Šiame darbe analizuojamos optinės judesio iliuzijos galimybės ir formos, vykstant dinamiškai žiūrovo ir kūrinio sąveikai. Vienas iš būdų judesio iliuzijai suformuoti – optinės iliuzijos kuriamas realiai neegzistuojantis vaizdas, atsirandantis dėl mūsų regos ir suvokimo specifikos. Judesio iliuzija naudojam optiniame bei kinetiniame mene, animacijoje. Analizuojamas Muaro efektas, tarnaujantis priemone žiūrovo ir meno kūrinio sąveikai skatinti. Aptariami kūriniai, kurių meninei idėjai atskleisti kūrinio ir žiūrovo kontakto metu vienas iš jų turi būti judėjimo būsenoje. Gvildenamas ekonomiškumo animacijoje klausimas: analizuojami pavyzdžiai kuomet judesio iliuzija kuriama minimaliomis priemonėmis, išnaudojant žmogaus aplinkos suvokimo galimybes. Analizuojant Analizuojant optinę iliuziją naudojusių kūrėjų darbus darytina išvada, kad ji, dinamiškoje sąveikoje veikdama pojūčius ir sąmonę, kūriniui suteikia įtaigumo o kūrėjui papildomų galimybių manipuliuoti žiūrovu. Kūrybinė dalis - muaro animacijos principu sukurta instaliacija „Motus Animus“. Jos idėjinis-meninis pagrindas – minčių, idėjų, stereotipų kopijavimas, dalijimasis bei plagijavimas vartotojiškoje industrinėje visuomenėje. / This paper concentrates on analyzing the potential and forms of optical illusion in relation to dynamic interaction between the art work and the viewer. Illusion of motion is an image that is created by optical illusion that does not exist in reality, but is registered in the mind because of our visual and cognitive specifications. Optical illusion of motion is used in optical and kinetic art and animation. This paper analyzes Moire effect that is a measure to encourage interaction between a creation and a viewer. This paper discusses art works that in order to reveal their artistic idea, the art work or viewer must move. Also this paper disputes the economy in animation: the cases are analyzed, when optical illusion of motion is achieved by using minimal means and exhausting the possibilities of man’s cognition. The analysis of the works of arts’ of artists that used optical illusion, the conclusion is made that optical illusion in dynamic interaction affects senses and consciousness and therefore delivers suggestibility to the work of art and more possibilities to manipulate the viewer to the artist. The creative project of thesis is an installation “Motus Animus” created by using Moire animation. The ideological and artistic background constitutes of copying, sharing and plagiarizing thoughts, ideas and stereotypes in consumption industrial society.

This study is an inquiry into the architectural aspects of stage space, which is believed to be the materialization of visual relationships, with the claim that it is also the best illustration of the proposition that architectural discourse is affected by the changes in visual culture. The study is based on the assumption that changes in the conceptualization of architectural space have also been influenced from the shifts in the field of vision, which are the consequences of the changes in the social, political and economical circumstances as well as the developments in science and technology. Within the acknowledgement of three major shifts in the field of vision that have been identified by Jonathan Crary, the study focuses on a reading and assessment of twentieth century developments that differ from the traditional conception of space and ways of spatial representation. Being a key to reconsider architectural space production, the outcomes of these developments are read through the construction of stage and performance spaces. Stage space possesses knowledge about the making of architecture. This study is an attempt to demonstrate how stage space is in relation to or anticipates changes in conception of architecture. Because of its instant nature and flexibility, stage space can be seen as a tool for making experiments for possible changes in the conception of architectural space.

