Esta tese propõe a investigação sobre as origens doutrinárias da função social dos contratos e, a partir delas, apresenta os instrumentos para a interpretação da cláusula geral do art. 421 do Código Civil. A tese encontra na doutrina italiana e no pensamento de Miguel Reale a base doutrinária da clláusula geral. A principal proposição dessa incursão é de que o juiz, ao aplicar a cláusula geral, deve usar os parâmetros doutrinários construídos pela tradição. A tradição e os dispositivos constitucionais que disciplinam a liberdade de contratar são os principais instrumentos para o controle das decisões judiciais, o que é indispensável que se preserve as regras do regime constritucional democrático e princípio da dignidade da pessoa. / The thesis proposes to survey the doctrinary origins of the social function of contracts and, from them, to present the instruments to interpret the general clause contained on the Civil Code’s article 421. The thesis sets the general clause doctrinary base on the Italian doctrine and also on Miguel Reale’s thought. The approach’s main proposition is that the judge, on applying the general clause, must use the doctrinary parameters built by tradition. Tradition and constitutional prescriptions that discipline the freedom to establish a contract are the main instruments to carry out the control of judicial decisions, what is fundamental to preserve the rules of the democratic constitutional regime and the person’s dignity principle.

Esta tese propõe a investigação sobre as origens doutrinárias da função social dos contratos e, a partir delas, apresenta os instrumentos para a interpretação da cláusula geral do art. 421 do Código Civil. A tese encontra na doutrina italiana e no pensamento de Miguel Reale a base doutrinária da clláusula geral. A principal proposição dessa incursão é de que o juiz, ao aplicar a cláusula geral, deve usar os parâmetros doutrinários construídos pela tradição. A tradição e os dispositivos constitucionais que disciplinam a liberdade de contratar são os principais instrumentos para o controle das decisões judiciais, o que é indispensável que se preserve as regras do regime constritucional democrático e princípio da dignidade da pessoa. / The thesis proposes to survey the doctrinary origins of the social function of contracts and, from them, to present the instruments to interpret the general clause contained on the Civil Code’s article 421. The thesis sets the general clause doctrinary base on the Italian doctrine and also on Miguel Reale’s thought. The approach’s main proposition is that the judge, on applying the general clause, must use the doctrinary parameters built by tradition. Tradition and constitutional prescriptions that discipline the freedom to establish a contract are the main instruments to carry out the control of judicial decisions, what is fundamental to preserve the rules of the democratic constitutional regime and the person’s dignity principle.

Esta tese propõe a investigação sobre as origens doutrinárias da função social dos contratos e, a partir delas, apresenta os instrumentos para a interpretação da cláusula geral do art. 421 do Código Civil. A tese encontra na doutrina italiana e no pensamento de Miguel Reale a base doutrinária da clláusula geral. A principal proposição dessa incursão é de que o juiz, ao aplicar a cláusula geral, deve usar os parâmetros doutrinários construídos pela tradição. A tradição e os dispositivos constitucionais que disciplinam a liberdade de contratar são os principais instrumentos para o controle das decisões judiciais, o que é indispensável que se preserve as regras do regime constritucional democrático e princípio da dignidade da pessoa. / The thesis proposes to survey the doctrinary origins of the social function of contracts and, from them, to present the instruments to interpret the general clause contained on the Civil Code’s article 421. The thesis sets the general clause doctrinary base on the Italian doctrine and also on Miguel Reale’s thought. The approach’s main proposition is that the judge, on applying the general clause, must use the doctrinary parameters built by tradition. Tradition and constitutional prescriptions that discipline the freedom to establish a contract are the main instruments to carry out the control of judicial decisions, what is fundamental to preserve the rules of the democratic constitutional regime and the person’s dignity principle.

1 Abstract The objective of this thesis is to analyse the liability in civil law, mainly from the prospective of individual preconditions that together result in such liability for inflicted harm. The text is divided into nine parts including introduction and conclusion. The first part comprises the analysis of the legal term of liability from the prospective of existing theoretical concepts, then the approach as set forth under Act no. 89/2012 Sb, Civil Code, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "Civil Code") and the author's own approach is presented at the end of this part. The next part discusses in details the preconditions of liability for harm and then the sets of preconditions that together result in such liability are analysed. The author calls these sets as liability systems, as they are actually a variant of the objective and subjective liability. A separate chapter is dedicated to the objective liability. A separate chapter is also dedicated to the division of types of liabilities such as for defects, harm, default, etc., as this is crucial for the discussed topic. Next parts focus on individual preconditions for liability for harm, namely on violating legal obligations and relevant damage, harm, causality and fault as on the precondition typical for subjective liability, i.e. liability for...

