Submitted by Edileide Reis (leyde-landy@hotmail.com) on 2013-04-17T12:42:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Michelline.pdf: 1199085 bytes, checksum: 2022a1f61f763fde3e6d0769d65e7059 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-09T18:06:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Michelline.pdf: 1199085 bytes, checksum: 2022a1f61f763fde3e6d0769d65e7059 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-09T18:06:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Michelline.pdf: 1199085 bytes, checksum: 2022a1f61f763fde3e6d0769d65e7059 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / A carta Magna trouxe novos matrizes pelos quais o tratamento filiatório passou a se sujeitar basicamente aos princípios constitucionais, entre eles, à dignidade de pessoa humana, exigindo-se nova postura e interpretação do sistema do de presunções antes vigente. Com o advento do DNA, impõe-se uma nova concepção das ações desta espécie, já que a possibilidade de verificação da ascendência com precisão e grau de acerto, permitiu o entrelaçamento do processo com novos conhecimentos sobre a vida. Deste modo, o objetivo de estudo deste trabalho é a prova pericial de DNA nas ações filiatórias, como forma de concretização do direito de perfilhação, e seus reflexos na ponderação de interesses, no sistema de presunções legal e judicial e frente ao instituto das coisas julgada. A temática pertinente ao presente trabalho foi escolhida por despertar calorosas discussões, provocar reformulações e contribuir em função da sua relevância, para o aparecimento de novas ponderações e teorias atreladas à perfilhação. Essas discussões conduzem a uma reflexão acerca da autoridade da coisa julgada, nas ações de paternidade, quando a sentença proferida transitou em julgado, destituída do critério científico da verdade biológica dos fatos, tendo a produção da prova genética (Era DNA) restado impossibilitada. Pretende-se assim verificar os meios de assegurar a aplicação coexistente dos princípios em conflito, sopesando o bem que deve prevalecer, tendo como norte a busca da verdade real. / Salvador

Por intermédio desse trabalho buscou-se estabelecer diretrizes, utilizando-se da jurisdição constitucional para estabelecer parâmetros para mitigação do princípio da segurança jurídica como forma de flexibilizar a coisa julgada. A metodologia utilizada foi pautada no balizamento dos regramentos legais referentes a segurança jurídica em confronto com as normas constitucionais e infraconstitucionais em referência a coisa julgada. Restou constatado que, em certos casos, a legislação pátria infra-constitucional já permite e flexibiliza a coisa julgada, por ser a mesma regrada quase que exclusivamente por normas infraconstitucionais, haja vista que a Constituição Federal resguardou apenas os casos em que uma nova norma não venha a violar situações protegidas pela coisa julgada. Para estabelecer parâmetros para a flexibilização foi feita uma diferenciação entre a coisa julgada legal e a coisa julgada inconstitucional e constatado que, no último caso, se a coisa julgada sobrepujar a Carta Magna teremos a sentença judicial como um instituto mais elevado que a própria Constituição, não sendo, por tal razão, imprescindível previsão infra-constitucional para se evitar a permanência de um ato lesivo a Carta Magna. Estas medidas e parâmetros ensejaram, por uma questão de hierarquia legal e por força da jurisdição constitucional que a coisa julgada deve guardar estreita observância aos ditames constitucionais, devendo ser observado o princípio da proporcionalidade quando da mitigação ou flexibilização do princípio da segurança jurídica podendo, para tanto, os jurisdicionados se valerem de diversos meios jurídicos, inclusive dotados de medidas de urgência, para extirpar do mundo jurídico a coisa julgada inconstitucional / Sem Abstract

