Authoritarianism is on the rise across the world and intriguingly in the United States, known as the democratic laboratory. Political theorists and activists inquire into this contradictory political phenomenon in the United States, but their inquiries are fruitless. This dissertation finds that they uncritically conceive democracy as a mechanism of governance. As such, this narrow conception hampers their intelligence for political inquiries into the surge of authoritarianism in America. This dissertation discusses why and how the current political phenomenon occurs and suggests a moral method to pursue the quest for democratic values. This method allows inquirers to successfully address the crisis of democracy. This dissertation appeals to John Dewey’s vision of deliberative democracy, comparing and contrasting it with Alasdair MacIntyre’s communitarianism-oriented political theory. It finds that just as the Deweyan democratic vision does, MacIntyre’s political vision of democracy, too, emphasizes citizens’ participation in the political activities of decision-making and policy formulation. For MacIntyre, deliberative and participatory citizens are engaged in small group meetings to resolve their social and political issues. However, his communitarian method falls short of inspiring inquirers who wish to establish meaningful hypotheses to overcome the crisis of democracy: the idea of value plurality that is deemed essential for the political hypotheses is negated to a substantial degree by Thomist humanism held in his later works. MacIntyre’s skeptical attitude toward the methodology of democracy fundamentally based on liberalism and empirical naturalism inhibits political inquiries to discover and apply methods required to resolve the existing political situation in the U.S. By contrast, Dewey provides an appropriate array of philosophical ideas concerning deliberative democracy based on cooperative intelligence for political inquirers. With Dewey’s thought-provoking philosophical ideas, they are prepared to address their recently revived interest in authoritarianism in politics. They open a path towards a way of life that promotes authentic participation and deliberation in public affairs to tackle complex policy issues and bring out human flourishing. On this moral and social path, people demolish authoritarianism. Democratic hope is no longer an unattainable dream.

Yes / This paper explores whether MacIntyrean virtue ethics concepts are applicable in non-Western business contexts, specifically in SMEs in Taiwan a country strongly influenced by the Confucian tradition. It also explores what differences exist between different polities in this respect, and specifically interprets observed differences between the Taiwanese study and previous studies conducted in Europe and Asia. Based on case study research, the findings support the generalizability of the MacIntyrean framework. Drawing on the institutional logics perspective and synthesizing this with MacIntyrean concepts, the paper explains the differences between the studies largely by reference to the Confucian tradition operating at both the micro-level within firms and at the macro-level as a means of harmonizing the potentially competing institutional logics to which firms are subject. The recent weakening of this tradition, however, suggests that increased conflict may characterize the future.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arquivototal.pdf: 869660 bytes, checksum: 6c78194f2526633dc3754d9685889226 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This present research aims to understand and stimulate the debate around virtue ethics in philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. To this Scottish philosopher, the contemporary society has been facing a serious morality crisis, which reflects majorly in social and psychological conflicts of the contemporary human being .The existence of such moral crisis is justified by an absence of a teleological character which can substantiate these subject s actions. Without a telos , human beings start substantiating their actions in personal emotions and desires, letting themselves be driven by emotionalism. Thus, considering the argumentative process of MacIntyre in major writings as: After virtue (2001), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1991), Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry (1999), the work claims to present the moral presuppositions of his thoughts, contrasting the concepts of practical, life narrative and tradition, offering