FRANÇA, Clístenes Chaves de. Pragmática formal, verdade e realismo: do conceito epistêmico à indeterminação da verdade em Jürgen Habermans. 2017. 284f. - Tese (Doutorado) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2017. / Submitted by sebastiao barroso (jrwizard2209@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-04T12:37:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017_tese_ccfrança.pdf: 1989334 bytes, checksum: aee408ece4b644c3838224272d5b1e15 (MD5) / Rejected by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br), reason: Estamos devolvendo a tese de CLÍSTENES CHAVES FRANÇA para fazer as alterações indicadas pela bibliotecária Eliene Vieira de Moura: atualizar o brasão da UFC; mudar a fonte da dedicatória e corrigir as referências, que estão em desacordo com a ABNT. Qualquer dúvida sobre as alterações, falar com a referida bibliotecária na Biblioteca das Casas de Cultura Estrangeira/UFC. Lembramos que a tese tem que estar de acordo com o Guia de Normalização da UFC que está disponível no sitio http://www.biblioteca.ufc.br/servicos-e-produtos/normalizacao-de-trabalhos-academicos/. on 2017-10-05T14:27:59Z (GMT) / Submitted by sebastiao barroso (jrwizard2209@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-24T17:19:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017_tese_ccfrança.pdf.pdf: 2088161 bytes, checksum: c62e7784615ddfad6b166812814a4ff3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-11-07T18:12:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2017_tese_ccfrança.pdf.pdf: 2088161 bytes, checksum: c62e7784615ddfad6b166812814a4ff3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-11-07T18:12:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2017_tese_ccfrança.pdf.pdf: 2088161 bytes, checksum: c62e7784615ddfad6b166812814a4ff3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 / The present work exposes and analyzes the theoretical-argumentative route that led Habermas to sustain an antirealist consensual-discursive concept of truth to defend a pragmatic concept that aims to account for the realistic presuppositions inherent to the communicative practices of subjects capable of action and speech. Having initially identified truth as the product of a rational agreement between arguers forged within an ideal speech situation, Habermas was convinced by the criticisms of authors such as Donald Davidson, Ansgar Beckermann, Albrecht Wellmer and Cristina Lafont, of the unsustainability of an antirealist grasp of the truth if, with this concept, we intend to clarify the communicative practices of understanding and intervention in the world of members from a linguistic community. The revision of his concept of truth is performed along with the establishment of a more adequate space in formal pragmatics for non-representational realism and weak naturalism. Knowledge cannot be reduced to mere representation of reality, but rather must incorporate the learning process effected by overcoming the failures concretely experienced in the sphere of action. The revision of his concept of truth is performed along with the establishment of a more adequate space in formal pragmatics for non-representational realism and weak naturalism. Knowledge cannot be reduced to mere representation of reality, but rather must incorporate the learning process effected by overcoming the failures concretely experienced in the action sphere. On the other hand, the de-transcendentalisation of the cognitive structures of the life-world that mediate our experience with the objective world does not authorize a causal explanation of life-world‘s normativity. The distinction between the epistemic concept of justification (rational acceptability) and the non-epistemic concept of truth is at the basis of Habermas's rejection of Richard Rorty's contextualism, since it results from a bad theoretical step that would make it impossible to elucidate our effective communicative practices and would require the reformulation of one's own common sense which would be based on a démodé platonic difference. However, with his pragmatic conception of truth, Habermas defends the existence of an unrenounceable epistemic relationship between truth and justification that finds no support in the discourse sphere. We need to recognize that, in this, what sets in is an epistemic relationship between the process of justification of our beliefs and their rational acceptability and not between the realistically apprehended concept of truth and the justification. In this way, we come to the conclusion that Habermas's pragmatic concept of truth suffers from a fundamental indetermination. This derives from Habermas' refusal to theoretically discuss the relationship between language and world demanded by the