Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-06-08T12:30:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristiny Mroczkoski Rocha._pdf.pdf: 4286717 bytes, checksum: fb46c4c811b9c52c4e347205df77e428 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-06-08T12:30:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristiny Mroczkoski Rocha._pdf.pdf: 4286717 bytes, checksum: fb46c4c811b9c52c4e347205df77e428 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-27 / Nenhuma / No Estado Democrático de Direito a verdadeira práxis reside na efetiva concretização dos direitos e garantias fundamentais dos indivíduos, e não mais unicamente na realização da vontade concreta da lei. É função da Justiça tutelar os direitos, prestando-se o processo como o meio pelo qual a parte pode alcançar a tutela almejada ao direito em crise de efetividade. Ocorre que, a duração do processo muitas vezes desponta como óbice a gerar prejuízos e situações injustas, lançando ônus precisamente sobre aquele que se encontra na condição de merecedor da tutela jurisdicional. Nesse sentido, fala-se então em tutelas diferenciadas, que prestam-se como meios de regulação provisória da crise de direito em que se encontram o(s) litigante(s). O Código de Processo Civil (Lei nº 13.105/2015) promoveu grandes mudanças em sede dessas tutelas, ditas ‘tutelas provisórias’, que são remédios processuais, em termos efetivos, para a busca de celeridade na prestação jurisdicional, seja para salvaguardar um direito, para satisfazê-lo, ou mesmo para reconhecê-lo como evidente. Daí que fala-se em um redimensionamento do tempo, a fim de tratar aquilo que François Ost já denominou de destemporalização do Direito. Contudo, para além de uma análise dogmática de todas as inovações advindas com a nova legislação, se mostra necessária uma investigação da própria práxis em sede de cognição sumária, como forma de verificar como o Estado-juiz, a um nível qualitativo, as tem prestado. Nesse especial, surge a Teoria Estruturante do Direito de Friedrich Müller, preocupada diretamente com a concretização da norma (e, assim, do próprio Direito). É uma teoria que parte de um viés indutivo, sendo considera pós-positivistas, isto é, apta a superar os limites dos positivismo jurídico (mera formalidade em detrimento da substancialidade). Diretamente ligada a corrente jusconstitucionalista (constitucionalismo contemporâneo) que aproxima o Direito da realidade, permite além de maior racionalidade ao trabalho do judiciário, a concretização de direitos e normatividade da norma decisória voltada ao caso concreto. No estanto, não se pode desconsiderar que os provimentos jurisdicionais, à luz do Estado Democrático de Direito, devem abarcar os conceitos de ‘coerência e integridade’, vetores principiológicos pelos quais todo o sistema jurídico deve ser lido. Nesse viés, possibilita-se o diálogo da TED com a Teoria de Ronald Dworkin, inclusive porque o novo Código de Processo Civil adotou os preceitos dworkinianos como “ferramentas” aptas a diminuir o voluntarismo judicial, sem, contudo, refletir como objetivo a promoção de tutelas exaurientes (onde há maior grau de certeza jurídica quanto à controvérsia). Tomando-se em consideração este cenário e sendo esta uma área da processualística onde denuncia-se o protagonismo judicial, surge a celeuma: como a Teoria e Metódica Estruturante de Friedrich Müller pode contribuir para a concretização da norma decisória em cognição sumária? Essa estruturação da norma reflete à promoção de coerência e integridade’, incentivando, por conseguinte, a uma teoria da decisão judicial que se coadune com o Estado de Direito fruto de uma democracia constitucional? / In the Democratic State of Right, the real practice lies in the effective realization of the fundamental rights and guarantees of individuals, and no longer solely in the realization of the concrete will of the law. It is a function of Justice provides the guardianship of the rights, rendering the process as the means by which the part can reach the tutelage aimed for the right in crisis of effectiveness. It happens that, the duration of the process often appears as an obstacle to generate losses and unfair situations, placing onus precisely on the one who is in the condition of worthy of the judicial protection. In this sense, there is talk of differentiated tutelages, which are provided The Civil Procedure Code (Law no. 13.105 / 2015) has promoted major changes in these tutelas, so-called 'provisional tutelages', which are procedural remedies, in effective terms, for the pursuit of speed in the jurisdictional provision, either to safeguard a right, to satisfy it, or even to acknowledge it as self-evident. Hence we are talking about a resizing of time, in order to deal with what François Ost has already called the timelessness of Law. However, in addition to a dogmatic analysis of all the innovations that come with the new legislation, it is necessary to investigate