La rencontre entre les contrats et les droits fondamentaux est au centre de très nombreux débats juridiques contemporains : qu’il s’agisse notamment de la place du fait religieux dans la société, de la marchandisation du corps humain, ou encore du respect de la dignité de la personne. Cette rencontre stimule la réflexion de nombreux juristes, le sens de l’étude est de contribuer modestement à celle-ci dans la perspective d’une comparaison entre les droits français et québécois.On peut alors observer que l’exigence de respect des droits fondamentaux dans les contrats progresse dans les deux systèmes. En premier lieu, parce que nos droits font une place de plus en plus grande aux instruments de protection des droits fondamentaux, leur autorité s’impose en matière contractuelle. Ensuite, il faut remarquer que l’autorité des droits fondamentaux n’épuise pas leurs effets dans ce domaine. Ils rayonnent dans les contrats, car de relecture en réécriture les droits français et québécois des contrats sont de plus en plus imprégnés par l’exigence de respect des droits fondamentaux. Toutefois, en France et au Québec, à cette progression répond la nécessité de permettre l’inscription sociale des droits fondamentaux. On voit alors que le pouvoir sur les droits fondamentaux dans les contrats s’affirme, et que de contrat médical en contrat de travail, il devient incontournable pour permettre leur exercice. Toutefois, la dangerosité inhérente du pouvoir sur les droits fondamentaux justifie une réflexion sur les limites qui peuvent lui être assigné, à la fois en considération du respect de la dignité de la personne, mais également en considération de sa légitimité / The meeting of contract law with fundamental rights is at the center of numerous contemporary legal debates, notably with regard to the place of the religious in society, the commodification of the body, or respect for human dignity. This encounter has prodded a reflection from numerous jurists. The aim of this study is to bring a modest contribution to the discussion, through a comparison of French and Québec law. The exigencies of respect for fundamental rights is evolving in the two legal systems. Because fundamental rights instruments play a larger role in our laws, their authority in contractual matters is becoming ineludible. Indeed, it should be noted that fundamental rights have not reached their full extent in this field. They emerge within contracts, because from revisiting to re-writing, Québec and French contract law are increasingly influenced by the obligation to comply with fundamental rights.However, this evolution in France and in Quebec is accompanied by a requirement that fundamental rights be allowed social admission. From that point on, we can see power over fundamental rights being asserted within contacts, that power evolving from medical contracts to work contracts towards becoming inescapable for their enforcement. Yet, the danger inherent in such power over fundamental rights calls for serious deliberations on the limits that must be set upon it, both with regard to the dignity of the human person, and in relation to its legitimacy

Le droit de retour légal est celui en vertu duquel une personne succède à des biens qui avaient été remis gratuitement au défunt décédé sans postérité. Il s’agit d’une institution ancienne dont le fondement premier était traditionnellement la conservation des biens dans la famille. Apparu en droit romain, appliqué dans l’ancien droit français, le retour légal fut inséré in extremis dans le Code Napoléon, à côté du droit de retour de nature conventionnelle qu’il est loisible aux parties de stipuler. Des trois cas de retour prévus en 1804, deux furent supprimés par la loi du 3 janvier 1972. Il fallut attendre la loi du 3 décembre 2001 pour qu’à l’article 757-3 un nouveau droit de retour légal soit instauré au bénéfice des frères et soeurs qui, du fait de la réforme, se trouvaient primés par le conjoint dans la dévolution ab intestat. Puis la loi du 23 juin 2006 instaura à son tour à l’article 738-2 un droit de retour légal au profit des père et mère qui venaient de perdre leur qualité d’héritier réservataire. Dans ces deux cas, on observe que l’instauration du droit de retour légal constitue une contrepartie, pour les uns de leur exclusion de la dévolution par le conjoint, pour les autres de la perte du bénéfice de la réserve : fonction originale pour un droit de retour légal. Si les fondements des textes nouveaux ne sont pas évidents à mettre en lumière, leurs régimes novateurs soulèvent également de nombreuses difficultés d’applications et d’interprétations. Naguère, le retour légal organisait la dévolution successorale d’un bien en fonction de son origine dont il résultait une dualité de succession. Aujourd’hui, le retour légal n’organise plus que la dévolution successorale d’une portion de bien en tenant compte de son origine et l’on doute qu’il constitue dans tous les cas une succession anomale impliquant une dualité de succession. Ces incertitudes engagent à se demander s’il est possible de déroger au retour légal et comment. Au-delà de la dérogation conventionnelle, la modification et même l’abrogation des textes doivent être envisagées. / The statutory reversion right is the right under which a person inherits assets which were returned free of charge to the deceased who died leaving no descendants. It is an old institution which primary basis is, traditionally, the preservation of assets in the family. Established in Roman law, applied in old French law, statutory reversion was inserted in extremis in the Napoleonic code (the French civil code) next to the conventional reversion right which can be stipulated by the two parties within the framework of a transfer contract inter vivos. Out of the three cases provided in 1804, two were removed by the law of January 3, 1972. But it was not until December 3, 2001 that was established, in article 757-3 of the Civil Code, a new statutory reversion right in favour of the brothers and sisters, who, as a consequence of the reform, were superseded by the spouse in the transfer under intestate succession. Then the law of June 23, 2006 established, in turn, in article 738-2 of the Civil Code, a statutory reversion right in favour of the father and mother who had just lost their qualification of rightful heirs. In both cases, we can notice that the establishment of the statutory reversion right constitutes a counterpart, on one hand according to the exclusion for transfer by the spouse, on the other hand, the loss of the benefit of reservation: a particular role for the statutory reversion right. If the bases of the new texts are not easily highlighted, their innovative schemes also raise numerous difficulties of application and interpretation. Formerly, statutory reversion established transmission of property by inheritance according to its origin from which a duality in terms of inheritance resulted. Nowadays, statutory reversion only establishes transmission of property by inheritance of a portion of goods, taking into account its origin, and this raises some doubt as to whether it shall constitute, in all cases, an anomalous succession implying duality in terms of inheritance. This results in uncertainties which lead to wonder if it is possible to derogate from the statutory reversion and how this could be done. Beyond variation by agreement, the modification and even the repeal of texts must be considered.

