En 1925, les Kunas (Gunas), autochtones du nord-est du Panama, se soulevèrent en armes afin de contrer les politiques assimilationnistes du gouvernement national. Première étape dans un long processus d’affirmation identitaire et de revendications territoriales, ce soulèvement est aujourd’hui connu sous le nom de Révolution kuna (Revolución Dule). Considéré de nos jours comme un symbole des luttes autochtones pour l’autodétermination et l’autonomie politique, cet épisode historique est grandement célébré dans le territoire de Kuna Yala (Gunayala). À Uggubseni, scène principale du soulèvement de 1925, la commémoration prend la forme d’une reconstitution historique où, pendant plus d’une semaine, les villageois reconstruisent le scénario révolutionnaire. Cette commémoration particulière est l’objet du présent travail de recherche, par lequel nous tentons d’analyser comment est remémorée et interprétée aujourd’hui la Révolution kuna. Pour ce faire, nous nous sommes d'abord penchés sur l’événement même de la commémoration. Une analyse de sa forme nous amena à considérer l’ensemble commémoratif comme un nouveau rite au sein de la ritualité kuna. Nous argumentons que par sa forme carnavalesque, la commémoration permet aux villageois de repenser la relation dialectique entre l’État panaméen et l’autonomie kuna, de même qu’elle sert d’exutoire aux tensions internes. Ensuite, nous nous sommes intéressés aux diverses interprétations de cette étape de l’histoire kuna et panaméenne afin de cerner les différents intérêts impliqués dans la commémoration du soulèvement kuna. Enfin, le cœur de ce travail porte sur le rôle de la mémoire collective dans la construction et la réitération d'un discours identitaire, et ce, en analysant comment la mémoire de la révolution est transmise, reçue, interprétée et utilisée aujourd'hui. / In 1925, the Kunas (Gunas), an aboriginal group in northeastern Panama, rose up in arms to fight the assimilationist policies of the national government. First step in a long process of identity recognition and land claims, this uprising is now known as the Kuna Revolution (Revolución Dule). Considered today as a symbol of the indigenous struggles for self- determination and political autonomy, this historic episode is the centre of important festivities in the territory of Kuna Yala (Gunayala). In Uggubseni, where the uprising of 1925 mainly took place, the commemoration takes the form of an historical reconstruction where, for nearly a week, the villagers re-enact the revolutionary scenario. This commemoration is the subject of my research, where I examine how the Kuna Revolution is remembered and interpreted in Uggubseni today. The first question addressed in this thesis concerns how the revolution is commemorated. An analysis of its form leads us to look at the commemoration as a new Kuna ritual. I argue that, by taking a carnival form, the commemoration allows villagers to rethink the dialectical relationship between the Panamanian state and Kuna autonomy, and at the same time serves as an outlet for internal tensions in the community. I then raise the question of to what exactly is being commemorated in this ritual. In doing so, I analyse the different interpretations of this episode in Kuna and Panamanian history and identify the various interests involved in the commemoration of the Kuna uprising. Finally, I examine the role of collective memory in the construction and reiteration of a discourse of ethnicity, analyzing how the memory of the revolution is transmitted, received, interpreted and used today. / En 1925, los Kunas (Gunas), indígenas del noreste de Panamá, se levantaron en armas en contra de las políticas asimilativas del gobierno nacional. Primera etapa de un largo proceso de afirmación identitaria y de reivindicaciones territoriales, ese levantamiento se conoce hoy en día como la Revolución Kuna (o Dule). Partiendo de considerar ese evento como símbolo de las luchas indígenas para el reconocimiento, la autodeterminación y la autonomía política, en este proyecto de investigación se propone estudiar cómo se celebra, se recuerda y se interpreta hoy en día tal etapa histórica. Concretamente, enfocamos nuestro estudio en la comunidad de Uggubseni, que fue la escena principal de la insurrección de 1925 y donde cada año los comuneros representan su historia, celebrando el aniversario de la Revolución Kuna en forma de una reconstitución histórica. Proponemos acercarnos primero al evento mismo de conmemoración. A través del análisis de la forma hemos llegado a considerarlo como un nuevo rito dentro de la ritualidad kuna. Sostenemos que por su forma carnavalesca, la conmemoración permite a los comuneros repensar la relación dialéctica entre la autonomía kuna y el estado panameño y a la vez resolver tensiones internas en la comunidad. Nos hemos interesado luego por las diversas interpretaciones de la Revolución Kuna, etapa importante de la historia kuna y panameña, para entender los distintos intereses implicados en los eventos conmemorativos. En fin, la preocupación principal de este trabajo se centra en el papel de la memoria colectiva en la construcción y reiteración de un discurso identitario, analizando cómo el recuerdo de la Revolución Kuna se transmite, recibe, interpreta y utiliza hoy en día.