the praxis itself in terms of summary cognition, as a way of verifying how the State-judge, on a qualitative level, has provided them. In this special, there is Friedrich Müller's Theory of Law, concerned directly with the concretization of the norm (and thus of the right itself). It is a theory that starts from an inductive bias, being considered post-positivist, that is, able to overcome the limits of legal positivism (mere formality to the detriment of substantiality). Directly linked to the current jusconstitutionalism (contemporary constitutionalism) that approximates the law to the reality, it allows, in addition to a greater rationality to the work of the judiciary, the concretization of rights and provides the normativity to the decisory rule directed to the concrete case. In this respect, it can not be disregarded that jurisdictional appeals, in the light of the Democratic Rule of Law, should embrace the concepts of 'coherence and integrity', the principle vectors by which the entire legal system must be read. In this bias, is it possible the dialogue between TED's and Ronald Dworkin's Theory, also because the new Code of Civil Procedure adopted the Dworkinian precepts as "tools" capable of diminishing judicial voluntarism, without, however, reflect that as an objective of promoting tutelages in exhaust cognition(where there is greater degree of legal certainty about the controversy). Taking this scenario into account and being an area of the procedural where the judicial protagonism is denounced, there is a stir: how can Friedrich Müller's Theory and Structural Methodology contribute to the realization of the normative decision-making in summary cognition? Does this structuring of the norm reflect the promotion of 'coherence and integrity', thus encouraging a theory of judicial decision that is consistent with the rule of law resulting from a constitutional democracy?

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-02-29T13:41:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lanaira da Silva_.pdf: 1030082 bytes, checksum: 7ad012030e40ab9677f8e998dd87e93a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-29T13:41:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lanaira da Silva_.pdf: 1030082 bytes, checksum: 7ad012030e40ab9677f8e998dd87e93a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-14 / Nenhuma / A partir da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito (Lenio Streck), o presente estudo buscou abordar, em uma perspectiva comparativa, aspectos elementares da estruturação normativa na Teoria e Metódica Estruturante do Direito (Friedrich Müller). Nesse sentido, o ponto fundamental na discussão proposta é o modo como se dão as concepções normativas de cada teoria. Tanto a Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito quanto a Teoria Estruturante do Direito distinguem-se de tantas outras teorias (de acepções positivistas) por apresentarem originalmente um tratamento diferenciado a essa questão que se revela como um ponto de partida essencial: a norma. A partir dessa constatação, ao trazer o debate para o interior dos paradigmas filosóficos (com inserção de um teorema fundamental da Filosofia Hermenêutica: a diferença ontológica), foi possível problematizar a amplitude de como esta distinção fundamental é capaz de desvelar, sob um outro viés, a diferença existente entre texto e norma. Dentro de um “chão” comum entre Crítica Hermenêutica, e Teoria Estruturante, em virtude da influente presença da “Hermenêutica Filosófica”, foram levantados alguns pontos de (des)encontros entre os autores, observando um critério fundamental para que uma teoria se designe “Pós-positivista”: o enfrentamento da discricionariedade. / From the “Hermeneutical Critique of law” (Lenio Streck), this study sought to address in a comparative perspective, elementary aspects of the regulatory structure in Theory and Methodical Structuring Law (Friedrich Müller). In this sense, the fundamental point in the proposed discussion is how to give the normative conceptions of each theory. Both Hermeneutical Critique of Law as the Structuring Theory of Law distinguished from many other theories (of positivists meanings) originally presented by different treatment to that question turns out to be an essential starting point: the norm. From this evidence, to bring the debate to the interior of the philosophical paradigms (with insertion of a fundamental theorem of Hermeneutics Philosophy: the ontological difference) it was possible to discuss the scope of how this fundamental distinction is able to reveal, under another, the distinction between text and standard. Within a "commonground" among “Hermeneutical Critique” and “Structuring Theory”, due to the influential presence of the "Philosophical Hermeneutics", some points were raised (un) meetings between authors observing a fundamental criterion for a theory designating of "Post -positivism ": the confrontation of discretion.