The general aim of this thesis was to investigate affective forecasting in the context of public transport. Paper I, Study 1 revealed that non-users of public transport were less satisfied with the services than users. It was hypothesised that non-users were biased in their satisfaction ratings, a claim that was subsequently investigated in Paper I, Study 2, where a field experiment revealed that car users suffer from an impact bias, due to being more satisfied with the services after a trial period than they predicted they would be. To address the question of whether a focusing illusion is the psychological mechanism responsible for this bias, two experiments containing critical incidents were conducted in Paper II. These experiments investigated whether car users exaggerate the impact that specific incidents have on their future satisfaction with public transport. A negative critical incident generated lower predicted satisfaction with public transport, both for car users with a stated intention to change their current travel mode (in Paper II, Study 1) and for car users with no stated intention to change their travel mode (in Paper II, Study 2), which support the hypothesis that the impact bias in car users’ predictions about future satisfaction with public transport is caused by a focusing illusion. Paper III showed that car users misremember their satisfaction with public transport as a result of their recollections of satisfaction with public transport being lower than their on-line experienced satisfaction. Additionally, the desire to repeat the public transport experience is explained only by remembered satisfaction, not by on-line experienced satisfaction. Paper IV investigated whether a defocusing technique would counteract the focusing illusion by introducing a broader context, thereby generating higher predicted satisfaction. A generic defocusing technique, conducted in Paper IV, Study 1, did not generate higher predicted satisfaction, whereas a self-relevant defocusing technique conducted in Paper IV, Study 2 generated higher predicted satisfaction with public transport. Additionally, it was found that car-use habit accounts for the level of predicted satisfaction regardless of defocusing; the stronger the car-use habit, the lower the predicted satisfaction. The conclusions from this thesis are that non-users of public transport rate the services lower than users do, and that car users become more satisfied when using the services than they predicted. These mispredictions are a result of over-focusing on a limited range of aspects in public transport (i.e., a focusing illusion). Car users’ desire to repeat the public transport experience is influenced by their inaccurate memories of the services and not by their actual experiences. However, defocusing techniques may help car users make more accurate predictions about future satisfaction with public transport; this could facilitate a mode switch from using the car to using public transport services more often. Switching to a more sustainable transport mode could be beneficial for the individual and for society.

The spatial frequency doubling illusion (FDI) occurs when the contrast of a low spatial frequency sinusoidal grating is modulated at high temporal frequencies – its apparent spatial frequency increases. Earlier suggestions were that the FDI is generated by a specific class of retinal ganglion cells, which are preferentially lost in the early stages of glaucoma. Based on this linking theory, frequency doubling perimetry (FDP) was developed and several clinical reports confirmed its high efficiency in diagnosing early glaucomatous vision loss. However, this linking theory is not universally accepted and newer suggestions posit that the illusion arises because of temporal frequency related difficulties in temporal phase encoding ability. This thesis psychophysically examines the spatiotemporal characteristics of both the FDI and temporal phase encoding ability with achromatic and equi-luminant (both red-green (RG) and blue-yellow (BY)) gratings at a range of spatiotemporal parameters including those eliciting the FDI. (For complete abstract open document)

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Litt. française--Grenoble, 1992. Titre de soutenance : Images du langage dans le roman à l'âge classique : le leurre et la fable, la poétique négative du roman des Lumières (1670-1730). / Bibliogr. p. 441-453. Index.

Embodiment is the experience of one's own body. It is often studied using the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI). This illusion varies the consistency between visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals to elicit a change to embodiment. Changes to embodiment are typically measured using a single sensory outcome measure of proprioceptive drift, which is interpreted as a proxy measure of embodiment. This approach obscures the unique contribution of other modalities such as vision and touch. The work presented in this thesis uses a mixed method approach to investigate the unique contribution of visual, tactile and proprioceptive modalities within the multisensory process of embodiment. In study one, a qualitative analysis showed that when visual-tactile discrepancies were present in the RHI, participants described both body ownership and body extension type changes to embodiment, and changes to tactile perception. In study two, psychophysical measurements of the RHI showed changes to visual, tactile and proprioceptive aspects of embodiment, suggesting that embodiment in the RHI could be measured using multiple sensory outcomes. Studies three and four assessed the utility of measuring multiple sensory outcomes of the RHI, by exploring changes to embodiment following internal and external forms of body perception training. Study three showed that brief body scan meditation, as a form of internal body perception training, reduced the longevity of the visual sensory outcome of the RHI and that this reduction was negatively correlated with improvements in interoceptive sensitivity. Study four showed that learning about the body through anatomical dissection training, as a form of external body perception training, reduced the longevity of the visual sensory outcome measure and decreased interoceptive sensitivity, but only in medical students who were high in trait personal distress. Collectively, these findings suggest that aspects of the multisensory processes of embodiment can become specialised and identify some unique contributions of individual sensory modalities to embodiment. The proprioceptive sensory outcome appears to be stable over time but the visual sensory outcome is a longer-term change to embodiment, which is susceptible to interference from body perception training. In study five, confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the psychometric properties of an embodiment change questionnaire measuring body ownership, body extension and perceived causality in the RHI. Factor scores from the questionnaire were correlated with visual and proprioceptive outcome measures of the RHI and measures of trait empathy. The results suggested factor scores had better convergent validity than the standard illusion score used in previous research. This work has improved subjective and perceptual measures of the RHI and specified ways that individual sensory modalities provide a unique contribution to embodiment. The methods developed have further applications for studying the multisensory process of embodiment and investigating embodiment in a number of clinical groups.

