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In this work, I scrutinize Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic and Callicott&rsquo / s interpretation of it both from normative and meta-ethical perspectives by making textual and conceptual analyses. Leopold suggests that an ethic which makes us responsible for the protection of whole nature is evolutionarily possible and ecologically necessary. Callicott tried to buttress Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic by developing a nonanthropocentric axiology and some meta-principles. Moreover, in his view, Leopold&rsquo / s views are not only compatible with nonanthropocentric axiology but also imply it. I show that Leopold did not build the land ethic on nonanthropocentrism and he did not enforce attribution of intrinsic value to nature and its constituents. I argue that weak anthropocentrism is quite compatible with Leopold&rsquo / s views, and it provides a way to maintain normative power of land ethic without being ecofascistic. Furthermore, I discuss that Leopold might not have objected attribution of intrinsic value to nonhuman beings although he primarily referred to instrumental values of nature. Moreover, I argue that Leopold preferred a middle position between the concepts of preservation and conservation. As a man of practical wisdom Leopold has always tried to find middle and practicable ways between opposing extremes to harmonize human realm with nonhuman one and to grow the embryo of the conservationist movement. Finally, I argue that Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic is a human ethic which requires human moral agents to accept responsibility for protecting whole nature in order to attain good life.

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Dénonçant dès le début de sa carrière une dégradation catastrophique de la fertilité des sols, de la diversité biologique et de la disponibilité de l'eau douce au sud-ouest des États-Unis, Aldo Leopold propose une nouvelle voie originale pour le mouvement de conservation de la nature. Il développe une éthique de la terre qui redonne sa juste part de responsabilité aux propriétaires privés, qui doivent viser un usage de la terre en harmonie avec celle-ci. De ce point de vue, l'éthique de la terre semble tout indiquée pour guider un usage écologique de la terre qu'on cultive. En effet, la terre en usage agricole est à l'intersection de l'humanité et la nature. Toutefois, John Baird Callicott, commentateur et ardent défenseur de la valeur philosophique de l'éthique de la terre de Leopold, a peu traité de la posture de ce dernier sur l'agriculture. Paul B. Thompson accuse non seulement Callicott, mais la plupart des philosophes de l'environnement américains de se désintéresser des questions agricoles, au moins jusqu'à la décennie 1990. Quelle est la source de ce divorce apparent entre l'agriculture et l'éthique environnementale ? Comment l'éthique de la terre de Leopold peut-elle guider un usage des terres qu'on cultive ? En réexaminant les textes de Leopold, sa conception de la terre comme communauté biotique, sa maxime morale de l'éthique de la terre et son idéal du *husbandry*, on voit se dessiner un ensemble de savoirs et de savoir-faire qui construisent une relation riche à la terre. À travers le regard de Leopold, un regard aiguisé par l'immersion dans la communauté biotique, on aperçoit une esquisse d'une agriculture biotique et d'une éthique de la terre qu'on cultive. / Early in his career, Aldo Leopold exposes a catastrophic degradation of soil fertility, biological diversity and freshwater availability in the southwestern United States. Many years later, he suggests a new path forward for the nature conservation movement, a land ethic that hands back their share of responsibilities to private landowners, who must aim for harmony between man and land. In this perspective, a land ethic could be a promising way to guide an ecological use of agricultural land. Indeed, farmland is at the intersection of humanity and nature. However, John Baird Callicott, who passionately advocated the philosophical value of Leopold's land ethic, wrote very little about Leopold's stance on agriculture. Paul B. Thompson accuses not only Callicott, but most American environmental philosophers of showing little to no interest to agricultural issues, at least until de 1990s. How can the apparent chasm between agriculture and environmental ethics be explained? How can Leopold's land ethic guide our use of agricultural land? By re-examining Leopold's texts, his concept of land as a biotic community, the land ethic moral maxim and his ideal of husbandry, we begin to understand how the right knowledge and know-how leads us to a closer and richer relationship to land. Through Leopold's gaze, a gaze sharpened by immersion in the biotic community, we begin to see a sketch of a biotic agriculture and of a land ethic applied to agriculture.

