Zugl.: Olten, Hochsch. für Soziale Arbeit, Diplomarbeit, 2006

The lecture recital was given December 5, 1971. A discussion of Beethoven's 33 Variations on a Waltz by Diabelli, Op. 120 included the circumstances under which the work was composed, analysis of the composition, and controversial opinions on the Variations. The piece was then performed by memory. In addition to the lecture recital three other public recitals were performed. These consisted entirely of solo literature for the piano. The first solo recital was on April 12, 1970, and included works of Bach, Beethoven, and Liszt. Part of the preparation included the writing of program notes of a historical and analytical nature. The second solo recital, on January 31, 1971, consisted entirely of sonatas by Beethoven, Chopin, and Prokofiev. The final solo program, on August 11, 1972, included works by Bach, Schumann, and Granados. All four programs were recorded on magnetic tape and are filed, along with the written version of the lecture material, as a part of the dissertation.

<p>Obemannade flygplan med attackförmåga (UCAV) används i allt större utsträckning i konflikter idag. En av de främsta fördelarna med dessa är att det inte finns någon risk att mista en pilot, då dessa är fjärstyrda. I attacker utförda av amerikanska UCAV:er i framför allt Afghanistan och Pakistan, har collateral damage inträffat vid ett flertal tillfällen. Det innebär att civila oavsiktligt fallit offer för attacker. Enligt krigets lagar kan sådana händelser rättfärdigas av att militär nödvändighet föreligger, men det är tveksamt om det går att hävda det när man inte riskerar egna förluster. Detta innebär i så fall att collateral damage alltid är krigsbrott när det orsakats av UCAV. Då är det viktigt att det går att utkräva ansvar ur obemannade system och det finns farhågor att ansvarsförhållandena blir otydligare när det inte sitter en pilot i flygplanet som ”trycker på knappen”. Men så länge den obemannade farkosten fjärrstyrs och besluten tas av en människa går det inte att se några skillnader i möjligheten till ansvarsutkrävande från bemannade system.</p> / <p>The use of Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) has seen an increasing use in modern conflicts. One of the main advantages of these is the fact that there is no risk of losing a pilot, as the aircraft are remote-controlled. The attacks carried out by U.S. UCAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have resultet in a number of incients with collateral damage. According to the laws of war, only military necessity can justify such incidents and it is highly doubtful if you can claim such necessity when you do not risk any loss of life yourself. This would mean that collateral damage caused by UCAVs automatically becomes a war crime. This raises the issue of accountability and wether it is possible to extract such from unmanned systems. There are fears that this would be difficult when no pilot is present in the aircraft to ”pull the trigger”. However, as long as operators remotely control the unmanned aircraft and the decision to release weapons in anger are made by humans, there are no differences to be found in terms of accountability between manned and unmanned systems.</p>

Obemannade flygplan med attackförmåga (UCAV) används i allt större utsträckning i konflikter idag. En av de främsta fördelarna med dessa är att det inte finns någon risk att mista en pilot, då dessa är fjärstyrda. I attacker utförda av amerikanska UCAV:er i framför allt Afghanistan och Pakistan, har collateral damage inträffat vid ett flertal tillfällen. Det innebär att civila oavsiktligt fallit offer för attacker. Enligt krigets lagar kan sådana händelser rättfärdigas av att militär nödvändighet föreligger, men det är tveksamt om det går att hävda det när man inte riskerar egna förluster. Detta innebär i så fall att collateral damage alltid är krigsbrott när det orsakats av UCAV. Då är det viktigt att det går att utkräva ansvar ur obemannade system och det finns farhågor att ansvarsförhållandena blir otydligare när det inte sitter en pilot i flygplanet som ”trycker på knappen”. Men så länge den obemannade farkosten fjärrstyrs och besluten tas av en människa går det inte att se några skillnader i möjligheten till ansvarsutkrävande från bemannade system. / The use of Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) has seen an increasing use in modern conflicts. One of the main advantages of these is the fact that there is no risk of losing a pilot, as the aircraft are remote-controlled. The attacks carried out by U.S. UCAVs in Afghanistan and Pakistan have resultet in a number of incients with collateral damage. According to the laws of war, only military necessity can justify such incidents and it is highly doubtful if you can claim such necessity when you do not risk any loss of life yourself. This would mean that collateral damage caused by UCAVs automatically becomes a war crime. This raises the issue of accountability and wether it is possible to extract such from unmanned systems. There are fears that this would be difficult when no pilot is present in the aircraft to ”pull the trigger”. However, as long as operators remotely control the unmanned aircraft and the decision to release weapons in anger are made by humans, there are no differences to be found in terms of accountability between manned and unmanned systems.

