Thesis (I.M.E.S.)--Baylor University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-48).

No description available.

Thesis (M. Env. St.)--University of Adelaide, Mawson Graduate Centre for Environmental Studies, 1999. / Bibliography: leaves 91-96.

This dissertation evaluates the role and effectiveness of law in the transboundary environmental governance of the Baltic Sea with regard to eutrophication. To this end, it reviews the applicable international agreements with their related instruments, as well as the EU legal frameworks, for the protection of the Baltic Sea environment on the basis of theories on resilience in social-ecological systems. The scientific discourse on resilience in social-ecological systems provides theories on effective governance of complex environmental problems with nonlinear causal connections. The governance features identified in resilience governance also show significant similarities with characteristic features of the concept of ecosystem approach. The resilience features can thus provide guidance to the operationalization of this concept, which lacks a distinct meaning in the legal context. Eutrophication is one of the main environmental problems in the Baltic Sea. Despite the fact that this problem has been acknowledged since the 1970s, only little progress has been visible in the attempts to limit the problem. Environmental governance in the form of cooperation and common action has, however, been established by the coastal states of the Baltic Sea to reduce the discharges to their common resource. This was originally coordinated through the Helsinki Convention and its administrative organization HELCOM in the 1970s. Since the year 2000 a new set of legal instruments and approaches have developed, emphasizing also the ecosystem approach. These instruments have a basis both in HELCOM and in EU environmental law, most significantly represented by the Water Framework Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. They establish a unique regulatory structure, with new approaches to regulation, which also give rise to questions regarding interpretation and effectiveness that have not previously been analyzed. It is concluded that applicable law in the Baltic Sea area reflects resilience features such as adaptability, flexibility and redundancy within the legal structure. The legal structure for the Baltic Sea is dynamic and stretches over many levels of governance. The applicable legal instruments are constructed so as to be adaptable and flexible. The legal instruments moreover include significant elements that provide for participation at different levels and in different forms, which contribute to enabling the mentioned resilience features. However, the Baltic Sea legal structure – as law in general – has different core functions than just providing for effective environmental governance. Law is based in a number of general principles connected to the rule of law and the function of law as a foundation for stability in the society and in human interactions. These principles are also important since they are directly linked to enforcement, monitoring and control. While the legal structure in the Baltic Sea may provide for effective governance and social-ecological resilience, the resilience features reflected in law do not always appear as far-reaching as suggested by resilience theories, much due to the legal principles. It is however because of these principles and the base for binding requirements they enable, that law can push for governance measures and features that might not have been accomplished otherwise. This, in the larger perspective, includes creating requirements that steer human activities away from critical thresholds. / Baltic Ecosystem Adaptive Management, BEAM

在世界及地區性貿易組織的努力下, 近來關稅等貿易障礙已經普遍降低。但與此同時, 環境品質向下沉淪的疑慮也隨之而來。儘管相關的討論不在少數, 但大部分著重於外生貿易障礙調降下的策略性環境政策, 以及其對應之福利變動; 或是在合作與非合作環境政策下, 同時決定環境與貿易政策, 然而也相對較少將環境階段的扭曲納入貿易政策制定的考量中。因此, 本文旨在探討若將生態傾銷的誘因納入考量,並改採序列賽局分別決定最適環境稅與關稅時, 貿易政策合作下所制定之最適關稅協定為何? 另一方面, 我們也觀察生產性跨國污染的大小對最適關稅的影響, 並發現當污染不具跨國外溢效果時, 此時不論環境政策合作與否, 最適關稅應對該污染性財貨提供進口補貼。相對地, 若跨國污染超過一定程度時, 除非環境政策能夠合作, 否則此時應對其課徵關稅, 以避免過度生產減損社會福利。 / By constructing a reciprocal-dumping model, we investigate a second-best tariff agreement when considering the linkage between the trade and the environmental policy. Though there has been much discussion about the linkage, most existing literature rarely considers the distortion when setting a trade agreement. We also take the transboundary strength of production pollution into account. Our results show that: (1) in the absence of transboundary pollution, the optimal tariff should be an import subsidy. Thus, whether both countries coordinate on their environmental policies or not, a bilateral reduction in tariffs will enhance the global welfare. (2) On the contrary, if the transboundary pollution is sufficiently strong, then the second-best tariff should be positive, while the first-best level is negative. In this situation, trade liberalization might decrease global welfare.

