In this inquiry I pursue two tasks. First, I locate the roots of Heidegger's philosophical project historically within a specific theological discourse bent on redefining the relation between religion and politics. Heidegger's main, if covert, intent was to combat the egalitarian, pluralistic impulses carried by a tradition of critical Christology, which leads from F.W.J. Schelling's (1775-1854) Philosophy of Revelation to the work of the radical theologian-philosopher Paul Tillich (1886-1965). These egalitarian impulses spring from a broadened understanding of religious community as a material communication community unified through the use of shared symbols into a community of understanding, knowledge, and interests. The theoretical expansion and deepening of such a communication model, I detect in the writings of the renegade Neogrammarian, Hermann Paul, here considered in light of the "neo-Idealist" initiative of one of Paul's most prominent critics, the Romanist Karl Vossler. Prior to the advanced theological exposition of symbolically mediated communication, in works such as Tillich's book Dynamics of Faith (2001; Engl. orig.1957), the Neogrammarian movement in language studies, I argue, holds the key to accessing the cloaked Christological subtext of Heidegger's thought. Second, after thus locating Heidegger's philosophical agenda within its intellectual-historical context, I expose how Heidegger manipulates philosophical rhetoric to achieve the suspension of Schelling's theological legacy. My analysis of Heidegger's rhetorical behavior is focused on his Letter on Humanism (written 1946, published 1949), a text very overt in both its philosophical biases and its politics. The Humanismusbrief comes the closest to revealing Heidegger's own self-positioning within his generation. The work's conclusion provides a brief look ahead, or Ausblick, to indicate the main features of how these findings about the Letter can be brought to bear on Heidegger's masterpiece fragment, Being and Time. Through this approach, Heidegger's inherently political philosophy gains a much clearer profile in the context of its formative phase in the waning days of the Weimar Republic and opens a new perspective on later attempts by its author to "re-apply" his philosophical program to the cultural situation of postwar Germany, as well as to the ethical-epistemological problems remaining after twelve years of German isolationism. / text

This study argues that a pragmatic conception of religion would enable philosophers to make important contributions to our ability to handle concrete problems involving religion. The term 'philosophical anthropology', referring to different interpretative frameworks, which philosophers draw on to develop conceptions of human phenomena, is introduced. It is argued that the classical pragmatists embraced a philosophical anthropology significantly different from that embraced by most philosophers of religion; accordingly, pragmatism offers an alternative conception of religion. It is suggested that a conception of religion is superior to another if it makes more promising contributions to our ability to handle extra-philosophical problems of religion. A pragmatic philosophical anthropology urges us to view human practices as responses to shared experienced needs. Religious practices develop to resolve tensions in our views of life. The pictures of human flourishing they persent reconstruct our views of life, thereby allowing more significant interaction with the environment, and a more significant life. A modified version of reflective equilibrium is developed to show how we, on a pragmatic conception of religion, are able to supply resources for criticism and reform of religious practices, so the extra-philosophical problems of religion can be handled. Mainstream philosophy of religion attempts to offer such resources by presenting analogy-arguments from religious experience. Those arguments are, however, unconvincing. A comparison of the two conceptions of religion thus results in a recommendation to reconstruct philosophy of religion.

This thesis investigates the continuity of Wittgenstein’s approach to, and conception of, philosophy. Part One examines the rule-following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks can only be read as interesting and coherent if we see him, as urged by prominent commentators, resisting the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. There is real difficulty, however, in ascertaining what the resulting Wittgensteinian position is: whether it is position structurally analogous with Kant’s distinction between empirical realism and transcendental idealism, or whether philosophical ‘therapy’ is meant to dissolve any drive towards such idealism. I argue that both of these readings of Wittgenstein are found in the work of McDowell. Part Two argues that related issues arise in respect to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the question of realism. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. Again, I argue, it is unclear whether Wittgenstein embraces a form of transcendental idealism or, on the contrary, ultimately reveals the idealist position to be empty. Part Three connects ‘sideways-on’ glances with the threat of idealism by introducing a philosophical ‘measure’. I argue that the measure is a useful tool in assessment of the Tractatus, and shows that Wittgenstein was no idealist, but is less useful as an assessment of the Investigations. It yields the result that Wittgenstein succumbed to idealism, but in doing so may overlook the ‘therapeutic’ nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

During the fourteenth century, with the rise of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1361), the gzhan stong philosophical tradition became a source of great controversy in Tibet. Dol po pa taught this new philosophical tradition for the first time to the wider Tibetan intellectual community. As Dol po pa's Jo nang teachings attracted an audience, many other philosophical giants of the day, such as Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), Red mda' ba Gzhon nu blo gros (1349-1412/13), and their students composed polemical works to refute Jo nang tradition. Lamp that Illuminates the Expanse of Reality was composed in the midst of this controversy to defend the Jo nang point of view. In it, its author, Gha rung pa Lha'i rgyal mtshan (1319-1402/03), attempts to prove that the Jo nang philosophical tradition is the definitive teaching and the quickest path to achieve the Buddhahood.

