Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität Regensburg, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 161-180.

Thesis advisor: Jean-Luc Solère / This dissertation examines the noetics of several early thirteenth-century Latin Augustinian thinkers, who first received Aristotle's noetic from the Arabs, examining in detail the early Latin reception of Aristotelian proposal that human thought is caused by the `agent intellect'. I argue that the early Latin-Augustinian reactions to the Arab noetics reveal an abiding Latin commitment to a concept of selfhood in natural thought. For different reasons, these early 13th century Latin thinkers explicitly locate the principle of natural thought within the individual's soul, thus conceiving the individual as the spontaneous origin of the activity of his or her thinking. I propose that there is a progressively more refined development of this concept within the interpretation of the Peripatetic noetic proposed within the early 13th century Franciscan school. I trace this development through John of La Rochelle to the anonymous author of the Summa Fratris Alexandri Book 2 to Bonaventure's early thought. At the same time, I analyze this Franciscan development relative to William of Auvergne's well-conceived opposition to all interpretations of the Aristotelian noetic. I make the case that William's critique sets the standard for the noetic of the individual to which these Franciscans adhere, even in their adoption of the Aristotelian noetic. I then argue that to adhere to William's standard, these Franciscans drew on Averroes' account of the agent intellect as found in Averroes' Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros. Finally, I argue that within the early 13th century's development of the noetic of the individual, there is an important, self-conscious development of the historico-philosophical concept of the Western self. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre pensamento e vontade em Averróis, principalmente no que toca a individualidade humana. A discussão movida no século XIII contra o Grande Comentário ao De Anima acusa o comentador de negar ao homem a possibilidade de transcender a existência material, pois a tese da unidade do intelecto material faz da alma humana apenas um receptáculo de formas sensíveis, que se corrompe com a morte do corpo. Em outras palavras, a liberdade e a individualidade do homem estão comprometidas, pois um ser desprovido de intelecto não é um ser dotado de vontade. Para Averróis, o propósito da existência humana é alcançar sua perfeição última, a identificação final com o intelecto agente separado da matéria, que também representa o alcance da felicidade suprema. Esta pode ser alcançada por meio do conhecimento do mundo e de suas causas, em outras palavras, o alcance da felicidade é uma investigação. Para tanto, o homem necessita do estabelecimento de uma relação de conjunção com os intelectos separados da matéria para a realização deste propósito. A aquisição da universalidade destas substâncias separadas é que permitirá ao homem universalizar o conhecimento particular obtido dos seres materiais. E essa atividade parece não ter outro motor que a vontade. Assim, é necessário analisar a estrutura desta relação de conhecimento, entender como é possível ao homem adquirir o conhecimento universal constitui um ponto fundamental na obra de Averróis. Já que este será o ponto de partida pra elaboração de toda uma postura ética que tem na vontade e na aquisição de conhecimento os elementos que constituem a plena realização da natureza humana na existência terrena e a garantia da bem aventurança na vida futura / This work aims to analyze the relation between thought and will in Averroes, particularly with respect to human individuality. The discussion moved in the thirteenth century against the Great Commentary on De Anima accuses the commentator of denying to man the possibility of transcending material existence, because the thesis of the unity of the material intellect makes the human soul just a receptacle of sensitive forms, which is corrupt with the death of the body. In other words, the freedom and individuality of man are compromised because one being devoid of intellect is not a being endowed of will. For Averroes, the purpose of human existence is achieving its ultimate perfection, the final identification with the intellect separated from matter, which also represents the attainment of the supreme happiness. This can be achieved through knowledge of the world and its causes, in other words, the achievement of happiness is an investigation. To this end, man needs the establishment of a relationship of conjunction with the separate intellects from matter to achieving this purpose. The acquisition of the universality of these separate substances will allow the man to universalize the particular knowledge obtained from material beings. And this activity seems to have no other motor than will. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the structure of this knowledge relation, understand how it is possible for man to acquire universal knowledge is a key point in the work of Averroes. Since this will be the starting point for developing a whole ethical position that has in the will and on the acquisition of knowledge elements which constitute the full realization of human nature in earthly existence and the guarantee of beatitude in the hereafter

Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre pensamento e vontade em Averróis, principalmente no que toca a individualidade humana. A discussão movida no século XIII contra o Grande Comentário ao De Anima acusa o comentador de negar ao homem a possibilidade de transcender a existência material, pois a tese da unidade do intelecto material faz da alma humana apenas um receptáculo de formas sensíveis, que se corrompe com a morte do corpo. Em outras palavras, a liberdade e a individualidade do homem estão comprometidas, pois um ser desprovido de intelecto não é um ser dotado de vontade. Para Averróis, o propósito da existência humana é alcançar sua perfeição última, a identificação final com o intelecto agente separado da matéria, que também representa o alcance da felicidade suprema. Esta pode ser alcançada por meio do conhecimento do mundo e de suas causas, em outras palavras, o alcance da felicidade é uma investigação. Para tanto, o homem necessita do estabelecimento de uma relação de conjunção com os intelectos separados da matéria para a realização deste propósito. A aquisição da universalidade destas substâncias separadas é que permitirá ao homem universalizar o conhecimento particular obtido dos seres materiais. E essa atividade parece não ter outro motor que a vontade. Assim, é necessário analisar a estrutura desta relação de conhecimento, entender como é possível ao homem adquirir o conhecimento universal constitui um ponto fundamental na obra de Averróis. Já que este será o ponto de partida pra elaboração de toda uma postura ética que tem na vontade e na aquisição de conhecimento os elementos que constituem a plena realização da natureza humana na existência terrena e a garantia da bem aventurança na vida futura / This work aims to analyze the relation between thought and will in Averroes, particularly with respect to human individuality. The discussion moved in the thirteenth century against the Great Commentary on De Anima accuses the commentator of denying to man the possibility of transcending material existence, because the thesis of the unity of the material intellect makes the human soul just a receptacle of sensitive forms, which is corrupt with the death of the body. In other words, the freedom and individuality of man are compromised because one being devoid of intellect is not a being endowed of will. For Averroes, the purpose of human existence is achieving its ultimate perfection, the final identification with the intellect separated from matter, which also represents the attainment of the supreme happiness. This can be achieved through knowledge of the world and its causes, in other words, the achievement of happiness is an investigation. To this end, man needs the establishment of a relationship of conjunction with the separate intellects from matter to achieving this purpose. The acquisition of the universality of these separate substances will allow the man to universalize the particular knowledge obtained from material beings. And this activity seems to have no other motor than will. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the structure of this knowledge relation, understand how it is possible for man to acquire universal knowledge is a key point in the work of Averroes. Since this will be the starting point for developing a whole ethical position that has in the will and on the acquisition of knowledge elements which constitute the full realization of human nature in earthly existence and the guarantee of beatitude in the hereafter

Scholars, philosophers, and theologians have debated the compatibility of Hellenic Philosophy with Islam since the eighth century CE. In his book Averroes et l’Averroisme (1852), Ernst Renan identified Tahāfut al-Falsifa by al-Ghazali and Tahāfut al-Tahāfut by ibn Rushd as the two key texts resolving the issue: the Islamic world accepted al-Ghazali and fell into decline, while Europe accepted ibn Rushd (Averroës) and experienced the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Renan’s argument has endured among Arab liberal intellectuals over the past one-hundred sixty years, but using ibn Rushd as the mascot for Arab Rationalism has failed to inspire anything resembling asecond Nahda. Two contemporary Arab intellectuals, Mohammad ʿAbed al-Jabari and George Tarabichi, have engaged in their own dialogue about the works of al-Ghazali’s and ibn Rushd’s and whether or not Averroism can effect real change in the modern Arab world. This paper examines the works of al-Ghazali, ibn Rushd, Renan, al-Jabari, and Tarabichi in their historical, cultural, and geographical contexts to conclude that the solution to the problems of the modern Arab world, if one exists, does not lie solely within the works of ibn Rushd. / text

