Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, August, 2003. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 179-186)

This dissertation explores a family of theoretical models of humanitarian military intervention. A number of recent theorists, including Tesón, Caney, Buchanan, Orend, Moellendorf, and Wheeler, build their models from a perspective called ‘cosmopolitanism.’ They offer arguments based on the moral supremacy of human rights, the arbitrary character of territorial boundaries, and the duty to protect individual human beings exposed to serious and systematic violence by their own governments. I develop a model of intervention that recognizes the moral significance of political self-government. To the extent that international society should countenance a ‘duty to protect’ human rights, the duty ought to be constrained by a commitment to the values of self-government. The model developed in this dissertation also recognizes the significance of international law enforcement. Insofar as we should permit a role of enforcement for international human rights, that role should be constrained by formally accepted global principles and in particular by positive obligations to prevent and punish actions regarded as international crimes. These other global values are viewed with suspicion by cosmopolitan theorists, who tend to construe them in stark contrast to the vision of global responsibility for human rights protection. But I will show how these other values emerged simultaneously with cosmopolitanism and share many of its underlying intuitions. Because self-government and law enforcement are linked politically to the cosmopolitan vision, these two distinctive global values can be utilized as tools to fortify or expand cosmopolitanism by enlarging the global sense of responsibility for human rights. The aim of this project is to explain how these other values came to be neglected by cosmopolitan theorists, and why they should not be forgotten. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-25 12:11:55.056

The purpose of this thesis is to offer a comparative study of Michael Walzer and Will Kymlicka¡¦s theories on citizenship. By comparing their different perspectives on conception of person and political equality, I demonstrate that due to their differing views on the significance of culture, they, as a result, have divergent theories of citizenship. Looking from a liberal multiculturalist perspective, Kymlicka defends the centrality of personal autonomy and sees cultures as important references that allow persons to choose their respective ideal ways of life. Walzer, on the other hand, faults liberalism for its hyper-individualist assumptions and misunderstanding of the significance of culture to human agency. Walzer insists that culture is not a resource/object for humans to appropriate but a constitutive part of human self-understanding that cannot be disregarded in human actions. These two distinct ideals of citizenship, I maintain, can therefore be seen as a continuation of the liberal-communitarian debate in the 1980s.

Submitted by Automação e Estatística (sst@bczm.ufrn.br) on 2018-05-02T23:53:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 WendellWilliamyCristyeSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1032933 bytes, checksum: f682fc10040e7c1a4deb77e0abdae195 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Arlan Eloi Leite Silva (eloihistoriador@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-05-08T21:27:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 WendellWilliamyCristyeSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1032933 bytes, checksum: f682fc10040e7c1a4deb77e0abdae195 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-08T21:27:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 WendellWilliamyCristyeSilva_DISSERT.pdf: 1032933 bytes, checksum: f682fc10040e7c1a4deb77e0abdae195 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-06 / Esta Dissertação se propõe a discutir as problemáticas morais subjacentes ao fenômeno da Guerra, a partir de uma análise da Teoria da Guerra Justa, na forma em que a mesma é delineada na obra de Michael Walzer. A Teoria da Guerra Justa trabalha assumindo como ponto de partida que há situações em que é moralmente justificável fazer uso da guerra e da violência que obrigatoriamente acompanha esta última. Ela se divide em duas partes. A justiça do guerrear (jus ad bellum) diz respeito aos motivos que justificariam o recurso à guerra, concentrando-se na discussão sobre agressão e autodefesa. Já a justiça no guerrear (jus in bello) se concentra na discussão sobre o cumprimento ou a violação das normas de combate, normas estabelecidas tanto pelo costume quanto por instrumentos legais. Uma vez que as duas partes componentes da realidade moral da Guerra se encontram separadas de forma lógica, torna-se possível que se façam julgamentos independentes entre si. Assim, segundo Walzer, é possível travar uma guerra que seja justa, ou seja, cumpra com os requisitos do jus ad bellum, mas de forma injusta, violando as normas que conformam o jus in bello. Da mesma forma, uma guerra que não seja justa pode ser travada em conformidade com as regras. Através deste estudo, procuraremos realizar uma discussão sobre a possibilidade de que a guerra possa ser analisada à luz da moralidade, bem como se é possível determinar as condições em que uma guerra pode ser dita justa ou injusta. / This dissertation offers to discuss the moral problems underlying the war phenomenon, starting from an analysis of the Just War Theory, in the feature which is outlined inside Michael Walzer’s work. The Just War Theory starts from the perception of the situations in which it is morally justifiable to dispose the war and the violence that necessarily accompanies the latter. It is divided into two parts. Jus ad bellum concerns the motives which justify the use of war, and it is focused on aggression and self-defense discussing. Jus in bello concentrates on discussion about compliance or violation of combat rules, established rules by both custom and legal instruments. Once the two component parts of the war moral reality are logically separated, it becomes possible to make independent judgments. Thus, according to Walzer, it is possible to wage a war which is just, that is, it complies the jus ad bellum requirements, but unjust, by violating the norms which conform jus in bello. In the same way, an unjust war can be fought in accordance with the rules. Through this study, we will attempt to discuss the possibility that war can be analyzed in the light of morality, as well as whether it is possible to determine the conditions under which a war can be considered just or unjust.

No description available.