abstract: I present in this dissertation a theory of moral disillusion. In chapter 1 I explain moral innocence and its loss. I show that becoming morally responsible requires shattering the illusion that one is not an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. The morally responsible individual must understand that she can be an agent of wrongdoing. In chapter 2 I explore the nature of the understanding that accompanies the different phases of disillusion. I show that moral disillusion is an ability, not to follow moral principles, but to question them. In chapter 3 I argue that another phase of disillusion involves an acquaintance with evil. One shatters the illusion that only malicious individuals can be evildoers. Morally good people can also bring about evil. I conclude that evil is the exploitation of the extremely vulnerable. In chapters 4 and 5, I analyze more complex phases of moral disillusion. These stages are characterized by an understanding that one can be an agent of unchosen evil, that one might bring about evil even when pursuing the morally best course of action, and that one can be morally responsible for doing so. In order to understand unchosen evil and the tragedy of inescapable moral wrongdoing, the individual sees that moral responsibility ought to track what we care about, rather than what we believe. In chapter 6 I show that Kierkegaard's conception of the self is a philosophy of moral disillusion. I argue that his prescription that we shatter moral illusions is congruent with Harry Frankfurt's prescription that we ought to care about some things and not others. From this discussion emerges the explicit distinction between moral disillusion and moral goodness. Moreover, I conclude that the morally disillusioned are morally accountable for more than those still harboring moral illusions. Although moral disillusion does not entail becoming morally good, by acquiring the ability to raise questions about moral principles and to affect the content of one's cares, one acquires the ability to take responsibility for, and potentially minimize, evil. To have and understand these abilities, but not to care about them, increases one's moral accountability. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2012

xiii, 109 p. : ill. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Numeric information is often presented to consumers in order to communicate important and precise information that is not well communicated through non-numeric information. The assumption of marketers, then, seems to be that numeric information is useful for consumers in evaluating products. Do consumers understand and use such numerical information in product claims? Recent research suggests that many people are "innumerate" and about half of Americans lack the minimal mathematical skills needed to use numbers embedded in printed materials. This suggests that many Americans lack the minimal mathematical skills needed to use numbers embedded in product claims and other marketing communications. In a series of five experiments, I investigated if and how consumers understand and use numeric information presented in product claims in their evaluation of consumer goods. The results demonstrated that participants, and especially less numerate individuals, were susceptible to an Illusion-of-Numeric-Truth effect: they judged false claim as true when numeric meaning was inaccurately translated (e.g., "30% of consumers" inaccurately translated to " most consumers"). Mediation analysis suggested that highly numerate participants were better at developing affective reactions toward numeric information in product claims and using these affective reactions as information when they were faced with truth judgments. Highly numerate individuals were also more sensitive to different levels of numeric information in their product evaluations. This sensitivity also seemed to depend on their drawing affective meaning from numbers and number comparisons and using this information in product evaluations. Although less numerate individuals reported that numeric information is important, they were less sensitive to numeric information unless they were encouraged to process numeric information more systematically. The results from this dissertation indicate that not all numeric information will be used and be useful to all consumers. Therefore, simply presenting numeric information may not be sufficient for numeric information to be useful for all consumers. / Committee in charge: Peter Wright, Chairperson, Marketing; Lynn Kahle, Member, Marketing; Ellen Peters, Member, Not from U of O; Robert Madrigal, Member, Marketing; Paul Slovic, Outside Member, Psychology

