Thesis advisor: Micah E. Lott / This thesis is a critique of consequentialist and deontological attempts to reduce normative ethics to strictly formulaic models of direct action guidance according to purportedly universal laws and principles of morality. This project explores how dominant theories such as John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism and Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative fail to account for critical nuances and contextual determinants that inform right action in moral conundrums. An applied analysis of each model suggests that, as exceptions to supposedly universal principles arise, both theories face a double-bind between appealing to a non-principle entity or necessitating immoral action in strict accordance with a codified verdict. By examining the limitations of codified frameworks, this thesis advocates for a paradigm shift towards incorporating virtue, contextual literacy, and practical discernment into ethical decision-making. Rosalind Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelian model of Virtue Ethics and indirect action guidance offers a more flexible and context-sensitive approach to normative ethics that corresponds to the dynamic and multifaceted nature of morality. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Morrissey School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy. / Discipline: Departmental Honors.

<p>This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.</p>

This paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.

This thesis develops the prioritization guidance and action guidance provided by Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model of responsibility for injustice. Young’s parameters of reasoning are limited in their ability to assist responsible agents in determining what they ought to do to fulfill their responsibilities, as they are severed from the structural analysis characteristic of the rest of the SCM. This thesis addresses the resulting limitations by developing categories of prioritization and an action guidance framework. I develop 6 categories of prioritization: power, benefit, interest, centrality, contribution, and control. Applied to social-group-based analysis, these categories determine the strength of the prioritization claim which a given injustice holds over a given social group. The action guidance framework takes the perspective of the political community and works its way through three questions and their corresponding considerations: “What can we do?” –structural change, altering practices, and harm alleviation; “How can we do it?” –understanding sub-issues and sub-options, determining interests, and organizing collectives; and “What can I do?” –eliminating contributory behaviours, and considering personal circumstances. Through this framework, agents can analyze the capacities of the political community and the structures of an injustice to determine which projects should be undertaken and how agents ought to contribute. Finally, the developments of this thesis are applied to the case of landlords and housing, therein establishing the necessity of landlords abandoning rental profits so as to fulfill and not contradict their responsibility to eliminate housing injustice. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / This thesis develops the prioritization guidance and action guidance provided by Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model of responsibility for injustice. Young’s parameters of reasoning, meant to provide this guidance, are limited in their ability to assist responsible agents in determining what they ought to do to fulfill their responsibilities. This thesis addresses these limitations by developing 6 categories of prioritization and an action guidance framework. The categories of prioritization determine which social groups ought to prioritize a given injustice. Through the action guidance framework, agents can analyze the capacities of the political community and the structures of an injustice to determine which projects should be undertaken and how agents ought to contribute to them. The developments of this thesis are applied to the case of landlords and housing injustice, therein establishing the necessity of landlords abandoning rental profits.

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