The focus of this study is the property rights theories tested in the context of Modern China’s rural areas. It is divided into three parts: Part I presents the theoretical framework, concepts. These form the analytical tools. Part II briefly describes the three big transformation of rural arable land ownership in modern China. This is a particular case in which the theoretical framework can be tested. In Part III of this study I apply the analytical framework developed in part I to understand the puzzles and problems described in part II. This is the application of theory to the history and reality. In this research, I show that the change of property rights is central to political, economic and social change in that particular society. As a formal institution, property rights provide an incentive or disincentive structure for a particular economy. The contrasting economic performance in modern China’s agriculture can be well explained by the underlying force— the property rights institutional arrangement. The stagnation and decline of Chinese economy and universal poverty is conditioned by the disincentive structure of the Commune System. While the specular economic growth and its relief of poverty is driven by the incentive structure of the Household Responsibility System (HRS). The success of the HRS is in that it is not only a government institutional arrangement but also a communal institutional arrangement in its origin. The rules created by the peasants themselves are legitimized by the central government as property rights. It really matter who creates the property rights and for whom. This research attempts to enrich our knowledge in social science. It challenges the conventional and standard political and economic theory used to explain Chinese puzzles in its economic growth and social development. In the theoretical sphere, it contributes mainly to the literature of Marx’s theory of property, Honoré’s concept of ownership and Ostrom’s theory of common-pool resources and institutional change. In the practical sphere, it contributes to our understanding of the radical and complex change in Modern China’s rural areas.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-11-18T13:53:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus Di Palma Back_.pdf: 1065653 bytes, checksum: d5a23ae5c08125bd959ac841e5c48e35 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-18T13:53:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus Di Palma Back_.pdf: 1065653 bytes, checksum: d5a23ae5c08125bd959ac841e5c48e35 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-16 / Nenhuma / Trata-se de dissertação que compara os conceitos de Direito carregados por categorias diferentes teorias do Direito. O conceito de norma jurídica descrito por Hans Kelsen e o conceito de expectativa normativa descrito por Niklas Luhmann têm em comum somente o fato de serem o produto de observações voltadas para uma realidade normativa. As suas semelhanças se encerram aí. Nesse sentido, a norma jurídica de Kelsen é marcada pela diferença entre o factual e o normativo, enquanto a expectativa normativa de Luhmann é marcada pela diferença entre o cognitivo e o normativo. Ainda que essas categorizações não sejam são diretamente comparáveis, na medida em que ambos esses conceitos são utilizados pelos seus autores para as suas descrições do Direito, esses conceitos tornam-se, na sua diferença, representativos da diferença que existe entre os conceitos de Direito que os fundamentam. Esse trabalho pretende se valer deles para realizar uma análise comparativa de ambas as descrições: entre o conceito normativo de Direito em Kelsen e o conceito sociológico em Luhmann. Ele será um trabalho bibliográfico e comparativo. A metodologia adotada será a seguinte: em um primeiro momento se apresentarão os fundamentos do modo descritivo da teoria do Direito de Kelsen; após, se apresentarão os fundamentos do modo descritivo da sociologia do Direito de Luhmann; e, ao final, se buscará, a partir dos conceitos-chave mencionados, os conceitos de Direito que os fundamentam para realizar a oposição dos diferentes modos de observação do Direito. Como resultado da pesquisa, concluiu-se que, ainda que realmente se compare um conceito analítico com outro funcional, as diferenças referentes aos conceitos não puderam ser resumidas ao potencial transdisciplinar das teorias, mas à uma opção de como se aproximar do objeto de pesquisa. / This is a dissertation which compares the concepts of law as presented by categories of diferent theories of Law. The concept of legal norm described by Hans Kelsen and the concept of normative expectations described by Niklas Luhmann have in common only the fact that they are the product of observations aimed at a normative reality. Their similarities end there. In this sense, Kelsen’s legal norm is marked by the difference between factual and normative, while Luhmann’s normative expectation is marked by the difference between cognitive and normative. These categorizations are not directly comparable, however, to the extent that both of these concepts are used by the authors for their descriptions of the law, these concepts become, in their difference, representative of the difference between the concepts of Law underlying them. This work intends to make use of them to carry out a comparative analysis of both descriptions: between Kelsen’s normative concept of law and Luhmann’s sociological one. It will be a bibliographical and comparative work. The way to do this is as follows: at first it will be presented the fundamentals of the descriptive mode of Kelsen’s theory of law; a second phase will present the fundamentals of the descriptive way of Luhmann’s sociology of law; in the end, it will be sought to derive, from the key concepts mentioned, those concepts of law underlying them for the purpose of oposing the different ways of observing the law. As a result of the research, it was concluded that, although it is really a comparison between an analytical concept with a functional one, differences related to the concepts could not be summarized to the transdisciplinary potential of theories, but to a choice of how to approach the object of research.

