The UN Security Council is the preeminent multilateral decision-making body and has the legal authority to initiate military interventions if it first determines a threat to international peace and security, including from civil wars or widespread state repression. While traditional norms of non-intervention and the politics of the Cold War curtailed the body’s ability to fulfil this role, evolving understandings and practices of sovereignty and security in the post-Cold War era have led to the apparent emergence of a new norm permitting ‘humanitarian intervention’ and an in principle acceptance that the body has a ‘responsibility to protect’ vulnerable civilians residing inside the borders of their own state, including through military means. In this context, the thesis argues that the situation in Darfur, western Sudan, has represented a quintessential case for the Council to fulfil its ‘responsibility to protect’. According to a number of authoritative investigations, since 2003 the Sudanese government and government-allied Arab militias have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity on a widespread and systematic basis against Darfur’s non-Arab population. As a result, over 200,000 people died either directly from violence or indirectly from conflict-induced disease and malnutrition, while a further two million fled from their homes and villages in fear. A number of nonmilitary measures were attempted by the Council but failed to create adequate security on the ground. As such, there was a compelling legal-institutional, normative and moral case for the Council to coercively deploy a military intervention in Sudan to protect vulnerable civilians in Darfur. However, during the 2003-06 period of study, no such intervention was deployed. The thesis argues that intervention by the Council was precluded by the national interests of its permanent members, including a lucrative economic relationship between China and Sudan, and because of valuable Sudanese intelligence cooperation in Western counter-terrorism operations in the region. The thesis concludes that the Council’s members chose to preserve these national interests at the expense of protecting civilians in Darfur.

During the past decade, a significant change in use of force norms took place within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The United Nations (UN) is founded on a collective security agreement, which gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of force to protect UN member-states. The UN Charter explicitly provides the UNSC with a mandate to keep peace between states, not within them. In 2006, however, the UNSC unanimously adopted the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine, which expanded what I call the UNSC's circle of protection to include "human protection." Further, in exceptional circumstances, R2P gives the UNSC the power to authorize the use of force in a country without the consent of its government. Many UNSC members initially resisted institutionalizing R2P, especially those with contested territory and a history of foreign intervention, such as China. This dissertation attempts to explain how and why this change in use of force norms developed. I argue this macro-level change was principally due to two often overlooked factors: an epistemic community pushing the Council to become more empathetic and altruistic, and Council members wanting to gain social status. In order to adequately explain the development of R2P you must explain the significant role the epistemic community played. And to adequately explain the significance of the epistemic community you must explain the significant role empathy played. Further, to sufficiently explain the UNSC's decision to adopt R2P you must explain the significance of China's acceptance. And to sufficiently explain China's acceptance you must explain the significant role status-seeking played. Explanations for the adoption of R2P that do not acknowledge the significant role of empathy and social influence are incomplete and insufficient. Although others have argued emotion and social influence are important causal variables in international relations, few offer specific mechanisms or micro-processes demonstrating how these factors work. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap. The implications are that empathy and status-seeking matter far more to international relations than many suggest.

Between 1953 and 1963, during the administrations of President Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, the United States government transformed the way it formulated and executed foreign and defense policies. These changes gave the White House its own foreign policy staff, in the form of the National Security Council, and increased the powers of the Secretary of Defense. Most of these changes began under Eisenhower in the 1950s. Eisenhower, however, delayed making several key reforms despite the recommendations of his staff. He believed some reforms were unnecessary and remained ambivalent about others. Moreover, he wanted to avoid sending complex reorganization legislation through Congress, which Eisenhower feared would allow legislators to interfere in matters of the Executive Branch. Democrats in the 1960 presidential election capitalized on the failure to push through these reforms. The Democratic attacks proved remarkably compelling to a bipartisan audience. Kennedy used this bipartisan agreement to enact many of the reforms Eisenhower had ignored. The motivating factor for many of these decisions was not merely an attempt by either President to concentrate power in the White House, it was a belief that the post-1945 world was so unstable that only giving the White House unfettered access and oversight of the levers of power could ensure the safety of the nation. This work merges Diplomatic History with the field of American Political Development to examine these dramatic changes to the structure of the US government. Historians traditionally have examined these Kennedy era administrative changes in isolation. Studying them together with those that took place under Eisenhower yields a more complete picture of how the national security state developed. Despite Eisenhower’s reluctance to adopt some of the reforms embraced by Kennedy, both presidents believed that major reforms were necessary. Any sound analysis of the ways the contemporary United States makes its foreign and defense policies requires understanding momentous changes that took place during the transformational period of the early Cold War

No description available.