the necessary basis not only to understand the existence of such moral crisis, but, also able to recover the teleological character consistent with social context of contemporary society. Therewith, it s expected to conclude that the liberal culture cannot provide a last end to human act and virtue ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre can be a satisfying proposal to solve the moral conflicts of this society. / A presente pesquisa visa compreender e estimular o debate em torno da ética das virtudes na filosofia de Alasdair MacIntyre. Para o filósofo escocês, as sociedades contemporâneas têm vivido uma séria crise da moralidade, que reflete em grande parte nos conflitos sociais e psicológicos do sujeito contemporâneo. A existência dessa crise moral é justificada pela ausência de um caráter teleológico que possa fundamentar as ações morais desses sujeitos. Sem um telos, o sujeito passa a fundamentar suas ações morais nas emoções e nos desejos pessoais, deixando-se guiar pelo emotivismo. Assim, considerando o processo argumentativo de MacIntyre em obras centrais como: Depois da virtude(2001), Justiça de Quem? Qual Racionalidade?(1991) e Tres versiones rivales de la etica(1999), o trabalho tem como pretensão apresentar os pressupostos morais do seu pensamento, destacando os conceitos de práticas, narrativa de vida e tradição, de forma a oferecer os fundamentos necessários não só para compreender a existência dessa crise moral, mas, capaz de recuperar o caráter teleológico condizente com o contexto social das sociedades contemporâneas. Com isso, se espera concluir que a cultural liberal não é capaz de fornecer um fim último ao agir humano e que a ética das virtudes de Alasdair MacIntyre pode ser uma proposta satisfatória para resolver os conflitos morais dessa sociedade.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis seeks to evaluate MacIntyre's claim that recourse to the tradition of virtue ethics in the Aristotelian-Thomist sense is the only viable intellectual option, given the alleged demise of the so-called"Enlightenment Project". It raises a twofold question: First, is it coherent to argue that MacIntyre's reappropriation of an ancient moral tradition is possible? Does such a claim duly reckon with the conditions under which meaningful forms are understood? The first claim being defended is that MacIntyre does not sufficiently respect Gadamer's conditions under which understanding occurs. It is also argued that MacIntyre does not provide coherent conditions for rationally choosing between traditions in order to possibly vindicate them. As such, MacIntyre's re-appropriating of the Aristotelian tradition in moral theory is not coherent and convincing. Secondly, does the dichotomy of "Nietzsche versus Aristotle" represent the only viable alternatives for us in our efforts to continue the enterprise of moral theorising? The second claim being defended is that the dichotomy is not a coherent way of moral theorising. The third claim being defended is that Gadamer represents a viable alternative to the ultimatum in that his thought provides the possibility of a more coherent way of moral theorising than MacIntyre's. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis stel ten doel die evaluasie van MacIntyre se standpunt dat die deugde-etiek van die Aristoteliaanse-Thomistiestradisie die enigste blywende opsie is, aangesiendie sogenaamde"Verligtingsprojek" misluk het. Die tesis stel twee kernvrae aan die orde: Eerstens, is dit sinvol om te argumenteer dat MacIntyre se appropriasie van bogenoemde etiese tradisie moontlik is? Verleen so n aanspraak genoegsame waarde aan die kondisies waaronder sindraers verstaan word? Die eerste standpunt wat verdedig word, is dat MacIntyre nie genoeg ag slaan op Gadamer se opvatting oor die kondisies vir verstaan nie. Daar word verder ook geargumenteer dat MacIntyre nie koherente kondisies aandui vir 'n keuse tussen tradisies nie en as sodanig ondermyn dit die koherensie van sy werk. MacIntyre se appropriasie van die Aristoteliaanse tradisie in morele teorie is dus nie koherent of oortuigend nie. Tweedens, is die dichotomie van "Nietzsche of Aristoteles" die enigste moontlike alternatief vir die voortgaande studie van morele teorie? Die tweede aanspraak wat verdedig word, is dat die dichotomie nie 'n koherente wyse van morele argumentasie is nie. Die derde aanspraak wat verdedig word is dat Gadamer 'n werkbare alternatief verskaf vir die dichotomie. Sy denke voorsien 'n meer koherente wyse om met morele teorie om te gaan as die een wat MacIntyre verskaf.

