Wolfgang Bock hat die Kantaufsätze des renommierten Transzendentalphilosophen Werner Flach in einem Band herausgegeben. Der Band versammelt sowohl bereits veröffentlichte als auch neu verfasste Aufsätze Werner Flachs. Die Aufsätze widmen sich der gesamten Breite der Philosophie Kants– und es ist schier unmöglich, alle Aufsätze des Autors in diesem Rahmen zu referieren, geschweige denn, Ihnen in einer Diskussion gerecht zu werden. Der Rezensent muss somit eine Auswahl treffen. Ich konzentriere meine Besprechung deshalb auf die zwei thematischen Hauptgruppen der Aufsätze, die mir besonders systematisch relevant zu sein scheinen. Es handelt sich dabei erstens um Flachs Aufsätze zur theoretischen Philosophie Kants und zweitens um die Aufsätze, die sich der Geschichtsphilosophie Kants widmen.

The limit between the proper and the foreign – how this limit is established, but also crossed and dissolved – has remained a crucial issue in phenomenology. Setting these questions in the context of the phenomenology of religion, this thesis develops an analysis of the relation between transcendence and body understood in terms of a certain limit. The introductory part is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s discussions of the concept of transcendence, which is shown to have an essential connection to the analysis of inner time-consciousness. Here we encounter a decisive limit to objectifying knowledge, which also comes across in his investigations of the body and its spatiality. The second part discusses Max Scheler’s critique of Husserl’s excessively objectifying view of knowledge, with a particular focus on Scheler’s understanding of love as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. Scheler is shown to have developed a new concept of transcendence that avoids the pitfalls of objectivism, although in his philosophy of religion he tends to downplay the importance of the body. The third part undertakes a reading of Edith Stein, who develops ideas similar to Scheler’s, though in a phenomenologically more nuanced fashion. Although her philosophy of religion also bypasses the body, Stein provides a more genuine access to the writings of the mystics, the analysis of which forms the core of the fourth and concluding part. Drawing on the work of the 13th century Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, this concluding chapter develops a phenomenological understanding of religion with an emphasis on transcendence and limit, while also retaining the centrality of our experience of the body. This means: a phenomenology of the limit is investigated, rather than a limit of phenomenology. / Hur gränsen mellan det egna och det främmande ska dras är en central fråga inom den fenomenologiska traditionen, en fråga som här undersöks i ett religionsfilosofiskt sammanhang. På vilket sätt kan vi överskrida oss själva mot det främmande och ogripbara, och på vilket sätt är denna möjlighet förbunden med vår egen kroppslighet? Dessa teman utvecklas i en serie diskussioner av filosofer som Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler och Edith Stein. Redan i Husserls analyser av transcendensen, tidsmedvetandet och kroppsligheten framträder en bestämd gräns för den objektiverande kunskapen, även om han i sista hand alltid uppfattade den som ett ideal. I Schelers och Steins religionsfilosofier utvecklas därefter en kritik av denna kunskapssyn, bland annat i form av en analys av kärleken (Scheler) och mystiken (Stein), men hos ingen av dem får kroppsligheten en central ställning. I den avslutande delen, som analyserar den mystika erfarenhetens uttryck hos den medetida beginen Mechthild von Magdeburg, utvecklas en fenomenologi som förbinder transcendens med kroppslighet och sinnlighet. Därmed undersöks en gränsens fenomenologi snarare än fenomenologins gräns. Jonna Bornemark är forskare och lärare på Södertörns högskola. Boken är hennes doktorsavhandling.

<p>The study argues that implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of immigration as human rights is supported by principle of positive freedom, negative freedom, and equal autonomy. The study endorses a liberal egalitarian perspective by claiming that human right to immigrate promotes equal autonomy. The study also investigates why the principle of immigration as a human right has been dismissed by doctrines within Liberalism. It argues that a state lacks a legitimacy to employ a principle of national self-determination against the immigration issue. Instead, a state has a moral obligation to the protection of a human right to immigrate; it also has a duty to provide equal social rights to the immigrants in compared with those of the citizens.</p>

<p>Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.</p> / <p>This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.</p>

<p>Through the notions of <em>the</em> <em>untimely</em> (l'intempestif) and <em>untimeliness</em> (intempestif) this paper seeks to gain a better understanding of the problematic surrounding and determining the concept of time in Deleuze. By tracing Deleuze's development of the concept of the untimely through Nietzsche and Kant, we are allowed to concretize the concept of time as pertaining to an experience of modernity (modern life), thus enabling us to better determine the place it holds within the philosophy of Deleuze itself - as a constitutive and productive problematic relating directly to the activity of thinking and being philosophically.</p>

This study offers the first comprehensive account of the problem of situation-dependence and facticity in Husserl's phenomenology of meaning. On the basis of a reconsideration of the central ideas of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning and intentionality, it presents a reconstruction and assessment of Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning. Taking its lead from Husserl's self-critical remark on the analysis of "occasional expressions" in the Logical Investigations, the study uncovers the underlying problem with Husserl's initial conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. It is shown that the problem of occasionality does not relate to indexicality in a standard sense, but to the essential facticity and subject-relativity of the intentional individuation of real being in general and to the contingency and inexhaustible transcendence of the world. The reconstruction of Husserl's solution is carefully related to an interpretation of central ideas of Husserl's developed philosophy. Critically reviewing influential interpretations of Husserl, the study elaborates on the question of internalism and externalism, the question of representationalism, the question of ideal contents, the notion of noema and the issues of direct reference and de re meaning. It is shown how Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning is related to the analysis of horizon-intentionality, to the constitution of the transcendent real world and to the constitution of the lived body as a centre of situated orientation. It is argued that Husserl succeeds in maintaining phenomenological internalism with regard to intentionality in concreto, while accepting a form of externalism with regard to meaning, according to which the possibility of true identity of meaning is bound to the presumptive existence of the experienced world.