Bibiography: leaves 91-96. The Timor Gap area is managed jointly by Australia and Indonesia through the Treaty of Timor Gap (1989). The Zone of Cooperation area A 's main activity is oil exploration and exploitation. The main concern of the research is the provisions for environmental protection and the procedure of environmental impact assessment in the Treaty.

本文將貿易政策與環境政策做連結, 建構一雙邊貿易之架構, 設立一三階段之序列賽局,以之探討: 當具有跨國性質之消費性污染存在時, 在考量兩國政府皆有誘因在環境政策上採取非合作的態度下, 兩國政府應如何藉由貿易政策之協定, 訂定其最適之出口品補貼政策, 以矯正環境政策非合作下之不效率。 本文研究發現: 在兩國政府僅能夠進行政策的部分合作時, 當需求參數愈大, 兩國政府之最適貿易政策是應將給予其各自國家出口品之單位補貼調升;但若伴隨消費財貨所排放之污染對環境具有較高之邊際污染, 或是其本身之外溢效果愈強, 兩國政府對出口品之最適補貼則應該調降。我們同時也發現, 此時即使各國政府之最適貿易政策是調降出口補貼, 會使得各國之污染稅稅率更低, 但卻不會使其更加偏離兩國政府在環境政策上合作下之最適稅率, 並且仍會為全球帶來更高之社會福利。 / This paper constructs a reciprocal-market model, which contains a three-stage game to investigate how the two countries decide the optimal export subsidy agreement when they do not coordinate their environmental policy. We find that the level of optimal export subsidy should decrease with the strength of transboundary pollution, which is associated to consumption activities. In addition, the export subsidy agreement should increase with the demand parameter. We also find that even a reduction in the export subsidy will decrease the non-coordinated environmental tax rate, it will not deviate the tax rate away from the coordinated one and still enhance the social welfare.