A presente pesquisa cuidou de enfrentar dois problemas: o primeiro, relativo à formação progressiva da coisa julgada, e o segundo, inerente à consequência da descoberta de um defeito rescisório em uma demanda que já tem parcela do mérito imutável. Nesses casos, o interessado deverá se utilizar de um meio típico de superação da coisa julgada, a exemplo da ação rescisória? Ou estará autorizado a reconhecer esse defeito endoprocessualmente, por intermédio de um meio de superação atípico da coisa julgada, consistente no efeito expansivo rescindente? Desde já, informa-se que se adotou essa última opção. Quanto ao primeiro problema, após o cotejo doutrinário e o apontamento da nova roupagem normativa inserida pelo Código de Processo Civil de 2015, percebeu-se que nosso ordenamento aceitou, perfeitamente, a formação progressiva da coisa julgada, sendo essa, inclusive, a orientação do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho e do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Com relação ao segundo problema, percebeu-se que a aplicação do princípio da instrumentalidade na forma de arguição do vício, aliado aos princípios da eficiência, economia, duração razoável do processo e da segurança jurídica, possibilitou concluir que o defeito rescisório pode ser reconhecido endoprocessualmente, ainda que em face de parcela do mérito já imutável. Sendo assim, se parte do mérito ficar imutável (seja por meio de uma decisão interlocutória, seja de algum capítulo autônomo da sentença que não foi objeto do recurso), e, no prosseguimento do processo para apreciação dos pedidos remanescentes, for encontrado um defeito rescisório, o julgamento do recurso em face da decisão que analisou a parcela final do mérito poderia ser dotado de um efeito expansivo rescindente, para alcançar a parte do mérito já imutável na demanda. Todavia, sabendo que, mesmo sem ser absoluta, a coisa julgada é de inquestionável importância sistêmica, o trabalho também abordou alguns requisitos, para viabilizar a expansão rescindente, iniciando pela existência de um defeito rescisório, ou seja, aquele que justificasse a utilização de um meio típico de superação da coisa julgada, além de requerimento expresso da parte interessada, juntamente com a observância do prazo bienal da rescisória e, por fim, a garantia de contraditório efetivo, que, juntos, formam os requisitos autorizadores da expansão rescindente dos efeitos do julgamento de um recurso, proporcionando o reconhecimento endoprocessual de um defeito rescisório em face da parcela do mérito já imutável. / This research faced two problems, one of them was the progressive formation of res judicata, and the other one was about the consequence of the discovery in a defect rescission in a process which already has a part of his immutable object. In those cases, the interested person must be use in a typical overcoming of res judicata, such as the rescission action? Or he is allowed to acknowledge this defect within the process, through a way of overcoming atypical of res judicata, namely the expansive effect rescission? Already, it is advised that it adopted this last option. Regard to the first problem, after doctrinaire collating and the appointment of the new rules garb inserted by Civil Procedure Code of 2015, it was realized that Brazilian law accepted, perfectly, the progressive formation of res judicata, that is, including the guidance of the Court Superior for Labour and the Supreme Court. Regarding the second issue, it is clear that the application of the principle of instrumentality in the way of complaint defect, combined with the principles of efficiency, economy, reasonable duration of the process and legal certainty, allowed us to conclude that the Rescission defect can be recognized inside the process , even in the face of the unchanging portion of merit. So if part of merit be immutable (whether through an interim decision or a stand-alone chapter of the sentence that was not resource object) and if in the continuation of the process for review of the remaining merit be founded a Rescission defect, the judgment of appeal in face of the decision that analyzed the final installment of merit, could be provided with an expansive rescission effect, to reach the part of the already immutable merit in demand. However, knowing that even without being absolute, the res judicata is unquestionable systemic importance, This work also addressed some requirements to enable rescission expansion, starting with the existence of a Rescission defect, that is, one that would justify the use of a typical overcoming of res judicataas well as express request of the interested side, together with the observance of the two-year rescission period and, finally, the effective contradictory assurance, which together form the authorizers requirements of rescission expansion of the effects of the judgment a resource, providing the recognition insde the process of a Rescission defect in face of the installment of immutable merit.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-08-10T13:45:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquvo total.pdf: 1248500 bytes, checksum: de65e47cb8e64bca94a8b03e6af603bc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-10T13:45:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquvo total.pdf: 1248500 bytes, checksum: de65e47cb8e64bca94a8b03e6af603bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / We analyze the sensible forms, namely, space and time, and their possible relationships with knowledge. We credit, as well, the following interrogative: as the fundamentals of sensibility, space and time, organize our knowledge since, only we can only consider the object of knowledge that which is intuited spatially and temporally? The issue raised by Immanuel Kant leads us immediately to another intriguing overlapping issue, that is, we can only have access to the phenomenon, but not the thing itself. By the facts, here our discussion. / Analisamos as formas sensíveis, a saber: espaço e tempo, e seus possíveis relacionamentos perante o conhecimento. Creditamos, pois bem, a seguinte interrogativa: como os fundamentos da sensibilidade, espaço e tempo, organizam nosso conhecimento já que, unicamente, só podemos considerar objeto de conhecimento aquilo que é intuído espacialmente e temporalmente? A problemática levantada por Immanuel Kant leva-nos, de imediato, a outra intrigante questão sobreposta, isto é, só podemos ter acesso ao fenômeno, mas nunca a coisa em si. Mediante os fatos, eis aqui nossa discussão.

