Doctor Legum - LLD / Competition law and its enforcement have become necessary tools in the face of trade liberalisation. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of cross-border cartels. The global South is steadily becoming aware of this. With the advent of globalisation and trade liberalisation, individual economies have become intrinsically linked. Anti-competitive conduct in one territory may have an impact in another territory. Therefore, an effective regional competition law framework complements trade liberalisation, especially in light of the principal objective of the South-South regional economic communities: the deepening of regional integration, in order to realise economic development and alleviate poverty. Cartel practices, such as, market allocation cartels, are in direct contradiction to this primary objective. This is when enforcement collaborations in South-South regional economic communities becomes crucial. The regional legal instruments of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, the Southern African Customs Union and the Southern African Development Community make provision for enforcement collaborations among Member States. To facilitate collaboration, regional competition authorities have been created to investigate, among other things, cross-border cartels. Within these economic communities, there is a strong case for enforcement collaborations, as evidence shows that the majority of the firms engaging in cartels are the so-called Regional Multinational Corporations. They operate throughout the territories of Member States. Additionally, the international nature of cartels, such as, private international cartels and export cartels, provide an opportunity for South-South co-operation to be utilised. However, this co-operation has not been utilised to the fullest extent, especially with reference to cross-border cartel activities. This has been attributed to various factors, such as, institutional incapacities, resource austerity, the absence of common procedural rules, the lack of adequate investigatory tools, and political ineptitude. As a solution, this current study makes specific recommendations that are directed at enhancing the effectiveness of South-South collaborations pertaining to cross-border cartel activities.

Submitted by Daniella Santos (daniella.santos@fgv.br) on 2009-11-30T17:28:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Rafael_Coutinho_Costa_Lima.pdf: 555268 bytes, checksum: a06061bb98e0ddefd846ff6034a22317 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Antoanne Pontes(antoanne.pontes@fgv.br) on 2009-12-01T11:42:43Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Rafael_Coutinho_Costa_Lima.pdf: 555268 bytes, checksum: a06061bb98e0ddefd846ff6034a22317 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2009-12-01T11:42:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Rafael_Coutinho_Costa_Lima.pdf: 555268 bytes, checksum: a06061bb98e0ddefd846ff6034a22317 (MD5) / This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the 'information transmission effect'. This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007. / Esta tese consiste de três artigos que tem como elemento unificador o modelo de agência comum com principais informados. Os dois primeiros capítulos investigam os efeitos econômicos da influência de grupos de pressão (lobbies) sobre a escolha da tarifas de importação (Capítulo 1) e sobre acordos de comércio internacionais (Capítulo 2). O capítulo 3 investiga a escolha da estrutura de revenda quando os produtores possuem informação privada sobre os seus custos. O capítulo 1 analisa como a atividade de lobby afeta a política econômica quando grupos de interesses possuem mais informação que o governo. Modifica- se o modelo de Grossman e Helpman (1994), assumindo que a competitividade dos produtores é informação privada dos lobbies. Isto permite investigar quais os efeitos de transmissão de informação neste modelo. Esta assimetria de informação gera dois efeitos no jogo político, um associado ao problema de sinalização da competitividade do lobby para o governo e outro associado ao custo de um lobby fazer um screening da competitividade do lobby rival junto ao governo. O principal resultado deste modelo é que a transmissão de informação reduz a capacidade de influência dos lobbies, o que aumenta o bem-estar da sociedade. O capítulo 2 aplica o modelo do Capítulo 1 para entender os efeitos de transmissão de informação que surgem em uniões aduaneiras quando os lobbies possuem mais informação que o governo. O foco é dado nos efeitos políticos que surgem nestes acordos. Quando os países formam uma união aduaneira o equilíbrio de forças político e um novo efeito surge: os governos usam as informações privadas do lobby de um país para extrair renda dos lobbies dos outros países. Este efeito aumenta o poder de barganha dos governos dentro de uma união aduaneira e reduzam a capacidade de influência dos lobbies. Desta forma, a transmissão de informação aumenta os benefícios de uma união aduaneira e reduz a tarifas de importação para os países fora do acordo. Além disso, é investigado o papel da transmissão de informação a criação das uniões aduaneiras e o resultado encontrado é que esta aumenta as chances destes acordos serem implementados. O capítulo 3 investiga a escolha da estrutura de revenda quando os produtores possuem informação privada sobre seus custos de produção. Duas estruturas de revenda são analisadas, uma onde cada produtor escolhe um revendedor exclusivo (exclusive dealing) e outra onde ambos os produtores escolhemo mesmo revendedor (agência comum). Agência comum reduz a competição no mercado final, mas dá ao revendedor a capacidade de extrair lucro dos produtores utilizando a informação de um contra o outro. Enquanto que exclusive dealing aumenta a competição entre produtores, mas não cria problemas informacionais entre produtor e revendedor. Uma caracterização preliminar da escolha da estrutura de revenda para o caso de bens substitutos mostra que quando a incerteza quanto sobre o custo aumenta relativamente ao tamanho do mercado, exclusive dealing tende a ser a estrutura de revenda escolhida, enquanto que quando o tamanho do mercado é grande em relação aos custos, agência comum tende a ser a estrutura escolhida. Esta tese se beneficiou enormemente da contribuição dos professores Hum- berto Moreira e Thierry Verdier. Também se beneficiou o estimulante ambiente acadêmico da Toulouse School of Economis, onde parte dela foi desenvolvida du- rante o ano de 2007.