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Thesis advisor: Jane E. Regan / In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) Pope John Paul II proposes solidarity as a social virtue for our fragmented yet interdependent world. This lens raises several important questions, but also suggests new opportunities for moral formation and the promotion of institutional charism in the context of Catholic higher education. Employing a praxis methodology, this dissertation begins by analyzing contemporary declines in social capital and the rise of atomistic individualism. The philosophical writings of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor help us to understand the moral and spiritual roots of these sociological trends. With the context established, the dissertation next traces the development of solidarity in the Catholic social tradition and attempts to locate the virtue within a Thomistic moral framework. Closely related to both charity and justice, the vision of solidarity advanced is linked to Aristotle's notion of civic friendship, perfected in its origin (the dignity of the human person) and goal (the common good). Constructive proposal are grounded in the concept of social practices developed by MacIntyre and adapted by religious educators and practical theologians. Beyond textual analysis, this dissertation includes a national survey of 87 senior mission leaders at Catholic colleges and universities. From these findings, concrete recommendations are offered for the practices of mission leadership and service-learning. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-07-25T11:46:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Antonio Ruzza.pdf: 2370761 bytes, checksum: 7d0329944e3730780c62a203227272d9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-25T11:46:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Antonio Ruzza.pdf: 2370761 bytes, checksum: 7d0329944e3730780c62a203227272d9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-15 / Centro Universitário Assunção - UNIFAI / The present thesis aims to discuss A. MacIntyre’s thinking, particularly his moral philosophy and his theory of justice, which rescues the ethics of the virtues of Aristotelian-Thomist inspiration in order to overcome the moral chaos which, according to him, dominates the modern society. He imputes this chaos to Enlightenment´s thinking, which has destroyed a consolidated moral tradition, declaring the independence and autonomy of the individual freed from any authority. The Enlightenment and its heirs (Kant, Hume, and British encyclopedists as their main targets), eliminates the idea of a telos in a human action, as well as relationship between fact and value, and introduces an ethics based on first abstract principles, which are unaware from historical traditions and narratives that is recognized by human groups. The individual has become the great artifact of modernity and individualism it´s dominant ideology. Liberalism is the political-social organization that allows the existence of many modern ethics and these ones are product of French and Industrial Revolutions, which has achieved success thanks to its efficiency and practical results. However, the Liberalism has created an apparently neutral system of laws and rules that regulates conflicts between individuals and classes: any ethical referential has been lost and many moral theories has been emerged in opposition to each other, happened because each one of them reflected different interests and conceptions (among which highlighted the emotivism). MacIntyre presents himself as a great critic of Modernity and its products: Liberalism and Individualism. Concentrating our interest on the problem of inequalities, we show that the Macintyrian proposal for a return to the ethics of virtues (especially those of "recognized dependence" and "fair generosity") and the criterion of merit, applies only to small communities, which by nature are more coercive and controlling, but it doesn’t solve the problem of inequalities in complex societies. We concentrate our efforts in following the evolution of justice concepts since the Middle Age until Rawls and Nozick, which reflects the new vision of the human being as an autonomous individual and as a subject of rights. We conclude that MacIntyre's critique reveals itself as a theoretical analysis of moral disorder in modernity, but not as a political project of transformation, especially since he admits that the attempt to re-establish a community-based society would be "ineffective or disastrous” / A presente tese tem o objetivo de discutir o pensamento de A. MacIntytre, particularmente a sua filosofia moral e a sua teoria da justiça, que resgata a ética das virtudes de inspiração