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1	Competing for managerial talent: what antitrust can tell us about antitakeover statutes Mikhno, Valeriya Unknown Date No description available. antitakeover antitrust
2	Competing for managerial talent: what antitrust can tell us about antitakeover statutes Mikhno, Valeriya 11 1900 (has links) This thesis looks at the antitrust implications of state antitakeover statutes. After a wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s, many state legislatures, lobbied by the managerial interests, enacted laws that made it more difficult for outsiders to take over target corporations. This, in turn, has led to inefficient entrenchment of management and adverse consequences for shareholders. This paper argues that such inefficiencies are inconsistent with the aims and purposes of antitrust laws. The thesis will discuss both the theories supporting strong managerial protection and the elimination of hostile takeovers and the theories supporting the claim that takeovers are a productive method of improving the control and management of assets. Such legislation deprives shareholders of a substantial premium, protects inefficient management, and has negative effects on the national economy as a whole. Hence, in so far as antitakeover statutes conflict with the goals of antitrust, the latter should trump the former. antitakeover antitrust
3	Wealth effects of antitakeover provisions in mergers / Goktan, Mehmet Sinan, January 2008 (has links) Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Texas at Dallas, 2008. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-125)
4	Corporate risk and corporate governance Li, Hao. Yost, Keven E., January 2009 (has links) Thesis--Auburn University, 2009. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-39).
5	The timing of and motivation for tender offer stock repurchases / Narasimhan, Premkumar. January 1999 (has links) Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [114]-118).
6	Competing for managerial talent : what antitrust can tell us about antitakeover statutes / Mikhno, Valeriya. January 2009 (has links) Thesis (LL.M.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws, Faculty of Law." Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on August 10, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.
7	Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance Ashraf, Rasha 06 July 2007 (has links) The first essay analyzes mutual funds proxy voting records on shareholder proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of managements policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. According to managerial entrenchment hypothesis, higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. Efficient contracting hypothesis argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay structure. Corporate governance Institutional investors Mergers and acquisitions Executive compensation Institutional investors Proxy Antitakeover strategies Executives Salaries, etc Mutual funds
8	Corporate governance and the firm's behaviour towards stakeholders Juks, Reimo January 2010 (has links) Obey the Law and Do a Little Bit Extra? The paper provides evidence on how firms’ stakeholder orientation is associated with standard measures of corporate governance using a panel of 1778 US companies during the period of 1995-2006. We construct two binary indicators, one measuring stakeholder hostility and the other stakeholder friendliness using data from KLD ratings agency. Based on these indicators, we classify firms into four groups representing stakeholder hostile, neutral, friendly and ”friendly and hostile” firms. Our results show that both stakeholder friendly and hostile firms tend to have significantly lower insider ownership, smaller option grants, lower pay-performance sensitivities, larger boards, older executive officers and directors, lower institutional ownership and larger number of anti-takeover defenses than the firms in the neutral group. We also find that the probability of stakeholder hostile activity is positively related to the strength of corporate governance, but the effect is insignificant except in local and global community areas. A possible explanation is that in these areas stakeholders are protected mainly by ethics and social norms rather than by various regulations that is commonplace in labour, environment and customer related areas. These findings lend support for the idea that stakeholders are best protected by various regulations. Corporate Governance and Workplace Safety. This paper examines how the weakening in corporate governance affects workplace safety. We use anti-takeover laws in the US in the 1980s as a source of variation in corporate governance. Our measures of workplace safety are the number of violations of OSHA workplace safety regulation, penalties paid for these violations, the number of accidents and employees’ complaints about their workplace safety. We find that firms affected by the regulation presented significantly more workplace safety violations and penalties than otherwise similar firms that were not affected by the regulation. Accidents and complaints tend to decrease as a result of the anti-takeover regulation, but the results are not entirely robust. We also document that the increase in workplace safety violations was significantly smaller in unionized firms. This suggests that unions can play an important role in curbing managerial discretion. How Responsible is Private Equity? The financial success of leveraged buyout targets (LBOs) is frequently associated with deteriorating conditions for other stakeholders, such as workers, customers, suppliers, tax-payers and society as a whole. We obtain a comprehensive set of stakeholder ratings for a sample of 373 LBOs and examine the pre-and post-LBO performance of these ratings. LBO targets are characterized by weak stakeholder relations across a number of measures compared to their peers, in terms of corporate governance, transparency, employee relations and community relations. Controlling for this selection, we do not find systematic evidence in favor of the idea that private equity funds gain at the expense of other stakeholders. Private equity ownership alters targets in the direction of higher pay, improved work-life benefits, increased charitable giving, and decreased concerns related to retirement benefits, adverse economic impact, tax disputes, unfair marketing practices and antitrust problems. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2010; Sammanfattning jämte 3 uppsatser. Corporate governance Managerial incentives Workplace safety Antitakeover regulation Stakeholders Corporate social responsibility Private equity Takeovers Leveraged buyouts Economics Nationalekonomi
9	Les moyens de défense contre les OPA hostiles / Antitakeover defenses Maouche, Samia 27 November 2017 (has links) Opérations particulièrement complexes, les offres publiques d'acquisition ne cessent de faire parler d'elles, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société visée. De nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Ces dernières ont par ailleurs développé un certain nombre de mécanismes de défense anti-OPA particulièrement efficaces, mais se révélant le plus souvent insuffisants face à l'ingéniosité dont peut faire preuve l'initiateur. Le droit positif montre ainsi ses limites face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. L'analyse prospective du droit anti-OPA permet d'observer les nouvelles mutations que subit le droit positif au regard des nouveaux enjeux économiques. Elle permet également d'envisager de nouveaux modes d'appréhension des OPA hostiles. Il est ainsi possible d'observer que le gouvernement d'entreprise prend une place considérable dans la vie des sociétés cotées. De même, la montée en puissance de la régulation et l'interventionnisme de l’État sont de plus en plus marqués ; et les salariés s'impliquent de plus en plus dans la gestion de l'entreprise. L'ensemble de ces paramètres marquent un glissement progressif vers une réorganisation du mode de fonctionnement des sociétés, ce qui a amené au développement du soft law, un droit à la frontière du droit positif et des pratiques des sociétés. Le soft law constitue à ce titre une approche inédite des OPA hostiles, dont l'analyse permet de cerner les apports liés à la mutation du droit positif et d'envisager l'émergence de nouveaux moyens de défense. Celui-ci doit toutefois demeurer complémentaire au cadre législatif et réglementaire existant. / No abstract Prise de contrôle Offres publiques d'achat Prise de contrôle hostile Offre obligatoire Offre amicale Sociétés cotées Moyens de défense Actions Initiateur Société cible Franchissement de seuils Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) Actionnaires Droits de vote Action de concert Salariés Conseil d'administration Comité d'entreprise Augmentation de capital Transparence Chevalier blanc Bons bretons (pilules empoisonnées) Droit souple Gouvernement d'entreprise Contre-OPA Sanctions Takeover bid Hostile takeover bid Mandatory bid Amicable bid Listed companies Antitakeover defenses Shares Raider Target company Crossing of shareholding thresholds Amf Shareholders Voting rights Concert Employees Board of directors Works council Increase of capital Transparency Wight knight Poison pills Soft law Corporate governance Pacman Sanctions 330

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