Wetlands in most parts of the world are under threat of over-exploitation, loss and/or degradation partly due to agriculture and urban land uses. Yala swamp, the largest fresh water wetland in Kenya measuring about 17,500 ha supports a large biodiversity and is source of livelihoods to communities around it. This study addresses the situation where part of this wetland is converted into large-scale agriculture by a multinational company, Dominion Farms (K) Ltd resulting into a conflict and controversy amongst key stakeholders. The study sought to investigate livelihood impacts this transformation has for the local community. It employs the concepts Stakeholder Analysis (SA) and Sustainable Livelihood Approaches (SLA) to asses the livelihood situation in terms of socio-economic conditions, rural infrastructure, income diversification, food security and environmental issues. Data and information have been obtained from primary and secondary sources through field survey at the Yala wetland, in which randomly sampled small-scale farmers, fisher folk, Dominion employees, local leaders and informants, traders and other stakeholders were interviewed using questionnaire and other participatory methods. The main questions were designed to gain information about historical use of the wetland, changes in livelihoods and wetland before and after entry of Dominion Company into the area. From the study, it is evident that assessment of the key stakeholders in relation to this natural resource is of utmost importance for mapping out an acceptable management strategy for the wetland. Besides being cause to a conflict and controversy over control of and access to the swamp, the conversion has resulted into both negative and positive short-term and long-term livelihood impacts to the local community. The wetland being a contested resource with multiple users who claim a stake on it requires a holistic approach in its management that caters for divergent needs and views of key stakeholder groups. The study identifies management issues and proposes abroad vision for the future including recommendations for planning as well as suggestions for specific research needs that should form the basis of action

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The goal of this study is to ascertain how Thailand wages counterinsurgency (COIN). Thailand has waged two successful COINs in the past and is currently waging a third on its southern border. The lessons learned from Thailand’s COIN campaigns could result in modern irregular warfare techniques valuable not only to Thailand and neighboring countries with similar security problems, but also to countries like the United States and the United Kingdom that are currently reshaping their irregular warfare doctrines in response to the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first set of COIN lessons comes from Thailand’s successful 1965-85 communist COIN. The second set comes from Bangkok’s understudied 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists. The third set comes from Thailand’s current war against ethnic Malay separatists and radical Islamic insurgents attempting to secede and form a separate state called “Patani Raya,” among other names. Counterinsurgency is a difficult type of warfare for four reasons: (1) it can take years to succeed; (2) the battle space is poorly defined; (3) insurgents are not easily identifiable; and (4) war typically takes place among a civilian population that the guerrillas depend on for auxiliary support. Successful COINs include not only precise force application operations based on quality intelligence, but also lasting social and economic programs, political empowerment of the disenfranchised, and government acceptance of previously ignored cultural realities. Background: In 1965, communist insurgents, backed by the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), began waging an insurgency against Thailand in order to overthrow its government and install a Marxist regime. The Thai government struggled, both politically and militarily, to contain the movement for years, but eventually, it prevailed. Its success was based on a combination of effective strategy and coordination, plus well-designed and run security, political, and economic programs, the latter nowadays called the “three pillars of COIN,” a phrase developed by David Kilcullen, a modern COIN theorist and practitioner. One of Bangkok’s most successful initiatives was the CPM program (civil-military-police), which used a linked chain of local forces, police, and the military to not only provide security for villages, but also economic aid and administrative training to rural peoples. State political programs that undercut communist political programs backed by masterful diplomacy and a constant barrage of rural works helped erode the communist position. The 1980s-90s COIN against southern separatists followed similar lines. The far South’s four border provinces, comprised of 80 percent ethnic Malay Muslims, had been in revolt on and off for decades since Bangkok annexed the