In this essay I attempt to examine critically Michael Walzer's just war theory. I begin by pointing out what I take to be philosophically sound about his conception; in particular, his philosophical commitment to a doctrine of human rights as being morally decisive for questions of war. He argues, and I think correctly, that questions of justified wars and justified means within wars are ultimately questions about whether or not human rights are being respected. Unfortunately, Walzer does not always formulate his war principles in light of his fundamental commitment to human rights, and where he fails to do so, supreme emergencies and nuclear deterrence, I argue that his account becomes incoherent. At bottom, Walzer supposes, in these instances, that while individual rights may not be overriden for purely utilitarian reasons, rights may, nevertheless, be overridden for the sake of the political community. What this amounts to, for Walzer, is the following claim: that it is more just to secure the rights of a collection of individuals than it is to secure the rights of one individual. If so, it is morally permissible to suspend some individual rights for the sake of many individual rights. And even though I will hold that this argument is very persuasive, I will suggest that it is mistaken from a moral point of view which takes human rights to be morally conclusive.

The "Diabelli" Variations, Op. 120, have long fascinated and repelled musicians and audiences alike. They refuse listeners the chief pastime afforded by the genre, offering little opportunity to track pleasant musical ideas through different guises. The delights of bourgeois spectatorship are confounded by non-parallelisms and motivic complexities that embarrass our customary framework for understanding variation form. Arnold Schoenberg's dictum that "in classical music every variation shows a unity which surpasses that of the theme" has never been more patently contradicted. Most of the variations are rhythmically and harmonically warped, few follow the theme in their sequential disposition of motifs, and almost all of them exhibit a granularity of design without precedent in Beethoven's oeuvre. Diabelli's threadbare waltz is not the sole progenitor of its strange children. I propose that the Variations represent an experimental application to music of an intellectual method used by German philosophers and writers of the time for deconstructing dualities and unities. In form and function the "Diabelli Principle" most closely approaches the Dialectic of Beethoven's exact contemporary G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), and is construed here in a Hegelian framework. Most variations juxtapose a pair of contrasting Antitheses whose differences are overcome in a summary conclusion amounting to a Sublation. In many cases, Antitheses emerge directly from formerly undivided Theses. As in Hegel's philosophy where the Dialectic is manifested through a wide-ranging variety of forms, the "Diabelli" Variations similarly realize a diverse range of dialectical structures. Moreover, by destabilizing musical objects through pervasive shifts of meter, melodic groupings, and motivic identities, the Variations undertake a Hegelian critique of musical perception and its underlying categories. I contend that their dialectical meaning is not intended to be decoded hermeneutically through score analysis, but directly apprehended through listening. As scholarship on the Kantian and Burkean Sublime implies, early nineteenth-century listeners understood peak musical experiences as unmediated, intellectual revelation. I suggest that music's engagement with spatial and gestalt reasoning introduced into music perception standards of physical logic and bestowed musical events with ontological significance. A reassessment of works by Beethoven reveals manipulations of implied topographies and objects that bring about "impossible" transformations. These acts of transcendent rationality may underlie the triumphant glory and intellectual significance of musical climaxes for Beethoven's audiences. In becoming sensitized to these phenomena, we may perhaps recuperate a nineteenth-century Idealist mode of listening that apprehended music as a primary ontological experience taking place in the higher reality of mental forms. Approached in this manner, the morphological games of the "Diabelli" Variations emerge vividly in perception and consequence.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

The four Mephisto Waltzes of Franz Liszt constitute the focus of the present paper. Aside from the fascination they hold as individual works, they form an intriguing group related by title and heritage yet made distinct by important structural differences. Also, the separation of more than 20 years between the completion of the first and the last means that as a group they illustrate well the changes of style and concerns in Liszt’s composing. In this paper, the four works are discussed in a manner that reflects a shift in their dramatic source. The first two waltzes are closely tied to the poem Faust by Nikolaus Lenau and derive most of their drama from that extra musical link. The latter two pieces, however, exhibit fewer connections to the poem but contain compelling tonal and structural features. The first two chapters discuss the First and Second Mephisto Waltzes respectively with an emphasis on those aspects that are most closely associated with Lenau's Faust. In addition, certain passages that are not necessarily tied to the poem but are interesting in themselves are discussed. An example of this is the coda of the Second Mephisto Waltz and its effect on the piece's overall tonality. The third chapter discusses those few elements of the Third and Fourth Mephisto Waltzes that can be seen as stemming from Lenau's poem, while the final two chapters are made up of tonal and structural analyses of these latter two waltzes. The Third Mephisto Waltz, in particular, is treated to a more intense analysis since it is the most problematic of the group. In this piece, the overall tonic is unclear as two different, yet related, keys struggle to dominate, with neither coming to a clear and decisive victory. F-sharp major and D-sharp minor are supported in turn throughout the work and can be seen to coexist at times when the piece is viewed in its background. The Fourth Mephisto Waltz, although tonally more clear, contains a dramatic game of frustrated expectations and then unexpected fulfillment as the tonic, F-sharp, is strongly implied twice and only later is attained with little preparation. In order to come to terms with some of the problems posed by these works, I have used a modified form of Schenkerian analysis. Departures from, or additions to standard techniques are mentioned within the appropriate chapters. Since the four Mephisto Waltzes (especially the latter two) have not been exhaustively analysed, it is hoped that this study makes some contribution to the field of Liszt research.

