Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1926. / Published also without thesis note. "Selected bibliography": p. [183]-191.

Inaug.-diss--Heidelberg. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur": p. 91-93.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1939. / Bibliography: p. 223-233.

Inaug.-diss--Heidelberg. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur": p. 91-93.

Magister Artium - MA / In 1980· het: die Noord-Amerikaanse Katolieke biskoppe 'n pastorale brief oor Marxisme laat verskyn. In gesprek met Hulpbiskop Peter Rosazza van Hartford het twee Franse priesters, klasmaats van hom, die volgende opgemerk: Hulle het gewonder, hoekom die biskoppe 'n brief uitgebring het oor Marxisme wat tog nie 'n brandende saak ("issueII) was nie. Hoekom nie 'n brief oor kapitalisme nie, was hulle vraag? (Berryman 1989:75). Dit het daartoe gelei dat Biskop Rosazza in 1980 by die biskoplike vergadering voorgestel het dat 'n pastorale brief oor "kapitalisme" opgestel moes word. Hierdie mosie is aanvaar en het dan gelei tot die pastorale brief oor die ekonomie van die VSA geti tel, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Let ter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S.Economy. 'n Vyfman biskoplike kommissie het in 1981 aan hierdie opdrag begin werk en met verloop van tyd besluit om in plaas van op die kapitalistiese sisteem te fokus, eerder die ekonomie van die VSA te ondersoek en te beoordeel. In November 1984, na wye konsultasies, besprekings en konferensies het die eerste publieke konsepdokument verskyn. Die biskoppe het dit juis laat verskyn na die uitslag van die presidensiele verkiesing tussen Reagan en MoridaLe (Berryman 1989: 113). Hulle het geredeneer dat hiermee - om dit te laat verskyn na die verkiesing - hulle sou kon verhoed dat hulle daarvan beskuldig sou kon word dat"hulle polities kant kies. Inteendeel, dit is toe juis wat gebeur het en die biskoppe is daarvan beskuldig dat hulle kies vir die Demokratiese Party teen Reagan wat die verkiesing gewen het. Die dokument het wye mediadekking geniet - nuusblaaie, sowel as die televisie - en "vi.qorou s public discussion took place around the first two public drafts of the letter (November 1984 and October 1985)11 (Berryman 1989:114). In Junie 1986 het 'n derde konsep verskyn en gedurende November 1986 "isdie finale dokument aanvaar deur die Nasionale Biskoplike vergadering en vrygestel.

This study endeavours to research the field of literary historiography in general and specifically biographic historiography. In South Africa this genre has a limited tradition. Apart from a few diffused contributions by specialists in technical and other publications, and the essays by Hennie Aucamp in Beeltenis verbode and J.C. Kannemeyer in Getuigskrifte and Ontsyferde stene, very little research has been done in South Africa in this field. Chapter one expounds the research methodology. It briefly states the definition of the problem, as well as the goal orientation and the delimitation of the field of study, actuality, hypotheses and structural development. Chapter two affords the theoretical foundation of literary and more specifically biographic historiography. The concept "biography" is defined. The modern biography and its characteristics and structure are scrutinized in terms of different theoretical criteria. Finally this chapter contem-plates some problems experienced by contemporary biographers. Chapter three is an overview which sets out the history of biographic historiography from the most ancient times, during the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the 16th to the 20th century. Biographic historiography in the USA is closely researched. Major achievements and the most important texts which influenced the genre are emphasized. The contributions of notable bio-graphers such as James Boswell and Lytton Strachey are highlighted. Chapter four is the core of this dissertation. Initially it contemplates biographic historiography in South Africa in general. Thereafter it researches literary biographies in depth. The earliest comprehensive literary biography in Afrikaans, Ds. S.J. du Toit in weg en werk by Totius, is discussed. Attention is drawn to Leon Rousseau's biography of Eugène N. Marais, which, in 1974, ushered in the true beginning of this tradition in Afrikaans. Subsequently the biographies of V.E. d'Assonville on Totius and S.J. du Toit are discussed. The major part of this chapter is devoted to the oeuvre of J.C. Kannemeyer, who probably made the most important contribution in this field with his comprehensive biographies on D.J. Opperman, C.J. Langenhoven, and C. Louis Leipoldt. Finally J.C. Steyn's monumental description of the life of N.P. van Wyk Louw, in two volumes, is discussed. The discussion and evaluation of these texts are set out narratively and comparatively. The said biographies are evaluated according to different biographic theories. Chapter five, a concise chapter, evaluates the hypotheses set out at the beginning of this research. Furthermore it is indicated that the field of biographic historiography in South Africa is still not properly exploited. Suggestions for further research are given. South Africa is a multi-ethnic country and contradictory political, cultural, socio-economic and language interests are not uncommon. Biographies could contribute to mutual understanding of these diversities, as manifested in J.C. Steyn's Van Wyk Louw: 'n Lewensverhaal. Perhaps at present research in this field is crucial. / Thesis (MA (Afrikaans))--University of Pretoria, 2003. / Afrikaans / unrestricted

Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die bestaande reg op regsverteenwoordiging uitgebrei het tot sy logiese eindpunt, is daar geen vaste inhoud aan hierdie reg gegee nie en sal die howe die omvang daarvan moet ontwikkel. Hierdie reg kan weens die heersende sosiale en ekonomiese omstandighede nie 'n absolute reg wees nie. Indien 'n beskuldigde nie 'n regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie, sal een op staatsonkoste aan horn verskaf word, maar slegs indien <lit andersins tot wesentlike onreg sal lei. In so 'n geval het die beskuldigde nie die reg op 'n regsverteenwoordiger van sy keuse nie. Effektiewe regsverteenwoordiging word ook nie gewaarborg nie. Daar word derhalwe steeds nie aan die sine qua non van 'n volledige strafregplegingstelsel soos <lit oor tyd in die Verenigde State van Amerika ontwikkel het, <lit is die verskaffing van kostelose regsverteenwoordiging aan elke behoeftige persoon beskuldig van 'n emstige misdaad, voldoen nie / Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has extended the existing right to legal representation to its logical conclusion, no definitive substance has been given to this right and the courts will have to develop the purview thereof. This right cannot be an absolute right because of ruling social and economic circumstances. Should an accused not be able to afford a legal representative, one will be supplied to him at state expense, but only if substantial injustice would otherwise result. In such an event the accused is not entitled to a legal representative of his choice. Effective legal representation is also not guaranteed. There is therefore still not compliance with the sine qua non of a comprehensive criminal justice system as has developed over time in the United States of America, that is the provision of free legal representation to every indigent person accused of a serious crime / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Straf en Prosesreg)

Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die bestaande reg op regsverteenwoordiging uitgebrei het tot sy logiese eindpunt, is daar geen vaste inhoud aan hierdie reg gegee nie en sal die howe die omvang daarvan moet ontwikkel. Hierdie reg kan weens die heersende sosiale en ekonomiese omstandighede nie 'n absolute reg wees nie. Indien 'n beskuldigde nie 'n regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie, sal een op staatsonkoste aan horn verskaf word, maar slegs indien <lit andersins tot wesentlike onreg sal lei. In so 'n geval het die beskuldigde nie die reg op 'n regsverteenwoordiger van sy keuse nie. Effektiewe regsverteenwoordiging word ook nie gewaarborg nie. Daar word derhalwe steeds nie aan die sine qua non van 'n volledige strafregplegingstelsel soos <lit oor tyd in die Verenigde State van Amerika ontwikkel het, <lit is die verskaffing van kostelose regsverteenwoordiging aan elke behoeftige persoon beskuldig van 'n emstige misdaad, voldoen nie / Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has extended the existing right to legal representation to its logical conclusion, no definitive substance has been given to this right and the courts will have to develop the purview thereof. This right cannot be an absolute right because of ruling social and economic circumstances. Should an accused not be able to afford a legal representative, one will be supplied to him at state expense, but only if substantial injustice would otherwise result. In such an event the accused is not entitled to a legal representative of his choice. Effective legal representation is also not guaranteed. There is therefore still not compliance with the sine qua non of a comprehensive criminal justice system as has developed over time in the United States of America, that is the provision of free legal representation to every indigent person accused of a serious crime / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M. (Straf en Prosesreg)