[pt] A presente tese de doutorado realiza um estudo comparativo, no âmbito da teoria da justiça, envolvendo a teoria da igualdade complexa, formulada por Michael Walzer, autor inserido no rol dos comunitaristas, e a teoria da justiça como imparcialidade, formulada por John Rawls, autor inserido no rol dos liberais. Trata-se, portanto, de um estudo comparativo de autores baseado na categoria da justiça distributiva, conceito cuja formulação original remonta ao pensamento aristotélico. A tese - que contém elementos de filosofia moral, filosofia política e filosofia do direito - tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da igualdade complexa, com sua metodologia particularista e seus princípios internos de distribuição, possibilita, como apregoa Michael Walzer, a crítica social ou se, de outra forma, esta crítica deve estar associada a uma moral universalista, como, por exemplo, a que nos é fornecida pelo modelo rawlsiano. / [en] The present doctorate thesis aims to make a comparative study, in the context of the theory of justice, involving the theory of complex equality, formulated by Michael Walzer, author inserted in the communitarians` list, and the theory of justice as fairness, formulated by John Rawls, author inserted in the liberals` list. It`s about, therefore, a comparative study of authors based on the category of distributive justice, whose concept was originally formulated by the aristotelic thought. The thesis - that contains elements of moral philosophy, political philosophy and philosophy of law - aims to verify if the theory of complex equality, with its particularistic methodology and its internal principles of distribution, makes possible, as well as Michael Walzer proclaims, the social criticism or if, on the other hand, this criticism has to be associated to an universalistic moral, as, for example, that one provided by the rawlsian model.

This thesis aims at answering the following questions:1) How can the existence of a state be justified?2) To what extent does the state have the right to restrict individual´s liberty of action?3) To what extent does the state have the right to restrict or redistribute any kind of "goods", and if so, which restrictions should be allowed on which"goods"?4) Can a moral theory be "goal-directed", and are there moral reasons that it should be "goaldirected"? In order to answer these questions, I will analyze Robert Nozick´s and Michael Walzer´s answers to these questions, as presented in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) and Spheres of Justice (1983). My answers, which are founded on an argument for the necessity of freedom of choice and ambition-sensitivity in theories of justice, are results of a compromise between the ideas in these theories, but also partially on criticism of both theories.

L'objectif de ce mémoire est de poser un jugement moral sur le terrorisme et la lutte antiterroriste. Pour ce faire, la théorie de la guerre juste du philosophe américain Michael Walzer est analysée à la lumière des défis moraux que posent le recours au terrorisme dans les conflits contemporains et le recours à la guerre dans la lutte contre les organisations terroristes. Bien que le phénomène terroriste ne soit pas nouveau, les théoriciens de la guerre juste se sont peu intéressés à lui, faisant plutôt porter leurs analyses sur la guerre conventionnelle, la dissuasion nucléaire ou les interventions humanitaires. L'absence d'un discours moral cohérent sur le terrorisme est une lacune que ce mémoire espère contribuer à combler. La pensée de Michael Walzer soulève trois questions importantes qui correspondent à chacun des chapitres de ce travail: la guerre peut-elle vraiment être juste? Si elle l'est, le terrorisme peut-il parfois l'être aussi? Et si le terrorisme ne peut jamais être légitime, est-il plus juste de vouloir le combattre par la guerre? Après avoir soumis la théorie de Michael Walzer à la critique de ses principaux détracteurs, il est possible d'affirmer que, effectivement, la guerre est une activité qui peut se justifier et qu'il est parfois moralement nécessaire d'entreprendre. Les deux théories rivales de la guerre juste, le réalisme et le pacifisme, sont incapables de prouver le contraire. À l'inverse, le recours au terrorisme ne peut jamais être justifié. Cette conclusion du deuxième chapitre est partagée par Michael Walzer, mais il peut être démontré que l'opinion de l'auteur sur le terrorisme est remplie de contradictions et que, par conséquent, celle-ci ne peut être acceptée sans modifications importantes. Enfin, la réponse à la troisième question de recherche sur la lutte antiterroriste est plutôt ambivalente. Contrairement à une idée reçue, faire la guerre à des terroristes ou à des États complices de terrorisme n'est pas toujours quelque chose d'impossible ou d'injuste. L'intervention militaire américaine en Afghanistan à l'automne 2001, qui sert d'étude de cas dans ce dernier chapitre, entre dans la catégorie des guerres de légitime défense justifiées par Michael Walzer, mais pour des raisons qui risquent peu d'être réunies à nouveau dans un avenir rapproché. Au terme de cet exercice, il n'apparaît pas nécessaire de rejeter ou de reviser complètement les catégories de la guerre juste de Michael Walzer pour pouvoir faire un jugement moral acceptable du terrorisme et de la lutte antiterroriste. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Guerre juste, Guerre, Terrorisme, Éthique, Morale, Afghanistan.

<p>This thesis aims at answering the following questions:1) How can the existence of a state be justified?2) To what extent does the state have the right to restrict individual´s liberty of action?3) To what extent does the state have the right to <em>restrict or redistribute</em> any kind of "goods", and if so, which restrictions should be allowed on which"goods"?4) Can a moral theory be "goal-directed", and are there moral reasons that it should be "goaldirected"?</p><p>In order to answer these questions, I will analyze Robert Nozick´s and Michael Walzer´s answers to these questions, as presented in <em>Anarchy, State and Utopia</em> (1974) and <em>Spheres of Justice</em> (1983). My answers, which are founded on an argument for the necessity of freedom of choice and ambition-sensitivity in theories of justice, are results of a compromise between the ideas in these theories, but also partially on criticism of both theories.</p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2008. / Vita. Advisor : P. Terrence Hopmann. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 303-309).