This thesis examines third-party actor influence on the domestic level in the ongoing diplomatic negotiations between P5+1 and Iran, with the research question being; What demands, arguments and strategies does the Congress and AIPAC use to influence the negotiation process between the U.S. and Iran? Secondly, what are their goals for doing so? Furthermore, the combined theoretical framework has been applied onto the material using a critical method in order to answer the questions. Legislative bills from the Congress, regarding congressional insight to the agreement, have been approved. In this pressured negotiation process with high stakes it is astounding that these actions are allowed. Due to this behavior from Congress, amongst others, it becomes interesting to study the negotiation process and its salient third-party actor influence. The results suggests that legislative actions combined with various demands and arguments, focused on mistrust of Iran, history and the security of Israel, are their main strategies to gain influence. An additional new, third, level has also been discovered by the authors of this thesis in regards to these complicated negotiations.

<p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p><h1>Abstract</h1><h2>C-Level Paper in Political Science, by David Olsson, Autumn 2008. Supervisor: Malin Stegman McCallion. “Regime Type and Trade Policy: Has Increased Democratization Contributed to Lower Trade Barriers Among Autocratic States?”</h2><p> </p><p>In this paper a new two-level game theory, based on previous research and deductive reasoning, is constructed and tested empirically. The purpose is to examine if developing new democracies, trading with developing autocracies, is an explanatory factor of trade liberalization among the latter. The research questions are: 1) Have tariff rates in developing autocratic countries followed the pattern of reduced tariffs among their developing new democratic trading partners? And; 2) If this is the case, is there a relative shift in trade flows that confirms this change to be an effect of the new democracies’ presumed influence?</p><p>                      In order to sufficiently carry out an empirical scrutiny, seven other determinants found to have effects on trade policies in previous research, are accounted for using a “most similar systems design”. For reasons of delimitation, six autocracies and their fifteen most important trading partners, observed 1980-1999, have been paired and analyzed. Each pair consists of one autocracy that trades with new democracies and one that does not; regarding the other determinants they are as similar as possible. The used material is the World Development Indicators, the Polity IV Dataset, the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, the World Economic Outlook Database, the Database of Political Institutions, statistics from the World Trade Organization, the Dataset of Armed Conflicts, and the Unweighted Average Tariffs Measurement.   </p><p>                      The conclusion is that there are no indicators that affirm the theory and research questions. However, the theory is not unambiguously falsified. Hence, studies on more countries and time spans are needed.       </p><p> </p><p> </p></p><p> </p><p><p> </p></p><p> </p>

The purpose of this study is to examine the U.S. relations to Israel and the affect the relationship has had on Palestine from the viewpoint of Robert D. Putnam’s `two level-game´ theory. The core of the theory is that representatives have been placed between two tables; where one represents domestic negotiations while the other represents foreign negotiations. The bargains made at the foreign table affects the state’s domestic politics and vice versa. Applying the theory on U.S. relations to Israel it is possible to see that the U.S. is leading an unsuccessful negotiation at both tables. The relationship between the U.S. and Israel has existed since U.S. decided to recognize the state in 1948. Events such as the Holocaust and 9/11 have let Israel keep its underdog status as well as its sympathy from the American population. Israel also has a very powerful lobby group which have tried to steer U.S. policies towards its goal, the continuation of the Israeli state. The U.S. government have different interests in the region, besides the peace between Israel and Palestine. This leads to the government’s most difficult mission, being able to both satisfy their own people as well as proceeding with its plans and agendas for the region.