aristotélico-tomista para superar o caos moral que, segundo ele, domina a sociedade moderna. Ele atribui origem desse caos ao pensamento iluminista, que destruiu uma tradição moral consolidada, afirmando a independência e a autonomia do indivíduo liberto de qualquer autoridade. Os iluministas e seus herdeiros (sendo Kant, Hume e os enciclopedistas britânicos os seus alvos principais), eliminaram a ideia de um telos da ação humana, assim como a relação fato / valor, e introduziram uma ética fundada em primeiros princípios abstratos, que desconhece as tradições históricas e as narrativas nas quais os grupos humanos de reconhecem. O indivíduo se tornou o grande artefato da modernidade e o Individualismo a sua ideologia dominante. A organização político-social que permite a existência das muitas éticas modernas é o Liberalismo, produto das Revoluções Francesa e Industrial, que alcançou sucesso graças à sua eficiência e aos resultados práticos. Porém, ele criou um sistema aparentemente neutro de leis e regras, que regulam os conflitos entre indivíduos e classes: perdeu-se qualquer referencial ético e surgiram muitas teorias morais em oposição entre si, porque refletem diferentes interesses e concepções (entre as quais se destaca o emotivismo). MacIntyre se apresenta como um grande crítico da Modernidade e dos seus produtos: o Liberalismo e o Individualismo. Concentrando nosso interesse sobre o problema das desigualdades, mostramos que a proposta macintyriana de um retorno à ética das virtudes (em especial, as da “dependência reconhecida” e da “justa generosidade”) e ao critério do mérito só se aplica a pequenas comunidades, que por natureza são mais coercitivas e controladoras, mas não resolve o problema das desigualdades em sociedades complexas. Nossa estratégia foi seguir a evolução do conceito de justiça da Idade Média até Rawls e Nozick, que refletem a nova visão do ser humano como indivíduo autônomo e como sujeito de direitos. Concluímos que a crítica de MacIntyre se revela como uma análise teórica da desordem moral na modernidade, mas não como um projeto político de transformação, sobretudo porque ele admite que a tentativa de restabelecer uma sociedade nos moldes comunitários seria “ineficaz ou desastrosa”

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raimunda Diva de Vasconcelos Ribeiro.pdf: 2566714 bytes, checksum: f64ff183208f288f0c57fed1cc1d1f9d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-10 / This thesis revisits the concept of technical in Hans Jonas by looking to expand its evaluation as the dominant telos of contemporary society, that is, that technique is no longer a mere instrument and has increasingly become a human end in a technological world. The aim is to think of technique as a practice, in light of the conceptual contributions of Alasdair MacIntyre, in which the ethical dimension is a key feature, since every practice as a socially developed and organized activity has a teleological structure, and consequently mobilizes concepts of virtue and also of a greater human good as excellence. Thus, it is possible to achieve a distinct perspective from Jonas s, with the contribution of MacIntyre, to overcome partial difficulties of the Jonasian thought regarding his understanding of technoscience, which it seems to be still connected to the instrumentalist vision. Therefore, it is necessary to identify, clarify, understand, and reflect on technoscience in all its complexity, the benefits that supply many human needs, while remembering the need of seeing it not as a neutral instrument, but as a practice in the MacIntyrian sense, which it means that carries on an inescapable ethical dimension. Theoretical elements were sought to provide evidence for understanding the evolution and conceptual transformations in the fields of technical until becoming technoscience, in order to provide conceptual elements to make a case for a critical interpretation of the main ethical problems and challenges posed by the emergence of technoscientific society in the XXI century. Besides the philosophers mentioned above, some other contributions are discussed from authors who study contemporary issues relevant concerning the use of technoscience and its power of saving and destroying / Esta tese faz uma releitura do conceito de técnica em Hans Jonas buscando expandir sua avaliação como o telos predominante da sociedade contemporânea, isto é, que a técnica deixou de ser instrumento e passou a ser entendida como finalidade humana em um mundo cada vez mais tecnológico. O objetivo é pensá-la como uma prática, à luz dos aportes conceituais de Alasdair MacIntyre, na qual a dimensão ética é uma característica fundamental, já que toda prática como atividade socialmente desenvolvida e organizada possui uma estrutura