Lo studio si propone di esaminare la valutazione della prova scientifica periziale a partire da elementi del diritto comparato, proponendo la tesi secondo la quale il magistrato può avere vincoli diversi con il risultato dell'attività periziale a seconda dei requisiti di questo mezzo probatorio scelti tra quelli disponibili e che sono sotto il controllo del giudice, nonché del tema discusso nel processo (standard de valutazione probatorio applicabile). Vengono utilizzati in questo studio i precedenti e la legislazione straniera, sempre con il dovuto contrappunto nella legislazione brasiliana, quando possibile. Il punto di partenza è l'esame del diritto fondamentale a un giusto processo e il conseguente diritto fondamentale alla prova, distinguendolo da altri diritti fondamentali (il contraddittorio e l’ampia difesa), addensandolo e mostrando le diverse implicazioni legate al suo riconoscimento, tra le quali, il diritto a un'adeguata valutazione delle prove. In seguito si affrontano questioni fondamentali legate al tema della prova, come il concetto di verità e la ricostruzione dei fatti nel processo, costruendosi un’eventuale scienza giuridica della prova a partire da presupposti epistemologici, soprattutto dal Foundherentism. Una volta stabilite le premesse giuridiche ed epistemologiche di questo lavoro, si procede all’esame della prova periziale propriamente detta, caratterizzata nell’ambito del sistema di valutazione vincolata della prova, nel tutto diverso dalla prova legale. Si esamina, quindi, il metodo scientifico e la sua difficoltà di demarcazione, puntando sulla necessità di distinzione tra la ‘buona' e la 'cattiva' scienza (scienza spazzatura). Alla fine, viene proposto, a partire da precedenti paradigmatici, dei criteri atti a determinare il ruolo del giudice nella produzione della prova tecnica e nella sua corretta valutazione, attività ad essere mediata dalle massime di esperienza e dai criteri della prova applicabili al caso, senza dimenticare alcuni diritti processuali fondamentali da prendere in considerazione insieme al diritto fondamentale alla prova. / O estudo tem por objetivo o exame do direito à adequada valoração da prova científico-pericial a partir de elementos do direito comparado, propondo a tese de que o magistrado possui diferentes graus de vinculação ao resultado da atividade pericial conforme uma série de requisitos deste meio probatório que estão sob o seu controle, também dependendo do tema debatido no processo (modelo de constatação aplicável). Permeia o estudo a utilização de precedentes e legislação estrangeira, sempre com o devido contraponto na legislação brasileira, quando possível. O ponto de partida é o exame do direito fundamental ao processo justo e do consequente direito fundamental à prova, distinguindo-o de outros direitos fundamentais (contraditório e ampla defesa), a fim de densificá-lo, delineando diversas implicações de seu reconhecimento, dentre elas, o direito à adequada valoração do material probatório. Em seguida são enfrentados temas fundamentais conectados à prova, como o conceito de verdade e a reconstrução dos fatos no processo, construindo-se uma possível ciência jurídico-probatória a partir de pressupostos epistemológicos, especialmente a partir do Funderentismo. Estabelecidas as premissas jurídicas e epistemológicas do trabalho, passa-se à análise da prova pericial propriamente dita, caracterizando-a no âmbito do sistema de valoração probatória vinculada, em nada similar à prova tarifada. Examina-se, então, o método científico e a sua dificuldade demarcatória, apontando-se a necessária distinção entre ciência ‘boa’ e ciência ‘ruim’ (junk Science). Em derradeiro, propõem-se, a partir de precedentes paradigmáticos, os critérios para determinar o papel do julgador na produção da prova técnica e a valoração adequada pelo juízo, mediando essa atividade pelas máximas de experiência e modelos de constação aplicáveis ao caso, sem olvidar alguns direitos fundamentais processuais que devem ser levados em consideração em conjunto com o direito fundamental à prova. / This study aims to examine the admissibility and the assessment of the scientific expert evidence based on elements of comparative law, proposing that the magistrate has different degrees of attachment to the result of the expert activity according to a series of requirements which they can control, also depending on the topic discussed during the legal process (applicable burden of proof). The use of precedents and foreign legislation also permeate this study, always relating them to Brazilian law whenever possible. The starting point is the examination of the fundamental right to due process and its consequent fundamental right to evidence, differentiating it from other fundamental rights (right to contradiction and broad defense), in order to densify it, outlining the several