Thesis (DPhil) -- Stellenbosch University, 1936. / VOORWOORD: Verskillende skrywers het verskillende interpretasies gegee van wat die eintlike onderwerp van die Geskiedenis van die Onderwys uitmaak. So is nog tot onlangs die beskouing gehuldig dat dit die geskiedenis van groot opvoedkundiges, hulle lewe en werke, moet weergee. Met dit as uitgangspunt is egter nie 'n goeie insig in sake te verkry nie en is die voorstelling noodwendig eensydig. Vir die opvatting dat dit 'n geskiedenis van pedagogiese stelsels is, is miskien meer te se. As hierdie stelsels egter op hulself bly staan en hulle samehang met allerhande ander faktore, met filosofie en godsdiens, met die hele strewe en lewe van die mensheid of ten minste van 'n groot groep van mense, nie gesien word nie, bring dit egter ook nie perspektief nie. Die Geskiedenis van die Onderwys moet dus meer gesien word as 'n uiteensetting van pedagogiese denke en doen as 'n deel van 'n groot organiese geheel: die algemene kultuurgeskiedenis van die mensheid.

Thesis (DPhil. (History))--University of Stellenbosch, 1992. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The erection of buildings in Paarl during the period between the two world wars was influenced by several important socio-economical and cultural circumstances. These events changed the built-up environment of Paarl dramatically. This period can be seen as a change from a traditionial to a modern way of living and this phenomena is clearly imposed on the buildings erected during this period. Some of the important happenings that changed the lives of all Paarlites in those years and influenced their building works, was the influenza epidemic of 1918, the worldwide depression of 1929 which lasted until 1932, the peak and the pining of the wagonbuilding industry, the introduction of the motor car, electricity, motion pictures and technological development in general. This technological progress, especially the introduction of the motor car, brought about the erection of new types of buildings like service stations, show rooms and private garages for these vehicles all over Paarl. Roads were tarred and improved and electrical street lighting was introduced. On 29 November 1924 all the documents and building plans housed in the then existing town hall were destroyed by fire. Further developments that influenced living in Paarl was the establishment of the KWV in 1918, SASKO in 1935, the erection of a new hospital, town hall, post office, schools and the establishment of several other fruit and wine related industries. The granite industry flourished during this period. For the first time Paarl had its own local architects, draughtsmen and builders. Several important architects from Cape Town and elsewhere executed buildings in the town. According to existing records at the Paarl Municipality no less than 34 different architects or partnerships, draughtsmen and builders were responsible for the execution of building plans handed in at the Municipality between 1926 and 1939. Before the period in question Paarl streets were never formally laid out and for the first time large townships were planned from scratch. A wide spectrum of structures ranging from alterations to existing buildings, verandahs, garages, swimming pools, shops, offices, schools, churches and public buildings were erected in Paarl during this period. / Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: After the First World War (1914-1918) – the first “total war” in modern history, where whole populations, not just military forces, became participants in the war effort, the potential power of propaganda was realised, through the exploitation of mass communication media to manipulate public opinion. Alongside politico-diplomatic, economic and military manoeuvres, governments needed to mobilise the minds of their population to secure support, to mobilise them behind the war policy and to avoid discontent and dissension. This was particularly crucial to South Africa during the Second World War (1939-1945), especially as the country was threatened by deeply ingrained political tensions and internal divisions. The wartime Union, under General Jan Smuts, experienced an escalation of political extremism and militancy from radical sections of white Afrikaner nationalists who opposed the government’s war policy. Furthermore, some elements within even the Union Defence Force (UDF) displayed disloyal tendencies which threatened the morale of the armed forces. Thus, in response, the government waged a massive propaganda campaign during the war aimed at stimulating recruitment, at preserving national morale, at combating anti-war resistance and at minimising disruptions to the implementation of its war policy. To this end, the