Thesis (M.P.A.)--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 1999. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2934. Typescript. Abstract precedes thesis as 2 preliminary leaves. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 59-66).

Habilitation--Universität, Potsdam, 2007/2008. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Thesis (M.S.)--Springfield College, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

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This study examines how agencies might work together more effectively to improve the life chances of young people who fall `through the net' of agency provision. Whatever the situation, the failure to co-operate challenges a democratic society and basic human rights. The problem occurs when individual primary care agencies either: • try to do on their own what can only be achieved by co-operation, or • fail to do anything because, in their view, the client's needs should be met by some other agency, or • only do what they can do on their own. The purpose of this study is to establish: • to what extent improvements in inter-agency co-operation would help agencies work more effectively with young people variously described as falling through the net, or on the margins of an agency's responsibility • what factors contribute to these improvements • what characterises effective models of inter-agency practice. The study finds that over the last thirty years, the legislative framework surrounding inter-agency co-operation for young people provides few examples of structures or procedures requiring agencies to co-operate. Where these exist, they have been set up in response to needs or crises of pressing concern at the time. Research into the practice of inter-agency work shows that successful inter-agency projects set up to meet the needs of those at risk of falling through the net follow a characteristic pattern. This led to the construction of a model based on the idea that successful inter-agency practice depends on the existence of collaborative activity at three interconnected levels: policy and planning; implementation, case work, research and training; networking/liaison. Projects supported at all three levels are more likely to be successful and survive than those which are not. This pattern can be replicated in different contexts and with different client groups to ensure effective co-ordination and redistribution of resources, and that a balance is held between preventative and proactive work. The model's key elements enable it to structure communication pathways within and between agencies, to co-ordinate activity in relation to a particular issue, to develop the interpersonal skills of participants and to provide feedback to policy makers. The research concludes that: • formal structures promoting inter-agency collaboration encourage agencies to innovate and to provide co-ordinated services for young people needing more support than can be provided by any one of them • inter-agency work has become a new area of professional and para professional expertise • models designed to help agencies meet the needs of people at risk can be applied to other projects set up to solve complex problems involving more than one department.

Ridership in the New Orleans region is down, and transit agencies are challenged to increase transit performance. Transit professionals expect many benefits from cooperation between transit systems in the region including an increase in efficiency and effectiveness. The question is "do these cooperative initiatives between transit agencies improve transit performance?" To answer this question a survey has been held to collect data regarding regional initiatives implemented by transit agencies. In addition data were collected from the transit agencies websites. The analysis focused on the comparison between agencies that implemented regional initiatives versus agencies that did not implement any regional initiative. From the analysis it appears that although agencies have implemented cooperative initiatives they are not very convinced that it had a significant impact on transit performance. Further, results show that cooperation might have some positive impact on transit performance, but are not as convincing as literature and transit professionals expect

This dissertation consists of three chapters that study issues in Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization related to the behavior of markets with asymmetric information. The first two chapters study the economics of credit rating agencies; the third chapter examines a process of social learning about product quality. Chapter 1 models the effect of rating agency competition on the quality of rated securities. I compare equilibria across a regime of competition between two rating agencies and a monopolistic regime. In both regimes, all available agencies are hired in equilibrium, so under competition more ratings are observed. However, competing agencies do not fully internalize the return of a reputation for being honest. Whenever strategic agencies are not very concerned about their reputation, competition can induce more issuer effort than monopoly. Otherwise, a monopolistic agency induces more effort. Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of the Cuomo Plan, a much-discussed regulation that prohibits issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities from making payments to rating agencies contingent on the assigned ratings. I construct a certification model which consists of the following features: (i) an issuer privately informed about her security's quality can hire a rating agency to assign a rating; (ii) the agency can observe, at a cost, a private signal correlated with the quality of the security; (iii) an undeserved favorable rating reduces the agency's future revenues. I show that the Plan has an effect on the informative content of the rating only if the agency's signal is not too costly. In this case, the Plan ensures that the rating is more informative; otherwise the Plan has no effect. In chapter 3, I study the pricing strategy of a monopolistic firm in a market characterized by consumers with heterogeneous preferences and private information about the product quality. Consumers purchase sequentially and observe the history of purchasing decisions, prices, and consumers' preferences. I characterize the conditions under which the monopolist gains when consumers learn the true quality, and, which pricing strategy ensures that learning takes place.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.