Why have states requested international authorization for their projections of military force more after 1989? One perspective suggests powerful states should not make such requests. Rather, they should look to their own power instead of international organizations. Another view suggests international authorization is a way to provide credible signals about state intentions. A third perspective suggests states view international authorization of military force as appropriate. I establish that states have changed their behavior, requesting international authorization more often after 1989. Then, I develop hypotheses involving material power, burden-sharing, informational signaling, and international norms. I assess their ability to explain the increase in authorization requests through evidence from over 150 military force projections by a wide range of states and through a detailed evaluation of United States behavior. The U.S. provides a strong test case for the theories evaluated, since powerful states should be least susceptible to pressures for requesting authorization, and yet it does so more frequently after 1989. I find the expectation that states should request international authorization emerged after the U.S. set a precedent during the Persian Gulf War. The end of the Cold War changed the perceived "viability" of different strategies for projecting military force for U.S. policy-makers. Requesting authorization from the UN became a plausible alternative. The decision to request international authorization--and the justifications U.S. decision makers offered for doing so--led to the expectation by other states that the U.S. would do so for future projections of military force. This international norm helps explain the politics of international authorization for the airstrikes on Iraq (1998), the Iraq War (2003) and the Libyan intervention (2011). The response of other countries to the Clinton Administration's failure to request authorization for airstrikes on Iraq in 1998 demonstrates that expectations regarding whether the U.S. should request authorization had shifted. The subsequent consolidation of the norm helps explain the requests for authorization by the Bush Administration for the Iraq War in 2003 and by the Obama Administration for Libya in 2011. The dissertation increases our understanding of the relationship, and the role of authority, between states and international organizations.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as mudanças institucionais ocorridas no Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos entre 2001 e 2016. Ele se enquadra nas Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul e, portanto, é dividido em três partes. A PARTE I é composta por uma contextualização do objeto, contendo uma descrição geral do objetivo do trabalho, bem como a delimitação do objeto, marco teórico, e marco temporal. A PARTE II é comporta pelo artigo em si, que analisa as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016). O objetivo é demonstrar que mudanças em agencias de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de analise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos. Primeiro, uma matriz institucional formada por normas, organizações, regras, capacidades e incentivos foi usada para comparar as mudanças no Conselho de Segurança Nacional para comparar as mudanças nas duas presidências. Em seguida, possíveis causas de mudanças selecionadas foram identificadas – design original da agencia, interesses dos atores burocráticos, ou eventos externos –, e finalmente, determinamos as consequências que essas mudanças podem ter para instituições ou politicas. A PARTE III apresenta a descrição da agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida. / This paper aims to analyze the institutional changes that took place in the National Security Council of the United States between 2001 and 2016. It is in accordance with Resolutions 114/2014 and 115/2014 of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and therefore is divided into three parts. PART I is composed of a contextualization of the object, containing a general description of the objective of the work, as well as the delimitation of the object, theoretical framework, and time frame. PART II is composed by the article itself, which analyzes the changes in the system of the United States National Security Council through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). The objective is to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be punctual or incremental, depending on their causes and consequences. In order to do so we used techniques of qualitative analysis and theory of punctuated equilibrium in the examination of official documents and public records. First, an institutional matrix consisting of norms, organizations, rules, capabilities, and incentives was used to compare changes in the National Security Council to compare changes in the two presidencies. Then, possible causes for selected changes have been identified - original agency design, bureaucratic actors’ interests, or external events - and finally we determine the consequences that such changes can have for institutions or policies. PART III presents the description of the research agenda to be followed.

No description available.

The Swedish state has participated as an elected member of the United Nations Security Council three times and is entering their fourth. The UNSC is an old institution that is not equal to what powers the states within it has. The permanent states, the victors from the second world war, have a more prominent role in the council and do not have to be elected every two years as the other states that want to be a part of the council. The cost of for small states like Sweden to be a part of the council can be quite large, but in financial means and as a time-consuming task for the foreign department. Therefore, it is essential to know if the time spent in the council for a state like Sweden amounts to something in the sense of influence over the outcome. This bears the question if Sweden has used and is using its membership in the UNSC in an effective manner. By looking at the official documentation by the foreign department and interviewing former diplomats about Sweden’s role in the UNSC during these periods this thesis analyses the way that Sweden has acted before. Furthermore, the thesis also looks at the first five weeks in the current period of 2017. The results are analyzed through a theoretical framework of what should be methods to achieve influence in the UNSC. As the analysis shows, Sweden has moved from being a more passive participant to a more active and proactive part of the UNSC. This, however, can come at the cost of changing other states view of the Swedish state in international relations.

