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Die konservativen Revolutionare : die Musik der Zweiten Wiener Schule als logische Entwicklung des Vorangegangenen und des Gleichzeitigen /Taylor, Greg, January 1993 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (B.A.(Hons.))--University of Adelaide, Dept. of German, 1994? / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 287-304).
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Carnap e a natureza da lógica / Carnap and the nature of logicTranjan, Tiago 28 January 2010 (has links)
Em The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap elabora o seu Princípio de Tolerância Lógica. Trata-se de um princípio lógico-filosófico de grande alcance, que condensa as posições mais consistentes do autor acerca do significado filosófico da pesquisa em lógica formal. A despeito do fracasso do projeto geral de uma filosofia sintática, esse princípio permaneceu como base de todo o pensamento posterior de Carnap. Mais do que isso, influenciou boa parte do melhor trabalho realizado em lógica até hoje, tendo deixado marcas duradouras sobre a filosofia analítica. Neste trabalho, buscamos examinar a origem do Princípio de Tolerância no pensamento de Carnap, como melhor caminho para estabelecer seu significado e implicações. / In The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap develops his Principle of Tolerance in Logic. This is a far-reaching principle for the whole philosophy of logic, and which sums up Carnaps most consistent tenets concerning the philosophical meaning of research in formal logic. Despite the failure of the general project of a syntactical philosophy, the Principle of Tolerance remained the basis for the whole of Carnaps subsequent thought. Moreover, it proved influential in a good deal of the most important work done in logic to this day; it also left permanent traces in analytic philosophy. In this work, we aim at examining the origins of the Tolerance Principle in Carnaps thought, as the best way to establish its significance and implications.
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Carnap e a natureza da lógica / Carnap and the nature of logicTiago Tranjan 28 January 2010 (has links)
Em The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap elabora o seu Princípio de Tolerância Lógica. Trata-se de um princípio lógico-filosófico de grande alcance, que condensa as posições mais consistentes do autor acerca do significado filosófico da pesquisa em lógica formal. A despeito do fracasso do projeto geral de uma filosofia sintática, esse princípio permaneceu como base de todo o pensamento posterior de Carnap. Mais do que isso, influenciou boa parte do melhor trabalho realizado em lógica até hoje, tendo deixado marcas duradouras sobre a filosofia analítica. Neste trabalho, buscamos examinar a origem do Princípio de Tolerância no pensamento de Carnap, como melhor caminho para estabelecer seu significado e implicações. / In The Logical Syntax of Language (1937) R. Carnap develops his Principle of Tolerance in Logic. This is a far-reaching principle for the whole philosophy of logic, and which sums up Carnaps most consistent tenets concerning the philosophical meaning of research in formal logic. Despite the failure of the general project of a syntactical philosophy, the Principle of Tolerance remained the basis for the whole of Carnaps subsequent thought. Moreover, it proved influential in a good deal of the most important work done in logic to this day; it also left permanent traces in analytic philosophy. In this work, we aim at examining the origins of the Tolerance Principle in Carnaps thought, as the best way to establish its significance and implications.
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Carnap's conventionalism : logic, science, and toleranceFriedman-Biglin, Noah January 2014 (has links)
In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature. Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.
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Schoenberg, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna circle : epistemological meta-themes in harmonic theory, aesthetics, and logical positivismWright, James K. January 2001 (has links)
This study examines the relativistic aspects of Arnold Schoenberg's harmonic and aesthetic theories in the light of a framework of ideas presented in the early writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the logician, philosopher of language, and Schoenberg's contemporary and Austrian compatriot. The author has identified correspondences between the writings of Schoenberg, the early Wittgenstein (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in particular), and the Vienna Circle of philosophers, on a wide range of topics and themes. Issues discussed include the nature and limits of language, musical universals, theoretical conventionalism, word-to-world correspondence in language, the need for a fact- and comparison-based approach to art criticism, and the nature of music-theoretical formalism and mathematical modeling. Schoenberg and Wittgenstein are shown to have shared a vision that is remarkable for its uniformity and balance, one that points toward the reconciliation of the positivist-relativist dualism that has dominated recent discourse in music theory. Contrary to earlier accounts of Schoenberg's harmonic and aesthetic relativism, this study identifies a solid epistemological core underlying his thought, a view that was very much in step with Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, and thereby with the most vigorous and forward-looking stream in early twentieth century intellectual history.