authorities exploited information avenues such as radio broadcasts, the press, films, mobile recruiting tours and military demonstrations for publicity and propaganda purposes. As propaganda delivery channels, radio, the press and films were potentially powerful. However, the strategy pursued by the authorities failed to maximise their full impact. The government also did not enjoy a media monopoly for the conduct of its war propaganda. The SABC continued operating independently and its airtime was not handed over to the authorities. Similarly, while the government relied on the support of sympathetic newspaper editors for its propaganda campaign, newspapers themselves sometimes ignored censorship regulations and published material which was unhelpful to the national war effort. Meanwhile, the opposition press also contested the propaganda terrain by waging anti-war campaigns. Films were the weakest link due to limited government control, production obstacles and an English language dominance which alienated the majority of white Afrikaans speakers. Another problem was persistent rivalry among various official and semiofficial propaganda agencies and a lack of clarity over a common propaganda policy. When it came to recruitment, government propaganda achieved particularly limited success. Despite patriotic appeals for volunteer enlistment, the shortage of manpower remained a persistent problem throughout the war. Alongside this, social and economic problems such as food and housing shortages also had a negative impact on public morale. The positive reach of propaganda efforts within the military, especially education, information and social welfare services, was also limited in that they were unable to dispel dissatisfaction resulting from poor service conditions, military policies, and the growing influence of war weariness. Towards the end of hostilities, there was a perceptible decline in troop discipline and morale. In general, therefore, the Union government’s overall war publicity and propaganda effort failed to produce a solid sense of national war cohesion or war unity. Although the country remained stable and was able to sustain war participation, it could not be said that South Africa’s leadership was able to persuade inhabitants – whether white or black - to participate in the Second World War as a war to be embraced as a people’s war. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Eerste Wêreldoorlog (1914-1918), die eerste “totale oorlog” in kontemporêre geskiedenis waartydens nie net militêre magte nie, maar hele gemeenskappe by die oorlogspoging betrek is, het die potensiaal van propaganda om die openbare mening met behulp van die massamedia te manipuleer, tuisgebring. Naas polities-diplomatiese, ekonomiese en militêre maneuvrering, moes regerings ook die gesindheid van die bevolking beïnvloed om hulle agter die oorlogspoging te skaar en twis en tweedrag te vermy. Gesindheidsbeïnvloeding was vir die Unieregering van kardinale belang gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog (1939-1945), aangesien Suid-Afrika onder diepgaande politieke verdeeldheid en interne spanning oor die oorlogskwessie gebuk gegaan het. Die Smuts-bewind het hewige politieke druk en militante weerstand ervaar van Afrikanernasionaliste wat teen die regering se oorlogsbeleid gekant was. Ontevrede elemente in die Unieverdedigingsmag (UVM) het insgelyks dislojale neigings openbaar, wat die moraal van die gewapende magte ondermyn het. Die regering het gevolglik gedurende die oorlog ’n omvattende propagandaveldtog van stapel gestuur om weerstand teen sy oorlogspoging te beveg, ontwrigting in die implementering van die oorlogsbeleid tot ’n minimum te beperk, die werwing van soldate te bevorder en die nasionale moraal hoog te hou. Die Smuts-regering het ’n verskeidenheid van instrumente, waaronder radio-uitsendings, die gedrukte media, rolprente, mobiele werwingsveldtogte en miltêre demonstrasies, vir hul reklame- en propagandaveldtogte ingespan. Die regering se propagandastrategieë het egter nie dié kragtige instrumente optimaal uitgebuit om maksimum trefkrag te verseker nie. Daarby het die regering ook nie ’n monopolie oor alle mediaplatvorms vir geniet om hul propagandaveldtogte te bedryf nie. Die SAUK het onafhanklik gefunksioneer en min lugtyd aan die regering afgestaan om radio-uitsendings vir publisiteit en propagande te benut. Die regering het voorts sterk op koerantredakteurs gesteun om hul propagandaveldtog te bevorder, maar redakteurs het soms sensuurregulasies geïgnoreer en artikels geplaas wat regeringsbeleid ondermyn het. Die opposisiepers het uiteraard ook die regeringspropaganda met anti-oorlogpropaganda beveg. Rolprente was die swakste skakel in die regering se reklame- en