realistic non-epistemic apprehension of truth. Habermas argues that the attempt to theoretically explain this relationship would involve metaphysical premises incompatible with a post-metaphysical thought, which implies that our author prefers to bequeath us an indeterminate concept of truth, to advance theoretically in the explanation of what is presupposed by the formal pragmatics itself. / O presente trabalho expõe e analisa o percurso teórico-argumentativo que levou Habermas da defesa de um conceito consensual-discursivo antirrealista da verdade para a defesa de um conceito pragmático que visa dar conta das pressuposições realistas inerentes às práticas comunicativas de sujeitos capazes de ação e fala. Por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica e análise crítica das obras indicadas nas referências, o trabalho mostra que Habermas, tendo inicialmente identificado a verdade como produto de um acordo racional entre argumentantes, forjado no interior de uma situação ideal de fala, vem a ser convencido posteriormente, pelas críticas de autores como Donald Davidson, Ansgar Beckermann, Albrecht Wellmer e Cristina Lafont, da insustentabilidade de uma apreensão antirrealista da verdade se, com este conceito, se pretende esclarecer as práticas comunicativas de entendimento e intervenção no mundo dos membros de uma comunidade linguística. A revisão de seu conceito da verdade é realizada de par com o estabelecimento de um espaço mais adequado na pragmática formal para o realismo não-representacionista e o naturalismo fraco. O conhecimento não pode ser reduzido à mera representação da realidade, mas antes deve incorporar o processo de aprendizagem efetivado pela superação dos malogros concretamente experienciados na esfera da ação. Por outro lado, a destranscendentalização das estruturas cognitivas do mundo da vida que medeiam nossa experiência com o mundo objetivo não autoriza uma explicação causal da normatividade do mundo da vida. A distinção entre o conceito epistêmico da justificação (aceitabilidade racional) e o conceito não-epistêmico da verdade está na base da rejeição de Habermas do contextualismo de Richard Rorty, pois este resulta de um mal passo teórico que inviabilizaria o esclarecimento de nossas práticas comunicativas efetivas e exigiria a reformulação do próprio senso comum o qual se sustentaria em uma diferença platônica démodé. Habermas, contudo, com seu conceito pragmático da verdade, defende a existência de uma relação epistêmica irrenunciável entre verdade e justificação que não encontra amparo na esfera do discurso. Nessa, é necessário reconhecer, o que se instala é uma relação epistêmica entre o processo de justificação de nossas crenças e sua aceitabilidade racional e não entre o conceito da verdade apreendido de maneira realista e a justificação. Dessa forma, este trabalho chega à conclusão de que o conceito pragmático da verdade de Habermas padece de uma indeterminação fundamental. Esta deriva da recusa de Habermas de discutir teoricamente a relação entre linguagem e mundo exigida pela apreensão realista não-epistêmica da verdade. Habermas alega que a tentativa de explicitar teoricamente essa relação envolver-se-ia com premissas metafísicas incompatíveis com um pensamento pós-metafísico, o que implica dizer que ele prefere legar um conceito indeterminado da verdade a avançar teoricamente na explicação daquilo que está pressuposto pela própria pragmática formal.

Legally Philosophical Aspects of Searching for Truth in Civil Procedure DIPLOMA THESIS Viktor Gazda Abstract The aim of this thesis is to discuss certain legally philosophical aspects of fact- findings in civil procedure. In a simplified way, this work is focused on exploring the possibility of determining the value of truthfulness of quaestio facti when applying law. The six chapters of the work include three basic themes. The first one examines the reflection of the philosophical concepts of truth in the process of determining the facts of a case, the second one clarifies the nature of the ideological aims of fact-findings in the form of principles of formal and substantive legal truth and the third topic deals with the nature of a judge's beliefs in the truthfulness of factual claims and the role of probability in the judge's belief At first I briefly present the phenomenon of truth in a wider philosophical context so that I can then proceed to outline the selected theories of truth. After explaining the basic essence of the legal procedural principles which have the greatest impact on the process of finding the facts, I pass, in another part of the thesis, to the very analysis of these principles through the prism of selected theories of truth. The reflection of the philosophical concepts of...