La question de savoir si la relation est différente réellement de son fondement se rencontre fréquemment dans les textes médiévaux à partir du milieu du treizième siècle. Elle se pose avant tout dans un cadre aristotélicien de discussion des catégories et revient à se demander si la catégorie de relation ajoute véritablement une chose supplémentaire, la relation, dans la réalité. Cette question s'inscrit dans une représentation réaliste des relations : pour la plupart des auteurs du treizième et du quatorzième siècle, le fait que des choses soient réellement reliées entre elles ne fait pas de doute. Deux hommes de même taille sont bel et bien égaux, c'est-à-dire réellement reliés entre eux par une relation d'égalité. La difficulté est alors de comprendre comment ces choses sont reliées entre elles, ou encore, ce qu'est exactement cette relation dont il est alors question. Faut-il dire que l'égalité dans chacun des hommes de même taille est une nouvelle chose qui s'ajoute à la substance de chacun d'eux et aux accidents de taille, appartenant à la catégorie de quantité, sur lesquels ces relations d'égalité sont fondées ? Ou faut-il dire que l'égalité est réelle d'une autre manière, c'est-à-dire sans pour autant ajouter une nouvelle chose à ce à quoi elle advient ? Ce problème, qui se rencontre déjà dans les tensions existant entre les différents exposés qu'Aristote a consacrés à cette catégorie, a reçu de multiples réponses. Celles-ci nous éclairent sur la manière dont le réel est appréhendé au Moyen-Âge et sur les débats ontologiques de l'époque. Le travail ici résumé entreprend de délimiter précisément ces réponses et propose une manière de les classer. / Whether relation is really distinct from its foundation or not is a question that can easily be found in medieval texts from the mid-thirteenth century onwards. It comes from an aristotelian background, the discussion about the categories, and asks if the category of relation really posits another thing, i.e. a relation, in reality. It results from a realist perspective on relations. In fact, most thirteenth and fourteenth century thinkers held without doubt that things outside the mind are really connected between them. Two men sharing the same height are really equal, that is, really linked to each other by a relation of equality. What is then left to understand is how these things are linked between them, or the exact nature of the aforementioned relation. Should we say that the equality in each of the equally sized men is a new thing that adds to the substance of each of them and to the accidents of height, belonging tho the category of quantity, on which these relations are founded? Or should we say that equality is real in another way, that is, without adding a new thing to the subject acquiring it? We can already find this issue in Aristotle himself, emerging from disagreeing texts devoted to this category. It received various answers that enable us to understand better how reality was defined in the Middle Age and some of the ontological debates of the time. The work that is here summed up attempts to precisely delineate these various answers and to provide a way of classifying them.

in English The motivation for this thesis is to analyze Bitcoin as Bitcoin is still a new phenomenon and requires an economical, legal, and legislative evaluation. In this thesis we seek an answer to the question what is Bitcoin. This thesis is divided into three main blocks, within them we use analytical, descriptive, and comparative methods. In the first part, we aim mostly on the economic side of Bitcoin, comparing Bitcoin to money in general sense. In the second part, we argue whether Bitcoin shall be considered a thing in a legal sense under the Czech law. In the third part, we describe the current Bitcoin's regulatory situation and suggest a drafting of Bitcoin specific regulation. The conclusion of this thesis is that Bitcoin is a digital medium of exchange that cannot be considered money or currency. To the extent, Bitcoin might be interpreted in ways where it does not satisfy the legal definition of a thing in legal sense, but for regulatory purposes it shall be, at least for now, considered a thing in legal sense. We also suggest that Bitcoin shall be systematically regulated by imposing various duties on persons who's scope of business is relating to the Bitcoin.

This paper deals, building on a ground defined by Heidegger's What is Metaphysics?, with a single question: in what sense do being and the no-thing belong together? This question is being addressed at two parallel levels. Based on a detailed interpretation of key text passages that have often been examined insufficiently due to their lack of accessibility, it aims to gain a complex insight into the issue and interpret it in its many nuances of meaning. At the same time, its aim is to articulate a general philosophical significance of the intrinsic connection between being and the no-thing; to what extent it affects the innermost intention of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as such, i.e. raising the question of the meaning of being. The paper builds on a phenomenological description of the original experience of the no-thing and captures a transformation of a human being into a pure Da-sein, which he goes through during this experience. Since the experience of the no-thing according to Heidegger is identical to the basic mood of dread, this piece of work depicts it in relation to seemingly similar, but in their meaning actually opposite moods: fear and, most importantly, abysmal boredom. Subsequently, it puts forward an interpretation of the no-thing's own ontological significance and thus...

