Spelling suggestions: "subject:"bailout""
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The Difficult Decision to Devalue a CurrencyBizuneh, Menna 07 August 2012 (has links)
The switch from a fixed exchange rate regime to a flexible exchange rate regime seldom goes smoothly. A major reason why devaluations are so disruptive is that countries are reluctant to abandon their fixed exchange rate regimes. This “reluctance to devalue” phenomenon is one of the puzzles in international finance. This dissertation makes towards understanding this “reluctance to devalue”. First, I investigate the factors that may influence the probability of a switch from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime using survival models. I find that pegs have non-monotonic duration dependence. Moreover, I find that GDP growth strongly influences the probability of abandoning a peg. Second, I propose that the “reluctance to devalue” could stem from uncertainty about the control over inflation after devaluation which raises the threshold of economic pain that could convince policy makers to devalue. I develop this argument in a rules-vs-discretion theoretical framework. Empirical analysis based on survey data from Bulgaria supports this hypothesis. Given that abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime is one of the three options that are available to countries on a peg, I investigate whether a periphery country's decision to abandon its peg is impacted by a potential move to a currency union. I find that the perception of “insurance” justified by expected-bailouts in a currency union increase the support for joining a currency union. The strength of this “safety net” perception is strong despite expected negative impact of the currency union on the country’s macroeconomic indicators.
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Discrete time modeling of subprime mortgage credit / M.C. SenosiSenosi, Mmamontsho Charlotte January 2010 (has links)
Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009
global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations
of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and
prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses
thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically
discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime
mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the
fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking
considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market
(including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch
and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and
systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis
that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents,
mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation
opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions,
timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous
references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further
research.
In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators
(SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall
Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs).
Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage
brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement
providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage
insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs,
the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the
government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role.
Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the
exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC
- subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters
in which they are found are outlined below.
In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation
under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully
amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit
incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained
optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we
show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios
imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between
Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel
regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation
exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative.
Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data
that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised.
In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our
research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend
low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for
instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled
SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases
where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing
and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to
be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged
ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the
policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand
ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective
of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not.
In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time
stochastic modeling and optimization is required.
The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international
journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4
peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.
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Discrete time modeling of subprime mortgage credit / M.C. SenosiSenosi, Mmamontsho Charlotte January 2010 (has links)
Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009
global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations
of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and
prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses
thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically
discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime
mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the
fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking
considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market
(including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch
and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and
systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis
that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents,
mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation
opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions,
timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous
references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further
research.
In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators
(SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall
Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs).
Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage
brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement
providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage
insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs,
the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the
government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role.
Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the
exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC
- subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters
in which they are found are outlined below.
In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation
under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully
amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit
incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained
optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we
show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios
imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between
Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel
regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation
exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative.
Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data
that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised.
In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our
research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend
low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for
instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled
SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases
where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing
and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to
be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged
ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the
policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand
ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective
of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not.
In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time
stochastic modeling and optimization is required.
The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international
journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4
peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.