BENEVIDES, Pablo Severiano. A dissolução das ilusões transcendentais na "Crítica da Razão Pura": um estudo sobre as relações entre a estética, analítica e a dialética transcendentais. 2007. 177f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2007. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T16:37:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2007-DIS-PSBENEVIDES.pdf: 1066342 bytes, checksum: 20d3aa7707f5f9d85cfb1e83e17d95f2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T18:20:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2007-DIS-PSBENEVIDES.pdf: 1066342 bytes, checksum: 20d3aa7707f5f9d85cfb1e83e17d95f2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-05T18:20:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2007-DIS-PSBENEVIDES.pdf: 1066342 bytes, checksum: 20d3aa7707f5f9d85cfb1e83e17d95f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / This study is not meant to be merely expository. Therefore, the aim is that some questions of capital importance for the understanding of Kant’s Theoretic Philosophy not only be raised but also resolved, based on this study. The initial starting point consists of raising the following question: “Will sensitive intuition exercise the role of supreme judge in the dissolution of transcendental illusions”? According to the most reoccurring interpretation of the “Critique of Pure Reason,” the answer to the aforementioned question will be affirmative, as seems to be the case in the interpretations of Cohen, Strawson, as well as a series of others to be identified. Such a concept (according to what will be revealed in the study), will advocate, in the end, that all the questions of traditional Metaphysics (pre-Kant) are denounced by Kant as illegitimate, precisely because they can not be presented in sensitive intuition, an object which corresponds to the ideas which it, itself has constructed. Hence, Kant would have done nothing more than outline a theory of the possibility of experience (Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic) and restrict all human knowledge to this domain, in a way which assumes that metaphysical questions are illegitimate, as they are not subject to the original epistemic demands, therein outlined. This study assumes that the understanding of this problem, mentioned above, is insufficient, in that it has neglected the fact that there is, in the “Critique of Pure Reason,” not only a dogmatic announcement of, but also a justification of the thesis that all human knowledge is restricted to the sphere of sensibility (grounds of the possibility of experience). This justification is none other than the critique of transcendental illusions made by Transcendental Dialectic. Through the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, the Antinomies of Pure Reason and the Ideal of Pure Reason, the syllogism realized naturally by reason, will be revealed as the foundation for raising an incoherency regarding the non-assumption of the initial proposals of reason, rather than an inadequacy of the demands of sensibility. Such incoherencies are the transcendental illusions of the existence of the soul, the world (the totality of phenomenon) and of God – the respective objects of psychology, cosmology and Rational Theology. We will attempt to show, in this study, that the illusion of affirming the existence of these objects, in light of the syllogisms a priori, consists firstly, in an inadequacy with the initial proposals of pure reason (even if later this becomes an illusionary configuration of such existences) and only as a consequence of it; and also with the express demands of Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. Hence, this requires a Critique of Rational Psychology, a Critique of Rational Cosmology and a Critique of Rational Theology for the realization of the task in this study. In this way we will justify the thesis that all knowledge is reduced to the sphere of sensibility and will thus clarity why this illusion is considered by Kant to be transcendental, rational and inevitable. This clarification is what the aforementioned “reoccurring interpretation” fails to do. / Este não pretende ser um trabalho meramente expositivo. Portanto, deseja-se que, a partir dele, algumas questões de importância capital para a compreensão da Filosofia Teórica de Kant sejam não somente erigidas, mas principalmente solucionadas. O ponto de partida inicial consiste no levantamento da seguinte indagação: “Exerceriam as intuições sensíveis o papel de juiz supremo na dissolução das ilusões transcendentais?”