Since the 1970s multiculturalism has emerged as an important area of scholarship within both academic and applied psychology. Scholars have offered a range of theories to assist psychologists in understanding the ways cultural context impacts psychological development and well-being with the aim of moving the field towards an affirming position on psychological differences that depart from the Eurocentric mainstream. One prominent example is the Multiple Dimensions of Counseling Competency (MDCC) by D. W. Sue (2001) which enjoins psychologists and counselors to acquire knowledge, awareness, and skills (KA&S) for five different racial and ethnic groups to promote culturally affirming work in a variety of professional and societal contexts. KA&S approaches like the MDCC remain the primary mode for conceptualizing multicultural competence today. This dissertation begins with a critical analysis of the extant multicultural competency literature which yields three important areas of concern. First, theorists face a dilemma regarding the definition of culture itself. Race and ethnicity receive stronger emphasis in the multicultural discourse which marginalizes other oppressed voices and perpetuates the invisibility of their unique struggles. In turn, attempts to expand the definition of culture to a non-hierarchical approach to all social identities and contexts draws attention away from race, an area already too easily avoided. Currently, no solution has balanced these two poles in the treatment of the word culture. Second, current models draw no limits to cultural relativism leaving questions of intragroup oppression unanswered. Third, models inadequately conceptualize the multiple social and cultural identities within the same person and offer insufficient guidance to professionals when intrapersonal identities conflict. Each of these three concerns is addressed by drawing from interdisciplinary scholarship in anthropology, political philosophy, and social psychology. These answers yield a new model for work with diverse social identities, Recognition Competency Theory (RCT). This new approach to competency with diverse populations has implications for the ways the psychology of oppression is conceptualized, taught, and treated as a focus of professional policy. Strengths of this new model, its relationship to the MDCC, its limitations, and implications for future research are discussed. / text

Immanuel Kant und Michel Foucault haben beide das Wort "Archäologie" benutzt, wenn sie auf die Geschichte des Denkens und der Philosophie zu sprechen kamen. Kant benutzt den Ausdruck \"philosophischeArchäologie\" nur einmal in seinen Notizen zur Beantwortung einer Preisfrage der Berliner Akademie über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik. Veröffentlicht wurden diese Notizen erst sehr viel später im Rahmen der Gesamtausgabe, dort im Band 20, der 1942 erschien. Der kurze Hinweis Kants, man könne eine philosophische Archäologie entwickeln, hat den jungen Foucault beeindruckt, der mit einer Übersetzung von und Einleitung zu Kants Anthropologie sein Studium abschloss. Foucault hat in seinen Büchern der 196oer Jahre das Wort Archäologie zu einem methodischen Konzept ausgebaut und diese Überlegungen in seinem Buch Archäologie des Wissens 1969 abgeschlossen. Foucaults Archäologie ist nicht aus Kant abgeleitet, aber sie reagiert auf eine kantische Fragestellung: Wie lässt sich die Geschichte der Philosophie philosophisch begreifen?

This thesis uses analytic philosophical inquiry and autobiographical narrative inquiry to identify a conception of critical thinking (CT) that is “most adaptable” for teaching History 12, and then discusses the strengths and limitations. The CT literature includes several conflicting conceptions of CT, and I use two specific types of analytic philosophical inquiry, (conceptual analysis and conceptual structure assessment), to identify which conception is “most adaptable” for teaching History 12. After considering the degree to which each conception meets the criteria developed for the “most adaptable” conception of CT, I conclude that the Critical Thinking Consortium’s (TC²) conception is the most adaptable. Of all the conceptions developed thus far, the TC² approach is unique because it is designed solely as a pedagogical model for embedding CT throughout the curriculum of each subject and grade level. In the second section of the thesis, I use autobiographical narrative inquiry to reflect on the strengths and limitations of the TC² model after using the model to teach History 12 for a year. One of the foundational principles of the TC² conception is the notion that embedding CT throughout the curriculum is a powerful way of improving understanding. I determine that this contention is accurate because students improved their knowledge of the curriculum, the epistemology of history, and the adoption of CT in their everyday lives. Furthermore, use of the TC² conception helped improve my planning and assessment practices, and initiated a positive change of my role in the classroom.