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La philosophie politique de l'empirisme logique : Otto Neurath et le "Cercle de Vienne de gauche" / Politics of logical empiricism : Otto Neurath and the "Left Vienna Circle"Aray, Basak 18 September 2015 (has links)
Malgré sa condamnation post-positiviste et sa réception négative par la gauche, l’empirisme logique regagne en intérêt. Cette thèse est une contribution à la littérature émergente du «Cercle de Vienne de gauche» (CVG). Autour de Neurath et quelques autres personnalités de l’aile gauche du Cercle (Carnap, Frank, Hahn, Zilsel), nous proposons de repenser la relation de l’empirisme logique avec le marxisme. Ces deux courants se rejoignent dans leur défense d’une «conception scientifique du monde» et leur sécularisme radical. Les critiques communistes et néo-marxistes (l’École de Francfort, l’épistémologie féministe) adressées à l’empirisme logique sont recensées et leur pertinence questionnée à travers les données de l’historiographie du CVG. La politique de l’empirisme logique est examinée à travers les textes économiques de Neurath et son œuvre d’infographiste. Son engagement pour l’économie socialiste planifiée et ses efforts en graphisme pour la popularisation des méthodes quantitatives (la méthode Isotype pour la visualisation des statistiques sociales) sont présentés en vue d’une évaluation politique du CVG, ainsi que les connexions de l’empirisme logique avec le mouvement pour une langue auxiliaire internationale. / Despite logical empiricism’s dismissal by ambient postpositivism in academia as well as by the Far Left, a growing interest in its previously unknown socialist origins has resulted in a new topic in the history of philosophy of science : «Left Vienna Circle» (LVC). This thesis dedicated to LVC studies aims to clarify the politics of European logical empiricism. A presentation of its major critics from the Left (from communist parties to neo-Marxist trends like Frankfurt School and feminist epistemology) is followed by more recent arguments about its socialist politics. The «scientific world conceptions» of logical empiricism and Marxism will be compared through the work of Neurath and some other representatives of LVC (Carnap, Frank, Zilsel, Hahn). Alongside the connections of logical empiricism to the movement for an international auxiliary language, Neurath’s economical writings and his efforts to popularize quantitative methods in social sciences (the Isotype method of visual statistics) will be presented in an attempt to evaluate the politics of logical empiricism.
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Novos olhares sobre Viena: um estudo sobre o recente trabalho de reavaliação do positivismo lógico / New approaches upon Vienna: a study concerning the recent re-evaluation work on logical positivismDavi da Silva San Gil 08 December 2008 (has links)
A pesquisa que ora se apresenta consiste em uma investigação sobre o recente trabalho de reavaliação das obras de membros do chamado Círculo de Viena, que foi o primeiro e principal grupo representativo da perspectiva filosófica conhecida como positivismo lógico. Nossa pesquisa compreende três partes: a primeira parte voltada para a reconstrução histórico-conceitual do período entre o alvorecer das idéias neopositivistas e os primeiros momentos posteriores à recepção norte-americana da imigração intelectual vienense; na segunda parte do trabalho, por sua vez, lançaremos luz propriamente à natureza de tal perspectiva contemporânea, a partir de uma descrição sobre o método e o escopo temático de tal projeto revisionista; à terceira parte, por fim, além de tecer uma avaliação geral sobre o que foi feito nas duas partes que a antecedem, coube conjecturar as possibilidades de se encontrar em tal trabalho uma agenda filosófica e política própria. / The present work consists on an inquiry concerning the recent re-evaluation in the works of members of the so-called Vienna Circle, which became the first and main representative of the philosophical movement known as Logical Positivism. Our research comprises three parts: the first one is devoted to a historical-conceptual reconstruction of the period between the uprising of the first Neopositivist ideas and the years immediately following the North-American reception of the intellectual immigration from Vienna; the second part of the work concerns the nature of such contemporary reappraisal researches on the positivists legacy, through a description of the method and scope of such re-evaluation project; finally, the third part comprises a general review of the previous parts, and was worked out in order to conceive conjectures about the possibility of finding out in this re-evaluation project a philosophical and political agenda of its own.
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Novos olhares sobre Viena: um estudo sobre o recente trabalho de reavaliação do positivismo lógico / New approaches upon Vienna: a study concerning the recent re-evaluation work on logical positivismDavi da Silva San Gil 08 December 2008 (has links)
A pesquisa que ora se apresenta consiste em uma investigação sobre o recente trabalho de reavaliação das obras de membros do chamado Círculo de Viena, que foi o primeiro e principal grupo representativo da perspectiva filosófica conhecida como positivismo lógico. Nossa pesquisa compreende três partes: a primeira parte voltada para a reconstrução histórico-conceitual do período entre o alvorecer das idéias neopositivistas e os primeiros momentos posteriores à recepção norte-americana da imigração intelectual vienense; na segunda parte do trabalho, por sua vez, lançaremos luz propriamente à natureza de tal perspectiva contemporânea, a partir de uma descrição sobre o método e o escopo temático de tal projeto revisionista; à terceira parte, por fim, além de tecer uma avaliação geral sobre o que foi feito nas duas partes que a antecedem, coube conjecturar as possibilidades de se encontrar em tal trabalho uma agenda filosófica e política própria. / The present work consists on an inquiry concerning the recent re-evaluation in the works of members of the so-called Vienna Circle, which became the first and main representative of the philosophical movement known as Logical Positivism. Our research comprises three parts: the first one is devoted to a historical-conceptual reconstruction of the period between the uprising of the first Neopositivist ideas and the years immediately following the North-American reception of the intellectual immigration from Vienna; the second part of the work concerns the nature of such contemporary reappraisal researches on the positivists legacy, through a description of the method and scope of such re-evaluation project; finally, the third part comprises a general review of the previous parts, and was worked out in order to conceive conjectures about the possibility of finding out in this re-evaluation project a philosophical and political agenda of its own.