Atualmente, há um debate acerca dos efeitos da aplicação de medidas antidumping entre as partes de um acordo regional de comércio. Discute-se que o emprego de tais instrumentos pode gerar um óbice ao livre comércio e ao avanço da integração econômica negociados em tais acordos. As regras do sistema multilateral de comércio determinam que direitos antidumping podem ser aplicados quando comprovada a existência de dumping, dano à indústria nacional e a relação causal entre estes. Entretanto, mesmo que haja regras sobre a condução de uma investigação antidumping e a aplicação da medida, ainda há muito espaço para a discricionariedade das autoridades nacionais investigadoras. Isso enseja a preocupação de que a aplicação desse instrumento pode conduzir a uma ineficácia dos objetivos de liberalização comercial negociados nos acordos regionais de comércio, além de neutralizar as concessões tarifárias feitas no âmbito desses acordos, em prol do protecionismo de uma indústria doméstica, muitas vezes, defasada e inapta à concorrência internacional. A presente dissertação pretende demonstrar que, à medida que o antidumping representa um potencial impacto negativo aos ideais dos acordos regionais de comércio, sua aplicação é antagônica com os objetivos desses acordos, inclusive no caso do MERCOSUL. Assim, as regras antidumping no âmbito do MERCOSUL deveriam ser repensadas, uma vez que a não aplicação de direitos antidumping no comércio intrarregional permitiria o avanço da integração econômica na região e representaria mais um passo rumo à consolidação da união aduaneira. / Currently, there is a debate about the effects of antidumping measures among members of regional trade agreements. It is argued that the use of such instrument can represent an obstacle to free trade and the deepening of economic integration. The rules of the multilateral trading system determines that antidumping duties may be applied when verified the existence of dumping, injury to the domestic industry of the importing country and causal relationship between them. However, even though there are rules governing the conduction of an antidumping investigation and the application of antidumping measures, there is still much room for discretion of investigating authorities. This gives rise to concern that the use of antidumping may lead to ineffectiveness of the goals of trade liberalization and neutralization of tariff concessions made under such agreements, in order to protect a domestic industry, usually outdated and unprepared to international competition. This thesis intends to demonstrate that, as antidumping represents a potential negative impact to the achievements of regional trade agreements, its application among members of a RTA is opposed to the goals of such agreements, including in the case of MERCOSUR. Thus, antidumping rules within MERCOSUR should be reconsidered, since the elimination of antidumping duties on intraregional trade would allow the deepening of the regional economic integration and represent a step towards the consolidation of the customs union.