My model-theoretic realist account of science places linguistic systems and the corresponding non-linguistic structures at different stages of the scientific process. It is shown that science and its progress cannot be analysed in terms of only one of these strata. Philosophy of science literature offers mainly two approaches to the structure of scientific knowledge analysed in terms of theories and their models, the "statement" and the "non-statement" approaches. In opposition to the statement approach's belief that scientific knowledge is embodied in theories (formulated in some (first-order) symbolic language) with direct interpretative links - via so-called "bridge principles" - to reality, the defenders of the non-statement approach believe in an analysis where the language in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role than the (mathematical) structures which satisfy that theory. The model-theoretic realism expounded here retains the notion of a scientific theory as a (deductively closed) set of sentences, while simultaneously emphasising the interpretative role of the conceptual (i.a. mathematical) models of these theories. My criticism against the non-statement approach is based on the fact that merely "giving" the theory "in terms of' its mathematical structures leaves out any real interpretation of the nature and role of general terms in science. Against the statement approach's "direct" linking of general theoretical terms to reality, my approach interpolates models between theories and (aspects of) reality in the interpretative chain. The links between the general terms of scientific theories and their interpretations in the various models of the theory regulate the whole referential process. The terms of a theory are "general" in the sense that they are the result of certain abstractive conceptualisations of the object of scientific investigation and subsequent linguistic formulations of these conceptualisations. Their (particular) meanings can be "given back" only by interpreting them in the limited context of the various conceptual models of their theory and, finally, by finding an isomorphic relation between some substructure of the conceptual model in question and some empirical conceptualisation (model) of relevant experimental data. In this sense the notion of scientific "truth" becomes inextricably linked with that of articulated reference, as it - given its model-dependent nature - should be. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Modern philosophy is often said to privilege rationality over received wisdom, but to some extent this is an ideal which we pursue under a measure of uncertainty. It is not always obvious what rationality requires. Nor is it clear how rationality is to be traded against other ideals. This dissertation seeks to clarify both questions as they pertain to the rationality of belief. The choice of topic is apposite, since many argue that the case of belief illustrates that what is rational and what there is most reason to do is one and the same thing. In particular, so-called evidentialists often argue that to believe what the evidence indicates is both to believe rationally and to believe what one has most reason to believe, since (i) rationality consists in responding to reasons, and (ii) only evidence that p can be a reason to believe that p. My first objective is to challenge this thesis. I do so by arguing that the class of reasons that rationalise a belief does not coincide with the class of reasons there are to have the belief all things considered. To equate the two classes would be to conflate the psychological issue of how we respond to reasons with the ontological issue of what reasons there are. My case against evidentialism does not depend on pragmatism being true, however. Even if Pascal was wrong to claim that the expected benefit of believing can be a reason to believe, it does not follow that evidentialism is true. Some non-pragmatic form of anti-evidentialism may still be true. The latter half of the dissertation explores this possibility in greater detail. There I argue that there is at least one class of beliefs which is not subject to common evidentiary strictures. When we use practical reasoning to form intentions about what to do in the future, we typically also form beliefs about what we will do. Yet, those beliefs are not based on evidence about what we will do, I argue. Typically, we do not predict what we do based on what we intend to do. Nor should we. When it is up to us whether we will perform an action, our intentions do to not carry enough weight as evidence that we must use them to predict what we will do. In the last part of the dissertation, I use this point to elucidate how we acquire self-knowledge and how belief relates to truth.

In an age of ever-expanding digital communication platforms and the presence of news online becoming paramount, the amount of information being shared and the truth of that information is becoming more and more difficult to track. The power of these social platforms is one that all should recognize and reflect upon in terms of their use of them, and reliance on them for the information they need. This thesis seeks to explore this power and the ways in which to remedy the falsities spread on the platforms faster than ever before, through photographic journalism.

This research is an analysis of Ontario teachers’ experiences with Grade 11 NDA3M Current Aboriginal Context in Canada curriculum. By deconstructing and critically analyzing the curricular and pedagogical implications, my thesis is a targeted response to number 63 of the Truth and Reconciliation Calls to Action. As outlined by Clandinin and Connelly (2000), this research is centred in narrative research techniques. Additionally, I draw on Miller’s (1996) 3L’s: Look, Listen, and Learn approach, paired with Dion and Dion’s (2004) storytelling as a means of telling and (re)telling the story. I used one-on-one interviews with teachers and one sharing circle with teachers and elders to synthesize data from documents to capture the essence of the lived experiences. Participants revealed their experiences of what Aoki claims is curriculum-as-planned and curriculum-as-lived in this course. The results of this research were revealed responses to components of number 63 of the Calls to Action; NDA3M requires a review of curriculum expectations to align with teachers’ classroom experiences; participants discussed how their respective schools are using every opportunity to students’ capacity and awareness of Indigenous Worldviews; and professional development to support Indigenous education is in high demand.

