The purpose of this thesis is to analyze a prominent figure of the 20th century, William Randolph Hearst and to analyze the influence he was able to exert over American foreign policy through his own personal connections and those of his periodicals. This also includes an analysis between Hearst and Roosevelt, and noting the varying levels of influence between the two. This thesis will demonstrate that William Randolph Hearst is a prominent figure of 20th century history, but was overshadowed by Roosevelt. Hearst while powerful was always putting his power into ventures that would backfire politically. When his papers declined, his influence over politics plummeted instantly.

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Possessing a vision to correct problems is an area of interest for leadership and political studies, as presumably vision provides the goal to orient upon and overcome problems, and should apply at all levels of leadership. The worsening situation in Syria since the end of the Cold War begs the questions of whether any recent U.S. President tried to address the issues in the relationship with Syria, and what was the vision the President sought to achieve. This study reviews Presidential rhetoric from President's News Conferences, major speeches and Executive Orders for a vision to ascertain the intended direction for U.S. policy for Syria. Also, the study reviews the leadership styles of the five Presidents for consistency and effectiveness in conveying a foreign policy message. Broadly, the study concludes that the Presidents need more than a strategy to engage other nation to fix problems. They need an achievable outcome to aim the U.S. government towards and to effectively broadcast their vision to a broad audience. It takes an appreciation for history, realistic expectations and an eye for the future to form a vision for a coherent way forward. Unfortunately, the Presidents in this study did not give the appropriate time or resources to correct the pervasive problems in Syria. Their overall policies ranged from incoherent to stagnant, therefore hampering the U.S. ability to guide progress fixing the situation. / Master of Arts / The pervasive problems within Syria are some of the more important U.S. foreign policy issues that require guidance and direction to overcome. The worsening situation in Syria since the end of the Cold War begs the questions of whether any recent U.S. President tried to address the issues in the relationship with Syria. Broadly, the study concludes that it takes more than a strategy to engage another nation and fix problems. It takes an appreciation for history, realistic expectations and an eye for the future to form a vision for a coherent way forward. Additionally, Presidents require the ability to effectively communicate their vision to a broad audience. Unfortunately, it appears the Presidents in this study did not give the appropriate time or resources to correct the problems, and therefore hampered the U.S. President’s ability to guide progress to fix the situation.

The main goal of this disertation is to map American pespectives on the position of Central Europe in American foreign policy after the Cold War. Its ambition is to systematize the particular area of American foreign policy thought that deals with Central Europe and, more precisely, with U.S. relations with the region. The goal is to contribute to a better understanding of how have the individual camps and traditions represented in the American foreign policy debate approached this particular issue. To achieve these goals, this disertation employs two existing typologies of American foreign policy thought and, subsequently, attempts to create a new, original typology that would better suit the aim of mapping the whole spectrum of relevant American perspectives on Central Europe. This disertation does not describe what has really happened in Central European-American relations, but rather aims at understanding better the U.S. foreign policy thought or, better said, one specific part of it: Opinions on U.S.-Central European relations and the position of Central Erope in international politics. Analysing the American post-Cold War discourse on Central Europe is the instrument to achieve this goal. This disertation, however, does not pressupose a direct causal link between the discourse and the...