area in 1902. Bangkok had waged haphazard COIN campaigns against rebel groups there for decades with mixed results. But after the successful communist COIN was up and running in 1980, Bangkok decided to apply similar ways and means to tackle the southern issue. The government divided its COIN operations into two components: a security component run by a task force called CPM-43, and a political-economic component run by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center, or SB-PAC. SB-PAC also had a Special Branch investigative capacity. Combined, the 80s-90s southern COIN strategy relied on extensive military intelligence networks to curb violence, civilian administrators to execute local political reforms, and local politicians to apply traditional Malay and Muslim problem solving techniques to keep the peace. These programs worked well against the multitude of southern insurgent groups that conducted sporadic attacks against government and civilian targets while also running organized criminal syndicates. By the end of the 1990s, with a dose of Thailand’s famed diplomacy and help from Malaysia’s Special Branch, Bangkok defeated the southern separatists. In January 2004, however, a new separatist movement in southern Thailand emerged – one based on ethnic Malay separatism and radical Islam. It is a well-coordinated movement with effective operational expertise that attacks at a higher tempo than past southern rebel groups. It moreover strikes civilian targets on a regular basis, thereby making it a terrorist group. Overall, it dwarfs past southern movements regarding motivation and scale of violence. Thai officials think the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate, or BRN-C, leads the current rebellion, but there are several other groups that claim to also lead the fight. Members of the insurgency are nearly exclusively ethnic Malays and Muslims. The movement demonstrates radical Islamic tendencies thought its propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and deeds. It is a takfiri group that kills other Muslims who do not share its religious beliefs, so it wrote in its spiritual rebel guidebook, Fight for the Liberation of Patani. BRN-C seeks to separate the four southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla from Thailand in order to establish an Islamic republic. The separatists base their revolt on perceived military, economic, cultural, and religious subjugation going back to the early 1900s. And they have a point. The central government has, at different times in the past, indeed treated southerners with tremendous disdain and sometimes violence – especially those considered insurgents. But Bangkok has also instituted scores of economic and social aid programs in the south – mosque building, college scholarships, and medical aid, for example – so it has not been a continual anti-Muslim “blood fest” as government detractors have painted it. Still the maltreatment, certainly many times less than yesteryear, has provided today’s insurgents with ideological fodder for a steady stream of recruits and supporters. Combined with radical Islam, it has bonded the insurgents to a significant degree. Statistically, in the 2005-07-time frame, insurgents assassinated 1.09 people a day, detonated 18.8 bombs a month, and staged 12.8 arson attacks a month. In 2005, they conducted 43 raids and 45 ambushes. The militants target security forces, government civilians, and the local population. They have killed fellow Muslims and beheaded numerous Buddhist villagers. The insurgents’ actions have crippled the South’s education system, justice system, and commerce, and also have maligned Buddhist-Muslim relations. Overall, the separatists pose a direct threat to Thailand’s south and an indirect threat to the rest of the country. Moreover, their radical Islamic overtones have potential regional and global terrorist implications. The Thai Government spent much of 2004 attempting to ascertain whether the high level of violence was, in fact, an insurgency. To begin with, the government, led by PM Thaksin Shinawatra, was puzzled by the fact that the separatists had not published a manifesto or approached Bangkok with a list of demands. By mid-2004, however, the insurgents had staged a failed, region-wide revolt, and their prolific leaflet and Internet propaganda campaign clearly demonstrated that a rebel movement was afoot. By fall 2005, the separatists had made political demands via the press, all of which centered on secession. By 2006, a coup against PM Thaksin succeeded and the military government that replaced him instituted a new COIN strategy for the south that by 2008 had reduced violence by about 40 percent. Some of the tenets of this new strategy were based on Thailand’s past successful COIN strategies. Whether or not the government has concocted a winning strategy for the future, however, remains to be seen. This paper analyses these COIN campaigns through the COIN Pantheon, a conceptual model the author developed as an analytical tool. It is based on David Kilcullen’s three pillars of COIN.