O objetivo deste trabalho é o exame da concepção espinosista da verdade, com ênfase no Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). Para tanto, empreendemos a análise da teoria das idéias, presente nesse texto, em um cotejo com as demais obras do autor. Apesar disso, privilegiamos o TIE dentre as demais, com o propósito de mostrar que essa obra não é uma fase superada. Com efeito, tem-se considerado o TIE como um fracasso de Espinosa pelo fato de o filósofo não ter conseguido nele elaborar a definição do intelecto. Entretanto, o que pretendemos mostrar é que, mesmo se nao inteiramente explicitada, a definição do intelecto pode ser ali encontrada e que, portanto, a tradicional interpretacao dos editores e comentadores - apesar de longamente endossada - está equivocada. De fato, tornou-se uma convenção dizer que o TIE não possui uma densa articulação com o sistema espinosista. Mostraremos, ao contrario, que ela não apenas existe, mas pode ser perfeitamente comprovada. / The objective of this work is to investigate the Spinozan concept of truth, with emphasis on the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione (TIE). In order to do so, we have analysed his theory of ideas, presented in this text, in close comparison with that presented in the rest of Spinoza\'s work. Despite this, we have given pride of place to the TIE over the rest, with the firm purpose of showing that this work is not merely a passing phase. In effect, the TIE has been considered, over the years, a Spinoza failure for its (apparent) lack of elaboration of the definition of the intellect. However, what we intend to do is to show that, even if not in an explicit way, the definition of the intellect is there and, therefore, that the editors\' and commentators\' traditional interpretation - despite its being amply endorsed - is wrong. In fact, it has become conventional to say that the TIE does not articulate easily with the core of Spinoza\'s system. It is our purpose, nonetheless, to show that not only does this articulation exist, but also that it can be thoroughly and consistently supported.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 763146 bytes, checksum: 12b30abfdba02d12b58f54feecc93fb1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-08-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The present work has the principal objective highlighted in the differences and similarities between the philosophers Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas about the concept of truth established for both. First, we present the Rorty s thought about truth, passing by the idea of etnocentrism and about the contingency that the language has beyond the idea of a democracy, fundamental subject for we understand his idea of truth. Second, we approach the habermasian idea of truth pointing his concept like something universal and transcendental to cultural contexts and temporal. His idea of life world intersubjectively shared. The appearance of one pos-metaphysic linguistic turns capable of changes in the main point of philosophy and his idea of democracy. Finally, a little sketch of one ethic of the discourse capable of join all necessary characteristics for the formation of one concept of truth universal and transcendental. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo principal destacar as divergências e semelhanças entre os filósofos Richard Rorty e Jürgen Habermas acerca do conceito de verdade. Primeiramente, apresentamos o pensamento rortyano sobre a verdade, passando pela idéia de etnocentrismo e pela idéia de contingência que a linguagem possui, além de seu pensamento sobre a democracia, para entendermos sua idéia de verdade. Em seguida abordar-se-á a idéia habermasiana de verdade apontando seu conceito como algo universal e transcendente a contextos culturais e temporais. Sua idéia de mundo da vida intersubjetivamente partilhado. O surgimento de uma virada lingüística pós-metafísica capaz de mudar os eixos da filosofia e sua idéia de democracia. E por fim, um pequeno esboço de uma ética do discurso capaz de unir todas as características necessárias para a formação de um conceito de verdade universalizável e transcendental. Por fim, confrontar-se-á os dois filósofos com o intuito de mostrar o debate sobre o conceito de verdade e as posições de cada um.