The dissertation research answers the question of what explains the variation across countries where the IMF SAP implementation is associated with the onset of armed civil conflict in some countries but not in others. Do SAPs increase the likelihood of the outbreak of armed civil conflict in recipient countries? By what causal mechanism could SAPs increase the probability of the onset of armed civil conflict? This study contributes to extant literature by taking actors’ preferences and ethnicity in recipient countries into account. I argue that the effect of SAP implementation on armed civil conflict is conditional on the ethnic characteristics of recipient countries. From a two-level game perspective, highly ethnic-fractionalized countries have a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the IMF at the international level due to their domestic weakness. Hence such governments will receive relatively moderate conditionality from the IMF because the Fund will adopt its second-order preference of containing the contagious effect of debt crisis and ensure the loan repayment. The ethnically fractionalized countries will also implement the austerity measures across different ethnic communities. The result is reducing probability of the onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic fractionalization increases. But in ethnically-dominant countries, the governments’ bargaining position at the international level is relatively weak due to their domestic strength. Therefore the governments are more likely to get stringent conditionality from the IMF because the Fund will adopt its first-order preference of satisfying its constituents by imposing stringent conditionality. The result is to increase the likelihood of the onset of armed civil conflict when ethnic dominance increases. By analyzing cross-national data for 162 countries from 1992 to 2009 based on improved measurement of IMF conditionality, the empirical results confirm the theoretical hypotheses. The statistical results also reveal that SAP impact on the outbreak of armed civil conflict varies with conditionality. Historical analyses of Ghana and Rwanda provide further understanding of the theoretical mechanisms.

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<p>This study explores different actors’ perceptions on how the democratization process is being influenced in Kosovo. It is based upon empirical facts gathered during a field study in Kosovo. The material was mainly gathered through interviews with different representatives from international organizations present in Kosovo and with members of the Kosovar political elite.</p><p>The theoretical standpoint in the study draws on the theory of polyarchy for defining the concept of democracy, and the two-level game. The interaction between domestic and international actors within the democratization process is highlighted.</p><p>The conclusions are that different actors are influencing the ongoing democratization process in Kosovo, mainly international external ones acting in several ways and on different levels. This influence is considered by the international community and the domestic political elite to be necessary both for the continued development of democracy and for the preservation of stability. However as the influence has more or less become institutionalized, problems occur when responsibility is handed over to domestic authorities without accountability being made clear.</p>

This study explores different actors’ perceptions on how the democratization process is being influenced in Kosovo. It is based upon empirical facts gathered during a field study in Kosovo. The material was mainly gathered through interviews with different representatives from international organizations present in Kosovo and with members of the Kosovar political elite. The theoretical standpoint in the study draws on the theory of polyarchy for defining the concept of democracy, and the two-level game. The interaction between domestic and international actors within the democratization process is highlighted. The conclusions are that different actors are influencing the ongoing democratization process in Kosovo, mainly international external ones acting in several ways and on different levels. This influence is considered by the international community and the domestic political elite to be necessary both for the continued development of democracy and for the preservation of stability. However as the influence has more or less become institutionalized, problems occur when responsibility is handed over to domestic authorities without accountability being made clear.

The purpose of this inquiry is to examine weather Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory could be expanded to a third level. Furthermore, the study seeks to answer the question weather international negotiations can be played on three levels. For the purpose of the study, the two-level game theory will be applied to the ongoing negotiations between Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) and the European Union. The third level will be investigated by considering United States’ role and its frequent involvement in negotiations. The General Framework Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) that ended the four-year war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with additional political and economic involvement of the USA in BiH will be utilized to signify the existence of the third level. The argument of this paper has been developed using qualitative research methods, where interviews have been combined with an analysis of contents. The study’s findings have several implications for the existence of the third-level. First, results demonstrate that Bosnian political figures fail to recognize USA’s involvement in the negotiation process. Second, study indicates an indirect, but intense influence of the United States due to its strategic interests. Third, the study significantly contributes to the international negotiations by incorporating the events on all three levels that influence all negotiation outcomes. The use of qualitative methods in this study deepened theoretical understanding of the three-level game, provided useful application for practitioners and opened up an opportunity to provide even greater understanding of international negotiations as a whole.