This dissertation treats of the problem of attributing the occurrence of an individual event or state to a single cause — a problem commonly understood either as a question of distinguishing the cause from the mere conditions or as a matter of singling out, from several causes, one cause, as the cause. The main purpose of the study is to clarify some basic concepts, and some criteria of ascertainment of the cause, that may be discerned in the literature on causal attribution. Special attention is devoted to how the adequacy of causal attributions depends on pragmatic factors. The study begins with an analysis of J. S. Mill’s distinction in A System of Logic between a scientific and a common-parlance approach to the problem of causal attribution. Mill’s assumption that causal attribution in science always requires a universal-law subsumption is then examined in the context of a general discussion of the range of applicability of the covering-law model of explanation. Mill’s scientific and common-parlance notions of cause are compared with R. G. Collingwood’s historical (sense-I) and scientific (sense-II and -III) notions of cause. It is argued that there are purposes of inquiry for which Mill’s common-parlance approach is more relevant to causal attribution in natural science than his scientific approach. And, more generally, it is argued that although law subsumptions are necessary for the ascertainment of the causes, more is often required for explaining the effect. Samuel Gorovitz’s differentiating-factor analysis is discussed, and limitations of the model are identified. The relevance of Morton White’s abnormalistic approach to historical research is also examined. Further, a number of objectivistic approaches are discussed, and it is argued that objectivity is not attainable in causal attributions in a sense in which it always implies an improvement of our ability to attribute the occurrence of an individual event or state to a single cause.

The thesis investigates how the notion of ‘ontology’ has been used in the field of medical informatics and knowledge representation. Partly to investigate what an ‘ontology’ can be said to represent and what requirements we can have on a good ‘ontology’. The author studies the already existing medical terminologies and ‘ontologies’ to elucidate what theories they are based on. The terminological theories of Eugen Wüster and his legacy in medical informatics are studied. It is noted that terminological theories handling linguistic entities are not suited for describing and representing medical theories, since these are assumed to refer to the real world, which consists of more than linguistics entities. In order to find a metaphysical theory in accordance with the world view that medical theories describe, the author turn to the critical realism of Karl Popper, Roy Bhaskar and Ilkka Niiniluoto. These theories, taken together with the metaphysical theories regarding universals of David M Armstrong and Ingvar Johansson, are used as a basis to find out what an ‘ontology’ can be said to represent, and what criteria and requirements we can have on a good ‘ontology’. Among the requirements presented in the thesis are stability, interoperability and the requirement that a good ‘ontology’ must be in accordance with our best available theories. Finally, it is discussed how these requirements and criteria can come into conflict with one another, and how one should reason when handling these trade-offs. The author emphasises the importance of including the medical expertise in the process of creating ‘ontologies’, in order to produce as useful and relevant ‘ontologies’ as possible. / Avhandlingen undersöker hur begreppet ’ontology’ används inom den medicinska informatiken och kunskapsrepresentation. Dels ämnar avhandlingen att utreda vad en ’ontology’ kan sägas representera och dels vilka krav man kan ställa på en god ’ontology’. Utifrån historiska studier av redan existerande medicinska terminologier och ontologier studeras vilka teorier som ligger till grund för dessa. Bland annat studeras Eugen Wüsters teorier rörande terminologi och hur dennes efterföljare inom medicinsk informatik ser ut. Författaren konstaterar att terminologiska teorier som behandlar språkliga entiteter inte är lämpliga för att beskriva och representera medicinska teorier, då dessa antas handla om en verklighet bestående av mer än språkliga entiteter. För att hitta en metafysisk teori som stämmer överens med den världsbild som de medicinska teorierna beskriver, vänder sig författaren till Karl Poppers, Ilkka Niiniluotos och Roy Bhaskars syn på kritisk realism, vad det gäller vetenskapliga teorier. Detta tillsammans David M Armstrongs och Ingvar Johanssons metafysiska teorier rörande immanent realism och universalia, används som grund för att försöka analysera vad en ’ontology’ kan sägas representera, och vilka krav vi kan ställa på en god ’ontology’. Bland de krav som presenteras i avhandlingen finns stabilitet, interoperabilitet och kravet på att en god ’ontology’ ska vara i enlighet med de bästa tillgängliga vetenskapliga teorierna. Avslutningsvis diskuteras hur dessa krav kan komma i konflikt med varandra, och hur man bör resonera när man hanterar dessa ’trade-offs’. Författaren poängterar vikten av att man tar med medicinska expertisen i skapandeprocessen av ’ontologies’, för att man ska producera så användbara och relevanta ’ontologies’ som möjligt.

The study argues that implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principle of immigration as human rights is supported by principle of positive freedom, negative freedom, and equal autonomy. The study endorses a liberal egalitarian perspective by claiming that human right to immigrate promotes equal autonomy. The study also investigates why the principle of immigration as a human right has been dismissed by doctrines within Liberalism. It argues that a state lacks a legitimacy to employ a principle of national self-determination against the immigration issue. Instead, a state has a moral obligation to the protection of a human right to immigrate; it also has a duty to provide equal social rights to the immigrants in compared with those of the citizens.

Through the notions of the untimely (l'intempestif) and untimeliness (intempestif) this paper seeks to gain a better understanding of the problematic surrounding and determining the concept of time in Deleuze. By tracing Deleuze's development of the concept of the untimely through Nietzsche and Kant, we are allowed to concretize the concept of time as pertaining to an experience of modernity (modern life), thus enabling us to better determine the place it holds within the philosophy of Deleuze itself - as a constitutive and productive problematic relating directly to the activity of thinking and being philosophically.