. Segundo a interpretação mais recorrente da “Crítica da Razão Pura” – como parece ser o caso das leituras de Cohen, Strawson, bem como de uma série de outras a serem identificadas – a resposta à questão anterior seria afirmativa. Tal concepção (conforme revelará este estudo) advogará que, em última instância, todas as questões da Metafísica tradicional (pré-kantiana) são denunciadas por Kant como ilegítimas precisamente porque não pode ser apresentado, na intuição sensível, um objeto que seja correspondente às idéias por ela construídas. Portanto, Kant não teria feito nada mais do que esboçar uma teoria da possibilidade da experiência (a Estética e a Analítica Transcendentais) e restringir todo o conhecimento humano a este domínio, de modo a postular que as questões metafísicas são ilegítimas por não se submeterem às exigências epistêmicas originais aí esboçadas. Este trabalho entende que a compreensão acima referida desta problemática é insuficiente, haja vista negligenciar o fato de que há, na “Crítica da Razão Pura”, não somente uma anunciação dogmática, mas uma justificação da tese de que todo o conhecimento humano é restrito à esfera da sensibilidade (solo da experiência possível). Esta justificação não é outra se não a crítica das ilusões transcendentais realizada pela Dialética Transcendental. Por meio dos Paralogismos da Razão Pura, das Antinomias da Razão Pura e do Ideal da Razão Pura, os silogismos realizados naturalmente pela razão serão revelados como as balizas para erigirem uma incoerência que diz respeito antes à não assunção dos propósitos iniciais da razão do que a uma inadequação às exigências da sensibilidade. Tais incoerências são as ilusões transcendentais da existência da alma, do mundo (totalidade dos fenômenos) e de Deus – os respectivos objetos da Psicologia, Cosmologia e Teologia Racionais. Tentaremos mostrar, por ocasião deste trabalho, que a ilusão de afirmar, mediante silogismos a priori, a existência destes objetos consiste primeiramente numa inadequação com os propósitos iniciais da razão pura (mesmo que esta venha a, posteriormente, configurar ilusoriamente tais existências) e, somente por conseqüência disto, também com as exigências expressas na Estética e na Analítica Transcendentais. Isto exige do empreendimento a ser realizado neste estudo, portanto, uma Crítica da Psicologia Racional, uma Crítica da Cosmologia Racional e uma Crítica da Teologia Racional. Deste modo, justificaríamos a tese de que todo conhecimento está reduzido à esfera da sensibilidade e esclareceríamos, assim, o porquê dessa ilusão ser considerada, por Kant, como transcendental, racional e, portanto, inevitável – esclarecimento este que a referida “interpretação recorrente” se abstém de realizar.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2055.pdf: 624273 bytes, checksum: e0adf063e039cd24fde9193455451d3a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-08-13 / The purpose of this work is to examine the problem of error and transcendental illusion in Kant s Critique of Pure Reason as two correlate, but sharply distinct aspects of his critique on dogmatic metaphysics. Following Kant s indications, we analyze his paradoxical doctrine that error is avoidable even if its positive source, transcendental illusion, is considered natural and inherent to human reason. Accordingly, we first analyze the status of error as a property of judgments in general Kant s thesis is that error can be explained in terms of a double influence that, if unnoticed, deviates the judgment from truth: imagination and sensibility. Under each of these influences, the human understanding helds merely subjective for objective principles of knowledge, thereby attaining error instead of true cognition. Secondly, applying this general analysis of error to one specific case, we focus our analyze on the issue of transcendental illusion involved in the transcendental idea of God In this particular case, we try to show how the legitimate demand of reason for a complete explanation (underlying the concept of God as an ens realissimum) allows room for a dialectic illusion, which holds that this concept of reason for a necessarily real and existing being. Finally, we try to point out the positive contribution to metaphysics which arises from Kant s distinction between judgmental error and transcendental illusion. / O propósito deste trabalho é examinar o problema do erro e da ilusão transcendental na Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant. Seguiremos as indicações do próprio Kant, que faz uma clara distinção entre erro e ilusão e o caráter próprio de cada um, em que o primeiro é corrigível enquanto o segundo é inevitável. Analisaremos em um primeiro momento o estatuto do erro, isto é, as fontes positivas do erro, em que o entendimento é desviado de seu reto agir por uma dupla influência despercebida: da imaginação e da sensibilidade. Tais influências conduzem o entendimento a confundir os princípios subjetivos e objetivos do conhecimento, ou seja, a tomar os primeiros como se fossem capazes de por si produzir conhecimento objetivo. No segundo momento analisamos a questão da ilusão transcendental, através da idéia de Deus, mostrando como se dá a passagem de uma busca natural da razão, a da totalidade de todo conhecimento (o incondicionado) para uma ilusão dialética: a certeza de que conhece o ens realissimum (Deus) como ser necessariamente real e existente. Por fim, tentamos demonstrar que contribuições à metafísica pode trazer essa discussão entre erro corrigível e ilusão inevitável, uma vez que a ilusão não configura nenhum erro, mas pode conduzir a ele.