propagandastelsels vanweë hul swak beheer daaroor, ’n gebrek aan tegniese vaardigheid, die hoë koste van rolprentproduksies, asook die oorheersing van die bedryf deur die Engelse taal, wat die meerderheid Afrikaanssprekendes die harnas ingejaag het. ’n Verdere probleem was die voortdurende wedywering tussen die verskillende amptelike en halfamptelike propaganda-agentskappe. Dit was veral die gebrek aan ’n duidelike propaganda-beleid wat tot oorvleueling en mededinging gelei het. Wat werwingspropaganda betref, het die regering beperkte sukses behaal. Naas ’n beroep op pligsbesef, eer en glorie, het die regering oor geen hefkrag beskik om werwing te bevorder nie. ’n Gebrek aan mannekrag het derhalwe die UVM dwarsdeur die oorlog gekortwiek in weerwil van die regering se omvattende reklame- en propagandaprogramme. Teen 1945 het slegs sowat 330 000 uit die Unie se bevolking van nagenoeg tien miljoen vir vrywillige krygsdiens aangemeld. Sosio-ekonomiese uitdagings soos ’n gebrek aan voedselvoorrade en behuising het ook negatief op die openbare en burgerlike moraal ingewerk. Interne propaganda in die UVM, veral deur middel van die opvoedings-, informasie- en welsynsdienste, het ook beperkte sukses behaal as gevolg van ontevredenheid met militêre beleid, swak diensvoorwaardes en oorlogsmoegheid. Dié ontevredenheid het moraal en dissipline ondermyn en teen die einde van die oorlog tot uitdagende gedrag en oproer onder die troepe gelei. Oor die algemeen genome, was die Unie-regering se totale reklame- en propagandapoging dus oneffektief. Alhoewel die hele die stelsel nie in duie gestort het nie en Unie se oorlogspoging sonder groot ontwrigting voortgegaan het, het oorlogsmoegheid, oneffektiewe beleide en die invloed van sosio-ekonomiese probleme uiteindelik tot openbare en militêre ontnugtering gelei.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / This thesis provides a critical and historical analysis of industrial ethnicity in African Harare between the 1890s and 1980. It examines the origins, dynamics and ambiguities of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Harare (then Salisbury) and its attendant implications for socio-economic wellbeing and inter-group relations. It locates industrial ethnicity within broader questions of inequality and social difference, especially issues like affordability, materiality and power. The thesis pays particular attention to individuals and groups’ differential access to the ‘raw materials’ used in imagining and constructing forms of identification. The thesis is empirically grounded in a specific case study of industrial ethnicity among disparate African groups in urban colonial Zimbabwe, and in the context formed by factors that fomented ethnic enclaves in African Harare’s competitive labour markets during particular historical epochs. Such complex currents remain under-represented in current Zimbabwean historical literature. This is despite the salience and resonance of industrial ethnicity, as well as its multi-layered and ambiguous implications for inter-group relations, and its potential to create differential access to life chances for individuals and groups. The thesis contends that in crisis situations, people tend to identify with their ‘type’ and to use ethnic, kinship and other social ties in their scramble for socio-economic and political resources. This usually involves definitions and re-definitions of ‘selves’ and ‘others’; ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’; contestations and negotiations over identification; and how these varied identities are ‘materialised’. The ways in which migrant workers positioned themselves in the labour market depended on ensuing socio-economic inequalities and the use of social networks, which were indispensable conduits for the transmission of job information and local intelligence. The prevalence of ethnic enclaves and widespread ethnic clusters in colonial Harare’s labour market is explained in terms of a complex synergy of factors, including behavioural, historical, institutional and structural elements. Equally, industrial ethnicity, which had pre-colonial precedents, remained contested, fluid, and ambiguous, and was one among a range of forms of identification available to Salisbury’s African migrant workers. The thesis further situates African ethnicity in its political context by examining its ambivalent interaction with nationalist politics, gender and ‘othering’ work. It contends that African nationalism’s inherent underlying contradictions and tensions, and the subsequent dual categorisation of citizens into ‘patriots’ and ‘sell-outs’ set the stage for hegemonic (and counter-hegemonic) politics, ethnic competition and the politics of marginalisation in postcolonial Zimbabwe.