Desde o fim da Guerra Fria, os Estados Unidos promoveram a noção da existência de \"Rogue States\", denominando-os \"novos inimigos\". No entanto, o termo confere muitas controvérsias em torno de sua definição, principalmente dos critérios que conferem o rótulo a tais atores. A irracionalidade na tomada de decisões e a busca pela aquisição de armas nucleares se apresentam como características fundamentais. Através da análise dos discursos americanos sobre rogue states, e sob a perspectiva construtivista, podemos depreender que o discurso foi utilizado como forma de corroborar as ações norte-americanas em relação a estes países, ao mesmo tempo em que moldavam as próprias estratégias americanas, uma vez que os atos de fala conferem uma ação em si. As ações tomadas diante de uma situação são definidas a partir da percepção deste fato e do significado que o ator dará a ele. Assim, o apontamento de certos países como sendo Rogue States pelos Estados Unidos serviu para distinguir entre os países do Sistema Internacional \"aqueles que deveriam ser combatidos\". Alguns críticos do termo afirmam que o critério de racionalidade aplicado a estados como Coreia do Norte e Irã é muito mais rigoroso que aquele aplicado aos demais estados, mesmo a USSR durante a Guerra Fria. O presente trabalho pretende avaliar o surgimento do termo rogue state e sua utilização pelo governo norte-americano como política oficial. Através de dois artigos, busca-se entender a construção do conceito de rogue state, levando-se em consideração as teorias construtivistas, principalmente dos teóricos da chamada virada linguística. Uma vez que o debate da irracionalidade está diretamente ligado a busca pela obtenção de armas nucleares - critério-chave para o apontamento como rogue-, pretende-se também avaliar as suposições para tal classificação através da investigação dos programas nucleares dos dois países na atualidade que estão no centro do debate nuclear- Irã e Coreia do Norte. / Since the end of the Cold War, the United States promoted the notion of the existence of \"Rogue States\", designating them as \"new enemies\". However, the term presents many controversies surrounding its definition, especially about the criteria that confer the label to such actors. The irrationality in decision-making and the pursuit of nuclear weapons are presented as the core characteristics of the concept. Through the analysis of American discourses on rogue states, and under the constructivist perspective, one can infer that the speech was used as a way of corroborating the U.S. actions towards these countries, while that shaped the American strategies themselves, once the speech acts are an action itself. Actions taken towards a situation are defined according to the perceptions and meaning the actor will give to it. Thus, the indication of certain countries as Rogue States by the United States served to distinguish among the countries of International System \"those who should be fought\". Some critics of the term argue that the criterion of rationality applied to states like North Korea and Iran is much more rigorous than the one applied to other states, even the USSR during the Cold War. This work intends to evaluate the emergence of the term rogue state and its use by the U.S. government as an official policy. Through two articles, we seek to understand the construction of the rogue state concept, taking into account the constructivist theories, especially the theory of so-called linguistic turn. Since the discussion of irrationality is directly linked to the search for acquiring nuclear weapons - key characteristic of a rogue-, it also intends to evaluate the assumptions for such classification by investigating the nuclear programs of both countries currently at the center of the nuclear debate -Iran and North Korea.

Pendant plus de quarante cinq ans l’atout maître de la diplomatie publique américaine a été l’Agence d’information des Etats-Unis (l’USIA, United States Information Agency), établie en 1953 à l’apogée de la guerre froide pour répondre à la propagande soviétique anti-américaine et coordonner les programmes culturels et d’information à l’étranger. En privilégiant une approche comparative, notre thèse se propose d’apporter un éclairage sur le rôle longtemps ignoré de la diplomatie publique au sein de la machine de la politique étrangère américaine en se concentrant sur trois Administrations présidentielles, Eisenhower, Kennedy et Reagan qui se distinguent comme des périodes charnières. Dans ce cadre, notre étude tente de déterminer le rôle qu’ont pu jouer les stratégies de la diplomatie publique américaine élaborées depuis Washington telles qu’elles furent pratiquées par les agents des services d’information (USIS) dans les pays de « la zone cruciale » (France, Italie et Allemagne) en Europe de l’Ouest, ou dans les nations captives. Notre thèse démontre que des premières campagnes de propagande des combattants de la guerre psychologique, dans les années 1950, aux émissions high-tech des champions de l’information et de la désinformation des années 1980, l’USIA fut au cœur des stratégies de persuasion de la puissance américaine en Europe. Au regard des succès et des échecs des activités officielles et officieuses pour lesquelles l’USIA a œuvré, nous abordons la délicate question de la réception des programmes d’information officiels et de l’efficacité des stratégies d’influence américaines dans les batailles européennes pour la liberté. / For 46 years, the centrepiece of U.S. public diplomacy was the United States Information Agency (USIA) established in 1953 at the height of the Cold War to counter anti-American propaganda from the Soviet Union and coordinate foreign information dissemination programs. The purpose of my dissertation - a comparative study - is to try to shed a new light on the too long neglected role of public diplomacy in the American foreign policy process over the course of three key presidential Administrations- Eisenhower, Kennedy and Reagan. Therefore in the course of my dissertation, through field centered case studies, I investigate the strategies set up by the USIA in Washington and by the USIS [United States Information Services] in the field for “the crucial zone” (defined as France, Italy and Germany), and for key “captive nations” (such as Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary). In my dissertation I argue that since the first propag! anda campaigns of the cold warriors to the high-tech broadcastings of the champions of information and disinformation, USIA was at the core of the American strategies of persuasion and power in Europe. Indeed, in the field, between 1953 and 1991 the psychological warfare between the US and the USSR turned into a cultural Cold War and a war of information in which both public and private networks were involved. Considering the success and failures of the covert and overt activities of the USIA I may tackle the tricky issue of the effectiveness of American strategies of influence in the European battle for freedom.