Civil Law is still one of the most important areas of the legal field. Its consideration as the Common Law is still dormant.In this sense, Professor Fernando Vidal Ramirez talks about the birth, evolution and importance of Civil Law in the society, explaining the role played by civil codification. Finally, he talks about his experience as a member of the Reformer Commission of the 1936 Civil Code, which allowed the provision of the still in force Peruvian Civil Code of 1984. / El Derecho Civil continúa siendo una de las áreas más importantes del ámbito jurídico. Su consideración como el Derecho Común sigueaún latente.En ese sentido, el profesor Fernando Vidal Ra- mírez habla sobre el nacimiento, evolución e importancia del Derecho Civil en la sociedad, explicando el rol que cumple la codificación civil. Finalmente, cuenta su experiencia como miembro de la Comisión Reformadora del Código Civil de 1936, la cual permitió la dación del todavía vigente Código Civil de 1984.

The reform of the text and the enactment of a new Civil Code both require a long and careful process; the work of a Reformer Commission should focus on   identifying areas for improvement in the text and propose solutions to the problems that may have occurred in theimplementation of the revised text.In this interview, Jorge Avendaño talks about his experience working in the Reformer Commissions of 1936 and 1984’s Civil Codes, the second of which he personally presided. He also refers to the proposals he made to the Book of Rights in Rem and the feasibility of its implementation. / La reforma del texto y promulgación de unnuevo Código Civil requiere de un proceso largo y cuidadoso; el trabajo de una Comisión Reformadora debe centrarse en identificar losaspectos a mejorar en el texto y plantear soluciones a los problemas que pudieran haberocurrido en la aplicación del texto reformado.En esta entrevista, el Dr. Jorge Avendaño cuenta su experiencia de trabajo en las Comisiones Reformadoras de los Códigos Civiles de 1936 y 1984, la segunda de las cuales llegó a presidir. Además, hace referencia a las propuestas que realizó al Libro de Reales y la viabilidad de suaplicación.

La conception de l'ordre public développée par les rédacteurs du Code civil a permis son essor au XIXème siècle. Au confluent du droit et de la morale, ainsi que du droit public et du droit privé, l'ordre public n'était envisagé par la doctrine du début du siècle qu'au travers de son caractère concret. Dès lors qu'elle parvint à se détacher de la tradition, elle rechercha à délimiter plus précisément la notion. / The conception of public order developed by the authors of the civil code allowed its expansion in XIXth century. Among law and moral, between public law and private law, public order was considered by the doctrine of the early century only trough its concreteness. Since it managed to detach the tradition, it sought to define more precisely the notion.

Filip Sobotka Mortgage law Abstract The aim of this thesis is the reflection of the mortgage law with the accent to current legal basis in the Czech Republic. The thesis is composed of two basic chapters, each of them dealing with different aspects of mortgage law. Firstly, the paper contains introductory. Chapter One focuses on historical development, both czech law and roman law. Chapter Two deals with the mortgage law in general. The chapter is subdivided into eight parts. Part one and part two deal with general description of the mortgage and explain function and principles which creates the fundamentals of the mortgage. Part three investigates the immovable property and its legal specification. Part four carries out the analysis of the formation procedure of the mortgage. Part five and part six deal with rights and commitments of the both contractual parties. And finally part seven and eight analyze the constituent point of view of the mortgage termination. Conclusions and recommendations are drawn in final chapter, but also through the whole paper.