Mit zunehmender Globalisierung wird es für deutsche Unternehmen als notwendig angesehen, deutsches Bilanzrecht zu Gunsten internationaler Regeln aufzugeben, um Zugang zu den internationalen Kapitalmärkten zu erhalten. Aber ist das deutsche Bilanzrecht tatsächlich schlechter als internationale Bilanzierungsstandards und sollte es demzufolge an diese ange-paßt werden? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird versucht, die Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts auf Bilanzierungsregeln anzuwenden, wobei § 249 HGB als typisches Beispiel dient. Es wird ein einfaches Unternehmensmodell in einer neo-institutionalistischen Welt eingeführt, dessen Schwerpunkt auf den Finanzierungsbeziehungen der Unternehmung liegt. Es wird unter-schieden zwischen den finanziellen Beziehungen der Anteilseigner, die das Unternehmen gegründet haben, den Beziehungen zwischen gegenwärtigen und potentiellen Anteilseignern und schließlich der Beziehung von Unternehmung und Banken. Während traditionelle Bilanztheorien oder -ansätze nicht einmal geeignet sind, den § 249 HGB in seiner Gesamtheit zu erklären, gelingt es den neueren Ansätze, die Agency Theorie bzw. die Theorie des Marktver-sagens mit Bilanztheorien verbinden, die Funktionen des § 249 HGB in einzelnen finanziellen Beziehungen zu erklären. Jedoch ist keiner dieser Ansätze in der Lage, die Funktionen des § 249 HGB in allen Beziehungen des Modells auf einmal zu erklären. Durch Anwendung der jüngst entwickelten Neuen Institutionenökonomie, die verschiedene Ansätze miteinander verbindet, gelingt es unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ökono-mischen Vertragstheorie alle finanziellen Beziehungen in der Unternehmung und zwischen der Unternehmung und den Finanzmärkten als Verträge zu interpretieren. Dadurch erhalten juristisches Denken und Bilanztheorien einen gemeinsamen Nenner. Verschiedene Ansätze können zu einem umfassenden System verknüpft werden, in welchem die Funktionen des § 249 HGB in den verschie-denen finanziellen Beziehungen positiv analysiert werden können. Die positive Analyse beantwortet jedoch nicht die Frage wie Bilanzierungsregeln ausgestaltet sein sollten. An dieser Stelle kann die Konstitu-tionenökonomie das fehlende Bindeglied darstellen. Sie faßt sämtliche Beziehungen als Ergebnis individueller Verträge zwischen Individuen auf. Alle Regeln können dann normativ analysiert werden, indem gefragt wird, ob sich die Betroffenen für oder gegen die Regel ausgesprochen hätten, wenn sie vorher gefragt worden wären. Hätten sie sich für eine Regel entschieden, dann dient diese Regel ihren Interessen. Ist mehr Wissen verfügbar, kann die Befragung wiederholt werden, und das Ergebnis kann sich zugunsten einer besseren Regel ändern. Es wird als ausreichend angesehen, wenn sich die Betroffenen freiwillig auf abstrakte Regeln einigen, wie die Verfassung. Vergleicht man den Gesellschaftsvertrag, den die Unternehmensgründer schließen, mit der Verfassung, läßt sich zeigen, daß Unterneh-mensgründer unter bestimmten Umständen freiwillig bereit wären, sich auf Regeln wie den § 249 HGB zu einigen. Ob die Einigung zustande kommt, hängt davon ab, wie die Unternehmung finanziert werden soll. Daraus kann geschlossen werden, daß die Besonderheiten des deutschen Bilanzrechts, die der § 249 HGB repräsentiert, nicht einfach aufgegeben werden sollten, nur um Forderungen internationaler Märkte zu folgen. Für bestimmte Unternehmen erfüllen deut-sche Bilanzierungsstandards ihren Zweck und sollten für diese als Option erhalten bleiben. / With the world turning into a global village it is generally considered necessary for German companies to abandon German accounting rules in favor of international standards in order to access money markets. But is German accounting law as laid down in the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) really inferior to international standards and should it consequently be adjusted to international rules? To answer these questions it is attempted to apply economic theory of law to accounting rules, using § 249 HGB as a typical example. To this purpose a simple business model in a in a neo-institutional world is introduced where the emphasis is put on different kinds of financial relations. A distinction is made between the financial relations between the shareholders that founded the company, the financial relations between new shareholders and the founders of the company and finally the relationship between the company and banks financing the business. Whereas traditional accounting theories or