A América do Sul, na história recente, foi palco de diversas ações de integração regional relacionadas ao comércio, influenciando os posicionamentos dos países em matéria de políticas de comércio interncional bem como formando um emaranhado de relações que se sobrepõe muitas vezes de formas antagônicas. Neste contexto, a presente dissertação aborda o histórico das principais blocos regionais que envolvem a América do Sul como base para mostrar a atual fragmentação deste subcontinente em três visões principais de política de comércio internacional, sendo uma visão intermediária caracterizada pelo Brasil e acompanhada pelos membros do MERCOSUL em uma vertente regional-multilateralista. Em um extremo estão Venezuela, Equador e Bolívia, representantes da ALBA, com seus governos de posicionamento extremo-nacionalista. E em posição antagônica a estes estão Chile, Peru e Colômbia, que conformam o eixo liberal-bilateralista. Objetivando comprovar que há uma tendência de fortalecimento da visão liberal-bilateralista na região será feito um estudo com base nas suas principais formas de atuação, ou seja, por meio da análise de Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio, mais especificamente FTAs bilaterais celebrados com países de distintas regiões com foco especial ao período imediatamente após a eclosão da crise de 2008, de 2009-2014. Finalmente, se a hipótese se confirmar, restando evidenciada a retomada do posicionamento bilateralista, após período de predominância da visão multilateralista na América do Sul, é importante apontar os desafios para o Brasil neste cenário. / South America, in recent history, has had several regional integration actions related to trade, influencing the countries positions in terms of international trade policies as well as forming a tangle of relationships that often overlaps with contrary views. In this context, this thesis addresses the history of the main regional blocs involving South America as a basis to show the current fragmentation of this subcontinent in three main views of international trade policy, with an intermediate vision characterized by Brazil and followed also by members of the MERCOSUR in a regional-multilateralist position. At one extreme, the countries Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, ALBA representatives, present their extreme-nationalist position. And in an antagonistic position, Chile, Peru and Colombia constitute the liberal-bilateralist axis. In order to prove that there is a trend towards the strengthening of the liberal-bilateralist vision in the region, a research based on analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements will be held, focusing bilateral FTAs concluded with different countries regions with special attention to the period immediately after the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, from 2009 to 2014. Finally, if the hypothesis is confirmed, demonstrating the resumption of the bilateralist position after a period in which the multilateralist vision was predominant in South America, it is important to point the challenges of this scenario for Brazil.

Esta tese aborda o desenvolvimento da regulação internacional sobre o comércio de serviços educacionais, em especial nos acordos preferenciais de comércio de Austrália, Chile, China, Cingapura, Estados Unidos, Índia e União Europeia. O seu objetivo foi avaliar o atual nível de liberalização comercial da educação superior no plano global, de modo que sua compatibilidade com o direito à educação pudesse ser criticamente analisada, assim como os seus possíveis impactos sobre a regulação da educação superior no Brasil. Para tanto, a pesquisa começa pela realização de entrevistas com atores que acompanham o processo de comercialização da educação superior no Brasil. Os passos seguintes envolvem a compreensão do funcionamento das disciplinas internacionais sobre o comércio de serviços, da formulação das posições no processo negociador e, finalmente, dos compromissos em serviços de educação superior em acordos preferenciais de comércio. Uma primeira hipótese é de que, mesmo sem acordos de comércio, o mercado brasileiro já se encontra significativamente liberalizado no que diz respeito aos investimentos estrangeiros em educação superior, sem qualquer restrição ao ingresso de capital internacional. Ainda assim, a regulação internacional do comércio de serviços aprofundaria esse processo a partir da ideia de consolidação do marco regulatório liberal doméstico e de mecanismos que conduzem à aceleração do processo de liberalização comercial. / This thesis analyses the development of international regulation on trade in educational services, especially in preferential trade agreements signed by Australia, Chile, China, Singapore, United States, India and the European Union. The goal was to determine a parameter of the current global level of trade liberalization on higher education, so that the compatibility between trade agreements and the right to education could be critically examined, as well as their possible impacts on the regulation of higher education in Brazil. Therefore, the research began by conducting interviews with professionals that accompany the commercialization process in the Brazilian higher education sector. The following steps involved understanding the operation of international disciplines on trade in services, the formulation of positions in the negotiating process, and finally, the commitments on higher education services in preferential trade agreements. A first hypothesis is that, even without trade agreements, the Brazilian market is already significantly liberalized regarding foreign investment on higher education, without any restriction on the inflow of international capital. Even so, international regulation on trade in services would deepen this process from an idea of consolidation of a liberal domestic regulatory framework and mechanisms leading to accelerate trade liberalization process.