Estimant qu'il est nécessaire de fonder la valeur intrinsèque de la nature et constatant l'insuffisance des pistes tracées par Baird Callicott pour ajuster son axiologie subjective moderne à un cadre de pensée postmoderne, j'entreprends de repenser ses notions de sujet et de valeur intrinsèque afin d'y intégrer non seulement l'invalidation écologique-quantique d'une séparation tranchée entre sujet et objet, mais également des éléments prégnants de la pensée postmoderne :la contextualisation, le constructivisme, et l'aperspectivisme découlant de ces deux traits (la pensée ne peut plus indûment privilégier une perspective particulière). <p>J'utilise pour cela comme outil heuristique la théorie intégrale de Ken Wilber, et mets à profit une série d'analyses et de concepts novateurs inscrits dans une post-métaphysique intégrale, afin de proposer une voie de dépassement au dualisme inhérent à l'axiologie de Callicott et d'équilibrer son approche foncièrement matérielle de l'ontologie morale et du soi relationnel par et au sein d'un holisme intégral (extérieur et intérieur). Celui-ci repose sur la ré-introduction des intériorités du monde :le holisme n'est en effet pas simplement un multiplexe de relations internes entre surfaces matérielles mais également, et nécessairement, le multiplexe des relations intérieures qui co-constituent toute entité, tout holon. <p>Un holon désigne un tout-partie – à la fois entièreté persistante en relation avec d'autres entièretés et partie constituante d'une entièreté plus profonde – qui possède donc intrinsèquement une dimension individuelle et une dimension collective. Celles-ci se doublent de dimensions extérieures (aspects du holon accessibles à l'observation par les sens physiques ou leurs extensions) et intérieures (aspects du holon qui échappent à l'observation matérielle et requièrent, pour leur appréhension, dialogue et interprétation). <p>Je préconise d'intégrer aux notions de sujet et de valeur intrinsèque ces quatre dimensions co-constitutives de tout holon, irréductibles les unes aux autres, et nécessairement impliquées pour tout référent. L'intersubjectivité, littéralement intrinsèque à tout rapport au monde comme à tout référent, en elle-même irréductible à des composantes matérielles, représente le dépassement des dualismes modernes en même temps que la ré-introduction en propre de l'intériorité inhérente du monde. Atomisme et holisme sont transcendés en une approche intégrale qui réinscrit, en regard des relations internes entre surfaces matérielles, les relations intérieures qui les agencent. Par le biais de la théorie intégrale de Wilber, je propose donc de réconcilier l'axiologie de Callicott et sa théorie de la valeur intrinsèque de la nature avec un cadre de pensée postmoderne réhabilitant les intériorités du vivant. <p>--------------- <p>Considering it necessary to articulate and to ground an understanding of the intrinsic value of nature, and finding that Callicott's proposals for adjusting his modern subjective axiology to a postmodern framework fall short on several accounts, I set about to rethink and reexamine his notions of subject and intrinsic value so as to have them integrate not only the ecological-quantic invalidation of the modern subject-object dichotomy but also some prominent features of postmodern thought :contextualism, constructivism, and, following those, aperspectivism (intenability of unduly privileging a single perspective). <p>To this end, I make use of Ken Wilber's Integral Theory as a heuristic tool and take advantage of several innovative analysis and concepts, set in the context of an integral post-metaphysics, in order to suggest a way of transcending the dualism inherent to Callicott's axiology whilst allowing for the fundamentally material conception of his moral ontology and relational self to be balanced by and within an integral holism (exterior and interior). This means re-introducing the world's interiorities :holism isn't simply about a multiplex of internal relations between material surfaces but also, and necessarily, about the multiplex of interior relations that are co-constitutive of any entity, of any holon. <p>A holon designates a whole-part – both a persisting entirety or whole involved in relations with other entities and a constitutive part of deeper wholes – that intrinsically possesses an individual and a collective dimension. These are both further comprised of exterior (aspects of the holon that are accessible to observation by the physical senses or their extensions) and interior (aspects of the holon that evade material observation and require, for their apprehension, a dialogue and interpretation) dimensions. <p>Intersubjectivity, which is literally intrinsic both to any relation with the world and to the co-creation of any referent, and is in itself irreducible to whatever material component, appears as the fundamental overcoming of modernity's dualisms. Concurrently, a holonic understanding of the notions of subject and of intrinsic value is recommended, such that the main constitutive and irreducible dimensions of any holon become foundational to both these notions. Atomism and holism are transcended into an integral approach that acknowledges the interior relations prominent in giving agency and meaning to the various internal relations between material surfaces focused on by Callicott. Through Wilber's Integral Theory, I thus suggest the means of reconciling Callicott's axiology and theory of the intrinsic value of nature with a postmodern framework that rehabilitates life's interiorities. <p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Ever since the environment and nonhumanity became major ethical topics, human-centered