La tesis analiza dos objeciones corrientes a la interpretación del problema de las reglas por el Wittgenstein de Kripke: el PROBLEMA DE LA OBJETIVIDAD DE LA REGLA, ¿puede un individuo estar acertado en contra de la opinión comunitaria consensuada?; y el PROBLEMA DE LAS RELACIONES INTERNAS entre reglas y casos, presuntamente violentada por el rol de la noción de acuerdo en la misma. La estrategia general de la tesis es examinar las vías de ataque al lenguaje privado (LP) previas a la de Kripke. El contraste con las mismas permite conceptualizar adecuadamente la propuesta de Kripke, para mostrar que las objeciones mencionadas no se le aplican. En el marco de la tesis, comprendemos por LP a cualquier tesis que sostenga que las condiciones de significatividad del lenguaje pueden ser provistas por estados mentales subjetivos, p.e. creencias, de ahí el solapamiento de la tesis del lenguaje privado con el escepticismo epistemológico y con posiciones solipsistas, y la convicción de que la refutación del LP acarrea la ruina del escepticismo epistemológico. Hay dos versiones clásicas del argumento del LP. Las versiones epistemológicas (Malcom, Fogelin son los representantes que examinamos) derivan la imposibilidad del LP de la imposibilidad de establecer la verdad/corrección de un uso en el contexto de privacidad. La crítica a estas versiones (Ayer, thomson) muestra un círculo justificatorio entre oraciones subjetivas y objetivas. Las versiones semánticas (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) intentan evitar el círculo, elucidando las presuposiciones que le subyacen. Esta respuesta no es satisfactoria ya que o bien regenera el círculo en un nuevo nivel, o bien no logran derrocar al círculo de la justificación. Con Stroud identificamos el fallo común de estas estrategias en el hecho de que en su intento de derrotar al escéptico-privatista, requieren o bien una PREMISA FÁCTICA que indica que conocemos, o bien la especificación del conocimiento como una NOTA DEFINICIONAL de los criterios/condiciones de significatividad que el argumento trascendental elucida en la pregunta del escéptico. Kripke impone un cambio de rumbo en el argumento, al plantear el desafío como una forma de ESCEPTICISMO SEMÁNTICO ONTOLÓGICO, el cual ya no se basa en las limitaciones cognitivas de la privacidad, sino justamente en las presuntas ventajas que presenta. El desafío de Kripke pregunta por las razones que podemos aportar para sostener que no ha ocurrido un cambio en el uso, lo cual equivale a preguntar ¿cómo sabes que tu uso actual CORRESPONDE con tu intención/significado previo? De la imposibilidad de responder a la cuestión clave del realismo clásico (correspondencia) en el caso del significado, Kripke concluye que no puede haber condiciones de verdad para las oraciones semánticas. Esto motiva una paradoja escéptica y una SOLUCIÓN ESCÉPTICA de la paradoja en términos de condiciones de aseverabilidad. Tener en cuenta el abandono de las condiciones de verdad es la clave para responder al problema de la objetividad, mientras que la forma del desafío y el funcionamiento de la concordancia en los juicios como base de atribución, es la clave para la solución del problema de las relaciones internas. / This dissertation analyses two objections currently raised against Kripke's Wittgenstein interpretation of rule-following considerations: The problem of OBJECTIVITY OF THE RULE: Can a single individual be right against communal assent?; and the problem of INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. The general strategy of the thesis is to examine different ways of attacking private language (PL) previous to Kripke's one. through contrast we are able to appreciate clearly the nature of Kripke's proposal, showing that mentioned objections cannot be applied to him. In the framework of this dissertation we understand PL as every theses that claim that conditions of meaning of language can be provided by subjective mental states exclusively, believes for instance, which explains usual association between PL and epistemological scepticism, and conviction that refutation of PL is as well a refutation of epistemological scepticism. There are two main versions of argument against PL. Epistemological versions (Malcolm, Fogelin, are considered) derive impossibility of PL from impossibility to establish corection/truth of a use or application of a given sign. Criticism to this version (Ayer, Thomson) indicates that argument concludes in a justificational circle between subjective and objective sentences. Semantical versions (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) try to avoid this circle elucidating its presuppositions, which are conditions of meaning of language allegedly neglected by privatist. This answer is no satisfactory, beacuse it raises the circle in a new, semantical level, or it doesn't work properly against justificational circle. with Stroud we indentify the common mistake of both strategies as consisting in proposals to beat the sceptic/privatist that requires either a FACTUAL PREMISE of to specify knowledge as part of the meaning of criterion conditions of significance elucidated in the questions of the sceptic or the claims of the privatist. Kripke imposes a change of direction in the argument because he poses a challenge with the form of a ONTOLOGICAL SEMANTICAL SCEPTICISM, which is not based on limitations of privacy but, quite on the contrary, is grounded in the supposed advantages it offers. Kripke's Wittgenstein challenge asks for reasons we can have to be sure that we are not now committing a mistake consisting in a change of use. This is equivalent to ask: how do you now that your actual use CORRESPONDS with your previous intention or intention? From impossibility of answering this question concerning the key question of classical realism (correspondence) in the case of meaning (conceived as a special setting: idealised epistemic conditions) Kripke concludes that there cannot be truth conditions for semantical sentences. This motivates as sceptical paradox and a SCEPTICAL SOLUTION to it, in terms of assertability conditions. I largue that in rejection of truth conditions we have the key to solve the problem the objectivity of the rule, while the special from of the challenge and particular functioning of agreement in judgements in sceptical solution, as ground of attribution, is the key to solve the problem of internal relationships.