approaches even fail to fully explain the set of rules put down in § 249 HGB, newer approaches combining agency theory and/or the theory of market failure with accounting theory are able to explain the function of § 249 HGB in one financial relation at a time. However, none of these approaches is applicable to all financial relations as depicted in the model. Using new institutional economics, a recently developed theory combining different other approaches in economics, and putting the emphasis on (economic) contract theory, it is possible to understand all financial relations within a company as well as the financial relations between a company and the money markets as contracts. This way legal thinking and newer accounting theories have a common denominator. Different approaches can be combined to form a comprehensive system. Within this system the functions of § 249 HGB in the model´s different financial relations can be positively analyzed. However, positive analysis does not provide the answer to the question of how German accounting rules should be. This is where constitutional economics may provide the missing link. Constitutional economics interpret all kinds of relationships as individual contracts between human beings. Then any given rule can be normatively analyzed by simply asking the people if they would have voted for or against the rule if they had been asked in advance. If they had voted for the rule then the rule is made the way it serves peoples´ interests best. However, if more knowledge is available the questioning can be repeated and the outcome may change in favor of better rules. It is considered sufficient that people voluntarily agree to a rule on a very abstract level, e.g. to the constitution. If the contract the founders of a company have to agree to is compared to the constitution, it can be shown that the founders of the company might under certain circumstances voluntarily agree to the rules as they are laid down in § 249 HGB. If agreement can be reached depends on the financial plans they have for the company. Therefore it can be concluded that specifics of German accounting law as represented in § 249 HGB should not simply be given up to follow the demands of the international money markets. For certain classes of companies German accounting rules serve their purpose and should at least be kept as an option for these companies.

In this article, the author tells us about the precedent along with its characteristics, as well as its role in the law. He tells us, also, about the situation of a precedent ruled by an International Court and its implications in the domestic law of each country. Likewise, he defines what is not a precedent and points us how effective is in the Law. Finally, he points us about the particularity and the universalism in the precedents, then he gave us his final thought of this theme. / En el presente artículo, el autor nos habla acerca del precedente y sus características, así como de su papel en el Derecho. Asimismo, profundiza la situación de un precedente emitido por una Corte Internacional y sus implicancias en el derecho interno de cada país. Asimismo, define qué no es un precedente y nos señala cuál es su eficacia en el Derecho. Finalmente, nos menciona acerca de la particularidad y el universalismo en los precedentes, para luego dar su reflexión final sobre el tema.

In this article, the author analyzes the complexity of a common problem in many parts of the world: social conflicts, putting emphasis on socio-environmental ones. Consequently, he starts addressing the social conflict concept and its elements, to approximate to its comprehension through various conceptions of the Theory of Law.Finally, the author provides a socio-anthropological analysis of Law in order to understand the importance of the knowledge of structural and systemic causes of socio-environmental conflicts and outlines an alternative solution. / En el presente artículo, el autor destaca y aborda la complejidad de un problema no poco común en nuestro país: los conflictos sociales, poniendo especial énfasis en aquellos de tipo socio-ambientales. Para ello, parte del concepto de conflicto social y analiza cada elemento que lo compone, para luego aproximarse a su comprensión a través de diversas concepciones de la Teoría del Derecho.Finalmente, realiza un análisis socio-antropológico del derecho para comprender la importancia del conocimiento de las causas estructurales y sistemáticas de los conflictos socio-ambientales, y esboza una alternativa de solución.

