.