La mort aussi naturelle qu'elle puisse paraître ne reflète pas un phénomène assuré au regard de la condition humaine. Elle nécessite une inscription subjective, tant au niveau de la psyché que du soma, afin que l'individu puisse se constituer sujet de l'inconscient. C'est en effet par la voie du processus tragique que cette inscription est possible. Comment l’approcher alors ? Le sentiment tragique serait-il en lien avec l’inconscient ? L’inconscient pensé comme le discours de l’Autre, le grand Autre en tant qu’il se définit par le lieu de l’épreuve existentielle du sujet, corrélée à la révélation de son sexe et à la contingence de son être au travers l’expérience de la pensée symbolique. Cette hypothèse serait-elle de l’ordre de l’évènement ? La dialectique psychanalytique depuis les premières découvertes de la théorie de la génitalité jusqu'à nos découvertes récentes allie le sexe et la mort dans un souci d’élucider ce qui détermine l'être parlant sur le chemin de la vie. / The natural death as it may seem does not reflect a phenomenon insured under the human condition. It requires a subjective inscription, both in terms of the psyche that the soma, so that the individual can be subject of the unconscious. It is indeed by the field of the tragic process that registration is possible. How to approach then? The tragic sense would it be related to the unconscious? The unconscious thought as the discourse of the Other, the big Other as it is defined by the place of existential test subject correlated to the revelation of her sex and contingency of his being through the experience of symbolic thought. Psychoanalytic dialectic since the first discovery of the theory of genitality to our recent discoveries combines sex and death in an effort to implement what determines the speaking on the path of life.

Epistemology in its contemporary post-modern ethos is generally believed to be inseparably hinged upon language. This of course ensures a major paradigm shift in the disciplined human conceptions of reality. It has been stated and is widely acknowledged that the Kantian Noumenal barrier has, in this recent shift, been proved to be looming far closer than it was ever previously considered. This new barrier to the world of ‘objective absolutes’ comprises a barrier of semantics and syntax, and calls for a radical restructuring of all the human sciences. There is surely no discipline in the humanities that can claim immunity to this colossal shift in epistemology, and theology (particularly of the Evangelical variety) is no exception to the rule. The impact of post-modern epistemological assumption upon contemporary Evangelicalism presents to those who adhere to this school’s position, a profound challenge. Conservative Christians, who hold to the propositional universality and the objectivity of biblical truth, find in the post-modern ethos little sympathy and no rational justification granted for their ‘metaphysical objectivity’. A major challenge therefore to Evangelical Christianity at the present time is this: Is there, in the light of the challenge of post-modern epistemology, any reasonable justification for continuing to adhere to the evangelical claim that God has spoken in unchanging propositional terms that are universally valid and binding? It would seem that in this regard many evangelicals are feeling pressured. Evidence of the pressure of this challenge can readily be found either in the growing contemporary evangelical tendency towards advocating a more cooperative attitude to the post-modern ethos, or in the reactionary theology of schools of thought like the Spiritual Warfare Movement. The writings of Clive Staples Lewis (1898 – 1963) have been proven effective in the countering of negative challenges to Christian faith for the past sixty years. Lewis, as an apologist, in the opinion of many intellectual searchers, positively and convincingly countered modernistic objections to faith in his own time. Modernistic assumptions prevailed in the Western world in Lewis’ day that tended to discredit a rational belief in the supernatural. Lewis was widely held to be an effective apostle to counter this modernistic scepticism. It is the conviction of the present writer that C. S. Lewis apologetics can be just as effectively utilised today in addressing post-modern challenges, as it was fifty years ago used to answer the questions raised by modernism. Lewis in all of his Christian writings, reveals an underlying epistemology that I believe (because it is based firmly upon Christian orthodoxy), has stood the test of time. The apologetics of C. S. Lewis may serve to answer post-modern challenges just as rationally as it did modernism. In this thesis, Lewis’ underlying epistemology will be examined. This will comprise the first part of my work. The second part of the thesis deals with the post-modern epistemological challenge to Evangelicalism as a world-view. The final part of this thesis consists of a dialogue between the most common post-modern challenges to evangelical thinking, and rationally compelling answers thereto that are found in Lewis’ writings. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Dogmatics and Christian Ethics / Unrestricted

Heidegger's Concept of Experience Abstract The paper aims to explore one of the central concepts of Heidegger's late philosophy. The experience here, compared to the concept in the early period of his thinking, takes on new forms of relation to the world and to the concealment and shows some basic features that the work will follow. These features of experience are: totality, immediacy, passivity, and the transformation of whoever experiences. A proper understanding of Heidegger's concept of experience should provide an important clue to understanding his late philosophy and the way of thinking that promotes it. But it also has wider implications for today's thinking and for grasping not only prominent experiences, such as religious experience.