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Schoenberg, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna circle : epistemological meta-themes in harmonic theory, aesthetics, and logical positivismWright, James K. January 2001 (has links)
No description available.
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De la conception empiriste du langage représentationnel au projet carnapien du réductionnisme logique : En quête d'une démarche empiriste libérale autour des années 1930 / The empiricist conception of language and Rudolf Carnap's logical reductionism. The quest for a liberal empiricism in the 1930sLengelo Muhenya, Junior-Placide 25 November 2016 (has links)
Une théorie empiriste de la connaissance affirme que le langage est doté de la capacité à « représenter » quelque chose d'autre que le langage lui-même. A la fin du XVIIe siècle, en effet, Locke et ses successeurs ont analysé empiriquement ce à quoi nos idées ressemblent et que les mots représentent mentalement. Autour des années trente, Schlick et ses camarades du Cercle de Vienne se servent des acquis linguistico-logiques de Frege, Russell et Wittgenstein pour analyser logiquement les propositions scientifiques, leur correspondance avec les états de choses qu'elles représentent. Avec eux, la philosophie analytique devra dorénavant ramener les problèmes de la connaissance au niveau de l'expérience langagière. C'est là que réside le caractère radical et réductionniste d'une démarche empiriste : les empiristes classiques ont fixé dans la perception la genèse chronologique de nos idées et nos pensées ; à leur tour, les Viennois déterminent le sens d'une proposition en la traduisant en propositions élémentaires, dites « Protokollsätze », qui renvoient directement au donné empirique. A la même période, Carnap se démarque des autres empiristes logiques en posant les problèmes du langage de la science en termes de reconstruction rationnelle des concepts et, cela, en introduisant de nouveaux concepts à partir de ceux déjà connus comme concepts de base phénoméniste (dans l'Aufbau en 1928) ou physicaliste (au cours des années trente). Tel est son réductionnisme logique qu'il renforce par la syntaxe logique. L'analyse logique ne porte pas sur le donné mais sur la proposition, et en particulier sur les propriétés formelles et des relations purement logiques qu'entretiennent les propositions dans un système. Carnap tente de libéraliser la démarche empiriste en assouplissant le critère de scientificité et, conformément à son « Principe de Tolérance », en adjoignant à l'ancrage empirique des questions de conventions pour la structure des propositions scientifiques. Il modère la critique viennoise de la métaphysique en attribuant à la philosophie, devenue « la logique de la science », la tâche de méthodes et formes adéquates pour la construction du langage de la science. / An empiricist theory of knowledge argues that language has the capacity to represent something other than itself. Beginning from the end of the 17th century, Locke and his successors analysed empirically what our ideas are reflections of and what words represent in the mind. At the beginning of the 1930s, Schlick and his Vienna Circle colleagues exploited the logico-linguistic advances of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein in the logical analysis of scientific propositions, i.e. their correspondence with the states of affairs they represent. Following their example, analytic philosophy would henceforth reduce problems of knowledge to the level of linguistic experience. This is where the radical and reductionist character of the empiricist perspective is to be found: the classical empiricists identified the chronological genesis of our ideas and thoughts in perception; the Vienna Circle philosophers in their turn determine the meaning of a proposition by translating it into elementary propositions or Protokollsätze, which reflect directly an empirical “given”. During the same period, Carnap distances himself from his fellow empiricists by formulating the formulating the problems of scientific language in terms of the rational reconstruction of concepts by introducing new concepts based on those already identified as fundamental from a phenomenalist (the Aufbau, 1928) or physicalist (during the 1930s) perspective. This is the logical reductionism that Carnap reinforces through logical syntax. For him, logical analysis is less concerned with the given than with the proposition, and in particular with the formal properties and purely logical relations between propositions within a system. Carnap attempts in this way to “liberalize” empiricism, both by rendering more flexible and open its claim to be scientific and, in conformity to his “Tolerance Principle”, in adding questions of conventions to the empirical grounding of scientific propositions. In attributing to philosophy, understood as “the logic of science”, the task of elaborating forms and methods adequate to the construction of the language of science, he thus moderates the Viennese critique of metaphysics.
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