implications of its recognition, the right to due assessment of evidentiary material particularly. After that, fundamental issues connected to evidence are confronted, such as the concept of truth and the reconstruction of facts in the legal process, leading to a possible legal evidentiary science from epistemological assumptions, especially through Foundherentism. Once the legal and epistemological premises of this paper are established, the analysis of expert evidence itself will be studied by characterizing it in the scope of the bound assessment evidence approach, which is not at all similar to the legal proof. The scientific method is then examined as well as its demarcation difficulty, pointing out the necessary distinction between 'good' science and 'bad' science (Junk Science). At last, from paradigmatic precedents, different criteria is proposed to determine the role of the judge in the production of technical evidence and the subsequent appropriate assessment by the court, mediating this activity through legal maxims and the applicable burden of proof, without forgetting some fundamental procedural rights which should be taken into consideration along with the fundamental right to evidence.

Lo studio si propone di esaminare la valutazione della prova scientifica periziale a partire da elementi del diritto comparato, proponendo la tesi secondo la quale il magistrato può avere vincoli diversi con il risultato dell'attività periziale a seconda dei requisiti di questo mezzo probatorio scelti tra quelli disponibili e che sono sotto il controllo del giudice, nonché del tema discusso nel processo (standard de valutazione probatorio applicabile). Vengono utilizzati in questo studio i precedenti e la legislazione straniera, sempre con il dovuto contrappunto nella legislazione brasiliana, quando possibile. Il punto di partenza è l'esame del diritto fondamentale a un giusto processo e il conseguente diritto fondamentale alla prova, distinguendolo da altri diritti fondamentali (il contraddittorio e l’ampia difesa), addensandolo e mostrando le diverse implicazioni legate al suo riconoscimento, tra le quali, il diritto a un'adeguata valutazione delle prove. In seguito si affrontano questioni fondamentali legate al tema della prova, come il concetto di verità e la ricostruzione dei fatti nel processo, costruendosi un’eventuale scienza giuridica della prova a partire da presupposti epistemologici, soprattutto dal Foundherentism. Una volta stabilite le premesse giuridiche ed epistemologiche di questo lavoro, si procede all’esame della prova periziale propriamente detta, caratterizzata nell’ambito del sistema di valutazione vincolata della prova, nel tutto diverso dalla prova legale. Si esamina, quindi, il metodo scientifico e la sua difficoltà di demarcazione, puntando sulla necessità di distinzione tra la ‘buona' e la 'cattiva' scienza (scienza spazzatura). Alla fine, viene proposto, a partire da precedenti paradigmatici, dei criteri atti a determinare il ruolo del giudice nella produzione della prova tecnica e nella sua corretta valutazione, attività ad essere mediata dalle massime di esperienza e dai criteri della prova applicabili al caso, senza dimenticare alcuni diritti processuali fondamentali da prendere in considerazione insieme al diritto fondamentale alla prova. / O estudo tem por objetivo o exame do direito à adequada valoração da prova científico-pericial a partir de elementos do direito comparado, propondo a tese de que o magistrado possui diferentes graus de vinculação ao resultado da atividade pericial conforme uma série de requisitos deste meio probatório que estão sob o seu controle, também dependendo do tema debatido no processo (modelo de constatação aplicável). Permeia o estudo a utilização de precedentes e legislação estrangeira, sempre com o devido contraponto na legislação brasileira, quando possível. O ponto de partida é o exame do direito fundamental ao processo justo e do consequente direito fundamental à prova, distinguindo-o de outros direitos fundamentais (contraditório e ampla defesa), a fim de densificá-lo, delineando diversas implicações de seu reconhecimento, dentre elas, o direito à adequada valoração do material probatório. Em seguida são enfrentados temas fundamentais conectados à prova, como o conceito de verdade e a reconstrução dos fatos no processo, construindo-se uma possível ciência jurídico-probatória a partir de pressupostos epistemológicos, especialmente a partir do Funderentismo. Estabelecidas as premissas jurídicas e epistemológicas do trabalho, passa-se à análise da prova pericial propriamente dita, caracterizando-a no âmbito do sistema de valoração probatória vinculada, em nada similar à prova tarifada. Examina-se, então, o método científico e a sua dificuldade demarcatória, apontando-se a necessária distinção entre ciência ‘boa’ e ciência ‘ruim’ (junk