This Chapter summarises the work carried out during the lifetime of the Action by Working Group I whose main task was to build multiregional NEG models. The main results are briefly presented and some of the questions left open are pointed at. Finally, topics for future research are suggested.

Magister Legum - LLM / The World Trade Organisation (WTO) deals with regulation of trade in goods, services and intellectual property between participating countries by providing a framework for negotiating trade agreements.1 Furthermore, it has implemented a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO agreements. Ideally, all WTO member states have ‘a level playing field’ in terms of access and equal rights under the dispute settlement mechanism. Disputes should be resolved in a fair and impartial manner. However, the WTO’s DSS has been criticised for being undemocratic, non-transparent and accountable to none. 2

Historically, International Labour Law was developed to mitigate the negative social externalities of the Industrial Revolution and protect international trade from unfair competition. With a similar objective, the international community failed to establish the International Trade Organisation provided for in the 1948 Havana Charter. In its place, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was adopted. However, the Havana Charter remains the first universal trade treaty to include a social clause. During the Cold War, Western countries failed to introduce a social clause in the GATT. The most resounding failure was in the 1990s when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created. This failure drove Western countries to introduce social clauses in bilateral and non-universal multilateral trade agreements. Since the 2000s there has been a ‘boom’ of new social clauses. These clauses have developed into two main models: the conditional model and the cooperative (or promotional) model. The former model is typical of the US, the latter of the EU. The US and EU clauses have four characteristics and structural elements: social obligations, procedural commitments, implementation mechanisms and dispute settlement mechanisms. The main difference between the two types of social clauses lies in the presence (US model) or absence (EU model) of sanctions for breach of obligations. The research question of this dissertation concerns the legal efficacy of social clauses. First, the research reconstructs the historical-legal background and conceptualises social clauses. Second, the study compares the EU and US models from a legal-historical perspective. Third, the dissertation comparatively assesses two fundamental (and so far unique) cases for breach of social obligations: the US v. Guatemala case and the EU v. Republic of Korea case.

Since the 1990s, EU has used human rights clauses as conditions in their trade agreements. In this thesis I will examine how these clauses has been utilized in agreements with Mexico, Morocco and Peru, how they differ from each other and furthermore study the effects that these may have had on the human rights situation in the countries. For the first part of my thesis I compared the content and the terms of clauses with each other, and the result was that they were quite similar but some important differences. In Mexico's agreement, there was an article which stipulated what cooperation on human rights should look like. In Peru's agreement, there was a section on labor rights. But besides that, it was the Universal declaration of human rights that all the clauses were based on. The second part of the thesis is to understand the impact that these agreements may have had on the different countries. The study showed that some improvements have been made, but they have been slow. From the material it could be deduced that there have been more improvements in Peru and Morocco than in Mexico. In the final step of my study, I wanted to link the results to a Press Freedom Index from Reporters Without Borders. This was to get a final indicator on the human rights situation. From the index it’s clear that the situation has not improved in Mexico, while it seems to have stagnated in Morocco and Peru.

<p>Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash / Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries.</p>