Abstract C-Level Paper in Political Science, by David Olsson, Autumn 2008. Supervisor: Malin Stegman McCallion. “Regime Type and Trade Policy: Has Increased Democratization Contributed to Lower Trade Barriers Among Autocratic States?”   In this paper a new two-level game theory, based on previous research and deductive reasoning, is constructed and tested empirically. The purpose is to examine if developing new democracies, trading with developing autocracies, is an explanatory factor of trade liberalization among the latter. The research questions are: 1) Have tariff rates in developing autocratic countries followed the pattern of reduced tariffs among their developing new democratic trading partners? And; 2) If this is the case, is there a relative shift in trade flows that confirms this change to be an effect of the new democracies’ presumed influence?                       In order to sufficiently carry out an empirical scrutiny, seven other determinants found to have effects on trade policies in previous research, are accounted for using a “most similar systems design”. For reasons of delimitation, six autocracies and their fifteen most important trading partners, observed 1980-1999, have been paired and analyzed. Each pair consists of one autocracy that trades with new democracies and one that does not; regarding the other determinants they are as similar as possible. The used material is the World Development Indicators, the Polity IV Dataset, the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, the World Economic Outlook Database, the Database of Political Institutions, statistics from the World Trade Organization, the Dataset of Armed Conflicts, and the Unweighted Average Tariffs Measurement.                          The conclusion is that there are no indicators that affirm the theory and research questions. However, the theory is not unambiguously falsified. Hence, studies on more countries and time spans are needed.

Submitted by Elesbão Santiago Neto (neto10uepb@cche.uepb.edu.br) on 2018-04-16T17:37:15Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Saulo Felipe Costa.pdf: 39300044 bytes, checksum: f6782ca64fbf0bdf0e899f17f6bf1d0f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-16T17:37:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Saulo Felipe Costa.pdf: 39300044 bytes, checksum: f6782ca64fbf0bdf0e899f17f6bf1d0f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-24 / CAPES / The research aimed to screen for evidence of the influence of ideals of the international medium on the pattern of public policies in Brazil and Colombia. Through an approach that linked the theory of two levels games and policy paradigm understanding in Kuhn and the mechanism of social learning, it was possible to develop a proxy for the degree of influence of international pressure for the adoption of a given policies. We attempted to analyze the influence of the proposed of solution to the state problems, issued by multilateral agencies, through what became known as the Washington Consensus. The choice of Brazil was due to an increased availability of data, while the choice of Colombia is its function in this country experience a long period of democratic rule, with jarring ideological profile of the Brazilian. For this, the research has focused on the behavior of public spending in both countries, was also performed a more specific case study on the deployment of the managerial model of public administration in Brazil, with the aim of better understanding how this process occurred import and export of ideas and solutions for different problems. The research showed that multilateral organizations have greater power to print your ideas in countries' policies when such changes are first and second order, by type built. In return, changes in third order are only induced by multilateral bodies, since the ideology of society plays a more decisive role for the incorporation or not of such ideas "exogenous”. / A pesquisa em tela buscou por evidências da influência de ideais do meio internacional sobre o padrão de oferta de políticas públicas no Brasil e na Colômbia. Através de uma abordagem que uniu a teoria dos jogos de dois níveis à compreensão de mudança de paradigma em Kuhn e ao mecanismo de aprendizagem social (social learning), foi possível elaborar uma proxy para o grau de influência das pressões internacionais pela adoção de determinado conjunto de políticas. Buscou-se analisar a influência das propostas de solução aos problemas estatais, emanadas por agências multilaterais, através do que ficou conhecido como Consenso de Washington. A escolha do Brasil se deu devido uma maior disponibilidade de dados, ao passo que a opção pela Colômbia se deu em função deste país experimentar um longo período democrático, com perfil ideológico destoante do brasileiro. Para tanto, a pesquisa se debruçou sobre o comportamento do gasto público em ambos os países, foi executado também um estudo de caso mais específico sobre a implantação do modelo gerencial de administração pública no Brasil, com o intuito de melhor compreender como se deu este processo de importação e exportação de ideais e soluções para os mais diversos problemas. A pesquisa evidenciou que os organismos multilaterais possuem um maior poder de imprimir seu ideário nas políticas dos países quando tais mudanças são de primeira e de segunda ordem, segundo a tipologia construída. Em contra partida, mudanças de terceira ordem são susceptíveis apenas de indução pelos organismos multilaterais, uma vez que a ideologia da sociedade desempenha um papel mais determinante para a incorporação ou não de tal ideário “exógeno”.