Despite historians describing the 1970s as a time of détente, both National Security Advisors that dominated America’s foreign policy pursued harsh stances against the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski sabotaged peace talks in order help the United States keep its edge against the other world superpower. Most historians point to the similarities between these two men, but what is most often left out of the narrative is that both men witnessed persecution at the hands of totalitarian governments: Kissinger by the Nazis and Brzezinski by both the Nazis and the Soviets. This influence is strong in their first works written at Harvard University, where they met Dr. Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, both German émigrés. This paper will explore how European intellectuals, as well as their own European heritage, predisposed both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their hawkish stances against the Soviet Union.

Given the contradictory reality of a well-developed human rights and humanitarian regime alongside extensive human rights abuses committed in the “Global War on Terror,” the dissertation asks how and why law has shaped contemporary security policy. Focusing on the American case over time, I examine this problem empirically by tracing the changing impact of both international and domestic legal and normative constraints on torture and interrogation, detention and trial, and surveillance practices, culminating in post-9/11 counterterrorism doctrine. I find that policy makers have increasingly violated rules with the adoption of controversial security and intelligence policies, but have simultaneously employed legalistic arguments to evade responsibility for human rights abuses. Using contrasting realist, decisionist, liberal, and constructivist accounts of the nature of state compliance with norms and law found in International Relations and legal scholarship, the dissertation theoretically explains this outcome and with it, law’s ability to moderate national security practice. In so doing, I propose an original reading of law as a permissive constraint, which challenges us to rethink paradigmatic assumptions in a way that accommodates both strategic and normative factors and recognizes the role of practice in giving content to rules.

Given the contradictory reality of a well-developed human rights and humanitarian regime alongside extensive human rights abuses committed in the “Global War on Terror,” the dissertation asks how and why law has shaped contemporary security policy. Focusing on the American case over time, I examine this problem empirically by tracing the changing impact of both international and domestic legal and normative constraints on torture and interrogation, detention and trial, and surveillance practices, culminating in post-9/11 counterterrorism doctrine. I find that policy makers have increasingly violated rules with the adoption of controversial security and intelligence policies, but have simultaneously employed legalistic arguments to evade responsibility for human rights abuses. Using contrasting realist, decisionist, liberal, and constructivist accounts of the nature of state compliance with norms and law found in International Relations and legal scholarship, the dissertation theoretically explains this outcome and with it, law’s ability to moderate national security practice. In so doing, I propose an original reading of law as a permissive constraint, which challenges us to rethink paradigmatic assumptions in a way that accommodates both strategic and normative factors and recognizes the role of practice in giving content to rules.