Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka möjligheten att effektivisera det svenska rättsväsendet med hjälp av ett plea bargain-liknande institut. Plea bargain skulle medföra kortare processer vid brottmål vilket i sin tur medför ett billigare rättssystem och mindre tryck på domstolarna. Kostnaden för en sådan vinning kan vara minskad rättssäkerhet och konflikter med gällande rätt och allmänna principer.

Under senare år har diskussionen om den eventuella användningen av plea bargain och kronvittnen i det svenska rättsystemet aktualiserats genom olika utredningar. Med plea bargain och kronvittnen menas förenklat system där åklagaren kan förhandla med den misstänkte som genom att erkänna brottet eller informera om andras brott kan få en mildare behandling. I utredningarna har diskuterats alltifrån införande av systemen på straffrättsområdet genom fängelsestraffskommitténs utredning från 1986, till mera avgränsade områden för att öka allmänhetens förtroende för det svenska näringslivet genom att få bukt med stora och komplicerade ekobrott och inom konkurrensrätten då eftergiftssystemet för kartelldeltagare skulle införas under början av 2000-talet. Gemensamt för dessa utredningar har varit att man öppnat för en diskussion kring möjligheten att byta information från misstänka mot ett mildare straff, oavsett om detta bestått i strafflindring, åtalsbegränsningar eller eftergift och nedsättning av konkurrensskadeavgifter.

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Três modelos teóricos de negociação entre seguradores e provedores privados são desenvolvidos e seus resultados simulados e analisados. Os modelos procuram captar o que seria o encontro entre um segurador e um provedor vinculados entre si por um contrato de parceria e sentados à mesa para negociarem os preços do seguro-saúde e do bem/serviço médico. Na estrutura dos modelos está presente o problema de agente-principal característico da relação entre os dois atores, dadas as assimetrias informacionais inerentes ao campo da saúde. Tanto o segurador quanto o provedor estão restritos por considerações junto a seus consumidores. O processo de negociação em si baseia-se no modelo de Stackelberg para oligopólios, o que produz dois cenários: num primeiro cenário o líder da negociação é o provedor e num segundo cenário o líder da negociação é o segurador. / Three theoretical models about negotiation between private insurers and providers are developed and their results are simulated and analyzed. The models try to catch what would be a meeting between an insurer and a provider tied each other by an association contract bargaining the health insurance price and the medical good/service price. The main problem is the agent-principal relationship in an environment with asymmetric information. Both agents are restricted by consumer behavior. The basis for the bargain process is the Stackelberg model for oligopolies, which gives two scenes: one with insurer leadership and other with provider leadership.

This thesis explores the experience – experience itself – of the economic crisis in Iceland 2008. This exploration takes its starting point in personal stories that together form a mythic narrative about the crisis in which the causes of the crisis are retroactively invented through the construction of a phantasmagoria. Since the reason for the stories peculiar form – their retroactive invention of the crisis’ causes – cannot be accounted for by the stories themselves, the stories are approached a symptoms of an experience that for some reason is articulated through a myth, rather than with the language of political economy, and this despite the fact that their narrators have experienced the consequences of a collapsed economic system. This thesis attempt to trace and formulate the experience that has given the personal stories illustrated in this thesis their mythic form.

Três modelos teóricos de negociação entre seguradores e provedores privados são desenvolvidos e seus resultados simulados e analisados. Os modelos procuram captar o que seria o encontro entre um segurador e um provedor vinculados entre si por um contrato de parceria e sentados à mesa para negociarem os preços do seguro-saúde e do bem/serviço médico. Na estrutura dos modelos está presente o problema de agente-principal característico da relação entre os dois atores, dadas as assimetrias informacionais inerentes ao campo da saúde. Tanto o segurador quanto o provedor estão restritos por considerações junto a seus consumidores. O processo de negociação em si baseia-se no modelo de Stackelberg para oligopólios, o que produz dois cenários: num primeiro cenário o líder da negociação é o provedor e num segundo cenário o líder da negociação é o segurador. / Three theoretical models about negotiation between private insurers and providers are developed and their results are simulated and analyzed. The models try to catch what would be a meeting between an insurer and a provider tied each other by an association contract bargaining the health insurance price and the medical good/service price. The main problem is the agent-principal relationship in an environment with asymmetric information. Both agents are restricted by consumer behavior. The basis for the bargain process is the Stackelberg model for oligopolies, which gives two scenes: one with insurer leadership and other with provider leadership.