Science). Em derradeiro, propõem-se, a partir de precedentes paradigmáticos, os critérios para determinar o papel do julgador na produção da prova técnica e a valoração adequada pelo juízo, mediando essa atividade pelas máximas de experiência e modelos de constação aplicáveis ao caso, sem olvidar alguns direitos fundamentais processuais que devem ser levados em consideração em conjunto com o direito fundamental à prova. / This study aims to examine the admissibility and the assessment of the scientific expert evidence based on elements of comparative law, proposing that the magistrate has different degrees of attachment to the result of the expert activity according to a series of requirements which they can control, also depending on the topic discussed during the legal process (applicable burden of proof). The use of precedents and foreign legislation also permeate this study, always relating them to Brazilian law whenever possible. The starting point is the examination of the fundamental right to due process and its consequent fundamental right to evidence, differentiating it from other fundamental rights (right to contradiction and broad defense), in order to densify it, outlining the several implications of its recognition, the right to due assessment of evidentiary material particularly. After that, fundamental issues connected to evidence are confronted, such as the concept of truth and the reconstruction of facts in the legal process, leading to a possible legal evidentiary science from epistemological assumptions, especially through Foundherentism. Once the legal and epistemological premises of this paper are established, the analysis of expert evidence itself will be studied by characterizing it in the scope of the bound assessment evidence approach, which is not at all similar to the legal proof. The scientific method is then examined as well as its demarcation difficulty, pointing out the necessary distinction between 'good' science and 'bad' science (Junk Science). At last, from paradigmatic precedents, different criteria is proposed to determine the role of the judge in the production of technical evidence and the subsequent appropriate assessment by the court, mediating this activity through legal maxims and the applicable burden of proof, without forgetting some fundamental procedural rights which should be taken into consideration along with the fundamental right to evidence.

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The assumption of the present study is that teachers should possess an adequate understanding of the nature of science and scientific method and hence this aspect was investigated. The empirical research carried out with Secondary School teacher trainees at Botswana colleges of education showed the following: Subjects possess an adequate understanding of some aspects of the nature of science and several aspects of the scientific method. They however do not have an adequate understanding on certain aspects of the nature of science. An association was found between the nature of science, type of educational institution attended, years of study and majoring in science. A positive association was found between scientific method and years spent studying. The present study recommended the inclusion of history, philosophy and sociology of science in the curriculum of teacher education. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (with specialisation in Natural Science Education)

In this dissertation, I investigate whether the conceptualisation of computerised technological phenomena is influenced by social variables, in particular exposure to the computer. The conceptualisation and behaviour of a group of students majoring in technology-related fields were studied. Through the application of Conceptual Blending Theory, the multi-modal desktop metaphorical blend (DMMB) (as an electronic representation of an actual office desktop) was focused on. The participants were provided with tasks with the aim of determining whether they conceptualise the electronic desktop as a literal ‘thing-in-itself’ or as an e-version of their actual desks. The intent was to examine to what extent social variables, especially exposure, motivate the nature of the conceptualisation. Therefore, it is hypothesised that exposure, regarded as the primary variable in this study, influences conceptualisation of the DMMB to the extent where the it either loses its metaphoric quality in participants, who maintain regular and prolonged exposure to the computer, or retains the metaphoric quality of the DMMB in participants, who are not exposed to the computer on a regular and prolonged basis. Two groups were distinguished based on the extent of the individual participants’ exposure to computer technology, namely a high-exposure group and a low-exposure group. A mixed method approach was used to test and analyse data collected from individual participants, as well as from the high- and low-exposure groups. Methods used to test these hypotheses included questionnaires, word association (a conceptual task), controlled observation (a behavioural task), and interviews. The resulting data were analysed by means of a thematic interview analysis and non-parametric statistical tests. / Linguistics and Modern Languages / M.A. (Linguistics)