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2007-12-18Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:37:55Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 eloy_cb_me_assis.pdf: 819605 bytes, checksum: cd0149117bdd3ddb1dbd172fef9c7e47 (MD5) / A violência sexual contra crianças não é um evento incomum; no entanto há a dificuldade de denúncia, pois além do estabelecimento da relação de dominação que o agressor exerce sobre a vítima, a maneira como tal fato é recebido pela sociedade e como é encaminhado pelas instituições judiciárias responsáveis também são determinantes para as omissões. A violência implícita ou explícita dos acontecimentos está contida nos autos processuais, por meio das declarações das pessoas envolvidas e exige procedimentos jurídicos urgentes e eficazes. Inserida no universo dos interrogatórios, muitas vezes, a criança causa confusão ao desmentir o que havia falado antes, reforçando possíveis preconceitos em relação a si. Na especificidade da atuação da Psicologia no Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo, em Comarca do interior foi que surgiu o presente trabalho, mediante a vivência das dificuldades encontradas no atendimento à criança vítima de abuso sexual e a determinação judicial para a avaliação da veracidade de seu discurso. Esta pesquisa, utilizando o referencial da teoria das Representações Sociais, traz a análise das diferentes práticas discursivas relacionadas ao processo de produção da verdade nos processos judiciais de abuso sexual infantil. O principal objetivo desta pesquisa foi proporcionar uma revisão dos paradigmas jurídicos frente à problemática da criança vítima de abuso sexual, caracterizando as relações entre a infância e a instituição judiciária, com principal enfoque no sistema de comunicação e notificação desse crime e as conseqüentes intervenções profissionais que buscam a validação, ou não, do relato da criança. Para tanto, foram pesquisados 51 processos judiciais de crimes de atentado... / The sexual violence against children is not an uncommon event; however there is the accusation difficulty, because besides the establishment of the dominance relationship that the aggressor exercises on the victim, the way as such a fact is received by the society and as it is directed by the responsible judiciary institutions are also decisive for the omissions. The violence implicit or explicit of the events is contained in the procedural solemnities, through the involved people's declarations and it demands urgent and effective juridical procedures. Inserted in the interrogatory’s universe, many times, the child causes confusion when denying what had spoken before, reinforcing possible prejudices in relation of itself. In the specificity of the Psychology’s performance in the Tribunal of Justice of the State of São Paulo, in a interior’s District, the present work appeared, by the existence of the difficulties found in the service to the child victim of sexual abuse and the judicial determination for the evaluation of the truthfulness of its speech. This research, using the Theory of the Social Representation’s referential, brings the analysis of the different speech’s practice related to the production’s process of the truth in the infantile sexual abuse’s lawsuits. The main objective of this research was to provide a revision of the juridical paradigms compared to the victim of sexual abuse child's problem, characterizing the relations between the childhood and the judiciary institution, with main focus on the communication and notification system of this crime and the consequent professional interventions that search for the validation, or not, of the child's report. For so much, there were researched 51 lawsuits of crimes ...(Complete abstract, click electronic access below)

Si bien Parménides no otorga, como Jenófanes, una connotación fuertemente negativa al discurso mítico de la tradición poética, no es menos cierto que asistimos con él a una verdadera transmutación del discurso homérico y hesiódico, fundamentalmente en lo que concierne al problema complejo de la verdad, el engaño y la verosimilitud. La originalidad filosófica de Parménides consistiría no solamente en la elaboración de un logos que encarnaría por primera vez en Occidente la idea de una razón crítica personal”, capaz de juzgar” la refutación enunciada por la autoridad de una maestra de la verdad”, y en el establecimiento de un gnōmē (juicio) susceptible de elegir entre lo más verosímil y lo menos verosímil, sino también en el hecho de entablar, mucho antes que Platón –y a diferencia del Sofista–, una reflexión sobre la verdad y el error que está guiada por la cuestión de las buenas y malas mezclas, las buenas y malas separaciones.---Mythos and logos in Parmenides”. Although Parmenides does not present a strongly negative connotation of the mythical discourse of the poetic tradition, as Xenophanes does, there is no less truth to the fact that we witness with him a true transmutation of the Homeric and Hesiodic discourse, especially regarding the complex problem of truth, deceit and verisimilitude. The philosophical originality of Parmenides lies not only in the elaboration of a logos that would, for the first time in Western Thought, embody the idea of a personal critical reason”, capable of judging” the refutation pronounced by the authority of a Master of Truth”, nor in the institution of a gnōmē (judgement) capable of choosing between things with more or less verisimilitude, but also in the fact of undertaking, long before Plato –and in a different manner than in the Sophist–, a reflection on truth and error that is guided by the question of the good and bad combinations, the good and bad separations.