The concept "beneficial use" plays a pivotal role in South African water law reform. It forms the foundation of the mechanism to make water use rights available for the reform of the allocation of water use entitlements. The mechanism involves that water use rights that were unexercised in the two years before the promulgation of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 are not defined as existing lawful water uses. Where the concept "beneficial use" is utilised to cancel unexercised water use rights, it can cause potential hardship. Some people whose rights have been cancelled believe that they should be able to rely on the property clause in section 25 of the Constitution of 1996 to either have the legislation declared unconstitutional or to demand compensation. Section 25 of the Constitution of 1996 prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property and states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest, subject to compensation. Section 25(4) states, however, that the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources. It is clear from this that reforms to bring about access to water are allowed by the property clause. One of the main questions discussed in this thesis was whether section 32 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 that made more water available for distribution for reform purposes by cancelling unexercised water user rights, leads to an arbitrary deprivation or an expropriation of property. It should be noted that section 32 of the National Water Act did not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property, as sufficient reason exists for water law reform. A possible constitutional challenge based on the lack of due process of law because of the retrospective operation of the section may possibly be averted because of the existence of section 33 of the National Water Act. Section 33 of the Act mitigates hardship by allowing unexercised water uses to be declared existing lawful water uses in certain circumstances where a good reason for the non–exercise of the water use right existed. Even in cases where section 33 does not prevent section 32 from being regarded as an arbitrary deprivation of property because there still was not a proper procedure, the government will probably be able to show that the limitation in section 32 is, in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996, reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. Despite the fact that section 25(1) prohibits arbitrary deprivations, it does not prohibit the government from regulating competing rights to use water even though some people may be negatively affected by the regulation. Because the Minister merely acts as public trustee of the nation's water resources on behalf of the national government in terms section 3(1) of the National Water Act, it cannot be claimed that the government acquired the cancelled water use rights. A claim that compensation should be paid for an expropriation of property will therefore not succeed. Compensation is only payable in terms of section 22(6) and section 22(7) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 for a loss of existing water entitlements, such as existing lawful water uses or existing licences. A court should thus consider interpreting section 25 by providing for compensation where an individual was unfairly burdened and was therefore denied the protection of the equality clause in section 9 of the Constitution when his unexercised water use rights were cancelled by section 32. The concept "beneficial use" currently restricts the content of the water use entitlement existing in terms of section 4 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. The loss of the entitlement when inter alia a licence for an existing lawful water use is refused, is not protected by the payment of compensation when water is used in an unfair or disproportionate manner, because such utilisation would not be regarded to be beneficial use. It became apparent that in terms of the current water law dispensation in South Africa, the possibility of compensation for an amendment of a water use licence and the refusal of a licence for an existing lawful water use implies that a water use entitlement is a right in property. The fact that section 22(7) of the National Water Act states that the amount of the compensation must be determined in accordance with section 25(3) of the Constitution implies that the legislature also recognises that a water use entitlement is constitutional property. Section 22(7) of the National Water Act underlines the basic premises of the National Water Act by subjecting the amount of the compensation that is payable to the same limitations that restrict the entitlement to use the water. The stipulations of section 22(7) draw the attention to the fact that the exercise of both existing lawful water uses and water use licences as rights in property is subject to basic principles of the National Water Act such as the Reserve and the concepts "public trusteeship" and "beneficial use" of the water resources. The fact that compensation is only payable when there has been severe prejudice to the economic viability of an undertaking implies that water use entitlements have to be exercised at the time of the application for the compensation to be payable. The concept "beneficial use" – in the sense that a water use must not be wasteful or polluting and in the sense that only water use entitlements that are being exercised are protected – thus restricts the water use entitlement as a property right. During the research, American and Australian water law reform and their interpretation of their property clauses were compared to water law reform in South Africa and the South African property clause. Furthermore, Australian policy to encourage more beneficial water use by the trade in water entitlements or allocations, was also discussed. South Africans will likely in future be encouraged to trade in water use entitlements or allocations. The objective with allowing the trade in water use entitlements or allocations is to encourage people to rather use water for uses with a high value instead of uses with a lower value. In this way the concept "beneficial use" may be broadened to include water allocation or entitlement trading. However, it was argued that a disproportionate impact on third parties would mean that water allocation or entitlement trading would in some cases not be regarded as beneficial use anymore. / Thesis (LL.D.