Submitted by VITOR LOUREIRO SION null (vitorlsion@gmail.com) on 2016-06-21T15:09:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 vitorsiondissertacaofinal2.pdf: 2161542 bytes, checksum: a10dcf0816f17ad7d51f3d2e5a48d39c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-06-23T16:25:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 sion_vl_me_mar.pdf: 2161542 bytes, checksum: a10dcf0816f17ad7d51f3d2e5a48d39c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-23T16:25:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 sion_vl_me_mar.pdf: 2161542 bytes, checksum: a10dcf0816f17ad7d51f3d2e5a48d39c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O trabalho analisa a política externa do governo de Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1964-1967). A partir do cruzamento da literatura existente com a análise das atas das reuniões do Conselho de Segurança Nacional (CSN), esta dissertação de mestrado pretende discutir as dinâmicas da diplomacia do primeiro governo da ditadura militar. O argumento deste trabalho discute a interpretação e o alcance do alinhamento automático do Brasil com os Estados Unidos entre os anos 1964 e 1967. Três aspectos centrais sustentam a visão deste trabalho: o pragmatismo da diplomacia castellista, a predominância dos condicionantes domésticos no processo de tomada de decisão e a atuação do Brasil como país semiperiférico com pretensões de ascender na hierarquia de poder do sistema internacional. O estudo do conteúdo das reuniões, que foi desclassificado e passou a ficar disponível para pesquisa apenas em 2009, é realizado no sentido de avançar na abertura da caixa preta do processo de tomada de decisão em política externa. Um dos benefícios da análise das atas do CSN consiste na possibilidade de identificar com clareza as divergências internas da ditadura militar. Outro aspecto discutido no trabalho é a evolução da política externa de Castello Branco, sobre a qual se considera que o Ato Institucional número 2 (AI-2), de outubro de 1965, representou um momento de inflexão. Argumenta-se neste trabalho que, a partir de então, a ação internacional do Brasil buscou maior autonomia, diminuindo a dependência em relação à superpotência ocidental. / This paper analyzes Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco’s foreign policy (1964-1967). By comparing the existing literature to the National Security Council (CSN)’s minutes, it examines the dynamics of the country’s diplomacy during Brazil’s first military government. It interprets and discusses the scope of Brazil’s automatic alignment with the United States between 1964 and 1967. There are three key aspects to support its conclusions: the pragmatism of Castello Branco’s diplomacy, the predominance of domestic constraints in the decision-making processes and Brazil’s actions as a semi-peripheral country aiming to rise in the international hierarchy power system. CSN’s meetings were declassified and available for research only in 2009. The study of its contents aims at opening the black box of the foreign policy’s decision-making process. One of the benefits of analyzing CSN´s minutes is the possibility of clearly identify internal divergences in the military dictatorship. This paper also discusses the evolution of Castello Branco's foreign policy, considering the Institutional Act No. 2 (AI-2), issued in October 1965, a turning point. Since then, Brazil has sought greater autonomy internationally, reducing its dependence of the United States, even during Castello Branco´s government.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as mudanças institucionais ocorridas no Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos entre 2001 e 2016. Ele se enquadra nas Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul e, portanto, é dividido em três partes. A PARTE I é composta por uma contextualização do objeto, contendo uma descrição geral do objetivo do trabalho, bem como a delimitação do objeto, marco teórico, e marco temporal. A PARTE II é comporta pelo artigo em si, que analisa as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016). O objetivo é demonstrar que mudanças em agencias de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de analise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos. Primeiro, uma matriz institucional formada por normas, organizações, regras, capacidades e incentivos foi usada para comparar as mudanças no Conselho de Segurança Nacional para comparar as mudanças nas duas presidências. Em seguida, possíveis causas de mudanças selecionadas foram identificadas – design original da agencia, interesses dos atores burocráticos, ou eventos externos –, e finalmente, determinamos as consequências que essas mudanças podem ter para instituições ou politicas. A PARTE III apresenta a descrição da agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida. / This paper aims to analyze the institutional changes that took place in the National Security Council of the United States between 2001 and 2016. It is in accordance with Resolutions 114/2014 and 115/2014 of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and therefore is divided into three parts. PART I is composed of a contextualization of the object, containing a general description of the objective of the work, as well as the delimitation of the object, theoretical framework, and time frame. PART II is composed by the article itself, which analyzes the changes in the system of the United States National Security Council through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). The objective is to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be punctual or incremental, depending on their causes and consequences. In order to do so we used techniques of qualitative analysis and theory of punctuated equilibrium in the examination of official documents and public records. First, an institutional matrix consisting of norms, organizations, rules, capabilities, and incentives was used to compare changes in the National Security Council to compare changes in the two presidencies. Then, possible causes for selected changes have been identified - original agency design, bureaucratic actors’ interests, or external events - and finally we determine the consequences that such changes can have for institutions or policies. PART III presents the description of the research agenda to be followed.