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Three Essays on Mergers and Acquisitions and Bank Stability / Trois essais sur les fusions-acquisitions et la stabilité du secteur bancaireAziz, Saqib 29 April 2016 (has links)
Cette thèse est constituée de trois essais sur les activités de fusions-acquisitions (F&A) des banques et leurs effets sur la stabilité du secteur bancaire. Le premier essai analyse l’intensité de l’activité F&A des grandes banques Européennes au cours d'une période vaste de 1990-2006 et les liens avec les mesures de sauvetages et les notations de crédit pendant la crise financière de 2007-2009. Trois résultats importants sont mis en évidence à partir de notre étude. En premier lieu, l'intensité de l'activité F&A est liée positivement à la probabilité de sauvetage pendant la crise financière. En second lieu, cette intensité des activités de F&A est liée à la détérioration des notations des émetteurs, suggérant ainsi un risque de défaut plus élevé des banques acquéreuses pendant la période de crise. Enfin, on constate un lien positif entre les mesures de protection gouvernementales et l'effet combiné des activités de F&A et du facteur « too big to fail ». Ceci laisse penser que les banques peuvent poursuive leurs activités de F&A pour exploiter des avantages de protection liés à leur statut de « too big to fail ». Le second essai analyse la relation entre les activités de F&A de grandes banques Européennes et leur vulnérabilité à la crise financière en utilisant l’indicateur DD de Merton (1974) et le ratio de Z-score comme mesures de risque de faillite et de solvabilité. Les résultats mettent en évidence que les stratégies d’acquisition de banques d'investissements sur une période de 1990-2006 sont liées significativement à l'augmentation en leur risque de défaut (mesuré par DD) et l'insolvabilité (mesuré par le Z-score) pendant la crise financière récente. Le troisième et dernier essai s’intéresse aux relations entre les opérations de F&A et les évolutions de la déréglementation bancaire et des réformes de régulation bancaire mises en place aux Etats-Unis. Nous analysons principalement les effets de deux actes de déréglementation significatifs des années 1990 qui ont permis aux banques américaines de s’étendre à travers les états (acte de Riegle-Neal de 1994 et acte de Gramm-Leach-Bliley de 1999). Nous comparons les activités de F&A des banques américaines avec comme groupe de contrôle les banques européennes sur la période 1990-2009. Nous constatons un effet significativement positif de la déréglementation sur les activités de F&A dans le secteur bancaire américain. Cependant, on peut remarquer que les effets constatés ne sont pas forcément les effets souhaités ou visés par les deux actes de déréglementation. De plus, nous montrons que l'intensité des activités de F&A et la déréglementation provoquent conjointement un effet négatif sur la stabilité du secteur bancaire américain, justifiant ainsi le lien souvent établi entre la concentration du système bancaire et sa fragilité. / This dissertation consists of three essays on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity of banks and various dimensions of their stability. The first essay delves upon whether and how acquisitiveness of large European banks over an extensive period of 1990-2006 relate to their bailouts and credit ratings during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Three important findings emerge from the performed analysis. First, the intensity of bank M&A activity positively relates to the likelihood and extent of their bailout support during the financial crisis. Second, the ex-ante acquisitiveness of banks relates in a significantly positive manner with the deterioration in bank issuer ratings – suggesting towards higher default risk of acquisitive banks during the crisis period. Third, a positive link between the external support and the joint effect of M&A activity and “too big to fail” factor substantiates that banks may pursue M&A activity to exploit safety net benefits associated with “too big to fail” status in the market. The second chapter analyzes the relation between M&A activity of large European banks and their vulnerability to the financial crisis using Merton (1974) based distance to default (DD) and the Z-score ratio as a measure of bankruptcy risk and solvency. The results suggest that a greater focus of samples banks towards acquiring investment banking operations over a time span of 1990-2006 significantly relates to the increase in their risk default (measured by DD) and insolvency (measured by Z-score) during the recent financial crisis. Moreover, relatively limited evidence indicates towards the positive stability effects of the acquisitions performed in the retail banking segment of industry by the sample banks. The third and final essay of this dissertation provides M&A centric evidence on bank deregulation, consolidation, and stability in the U.S. banking industry. We primarily analyze the effects of two significant deregulatory acts of the 1990s that permitted U.S. banks to expand across states (the Riegle-Neal act of 1994) and functions performed (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act of 1999). We employ difference-in-difference approach over M&A activity of U.S. (treatment group) and European (control group) banks over a time span of 1990-2009 in an unbalanced panel setting. We find a significantly positive effect of deregulation in spurring M&A centric consolidation in the U.S. banking industry. However, such effects are not fully reflected in the types of diversification aimed at in the two deregulatory acts. Moreover, we also show that M&A intensity and deregulation jointly cast a negative effect on the stability of U.S. banking industry –thus substantiating “Concentration – Fragility” view over banking.
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Essays on Financial Intermediation and Monetary PolicySetayesh Valipour, Abolfazl 24 August 2022 (has links)
No description available.
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Essays in macroeconomics and international financeCoulibaly, Louphou 06 1900 (has links)
No description available.
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