teleológica e, por conseguinte, conceitos de virtude e de um bem humano como excelência maior. Assim, pode-se atingir um plano de reflexão distinto de Jonas e, deste modo, com a contribuição de MacIntyre, superar as dificuldades parciais do pensamento jonasiano no tocante à compreensão da tecnociência, ainda vinculada a uma visão instrumentalista. Para tanto, acreditamos ser necessário identificar, aclarar, compreender e refletir sobre a tecnociência como ela se faz em toda sua complexidade, os benefícios que suprem as necessidades humanas, sem deixar de lembrar a necessidade de vê-la não mais como um instrumento neutro, mas como prática no sentido dado por MacIntyre, portadora de uma dimensão ética que lhe é iniludível. Procurou-se apresentar elementos teóricos para a compreensão da evolução e das transformações conceituais nos domínios da técnica até transformar-se em tecnociência, visando fornecer elementos conceituais para defender uma interpretação crítica dos principais problemas e desafios de ordem ética, colocados pela emergência da sociedade tecnocientífica do século XXI. Além dos filósofos citados, discute-se também algumas contribuições de autores contemporâneos que estudam questões pertinentes à nossa reflexão sobre o uso da tecnociência no tocante ao poder da salvar e destruir que esta possui

Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2016-05-03T15:33:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_JOSE_ELIELTON_DE_SOUSA_PARCIAL.pdf: 351200 bytes, checksum: cc9c9a1afd85e7438433029b967c21c1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-03T15:33:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TES_JOSE_ELIELTON_DE_SOUSA_PARCIAL.pdf: 351200 bytes, checksum: cc9c9a1afd85e7438433029b967c21c1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-14 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / The thesis is an effort to expand Alasdair MacIntyre?s theory of virtues by adding a third set of virtues, namely, the virtues of shared responsibility. Therefore, we set out to explain the historical, plural, and unfinished character of his conception of virtue, by means of the intertwining of the concepts of practices, narrative order of a single human life, and tradition. Then, considering the weakness and dependence of the human animal, we demonstrate the naturalistic and open aspects of the concept of the human good that underpin the transition from animality to rationality, analyzing the concepts of animal human identity, practical rationality, and flourishing. Finally, in order to recognize the limits of MacIntyre?s virtue theory regarding the implications of human vulnerability and dependence resulting from its animal condition, we propose the addition of a third set of virtues to MacIntyre?s typology, namely, the virtues of shared responsibility. / A tese consiste num esfor?o para ampliar a teoria das virtudes de Alasdair MacIntyre, atrav?s da adi??o de um terceiro conjunto de virtudes ? as virtudes da responsabilidade compartilhada. Para tanto, primeiramente explicitaremos o car?ter hist?rico, plural e inacabado de seu conceito de virtudes, atrav?s do entrela?amento dos conceitos de pr?tica, ordem narrativa de uma vida humana singular e tradi??o. Em seguida, considerando a fragilidade e depend?ncia do animal humano, demonstramos o aspecto naturalista e aberto do conceito de bem humano que fundamenta o processo de transi??o da animalidade para a racionalidade, analisando os conceitos de identidade humana animal, racionalidade pr?tica e florescimento. Por fim, ao reconhecermos os limites da teoria das virtudes de MacIntyre quanto ?s implica??es da vulnerabilidade e depend?ncia humana decorrente de sua condi??o animal, proporemos o acr?scimo de um terceiro conjunto de virtudes ? tipologia macintyriana: as virtudes da responsabilidade compartilhada.

<p>This dissertation begins a conversation between "apocalyptic" interpretations of the Apostle Paul and the contemporary revival in "virtue ethics." It argues that the human actor's place in Pauline theology has long been captive to theological concerns foreign to Paul and that we can discern in Paul a classical account of human action that Alasdair MacIntyre's work helps to recover. Such an account of agency helps ground an apocalyptic reading of Paul by recovering the centrality of the church and its day-to-day Christic practices, specifically, but not exclusively, the Eucharist. To demonstrate this we first offer a critique of some contemporary accounts of agency in Paul in light of MacIntyre's work. Three exegetical chapters then establish a "MacIntyrian" re-reading of central parts of the letter to the Romans. A concluding chapter offers theological syntheses and prospects for future research.</p> / Dissertation