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The concept "beneficial use" plays a pivotal role in South African water law reform. It forms the foundation of the mechanism to make water use rights available for the reform of the allocation of water use entitlements. The mechanism involves that water use rights that were unexercised in the two years before the promulgation of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 are not defined as existing lawful water uses. Where the concept "beneficial use" is utilised to cancel unexercised water use rights, it can cause potential hardship. Some people whose rights have been cancelled believe that they should be able to rely on the property clause in section 25 of the Constitution of 1996 to either have the legislation declared unconstitutional or to demand compensation. Section 25 of the Constitution of 1996 prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property and states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest, subject to compensation. Section 25(4) states, however, that the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources. It is clear from this that reforms to bring about access to water are allowed by the property clause. One of the main questions discussed in this thesis was whether section 32 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 that made more water available for distribution for reform purposes by cancelling unexercised water user rights, leads to an arbitrary deprivation or an expropriation of property. It should be noted that section 32 of the National Water Act did not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property, as sufficient reason exists for water law reform. A possible constitutional challenge based on the lack of due process of law because of the retrospective operation of the section may possibly be averted because of the existence of section 33 of the National Water Act. Section 33 of the Act mitigates hardship by allowing unexercised water uses to be declared existing lawful water uses in certain circumstances where a good reason for the non–exercise of the water use right existed. Even in cases where section 33 does not prevent section 32 from being regarded as an arbitrary deprivation of property because there still was not a proper procedure, the government will probably be able to show that the limitation in section 32 is, in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996, reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. Despite the fact that section 25(1) prohibits arbitrary deprivations, it does not prohibit the government from regulating competing rights to use water even though some people may be negatively affected by the regulation. Because the Minister merely acts as public trustee of the nation's water resources on behalf of the national government in terms section 3(1) of the National Water Act, it cannot be claimed that the government acquired the cancelled water use rights. A claim that compensation should be paid for an expropriation of property will therefore not succeed. Compensation is only payable in terms of section 22(6) and section 22(7) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 for a loss of existing water entitlements, such as existing lawful water uses or existing licences. A court should thus consider interpreting section 25 by providing for compensation where an individual was unfairly burdened and was therefore denied the protection of the equality clause in section 9 of the Constitution when his unexercised water use rights were cancelled by section 32. The concept "beneficial use" currently restricts the content of the water use entitlement existing in terms of section 4 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. The loss of the entitlement when inter alia a licence for an existing lawful water use is refused, is not protected by the payment of compensation when water is used in an unfair or disproportionate manner, because such utilisation would not be regarded to be beneficial use. It became apparent that in terms of the current water law dispensation in South Africa, the possibility of compensation for an amendment of a water use licence and the refusal of a licence for an existing lawful water use implies that a water use entitlement is a right in property. The fact that section 22(7) of the National Water Act states that the amount of the compensation must be determined in accordance with section 25(3) of the Constitution implies that the legislature also recognises that a water use entitlement is constitutional property. Section 22(7) of the National Water Act underlines the basic premises of the National Water Act by subjecting the amount of the compensation that is payable to the same limitations that restrict the entitlement to use the water. The stipulations of section 22(7) draw the attention to the fact that the exercise of both existing lawful water uses and water use licences as rights in property is subject to basic principles of the National Water Act such as the Reserve and the concepts "public trusteeship" and "beneficial use" of the water resources. The fact that compensation is only payable when there has been severe prejudice to the economic viability of an undertaking implies that water use entitlements have to be exercised at the time of the application for the compensation to be payable. The concept "beneficial use" – in the sense that a water use must not be wasteful or polluting and in the sense that only water use entitlements that are being exercised are protected – thus restricts the water use entitlement as a property right. During the research, American and Australian water law reform and their interpretation of their property clauses were compared to water law reform in South Africa and the South African property clause. Furthermore, Australian policy to encourage more beneficial water use by the trade in water entitlements or allocations, was also discussed. South Africans will likely in future be encouraged to trade in water use entitlements or allocations. The objective with allowing the trade in water use entitlements or allocations is to encourage people to rather use water for uses with a high value instead of uses with a lower value. In this way the concept "beneficial use" may be broadened to include water allocation or entitlement trading. However, it was argued that a disproportionate impact on third parties would mean that water allocation or entitlement trading would in some cases not be regarded as beneficial use anymore. / Thesis (LL.D.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.