The author claims that, from a general perspective, the economic analysis of infonnation and its relation with law presents a strong inefficiency. The author develops a study ofthe economic incentives in general and the manner how prívate property is constituted as the principal but is not the only one of the economic incentives for the production of information and innovation. In strict sense, the author explores the ontology of property, showing that it does not allow the inclusion of immaterial and intangible goods since the modern fundamentals of such institution come form the appropriation and the homesteading rule, categories incompatible with the ontology of information. Into such argumentation, the author studies the economic incentive theories for information and innovation, initiating with the study of the characters of information and the fallacies that always had surrounded such good. The author concludes showing that intellectual property rights are not the product of an evolutionary process, but, on the contrary, they come from privileges conceded by the State, which its justification and fundament is invalid and equivocal due to the incompatibility of the property and the homesteading rule with the ontology of information. / El autor argumenta que, desde una perspectiva general, el análisis económico de la información y su relación con el derecho presenta una ineficiencia liminar. Para ello, desarrolla un estudio de los incentivos económicos en general y de la manera como la propiedad privada se constituye en el principal pero no el único de los incentivos económicos a la producción de información e innovación. En sentido estricto el autor hace una ontología de la propiedad, demostrando que ella no permite la inclusión de bienes inmateriales o intangibles en tanto que el fundamento moderno de tal institución proviene de la apropiación y la ocupación, categorías incompatibles con la naturaleza de la información. Dentro de tal argumentación, el autor se fundamenta en el espectro de los incentivos económicos para la producción de información e innovación, iniciando con un estudio de la naturaleza de la información y las falacias que siempre han rodeado a dicho bien. El autor concluye mostrando que los derechos de propiedad intelectual no son el producto de un proceso evolutivo de una institución como la propiedad, sino que, por el contrario, ellos proceden de privilegios concedidos por el Estado, cuya justificación y fundamento es inválido y equivoco debido a la incompatibilidad del ser de la propiedad y la ocupación con la ontología de la información

Submitted by Ana Carla Almeida (ana.almeida@ucsal.br) on 2018-05-17T19:12:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAOEURIPIDESCUNHAJUNIOR.pdf: 2056563 bytes, checksum: 6ff16ac852ae6fdf63018a74c5062bd4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rosemary Magalhães (rosemary.magalhaes@ucsal.br) on 2018-05-17T19:52:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAOEURIPEDESCUNHAJUNIOR.pdf: 2056563 bytes, checksum: 6ff16ac852ae6fdf63018a74c5062bd4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-17T19:52:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTACAOEURIPEDESCUNHAJUNIOR.pdf: 2056563 bytes, checksum: 6ff16ac852ae6fdf63018a74c5062bd4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-29 / A partir da noção da família contemporânea como um grupo social humano primário, constituído de uma plena relação social entre seus membros, como espaço de entrelaçamento entre o privado e o público, esta pesquisa procura identificar os impactos nela causados pelo processo de secularização como fenômeno cultural correspondente a um desenraizamento, correlato a um processo de laicização como fenômeno político, dentre os quais a pluralização das formas familiares, manifestada na legitimação social de novos modos de ser família, que tomam como referência, a ser reforçada ou combatida, uma estrutura latente baseada na tríade pai-mãe-filho, em que o amor é meio simbólico generalizado de intercâmbio, combinando em certo modo os elementos dom, reciprocidade, generatividade e sexualidade, tendo a dignidade da pessoa humana como macroprincípio jurídico fundador do princípio do livre desenvolvimento da pessoa humana. Como segundo objetivo, investiga os reflexos de tais fenômenos sobre o ordenamento jurídico, em especial se as intenções de valor dos grupos minoritários politicamente ativos incidentes sobre referida base de fato constituem poder a interferir no processo legislativo a ponto de convertê-las em norma jurídica. O terceiro objetivo é identificar, em meio à pluralização das formas familiares, se alguma delas possibilita maiores chances de duração e de êxito, a si própria e a seus membros. / Starting with the notion of contemporary family as a primary human social unit consisting of a complete social relationship among its members, and as space of entanglement between the private and the public, this research aims to identify the impacts on it by the secularization as a cultural process phenomenon corresponding to an uprooting, related to a laicization process as a political circumstance, among which the pluralization of the family forms revealed in the social legitimation of new modes about being family that use as reference — to be either reinforced of fought against — a latent structure based on the father-mother-child triad in which love is the generalized, symbolic means of exchange, somehow combining the four components or elements, namely gift, reciprocity generativity and sexuality, and the dignity of the human being as indeed a higher value and a founding principle the ensures free development of individuals. As a secondary endpoint, this work investigates the effect of such phenomena on the legal framework, notably whether the intention of value from politically active minorities impinging on the above base constitute power that interferes on the law-making process to the extent that they are turned into legal norms. The third endpoint is to identify among the pluralization of the family forms if there is anyone which is most likely to be successful and long-lasting regarding itself and its members.