worldviews have been blamed for all that is morally wrong about our dealings with nature. Those who consider themselves nonanthropocentrists typically assume that the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies underlie all of the environmental degradations associated with our species. On the other hand, a handful of environmental philosophers argue that anthropocentrism is perfectly acceptable as a foundation for environmental ethics. According to Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis, "If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate policies, a nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as a suitably broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism" (Norton 2004:11). Norton notes that although adherents to either ism may disagree about the relative importance of the various reasons they have for advocating such policies, they nevertheless share an equal commitment to protecting the environment. Because any form of anthropocentrism must fundamentally favor humanity over nonhumanity, nonanthropocentrists are nevertheless concerned that such favoritism is "nothing more than the expression of an irrational bias" (Taylor 1981:215). They reason that only a nonanthropocentric ethic can guarantee that policies do not arbitrarily favor humans when their interests conflict with those of nonhumans. I argue that critics of convergence fail to appreciate that Norton’s hypothesis is limited to ideologies that he deems "reasonable" and "suitably broad and long-sighted," or else they misapprehend what these terms imply. When it comes to ethics, nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or collectivistic axiologies and their associated timescales. The most unreasonable, narrow, and short-sighted ideologies are those that are the most individualistic. It is at the collective end of the continuum that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place. I defend a version of anthropocentrism that I term ecological anthropocentrism.

This thesis aims to contribute to ecocentric views by revising and criticising Callicott&#039 / s conception of environment and ecocentric ethics that he develops in the light of ecology and the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics. The thesis also aims to support the ecocentric point of view by suggesting a different approach to the conception of environment in the light of the Existential Interpretation.

Dans ce mémoire, nous étudierons la place que devrait occuper en éthique environnementale, la notion de valeur intrinsèque de la nature, et nous critiquerons l’approche pragmatique qui rejette cette dernière. Pour Bryan G. Norton, l’un des pères du pragmatisme en éthique environnementale, la notion de valeur intrinsèque est un frein à la mise en place de politiques publiques en environnement. Nous défendrons, au contraire, l’idée que cette notion peut jouer un rôle essentiel en éthique environnementale en servant de base commune à l’établissement de politiques pouvant lutter efficacement contre des problématiques mondiales en environnement. Pour ce faire, nous commencerons par présenter l’approche pragmatique et ses critiques des théories de la valeur intrinsèque de la nature. Dans un second temps, nous critiquerons certains aspects du pragmatisme pour montrer que cette approche possède des défauts pouvant être comblés par la notion de valeur intrinsèque. Le caractère inadéquat d’une approche purement pragmatique face à des enjeux mondiaux en environnement ayant été établi, nous articulerons finalement la notion de valeur intrinsèque de la nature telle que la conçoit J. Baird Callicott. Ce faisant, nous établirons la base métaphysique permettant de soutenir l’existence de ce type de valeur pour les espèces et nous montrerons, grâce à Willis Jenkins, qu’une approche pragmatique peut être compatible avec la notion de valeur intrinsèque de la nature, moyennant certains aménagements. La notion de valeur intrinsèque de la nature peut ainsi jouer un rôle crucial en éthique environnementale et il est de notre devoir de résister aux tentatives de marginalisation la visant. / In this paper, we will study the place that the notion of intrinsic value in nature should take in environmental ethics and we will criticize pragmatism for rejecting the notion of intrinsic value. For Bryan G. Norton, one of the forefathers of environmental pragmatism, the notion of intrinsic value is an obstacle to the establishment of public environmental policies. Contrary to this belief, we will argue that this notion can play an essential part in environmental ethics as a common ground for establishing global politics able to respond to international environmental issues. For this purpose, we will first present the pragmatic approach and its arguments against the use of intrinsic value in nature. On this basis, we will then criticize some aspects of environmental pragmatism in order to show that this position is not flawless and that some shortcomings could be remediated with the use of the notion of intrinsic value in nature. The inadequacy of a purely pragmatic position in regard to global environmental threat having been shown, we will finally present the notion of intrinsic value in nature as conceived by J. Baird Callicott. This presentation will give us the essentials tools to establish the metaphysical foundation of the intrinsic value for species. We will finally show, with the help of Willis Jenkins position, that environmental pragmatism can be compatible with the use of intrinsic value in nature. Intrinsic value in nature can play a crucial role in environmental ethics and we should consequently resist to those who treat this notion as irrelevant.