The four Mephisto Waltzes of Franz Liszt constitute the focus of the present paper. Aside from the fascination they hold as individual works, they form an intriguing group related by title and heritage yet made distinct by important structural differences. Also, the separation of more than 20 years between the completion of the first and the last means that as a group they illustrate well the changes of style and concerns in Liszt’s composing. In this paper, the four works are discussed in a manner that reflects a shift in their dramatic source. The first two waltzes are closely tied to the poem Faust by Nikolaus Lenau and derive most of their drama from that extra musical link. The latter two pieces, however, exhibit fewer connections to the poem but contain compelling tonal and structural features. The first two chapters discuss the First and Second Mephisto Waltzes respectively with an emphasis on those aspects that are most closely associated with Lenau's Faust. In addition, certain passages that are not necessarily tied to the poem but are interesting in themselves are discussed. An example of this is the coda of the Second Mephisto Waltz and its effect on the piece's overall tonality. The third chapter discusses those few elements of the Third and Fourth Mephisto Waltzes that can be seen as stemming from Lenau's poem, while the final two chapters are made up of tonal and structural analyses of these latter two waltzes. The Third Mephisto Waltz, in particular, is treated to a more intense analysis since it is the most problematic of the group. In this piece, the overall tonic is unclear as two different, yet related, keys struggle to dominate, with neither coming to a clear and decisive victory. F-sharp major and D-sharp minor are supported in turn throughout the work and can be seen to coexist at times when the piece is viewed in its background. The Fourth Mephisto Waltz, although tonally more clear, contains a dramatic game of frustrated expectations and then unexpected fulfillment as the tonic, F-sharp, is strongly implied twice and only later is attained with little preparation. In order to come to terms with some of the problems posed by these works, I have used a modified form of Schenkerian analysis. Departures from, or additions to standard techniques are mentioned within the appropriate chapters. Since the four Mephisto Waltzes (especially the latter two) have not been exhaustively analysed, it is hoped that this study makes some contribution to the field of Liszt research. / Arts, Faculty of / Music, School of / 5 sound cassettes - Univeristy Archives - AW5 .B7 808160 Discussion of Liszt’s 4 Mephisto waltzes for solo piano. The 1st 2 are Liszt’s arrangements of his own orchestral works. The 1st is his arrangement of the 2nd episode, Tanz in der Dorfschenke, of his Episodes from Lenau’s Faust for orchestra, S. 110. The 3rd and 4th waltzes are piano works, the 4th left unfinished by Liszt. Includes programs of the author’s piano performance graduation recitals and lecture/recital. / Graduate

Ce mémoire traite de la critique communautarienne du libéralisme et se donne deux projets. D’abord, il s’agit de formuler une position de synthèse à partir des travaux des philosophes Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre et Michael Walzer. Cette synthèse s’articule autour de trois axes, soit ontologique, sociale et méthodologique. Le deuxième projet est d’évaluer cette position pour statuer sur son rapport au libéralisme, et, plus précisément, pour déterminer si elle est seulement une critique, une alternative, ou encore une variante à l’intérieur du libéralisme. Il est conclu que le communautarisme est réconciliable avec une certaine forme de libéralisme et que sa critique permet même de l’améliorer. / In this essay about the communitarian critique of liberalism I seek to reach two goals. First, it is to form a synthesis from the works of philosophers Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer. This synthesis is articulated through three axes: ontologicial, social and methodological. Building on this, my second objective is to assess its relation to liberalism. More specifically, I seek to determine whether communitarianism is merely a critique, an alternative or a variant of liberalism. My conclusion is that communitarianism is reconciliable with a certain form of liberalism and that its critique allows to improve it.