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T13:42:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Abner Ribeiro Salaroli.pdf: 1501159 bytes, checksum: 785e0b746fea831ea9b6ac9abb4c02d4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-09-06 / It was sought in this study to investigate how the public consultation process can influence the delimitation of the International Public Accounting Standards (IPSAS) issued by IFAC. Thus, it was possible to identify the participation of several worldwide agents, in addition to verify the link between the characteristics of suggestions submitted and its acceptance by the responsible agency. This research was based on theoretical conceptual the Tridimensional Theory of Law, developed by Miguel Reale, wherein fact, value and norm are present and are related consistently, dialectical and complementary throughout the regulatory process, in the case in question, the accounting standardization. The facts represent present situations in the context of each participant, which are, in its turn, oriented, among other factors, by ideologies and principles, which are the values. Already the norm is the result of the relation between facts and values and is represented here by the IPSAS. As a methodological approach, resorted to documental research, to the content analysis and to the quantitative analysis through the Chi-square test and the interpretation of standardized residuals. From the sample, composed by suggestions made in 123 letters, was identified 59 agents from many countries, and 76% were not owned by the IFAC members. Also, the institutions occurred in seven different grades, such as professional institutions, regional standardization bodies, government agencies. On the acceptance level of the submitted contributions, were counted 926 suggestions, of which 322 somehow, the IFAC held. Moreover, there was an expressive participation from Oceania with 29.5% of the contributions total and participation of the Accounting Standards Board (South Africa) and the Australian Heads of Treasuries Accounting and Reporting Advisory Committee (HoTARAC) and Australian Accounting Standards Board, and both institutions that most delivered contributions. Additionally, the quantitative approach, succeeded evidence of a greater association between the suggestions of non-members and acceptance by the IFAC. There was also a strong link between compliance and the contributions of type Form. Still, for the entire sample, there was no evidence of dependence between the level of acceptance and the fact that the items whether they are converging standards issued by the IASB. However, the tests for each statement occurred, in some cases, evidence of association for both situations: approach and distancing of private standards, according to the sub-sample analyzed / Buscou-se neste estudo investigar como o processo de consulta pública pode influenciar o delineamento das Normas Internacionais de Contabilidade Pública (IPSAS), emitidas pela IFAC. Nesse sentido, foi possível identificar a participação de vários agentes mundiais, além de verificar a relação entre as características das sugestões enviadas e sua aceitação pelo órgão responsável. Esta pesquisa teve como base teórica e conceitual a Teoria Tridimensional do Direito, desenvolvida por Miguel Reale, na qual fato, valor e norma estão presentes e se relacionam de forma constante, dialética e complementar, ao longo do processo normativo e, no caso em tela, a normatização contábil. Os fatos representam situações presentes no contexto de cada participante, as quais são, por seu turno, orientadas, entre outros fatores, por ideologias e princípios, que são os valores. Já a norma é fruto da relação entre fatos e valores e é aqui representada pelas IPSAS. Como abordagem metodológica, recorreu-se à pesquisa documental, à análise de conteúdo e à análise quantitativa, por meio do teste Qui-quadrado e da interpretação dos resíduos padronizados. Da amostra, composta pelas sugestões presentes em 123 cartas, houve identificação de 59 agentes de diversos países, dos quais 76% não eram pertencentes ao corpo de membros da IFAC. Ainda, as instituições ocorreram em sete diferentes classes, como órgãos profissionais, organismos regionais de normalização, órgãos governamentais. Sobre o nível de aceitação das contribuições enviadas, contaram-se 926 sugestões, das quais 322, de alguma forma, a IFAC considerou. Ademais, houve expressiva participação da Oceania com 29,5% do total de contribuições e a participação do Accounting Standards Board (África do Sul) e dos australianos Heads of Treasuries Accounting and Reporting Advisory Committee (HoTARAC) e Australian Accounting Standards Board, sendo ambas as instituições que mais forneceram contribuições. Além disso, pela abordagem quantitativa, sucederam evidências de maior associação entre as sugestões de não membros e aceitação pela IFAC. Também ocorreu uma forte ligação entre o acatamento e as contribuições do tipo Forma. Ainda, para a totalidade da amostra, não houve comprovação de dependência entre o nível de aceitação e o fato de os itens serem ou não convergentes às normas emitidas pelo IASB. Entretanto, nos testes para cada pronunciamento ocorreram, em alguns casos, evidências de associação para ambas as situações: aproximação e distanciamento das normas privadas, de acordo com a subamostra analisada