Cette thèse de doctorat étudie la manière dont Aristote, Platon et Isocrate font du recours à la notion d’empeiria et de la promotion d’une certaine conception de l’expérience, le moyen de se défendre contre l’accusation d’inexpérience qui les vise et de polémiquer entre eux sur la question de l’excellence, dans les domaines théorique, technique et pratique. Cet examen permet d’éclairer sous un jour nouveau la question de l’empirisme antique, en considérant, d’une part, la critique que Platon et Aristote adressent à une certaine conception empirico-sophistique des savoirs et de la pratique, en reconsidérant de l’autre, le supposé empirisme d’Aristote. Si la notion d’empirisme n’a pas d’équivalent en grec, Platon fait de la notion d’empeiria, désignant une forme de pratique non-technique ignorant les causes, un instrument polémique permettant de souligner le défaut de technicité des différentes techniques, que les sophistes se font forts de transmettre. En mettant l’accent sur « l’expérience de la vérité », Platon remet en question l’empirisme de ceux qui ignorent la valeur théorique et pratique de la connaissance des réalités intelligibles. Aristote poursuit la réflexion, en reconsidérant le rôle positif, cognitif et pratique, de l’empeiria comme connaissance acquise à partir de la sensation. Aristote poursuit la critique d’un certain empirisme, dont se rendent coupables tous ceux qui échouent à s’élever à la connaissance de l’universel, tout en déplorant le défaut d’empeiria de ceux dont le savoir est purement théorique. Si comme Platon, Aristote n’est pas un empiriste, parce qu’il refuse de faire de la sensation le principe de la connaissance et le critère du vrai, son rationalisme diffère de celui de Platon, par le rôle reconnue à la sensation et l’expérience dans les domaines théorique, technique et pratique. Cette étude entend révéler l’urgence de distinctions en philosophie de la connaissance dans le cadre des études anciennes, comme la distinction entre le rationalisme logique de Platon et le rationalisme empirique d’Aristote, par exemple, permettant de mesurer l’originalité des doctrines antiques sur des problèmes aussi fondamentaux que l’origine et le principe de la connaissance et de l’action bonne. / This dissertation investigates how Aristotle, Plato and Isocrates use the notion of empeiria and promote a certain conception of experience, in order to defend themselves from the charge of inexperience made against them, and also in order to debate about the question of excellence in the theoretical, technical and practical fields. This study sheds some new lights on ancient empiricism, by investigating, on one hand, Plato’s and Aristotle’s criticism against an empiricist sophistic approach of knowledge and action, and, on the other hand, the so-called Aristotelian empiricism. Although the concept of ‘empiricism’ has no equivalent in Greek, Plato uses the notion of empeiria to designate a non-technical form of action, in order to underlie a lack of technicality and to question the value of what some sophists claim to teach under the name of technai. While insisting on a philosophical kind of experience of truth, Plato criticizes what appears to be the empiricism of those who ignore the theoretical and practical value of the knowledge of intelligible realities. Aristotle goes beyond this stance by re-evaluating positively the role of empeiria, both in its cognitive and practical aspects, as a specific kind of knowledge, derived from sense-perception. He still criticizes the empiricism of those who fail to reach a certain kind of knowledge, namely the knowledge of universals, but also adds a criticism against those who lack the knowledge of particulars acquired through sense-perception and experience.If Aristotle is no more an empiricist than Plato, since he does not recognize sense-perception as the principle of knowledge and as the criterion of the truth, his rationalism is quite different from Plato’s, because of the important role he gives to sense-perception and experience in all areas. This study intends to break through in the direction of some distinctions in ancient philosophy, such as the distinction between Plato’s logical rationalism and Aristotle’s empirical rationalism, which would enable us to re-evaluate the originality of the Ancients on some fundamental issues like the problem of the origin and principle of knowledge and of good action.