Much public historical mythology asserts that Chief Albert Luthuli, the onetime leader of Africa's oldest liberation movement, launched an armed struggle on the very eve he returned to South Africa after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. This profound irony engenders what is arguably one of the most relevant and controversial historical debates in South African as some recent scholarship suggests Luthuli did not countenance the armed movement. Today, Luthuli remains a figure of great contestation due to his domestic and international prominence and impeccable moral character. Icons of the liberation struggle, political parties and active politicians understand their justification for past actions and their contemporary relevance to be dependent upon a given historical memory of Luthuli. Often that memory is not compatible with the archival record. Contrary to a nationalist inspired historical perspective, this investigation concludes that Luthuli did not support the initiation of violence in December 1961. Evidence suggests that Luthuli only reluctantly yielded to the formation (not the initiation) of an armed movement months before the announcement in October 1961 that he would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1961. After the announcement, Luthuli vociferously argued against the use of violence until April 1962. From April 1962 to his death in 1967, Luthuli only advocated non-violent methods and did not publicly support or condemn the use of violence. Congregationalism imbedded within Luthuli the primacy of democracy, education, multiracialism and egalitarianism, propelling him to the heights of political leadership prior to 1961. Following 1961 these same seminal emphases rendered Luthuli obsolete as a political leader within an increasingly radicalised, desperate and violent environment. The author argues that not only did the government drastically curtail Luthuli's ability to lead, but so did his colleagues in the underground structures ofthe Congresses' liberation movement, rendering him only the titular leader ofthe African National Congress until his death. While Luthuli's Christian faith provided the vigour for his political success, it engendered the inertia for his political irrelevance following the launch of violence. By not supporting the African National Congress' initiation of the violent movement, Luthuli's political career proved to be 'bound by faith'. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2008.

The Great Depression has received relatively little attention from South African historians and economists. Most studies of the period concentrate almost exclusively on political aspects, and ignore the economic realities. Little attempt has been made to quantify and analyse the effects of the depression and drought, nor has a proper integration of these economic realities and their impact on politics been attempted. There is perhaps good reason for this. There is such a wealth of material to be digested that the task has been perceived as too daunting for a single researcher. Local or thematic studies have therefore been undertaken. This thesis is essentially a local history study which examines the effects of the Great Depression on the then province of Natal. The depression affected all areas of economic activity in the region; industry, coalmining, and both commercial and subsistence agriculture. Hardly any aspect of life was untouched. It scarred the collective consciousness of an entire generation. Under the twin onslaughts of the depression and drought, the people of Natal turned to the state for assistance. The state turned out to be a poor provider, preferring to devote its efforts to alleviating distress ' among white farmers, while forcing the major burden of relief onto the urban local authorities. Such authorities were obviously reluctant to assist anyone other than their own burgesses. Prevailing racist sentiments ensured that the major economic burden was passed onto those who could least afford to bear it, the African majority. Government policy held that Africans were expendable components of the urban work-force; when the economy shrank they were simply expected to return to their places of origin. During these years the idea that the reserves could accommodate all the "surplus" African workers was finally exploded. Isolated from the centres of power, and under intense pressure from the depression and drought, white Natalians reacted with characteristic jingoism and agitated for the secession of the province from the Union. Black politics, which had reached boiling point prior to the depression, fell into a slump, also occasioned by the prevailing economic woes. Militancy turned into co-operation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1994.

No abstract available / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1974.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1973.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1983.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, 1979.