Wide debates over the last 15 years have questioned the impact of global initiatives like the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 and more recently the Grand Bargain 2017 on any real improvements to the development effectiveness agenda. Many also ask to what extent do the initiatives consider the concerns and views of practitioners as stakeholders who implement the objectives and who have valuable experience, contextual insights, specific skill-sets and innovative ideas on how to address complex problems (Sjöstedt 2013). The breadth of literature surrounding the initiatives seems to reflect this, collectively calling for improvements in four common theme areas; greater collaboration, partnership and coordination between actors; instilled mutual accountability and shared responsibility; simplified administrative requirements for implementers; and greater participation and inclusion of stakeholder voices throughout processes. Questions that ask ‘who are the actors and decision-makers?’, and ‘who ought they be?’ can highlight gaps between an ideal situation and the reality, and is characteristic of a Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) approach to analysing sources of influence in a typical system, or in this case, global initiative. Therefore, this paper analyses the voices of aid and development practitioners who are actively working in the sector, and compares their responses to the four themes from the literature. The research was conducted over three (3) months from May to July 2018 and interviewed nineteen (19) participants from a wide variety of development and humanitarian backgrounds and levels. The main findings of the research are summed as follows: Definitions of ‘effectiveness’ vary and depend on underlying political influences  Global initiatives like the Paris Declaration and Grand Bargain have had minimal visible impact on changing systems at the implementation level The role of global initiatives is however still important as forums for promoting discussion, defining boundaries and unifying debates Power imbalances and hierarchies within the development sector are structurally embedded and addressing this is crucial to improving effectiveness Real improvements to the effectiveness agenda require both innovative, participative and evidence-based learning, and systems to accept and address the concerns of implementers

This master's thesis focuses on the subject-matter of agreement on guilt and punishment. It became a part of Czech Criminal Procedure Code by the enactment of Act no. 193/2012 Coll. The plea bargaining, which is widely spread and used in common law countries, served as an inspiration. It should have primarily enhanced the efficiency and speed of the criminal proceedings. It is a type of diversion which is based on a negotiation between the prosecutor and the defendant. The defendant may plea guilty and require a milder punishment in reverse, comparing to a punishment which would have been imposed if a trial took place. The conducted agreement on guilt and punishment has to be subsequently approved by the judge in a form of the approval judgement. The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first one deals with other alternative ways, by which criminal cases may be solved. The influence and potential disruption of basic principles of the criminal procedure caused by the incorporation of agreement on guilt and punishment, is described as well. A short section is dedicated to previous legislative efforts of incorporation the agreement on guilt and punishment into the Czech legal system. The second chapter outlines the contemporary legal regulation of the agreement of guilt and punishment in the...

The aim of this thesis is to explore the localisation agenda in humanitarian aid put forward during the 2016 Grand Bargain. The thesis aims to prove that localisation remains a high level concept with little effective implementation in humanitarian contexts. The concepts of “the local”, decoloniality and localisation provide a theoretical framework for the analysis, while the theories of power and dependency are used to analyse the results of the research.  In order to show that localisation has not been highly effective at the local level, this thesis compares the contexts of Haiti and Bangladesh to the 2016 Grand Bargain commitments and the fifth annual report on the progress of the Grand Bargain. A comparative case study was conducted using desk research to analyse the available data on each Grand Bargain commitment. This research suggests that there has been mixed success in implementing the Grand Bargain commitments in Haiti and Bangladesh. Some commitments, such as increasing the use of cash and joint assessments, have been successful in both contexts, and are consistent with the reported progress by IASC. Several commitments, such as shifting power to affected communities and increasing funding to local and national humanitarian organizations, have seen little progress in either Haiti or Bangladesh. The findings are largely in line with the fifth annual report on the progress of the Grand Bargain commissioned by IASC. Despite this seeming progress on the Grand Bargain commitments, this thesis also explores how the international sphere — including INGOs and donors — have shaped the localisation agenda to be more palatable to the stakeholders who have to give up funding and power to empower local actors.