Non-conformiste dans sa méthodologie, hétérodoxe modéré dans sa théorie et réformateur dans ses actions, Rueff apporte une contribution originale à la pensée économique du XXème siècle. L’étude de son œuvre théorique a cependant été limitée à sa seule théorie monétaire et financière et a donné de ce fait une vision incomplète de la nature de ses apports à la théorie économique. Au contraire, ma présente thèse va au-delà de cette vision, pour s’intéresser à des aspects relativement ignorés par la littérature secondaire tels que sa théorie du chômage, les caractéristiques propres de son libéralisme et sa méthodologie. Il s’agit non seulement de présenter la théorie rueffienne, mais également de reconstruire le projet intellectuel dans lequel elle s’insère, afin de mettre en évidence l’unité et la cohérence de sa pensée. Partant du jeune Rueff des années 1920 s’interrogeant sur la méthodologie en économie, pour arriver au Rueff de l’après Seconde Guerre Mondiale questionnant le rôle de la théorie économique dans la structure et l’organisation de la société, ma thèse a pour objet d’identifier les influences intellectuelles qu’il a subies. Il s’agira de montrer, d’une part comment celles-ci sont à la source de sa pensée économique et en assurent la singularité ; et d’autre part comment se construit, à partir de celles-ci, un projet intellectuel global qui est déterminant pour comprendre sa théorie économique et identifier ses apports à la théorie économique. / Methodologically unconventional, moderately heterodox in theory and reformer at heart, Rueff makes an original contribution to twentieth-century economic thought. However, the study of his theoretical work has often been limited only to his monetary and financial theory. Accordingly, it gives an incomplete vision of his true contribution to economic theory. On the opposite, my dissertation focuses on issues relatively unexplored in secondary literature up until now, such as his unemployment theory, the specific features of his liberalism and his methodology. The aim is not just to set out Rueff’s theory, but also to reconstruct the intellectual project in which it fits in order to shed light on the unity and consistency of his thought. Whether it is for the young Rueff of the 1920’s—who wondered about the methodology in economics—or Rueff after the Second World War—considering the role of economic theory in the structure and organization of society—, the aim of this research is to identify his intellectual influences. We show how they constitute the essence of his economic thought and ensure its uniqueness; but also, how a global and intellectual project built, from them which is essential to understand his economic theory and identify his contribution to economic theory.