Práce se snaží zachytit pozici některých středověkých autorů co se týče sporu o původ a trvání světa. Nějprve jsou zmíněny některé biblické prameny a nauka magisteria. Následuje rozsáhlá kapitola o Filoponově sporu se Simpliciem ohledně výkladu Aristotelova spisu De caelo (O nebi), která je doplněna krátkou kapitolou pojednávající o problémech spojených s konceptem nekonečna. Následují dvě kratší kapitoly. První je o Averroově stanovisku k problému věčnosti světa, které popsal ve svém spise Tahafut al Tahafut. Následuje kapitola o Maimonidově stanovisku popsaném v jeho Dux perplexorum. Poté již přichází sekce, v které je provedena analýza Sigerova spisu De aeternitate mundi s přihlédnutím k jeho Questiones metahysicae. Tuto kapitolu doplňuje detailní popis vztahu rozumu a víry načrtnutý ve spise Boethia z Dacie-De mundi aeternitate, který je následně aplikován na řešený problém.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo proceder ao exame da análise realizada por Averróis a respeito da natureza do intelecto material. Nosso autor procura demonstrar a certa incompletude presente nas teses lançadas a esse respeito, principalmente por Themístio e Alexandre de Afrodísia, e solucionar as antinomias que envolvem a afirmação de que o intelecto material é uma substância separada e única para toda a humanidade. As principais questões decorrentes dessa afirmação envolvem principalmente o processo de formação dos inteligíveis; a possibilidade do conhecimento individual; a relação que é estabelecida entre o homem e o intelecto; e, sobretudo, a natureza do intelecto material. Fruto de grande controvérsia, a tese da unidade do intelecto material possui grande importância no pensamento de Averróis, pois o estabelecimento dessa natureza representa a solução de diversas questões no âmbito da metafísica. Os reflexos dessa questão chegam até mesmo ao âmbito moral de sua filosofia, onde é estabelecido que o movimento natural do homem se dê por meio da relação com essa substância separada e tem seu fim exatamente aí, onde o terreno da absoluta felicidade só é alcançado nessa relação entre homem e intelecto. / The objectiveof this work is to proceed the examination of the analysis carried through Averroes regarding the nature of the material intellect. The author aims to demonstrate certain incompleteness presented in some thesis about it, mainly those of Themístius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, and to solve the antinomies wich involves the affirmation of that the material intellect as a separate and a single substance for all humankind. This affirmation rises many questions, mainly the formation process of the intelligible; the possibility of the individual knowledge; the relation established between man and intellect; and, over all, the nature of the material intellect. Originated among great controversy, the thesis for the unit of the material intellect has great importance in the thought of Averroes, therefore the establishment of this nature represents the solution of many questions in the scope of metaphysics. The consequences of this question arrive even though at the moral ground of its philosophy, where it is established that the natural movement of the man happens trought the relation with this separate substance and has its end precisely there, where the land of the absolute happiness is reached only by this relation between man and intellect.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo proceder ao exame da análise realizada por Averróis a respeito da natureza do intelecto material. Nosso autor procura demonstrar a certa incompletude presente nas teses lançadas a esse respeito, principalmente por Themístio e Alexandre de Afrodísia, e solucionar as antinomias que envolvem a afirmação de que o intelecto material é uma substância separada e única para toda a humanidade. As principais questões decorrentes dessa afirmação envolvem principalmente o processo de formação dos inteligíveis; a possibilidade do conhecimento individual; a relação que é estabelecida entre o homem e o intelecto; e, sobretudo, a natureza do intelecto material. Fruto de grande controvérsia, a tese da unidade do intelecto material possui grande importância no pensamento de Averróis, pois o estabelecimento dessa natureza representa a solução de diversas questões no âmbito da metafísica. Os reflexos dessa questão chegam até mesmo ao âmbito moral de sua filosofia, onde é estabelecido que o movimento natural do homem se dê por meio da relação com essa substância separada e tem seu fim exatamente aí, onde o terreno da absoluta felicidade só é alcançado nessa relação entre homem e intelecto. / The objectiveof this work is to proceed the examination of the analysis carried through Averroes regarding the nature of the material intellect. The author aims to demonstrate certain incompleteness presented in some thesis about it, mainly those of Themístius and Alexander of Aphrodisias, and to solve the antinomies wich involves the affirmation of that the material intellect as a separate and a single substance for all humankind. This affirmation rises many questions, mainly the formation process of the intelligible; the possibility of the individual knowledge; the relation established between man and intellect; and, over all, the nature of the material intellect. Originated among great controversy, the thesis for the unit of the material intellect has great importance in the thought of Averroes, therefore the establishment of this nature represents the solution of many questions in the scope of metaphysics. The consequences of this question arrive even though at the moral ground of its philosophy, where it is established that the natural movement of the man happens trought the relation with this separate substance and has its end precisely there, where the land of the absolute happiness is reached only by this relation between man and intellect.

