The thesis deals with the contemporary problem of Somali maritime hijackings from the European Union perspective. First, it presents the problem per se while focusing on the framework in which the piracy issue is being solved. Second, it analyses the role of the post-Lisbon European Union in international crisis management. Taking EU's first naval military mission EU NAVFOR Somalia "Atalanta" as a case study, the paper essentially aims at shedding some light on the current state of the European Union's recognition as a major actor in international politics. Based on the Somali piracy case study, the text contributes to the theoretical debate about EU actorness.

<p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda handlingskapaciteten av EU:s utrikespolitik. Irakkrisen valdes som empiriskt exempel där EU ansågs ha lidit av handlingsförlamning. Tecken på handlingsförlamningen var avsaknaden av en gemensam position samt en effektiv ståndpunkt. Syftet är därför att utreda varför en gemensam ståndpunkt inte presenterades. Uppsatsen diskuterar även om resultatet är specifikt för Irakkrisen eller om det är generellt för den europeiska utrikespolitiken. Två modeller som förklarar handlingskapacitet används för att utreda Irakkrisen. Modellerna är uppbyggda av variabler som förklarar handlingskapacitet. Den första modellen inkluderar självständighet, sammanhållning, auktoritet och erkännande. Modell två använder tillfälle/möjlighet, närvaro och kapacitet. Modell ett visar att EU saknade auktoritet, vilket påverkade de övriga variablerna negativt. Resultatet anses vara generellt för den europeiska utrikespolitiken snarare än specifikt för Irakkrisen, eftersom auktoritet enbart kan förändras i en bearbetning av fördragen. Sammanhållning kan bero på fallet men på grund av komplexiteten i utrikespolitik är det en stor risk att även sammanhållning kan brista. Modell två framhåller en process där EU skapar sig en roll i världspolitiken. Rollen förstärks genom EU:s agerande. Den roll som EU har skapat sig antyder inte en enhet som agerar krig, utan är snarare förenlig med återuppbyggandet efter krig. Idén om EU har konsekvenser för vad ett tillfälle/möjlighet innebär, likaså för EU:s kapacitets trovärdighet. Eftersom rollen skapas i en process som sker över tiden så är risken stor att de svårigheter som resultatet belyser är generella. Det vill säga att problematiken troligen kommer återfinnas i liknande kriser.</p> / <p>The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the actorness of EU’s foreign policy. The crisis in Iraqwas chosen as an empirical example, where the EU was considered to have suffered from incapacity. Signs of the incapacity were the lack of a common position and effective statements. The aim is therefore to evaluate why there was no common position presented. The thesis furthermore discusses whether the result is specific for the Iraq crisis, or if it is general for the European foreign policy. Two models explaining actorness are used to evaluate the crisis in Iraq. The models are constituted by variables explaining actorness. The first model includes autonomy, cohesion, authority and recognition. Model two uses opportunity, presence and capacity. Model one shows that EU lacked in authority, which affected the remaining variables negatively. The result is considered general to the European foreign policy, rather than specific to the Iraq crisis, since authority can only be changed in a revision of the treaties. The cohesion may depend on the case, but due to the complexity of foreign policy there is a great risk that it may also fail. Model two emphasises a process where the EU creates a role for itself in world politics. The role is enforced by the EU’s actions. The role that the EU has created does not suggest an entity that acts in war, but is rather more compatible with the rebuilding after war. The idea of the EU has consequences for what constitutes an opportunity, as well as for the credibility of EU’s capacity. Since the role is created in a process that takes place over time there is a great risk that the problems, that the result elucidates, are general and not specific to the Iraq crisis.</p>

Following the 2017-2018 North Korea nuclear crisis and a decade of disinterest, scholarly attention to the EU’s involvement in the Korean conflict has steadily increased. This thesis compares EU actorness in the Korean conflict, spanning the periods 2011-2012 and 2018-2019, using parts of Rhinard’s and Sjöstedt’s (2019) new actorness framework. Following recent developments in Actorness studies and heeding calls for a greater focus on external factors, it situates the analysis within the Korean conflict's broader context. It concludes that while the EU has deepened its overall engagement in the Northeast Asia region – shifting focus from North to South Korea – the EU has shown little interest in getting involved, despite other actors perceiving further EU involvement favorably. Brussels has continuously been unable to define what role it wants to play. Internal disunity concerning how the EU should balance its troubled relationship with the US with commitments to Seoul has led to the embrace of a traditional passive status quo approach, hindering proactive engagement. The EU’s stance on North Korea remains hardened, making all further cooperation and engagement entirely conditional on progress in the denuclearization talks with the US. The analytical variables borrowed from Rhinard and Sjöstedt’s actorness framework address key concerns in previous actorness studies, allowing for a detailed analysis even when no comprehensive EU-DPRK relations are found.

This study analyses the Actorness Cohesion (AC) of the EU’s foreign policy in the United Nations General Assembly First Committee by comparing the EU Delegation foreign policy-maker’s role conceptions to those made by the EU Member State (EU MS) Delegations on the same topic clusters. The concept of AC is developed from actorness and role theory as an ideational, constructivist measure of vertical policy coherence. AC represents the absence of ‘vertical conflicts’ between the EU and EU MS Delegation’s expressed role conceptions along four dimensions; Identity Cohesion, Goal Cohesion and Function Cohesion and Worldview Cohesion. This is studied by interpreting the role stability in the role-set; whether the contents are consistent, the EU role conception is central or whether the EU MS Delegations complement and/or are compatible to the EU role conception. Statements on topic clusters: ‘Disarmament Machinery’, ‘Conventional Weapons’ and ‘Outer Space (disarmament aspects)’ are analysed in order to determine the AC. The study concludes that whilst there is little evidence of the EU Delegation’s role conception being central to the EU MS Delegations, there is considerable consistency of contents. There are also indications of an emerging AC due to the EU MS Delegation’s role conceptions being complementary to that of the EU Delegation. The study calls for more research that will complement this plausibility-probe study and the concept of AC.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação busca demonstrar o comportamento da União Europeia como um ator unitário nas Organizações Internacionais. Com o aprofundamento da integração europeia e seus desdobramentos institucionais, é possível perceber o surgimento de um novo ator no cenário internacional, que engloba 27 Estados e vem ganhando força impactando nas negociações internacionais. Através de dois estudos de caso, a pesquisa demonstra a actorness da União Europeia e o seu comportamento em duas Organizações Internacionais, o Fundo Monetário Internacional e a Organização Mundial do Comércio. / The present dissertation seeks to analyse the European Union behaviour as a unitary actor in the International Organizations. As the European integration deepens, along with its institutional unfolding, it`s possible to perceive that a new actor has come to light in the international scenario, enclosing 27 countries and that has been strengthen up to the point to impact in international negotiations. Through two case studies, this research presents the European Union actorness and its behaviour in two International Organizations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.