The assumption of the present study is that teachers should possess an adequate understanding of the nature of science and scientific method and hence this aspect was investigated. The empirical research carried out with Secondary School teacher trainees at Botswana colleges of education showed the following: Subjects possess an adequate understanding of some aspects of the nature of science and several aspects of the scientific method. They however do not have an adequate understanding on certain aspects of the nature of science. An association was found between the nature of science, type of educational institution attended, years of study and majoring in science. A positive association was found between scientific method and years spent studying. The present study recommended the inclusion of history, philosophy and sociology of science in the curriculum of teacher education. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (with specialisation in Natural Science Education)

In this dissertation, I investigate whether the conceptualisation of computerised technological phenomena is influenced by social variables, in particular exposure to the computer. The conceptualisation and behaviour of a group of students majoring in technology-related fields were studied. Through the application of Conceptual Blending Theory, the multi-modal desktop metaphorical blend (DMMB) (as an electronic representation of an actual office desktop) was focused on. The participants were provided with tasks with the aim of determining whether they conceptualise the electronic desktop as a literal ‘thing-in-itself’ or as an e-version of their actual desks. The intent was to examine to what extent social variables, especially exposure, motivate the nature of the conceptualisation. Therefore, it is hypothesised that exposure, regarded as the primary variable in this study, influences conceptualisation of the DMMB to the extent where the it either loses its metaphoric quality in participants, who maintain regular and prolonged exposure to the computer, or retains the metaphoric quality of the DMMB in participants, who are not exposed to the computer on a regular and prolonged basis. Two groups were distinguished based on the extent of the individual participants’ exposure to computer technology, namely a high-exposure group and a low-exposure group. A mixed method approach was used to test and analyse data collected from individual participants, as well as from the high- and low-exposure groups. Methods used to test these hypotheses included questionnaires, word association (a conceptual task), controlled observation (a behavioural task), and interviews. The resulting data were analysed by means of a thematic interview analysis and non-parametric statistical tests. / Linguistics and Modern Languages / M.A. (Linguistics)

Le mémoire vise à proposer une épistémologie pragmatique de la science scolaire à l’école primaire. Un défaut de compréhension de la nature de la science pourrait en effet justifier en partie les difficultés de l'enseignement des sciences par démarche d'investigation. Une étude des représentations de la science chez les enseignants et futurs enseignants confirme qu’ils n‘en ont pour la plupart qu‘une vision assez floue, relevant majoritairement d'une forme d'empirisme naïf. Un jeu opératoire de critères de scientificité adapté au contexte de l’école est développé dans une approche "bottom-up" partant des pratiques de classe effectives. Sa capacité à discriminer pratiques scientifiques et non scientifiques est discutée, de même que les implications didactiques et épistémologiques de son utilisation. Il est en particulier possible d‘en déduire des définitions évolutives d‘une science scolaire normative mais subsidiaire par rapport à la “science des scientifiques”. Cet outil épistémologique s’avère bien reçu par les enseignants auxquels il a été présenté. Le test en situation de différentes stratégies pédagogiques fait apparaître que les plus efficaces pour l'appropriation de critères de scientificité ajoutent à la démarche d’investigation une composante épistémologique explicite. Certains éléments de méthode scientifique peuvent être travaillés dès la Grande Section de maternelle (5-6 ans) : des élèves ayant vécu des démarches d’investigation s’avèrent capables de revendiquer la primauté de l’expérience, mais aussi de mettre en œuvre des tests relatifs à plusieurs critères de scientificité et de s‘approprier les rudiments de la modélisation scientifique. / The purpose of this thesis is to propose a pragmatic epistemology of school science in primary school. Indeed, some of the difficulties encountered by inquiry-based science education may be attributed to a lack of understanding of the very nature of science. A survey on the perception of science by incumbent teachers and teachers in training confirms that most of them have a relatively vague vision grounded in a form of naive empiricism. A practical set of criteria of scientificity adapted to the school context is developed through a “bottom-up” approach based on actual classroom practices. Its efficiency at discriminating scientific and non-scientific practices is discussed, as well as the didactical and epistemological implications of its use. It is thus possible to deduce evolutive definitions of a school science that is normative yet subordinated to the “science of scientists”. Teachers responded positively to this epistemological tool when it was presented to them. Among the different teaching strategies tested in a classroom, the most efficient for the acquisition of criteria of scientificity were those which supplemented the inquiry process with an explicit epistemological component. Some elements of scientific method can be introduced as early as kindergarten (5-6 y.o) : after experimenting with inquiry processes, pupils have proved able not only to claim the primacy of experiment but also to run tests related to different criteria of scientificity and acquire the basics of scientific modeling.