Cette thèse est consacrée à une analyse doctrinale et philologique du commentaire de Thomas d'Aquin sur la distinction 35 du premier Livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard. Le sujet de cette distinction est la science que Dieu a de lui-même et des autres choses. La première partie de notre travail est une présentation conceptuelle et historique de l'arrière-fond de cette distinction. Elle est divisée en quatre étapes. Dans la première, nous nous sommes interrogé sur la science divine dans une perspective linguistique. Dans la seconde, nous avons discuté le rôle de l'autre, en tant qu'objet, dans la connaissance divine. Dans la troisième,nous avons étudié la synthèse chez Thomas des éléments aristotéliciens et pseudo-dionysiens, comme la notion d'actus purus et la notion d'esse. La quatrième étape, présente brièvement le contexte historique pour comprendre la méthode du commentaire des Sentences, ainsi qu'un bref panorama de l'Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle. La deuxième partie de la thèse offre une édition critique de la distinction 35. Après avoir collationné les témoins manuscrits selon les critères de la Commission Léonine, nous avons présenté le texte avec une introduction où nous établissons les différentes familles de la transmission textuelle. / This dissertation provides a doctrinal and philological study of Aquinas' Commentary on Book I, dist. 35 ofPeter Lombard's Sentences. At issue is the knowledge that God has of Himself and of the things other thanHimself. The first part of the dissertation investigates the conceptual and historical background of dist. 35. Itdivides into four sections. First, we approach the topic of the divine science from a linguistic perspective.Secondly, we examine the role of things other than God as objects of the divine knowledge. Thirdly, we drawattention to Aquinas' synthesis of Aristotelian and pseudo-Dionysian elements, namely the notions of actuspurus and esse. The fourth section provides an overview of the historical context and the XIIIth-centuryUniversity of Paris, in order to better understand the method of commentaries on the Sentences. The secondpart of the dissertation intends to provide, for the first time, the critical edition of Aquinas' Commentary onBook I, dist. 35 of Peter Lombard's Sentences. The manuscripts are collated according to LeonineCommission's criteria. The critical text is introduced by a philological study in which we investigate the textualtransmission of dist. 35 and we propose a stemma.

Le Sefer Ha-ʻIqqarim de Joseph Albo qui a pour objet la définition des principes fondamentaux du Judaïsme s’inscrit dans une réflexion qui a commencé avec Sadia Gaon, qui s’est poursuivie avec Maimonide, Gersonides, Crescas, Duran. Dans le but de permettre au lecteur de se faire sa propre opinion, nous avons souhaité présenter et traduire l’oeuvre de Joseph Albo. Traduire l’ensemble du Sefer Ha-ʻIqqarim dépassant le cadre de notre projet, nous nous sommes contentés de traduire le premier traité qui présente la conception de Joseph Albo sur les principes fondamentaux et sa réduction à trois principes fondamentaux qui sont la croyance à l’existence de Dieu, la croyance à une révélation divine, et la croyance à la rétribution. Les trois traités suivant ne constituant qu’un approfondissement du premier, nous avons traduit un chapitre supplémentaire pour voir et comprendre comment Joseph Albo développe et approfondit le thème déjà ouvert dans le premier traité. C’est le troisième traité qui développe le second principe fondamental de la croyance à la révélation divine. / The Sefer Ha-ʻIqqarim of Joseph Albo which try to determine the basic principles of Judaism is part of a reflection that began with Sadia Gaon, which continued with Maimonides, Gersonides and Crescas Duran. To allow the reader to form his own opinion, we wanted to introduce and translate the work of Joseph Albo. Translating the whole of the Sefer Ha-ʻIqqarim exceeding the framework of our project, we simply translate the first treaty which presents the conception of Joseph Albo on fundamentals and its reduction to three fundamental principles which are the belief in the existence of God, the belief in a divine revelation, and the belief in retribution. The three following treaties being only a deepening of the first, we have translated an additional chapter to see and understand how Joseph Albo develops the theme already opened in the first treaty. This is the third treaty that develops the second fundamental principle of belief in the divine revelation.