Cette thèse est composée de trois chapitres qui traitent de la problématique de la régulation optimale des émissions de carbone pour atténuer le changement climatique. Dans le premier chapitre, nous analysons les interactions stratégiques entre un cartel, exportant une ressource non renouvelable génératrice de pollution, et deux pays importateurs hétérogènes qui souhaitent atténuer les dommages dus à la pollution. Les pays importateurs différent selon leur demande de la ressource et selon leur degré d’exposition au stock (mondial) de pollution. Les pays importateurs fixent de manière non coopérative des taxes carbone sur la consommation de la ressource polluante et le cartel exportateur fixe son prix à la production. En utilisant équilibre de Nash en boucle ouverte, nous obtenons des solutions explicites des trajectoires temporelles des taxes carbone, du prix au producteur et du stock de pollution. Nous montrons que lorsque les pays importateurs agissent de manière non coopérative, à un temps fini, le prix à la production bondit et le pays importateur le plus touché par la pollution cesse de demander la ressource. Nos résultats numériques basés sur la caractérisation explicite de l’équilibre non coopératif montrent qu’une plus grande symétrie par rapport aux coûts de la pollution conduit à une augmentation plus rapide du stock de pollution en début d’horizon temporel, mais à un stock de pollution de long terme plus faible et un bien-être total plus élevé. Dans le deuxième chapitre, Nous analysons les effets des ajustements carbone bilatéraux aux frontières sur les taxes carbone dans un jeu non coopératif entre deux pays symétriques ouverts ayant des firmes en concurrence imparfaite en présence de pollution transfrontalière. Nous comparons également dans ce chapitre les résultats de ce jeu avec ceux de deux benchmarks (soient, le jeu non coopératif sans ajustements carbone aux frontières et la solution efficace). Nous constatons que lorsque les pays souffrent peu de la pollution, seuls des équilibres symétriques existent. En revanche, si les pays souffrent suffisamment de la pollution, seuls des équilibres asymétriques existent. Les taxes sur le carbone en équilibres symétriques sont plus élevées que les taxes efficaces, tandis que l’inverse est vrai pour les équilibres asymétriques. Dans tous les cas d’intérêt, le bien-être total à l’équilibre du jeu non coopératif avec ajustements carbone aux frontières est supérieur à celui du jeu non coopératif sans ajustements carbone aux frontières. Lorsque les coûts de la pollution sont suffisamment bas, il existe un niveau d’ajustement carbone aux frontières tel que les taxes d’équilibre non coopératif sont efficaces. Enfin, dans le cas où les pays souffrent suffisamment de la pollution, le niveau optimal d’ajustement carbone aux frontières peut être partiel ou total selon les paramètres du modèle. Nous étudions enfin, dans le dernier chapitre, un jeu de pollution frontalière non coopératif entre respectivement deux pays et trois pays fixant des taxes carbone en présence d’ajustements carbone aux frontières et avec présence d’une concurrence imparfaite sur le marché international des biens polluants. Les pays sont asymétriques quant à leur volonté de payer pour la réduction des émissions mondiales de carbone. Dans nos modèles, seul le pays le plus touché impose un ajustement carbone aux frontières. Nous montrons que, contrairement à la littérature existante utilisant des modèles à deux pays avec un seul marché, le pays le plus touché préfère très généralement utiliser un ajustement carbone total aux frontières (c’est-à -dire un tarif qui ajuste exactement les écarts entre sa propre taxe carbone et celles des autres pays) à un ajustement carbone partiel aux frontières. De plus, un ajustement carbone total aux frontières est optimal pour le bien-être global dans la plupart des cas d’intérêt. / This thesis is composed of three chapters which concern the problem of the optimal regulation of carbon emissions to mitigate climate change. In the first chapter, we analyze strategic interactions between a resource cartel exporting a non-renewable stock pollutant and two heterogeneous importing countries, who want to mitigate pollution damages. The importing countries differ with respect to market size and with respect to how strongly they are affected by the (global) stock of pollution. The importing countries non cooperatively set emissions taxes and the exporting cartel sets its producer price. Using open loop Nash equilibrium, we obtain explicit solutions for the time paths of the carbon taxes, the producer price and the stock of pollution. We show that when the countries act non cooperatively, at a finite time, the producer price jumps and the country that is most affected by pollution stops demanding the resource. Our numerical results based on the explicit characterization of the non-cooperative equilibrium yield that more symmetry with respect to the cost of pollution leads to faster increase of the stock of pollution initially, but to a lower long-term stock and higher total discounted welfare. In the second chapter, we analyzes the effects of bilateral border tax adjustments on carbon taxes in a non-cooperative game between two symmetric open countries trading in an oligopolistic framework with cross-border pollution. We also contrast the results of this BTA game with those of two benchmarks (the non-cooperative game without BTA and the efficient solution). We note that when countries suffer little from pollution, only symmetric equilibria exist. By contrast, if countries suffer sufficiently from pollution, only asymmetric equilibria exist. Carbon taxes in symmetric equilibria are higher than the efficient taxes, while the opposite is true for the asymmetric equilibria. In all cases of interest, the total welfare in the equilibrium of the non cooperative game with BTA is higher than that in the equilibrium of the non cooperative game without BTA. If the cost of pollution is sufficiently low, there is a level of BTA such that non cooperative equilibrium taxes are efficient. Finally, in the case where the countries suffer a lot from pollution, the optimal level of BTA can be partial or full depending on the parameters of the model. Finally, in the last chapter, we study a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game between respectively two countries and three countries setting carbon taxes in the presence of a Border Tax Adjustment (BTA) and with imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market. Countries are asymmetric with respect to their willingness to pay for reductions of global emissions. In our models, only the most affected country imposes a BTA. We show that, unlike in the existing literature using two-country models with only one market, the most affected country generally prefers using a full BTA, a tariff that fully adjusts for the differences between its own carbon tax and those in other countries, to a partial BTA. Moreover, a full BTA is optimal for the global welfare in most cases of interest.