In this dissertation I focus on the life and works of Marguerite Poland and argue that landscapes in her fiction act as sites for identity construction. In my analysis I examine the central characters’ engagement with the land, taking cognisance of Poland’s historical context and that of her fiction as represented in her four adult novels and eleven children’s books. I also focus on her doctoral thesis and non-fiction work, The Abundant Herds: A Celebration of the Nguni Cattle of the Zulu People (2003). Poland’s latest work The Boy In You (2008) appeared as this thesis was being completed, thus I only briefly refer to this work in the Conclusion. My primary aim puts into perspective personal, social and cultural identities that are constructed through an analysis of the landscapes evident in her work. Post-colonial theories of space and place provide the theoretical framework. In summary, this thesis argues that landscape is central to Poland’s oeuvre, that her construction of landscape takes particular forms depending on the type of writing she undertakes; and that her characters’ construction of identity is closely linked to the landscapes in which they are placed by their author, herself a product of her physical and cultural environment. “Landscape is dynamic; it serves to create and naturalise the histories and identities inscribed upon it, and so simultaneously hides and makes evident social and historical formations” (Carter et al 1993: xii). The implication of this statement is that the landscape is continuously constructed and deconstructed; that there is a constant evolution of meaning between individuals and the landscape; and that socio-historical conditions are largely responsible for forming ideology and consciousness. This, I argue, is also true for Poland’s fiction. Poland’s own position, as a writer who draws inspiration from the land and its inhabitants, is also discussed. In this thesis I examine the different phases of Poland’s work looking at different kinds of identity construction through different kinds of landscape portrayal. As a prolific South African female contemporary writer, Poland has made inroads into the world of fiction writing once dominated by men. Consequently, feminist issues abound in her writings and I deconstruct characters’ engagement with the land in order to uncover their gendered identities. Primarily, I explore the themes of belonging, identity formation, displacement and dispossession in a particular space and place. My thesis opens with an introduction outlining reasons for my choice of writer, her works to be discussed and the theoretical approaches to landscape and identity construction pertinent to the thesis. I focus on what Poland’s writing yields in terms of gendered identities, racial attitudes and cultural practices in her fictional landscape construction. These sections are grounded in the theories proposed by writers such as, inter alia, Paul Carter, Edward Relph, Chris Fitter and Dennis Cosgrove. In Chapter 2 my discussion focuses on the life and works of Poland placing her in a historical and cultural context. In Chapter 3, I explore how Poland constructs what I call a ‘mythological landscape’. My aim here, as in the following chapters, is to analyse place as a text upon which histories and cultures are inscribed and interpreted and which, in turn, inscribes them too. I also show the extent to which Poland relies on oral folklore to create space and place in her fiction. The literary focus is on her children’s literature and her writings on cattle description and folklore. Chapter 4 focuses on a literary analysis of Train To Doringbult (1987), Shades (1993), and Iron Love (1999) respectively. These novels demonstrate how Poland shows identity shaped within a ‘colonial landscape’. I examine how these novels reiterate that socio-historical conditions are responsible for forming ideology and consciousness. I also analyse how this particular genre puts into perspective personal, social and cultural identities that emerge from particular periods in South African history. Chapter 5 focuses on what I call the ‘indigenous landscape’, on how the South African landscape and the indigenous cattle of the region become characters in their own right. A literary analysis of Recessional for Grace (2003), The Abundant Herds: A Celebration of the Nguni Cattle of the Zulu People (2003) and Poland’s thesis, Uchibidolo: The Abundant Herds: A descriptive study of the Sanga-Nguni cattle of the Zulu people with special reference to colour-pattern terminology and naming practice (1996), form the basis of my discussion in this chapter. I conclude my thesis by further confirming the significance of landscape in Poland’s work as a site for the construction of identity. I focus on Poland’s impact on South African literature to date. I also focus on Poland’s preoccupation with identity in a transforming landscape, showing that there is a constant evolution of meaning between individuals and the landscape within which they find themselves. In this regard I show that identity linked to place has to be seen in terms of context. I mention Poland’s most recent commissioned project – a historical biography of the St. Andrew’s College in Grahamstown, an institution that is now a hundred and fifty years old. Poland’s association with this college, its social and historical context and other discursive issues pertaining to landscape, transformation and construction of identities are fore-grounded, to lend impetus to my thesis. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2008.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2000.