China has a long tradition of using deception and psychological tactics. During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China displayed extensive perception management, aiming at showing a better picture of China. The purpose of this study is to examine if China has continued to display a distorted image since the Olympics and if it could be classified as attempts on deception directed towards a western audience. By combining case studies with descriptive, comparative and a qualitative content analysis method, three cases are researched in order to establish how they are portrayed in the Chinese newspaper China Daily and the BBC News. The differences discovered are matched with the six different kinds of deception presented in Barton Whaley’s general deception theory. In all three cases, numerous examples can be found which indicates that China attempts to deceive their western audience through the media. Both passive and active types of deception are discovered. The results are discussed concerning whether the differences are examples of deception, perception management or both. Numerous suggestions for future studies conclude the paper. / Kina har en lång och gammal tradition av informationsoperationer och av att vilseleda sin motståndare i krig. Denna tradition lever kvar idag och kan bland annat ses i nyare kinesiska doktriner. Under OS i Peking 2008 visade Kina i fredstid exempel på så kallad perceptionsstyrning där kommunistpartiet styrde vad som skulle visas i media och gjorde allt för att framställa den egna staten i så gott ljus som möjligt. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka om Kina även efter OS 2008 försöker framställa en tillrättalagd bild av den egna staten och om det i så fall kan klassificeras som vilseledning. Syftet uppnås genom att undersöka om försök till vilseledning förekommer i kinesisk medierapportering riktad mot en västerländsk publik. Uppsatsen är uppbyggd kring tre stycken fallstudier av händelser som antas kunna påverka Kinas internationella anseende negativt. De tre fallen är när den kinesiska regimkritikern Liu Xiaobo anhålls 2009, när han tilldelas Nobels Fredspris 2010 samt när Google 2010 meddelar att de överväger att sluta censurera sin kinesiska sökmotor google.cn och eventuellt lämna den kinesiska marknaden. En beskrivande metod används för att undersöka hur kinesisk media riktad mot Europa rapporterar om händelserna. Som kinesisk media används tidningen China Dailys Internetupplaga. Den kinesiska framställningen jämförs sedan med hur brittiska BBC News skriver om samma händelser. Genom kvalitativ innehållsanalys och med komparativ metod analyseras hur den kinesiska medierapporteringen skiljer sig från den västerländska. De skillnader som upptäcks i de olika nyhetsmediernas framställningar jämförs därefter med Barton Whaleys generella deceptionsteori som säger att vilseledning genomförs på ett av sex olika sätt. Jämförelsen visar att det i samtliga studerade fall förekommer skillnader i nyhetsrapporteringen som kan klassificeras som försök till vilseledning. Både passiv och aktiv form av vilseledning kan identifieras.

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One of the most efficient countermeasures towards deception is awareness and knowledge that in fact deception is being performed. Hence, if the general level of knowledge within the main population of Sweden would be higher, it would probably hamper the effects of a deception operation if the population anticipated it. In order to counter deception, awareness that one could be encountered to deception and analyze the incoming information accordingly is a major protection. Furthermore in combination with mental awareness the counterdeception actions need to be managed from a central Swedish national level and well-coordinated between authorities within the governmental structures. This is in order to fully cover the wide spectra of channels of information that probably will be used within deception operations toward Sweden. The primary objective within a deception plan is to manipulate a human mind, not the technical sensors or systems.  Therefor the reasonable best way of counteract deception should lie within preparing the human mind. But paradoxological, the more aware one´s mind is regarding deception, the more one´s mind will discover deception.

This study examines if theory of deception can be understood in successful air operations on a tactical level. Research on deception is mostly conducted on a strategic level and the different theories vary in aim and tend to be comprehensive. Studies of air power are mostly conducted on a tactical level and deception within air power has become more common throughout the years. This study aims, using a theory testing case study, to explain how theories of deception work on a tactical level. The analysis is based on Barton Whaley’s structure of deception, and the cases that were analyzed were the Six-Day War and Operation Desert Storm. The result showed that the theory partly could describe deception on a tactical level as a majority of the different categories of Whaleys theory were present in both conflicts. However, the priority of the different categories in the theory did not correspond to either of the cases. This led to the conclusion that Barton Whaley’s theory of structure of deception does not alone describe success in air operations on a tactical level.

Russian application of deception in warfare has an extensive history. A lot of previous research has explored both its application and development through different historical conflicts. However, the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea has raised a debate that challenges the classic application of Russian deception methods. Nevertheless, many researchers claim that Russia continues to use traditional methods of warfare and deception, albeit adapted to a modern context.   This thesis explores these claims by a concrete comparison of the application of Russian deception methods during the annexation of Crimea with a successful historical Russian deception operation, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is done by a comparative case study, which breaks down both cases with theoretical support from Barton Whaley's theory of deception. The study validates claims that traditional Russian deception methods are being applied in a contemporary context. What has changed, however, is how the different types of deception mutually support one another and are utilized to achieve synergy effects.

Deception seems to be a vital part for special forces operations and a new prioritized task in the future. Despite that, is deception a phenomenon that is not taking an independent starting point in special operations theories. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate about the role of deception in special forces operations. This has been done by examining the extent to which Barton Whaley’s theory can explain the outcome of special operations. By analysing Operation Neptune’s Spear and Operation Gothic Serpent with Whaley’s theoretical framework, the conclusion is that deception can, to some extent, explain the outcome. The operations are opposites, one successful and the other unsuccessful. The result shows that deception is more common in the successful one. Despite this, the result suggest that more research is needed to draw relevant conclusions. One can only say that the result gives an indication about the role of deception in these kinds of operations.

Deception has long been a central component of Russian warfare, a fact that has become evident in modern conflicts where the state has been involved, not least during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. After the armed conflict, an unstable period unfolded in several Ukrainian regions, as well as in the adjacent maritime areas of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Russia’s aggressive behavior in the sea regions was driven by a goal of dominance, manifested through multifaceted actions that included both conventional and unconventional methods. A gray zone conflict was launched in the maritime domains. Existing research studying Russia’s naval warfare has paid only limited attention to use of deception, which means it misses a key aspect of its on-sea activity. With the aim to contribute more broadly to research on Russian naval warfare, this study has used a theory of deception to describe how and when the state has employed methods related to the phenomenon in the gray zone conflict. The result of the analysis shows that Russia, in its multidimensional conduct across the broad spectrum between war and peace, has utilized deception methods in various instances, with an increased intensity in the year preceding to the conflict’s escalation into full-scale war.