"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en droit option recherche" / Nous entamons notre étude par l'examen de cinq justifications avancées au soutien de la liberté de religion: la tolérance, la rationalité, l'utilitarisme, le perfectionnisme et la neutralité. Ensuite, nous exposons de façon générale le droit relatif à liberté de religion tel qu'il est mis en oeuvre au Canada. Ces deux étapes préliminaires nous amènent à analyser de façon critique l'interaction entre la liberté de religion et les droits et intérêts des enfants. La thèse générale que nous développons est la suivante: lorsqu'une situation met en présence la liberté de religion ainsi que les droits et intérêts fondamentaux d'un enfant qui n'est pas assez mature et intellectuellement indépendant pour pouvoir faire des choix éclairés, nous sommes d'avis que le test de proportionnalité n'est pas appliqué par la Cour suprême et que généralement, il ne devrait pas l'être. Nous concluons que l'intérêt et les droits fondamentaux de l'enfant ont un poids prépondérant. / First, the author analyses five reasons that may be advanced to justify freedom of religion: tolerance, rationality, utilitarianism, perfectionism and neutrality. Then, the author generally sets out the mechanisms by which freedom of religion is interpreted in Canada. These two preliminary steps lead to a critical analysis of the interaction between freedom of religion and children's rights and interests. The author submits that when a legal situation involves freedom of religion and the fundamental interests or rights of children that are not capable of autonomous choices, the Supreme Court does not apply a proportionality test and, generally, courts should not apply it. The author concludes that the fundamental rights and interests of children are preponderant.

La frontière entre le politique et l'intellectualisme militant est, d'ordinaire, ténue. Tout univers politico-constitutionnel est ainsi susceptible de faire les frais d'un martèlement doctrinal qui, à maints égards, relève davantage du construit que du donné. Résultante directe d'une construction parfois intéressée, le récit identitaire, à force de répétition, s'installera confortablement sur les sièges de l'imaginaire populaire. Il accèdera, au fil du temps, au statut de mythe pur et simple. Ce dernier, politiquement parlant, revêt de puissants effets aphrodisiaques. La présente thèse doctorale s'intéresse plus particulièrement aux mythes créés, depuis 1982, par un segment de la doctrine québécoise : en matière de droits linguistiques, objet principal de notre étude, Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et Cour suprême, toutes deux liguées contre le Québec, combineront leurs efforts afin d'assurer le recul du fait français dans la Belle Province. Quant aux francophones hors Québec, ceux-ci, depuis l'effritement du concept de nation canadienne-française, sont dorénavant exclus de l'équation, expurgés de l'échiquier constitutionnel. En fait, l'adoption d'un nationalisme méthodologique comme nouvelle orthodoxie politique et doctrinale rend ardue, en plusieurs sens, la conciliation de leur existence avec les paradigmes et épistémologie maintenant consacrés. Ainsi, et selon la logique du tiers exclu, une victoire francophone hors Québec signifiera, du fait d'une prétendue symétrie interprétative, un gain pour la communauté anglo-québécoise. Cette thèse vise à discuter de la teneur de diverses allégories établies et, le cas échéant, à reconsidérer la portée réelle de la Charte canadienne en matière linguistique. Il sera alors démontré que plusieurs lieux communs formulés par les milieux intellectuels québécois échouent au moins partiellement, le test de l'analyse factuelle. Celui-ci certifiera de l'exclusion, par la doxa, de toute décision judiciaire ou autre vérité empirique ne pouvant cadrer à même les paramètres, voire les prismes, de l'orthodoxie suggérée. / The boundary between politics and intellectual activism is generally fluid. The whole universe of political-constitutional thought while banging the doctrinal drum is often merely a political construct rather than grounded in fact. Through constant repetition, the Quebecois national identity narrative has established itself firmly in the public’s imagination. Through the years, it has attained the status of an outright myth. Utilized in the political arena, this myth holds tremendous sway. This doctoral thesis focuses on the different myths which have been created since 1982 by writers of a particular branch of Quebec doctrine: language rights, the primary focus of this study, where the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court of Canada are considered to have joined forces to redress the French language’s gains in la Belle Province. Francophones outside Quebec, since the crumbling of the concept of a French Canadian nation, find themselves excluded from the equation and removed from the constitutional chessboard. In fact, the adoption of methodological nationalism as the new political and doctrinal orthodoxy makes it particularly difficult to reconcile the existence of a national identity narrative with the enshrined myths. Thus, and following the logic of the excluded third party theory, a Francophone victory outside of Quebec is considered according to the interpretative symmetry a win for the Quebec Anglophone community. This thesis seeks to question the value of the different established myths, and if applicable, to revaluate the scope of the Canadian Charter with regard to language rights. It will demonstrate that many of the accepted theories by Quebec scholars and doctrinal writers fail, at least partially, a fact-based analytical test. This will confirm that these espoused theories purposely ignore judicial decisions and other empirical facts which do not adhere to the suggested orthodoxy.

The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate “only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.” The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”: The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the healing of wounds and the restoration of social harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony were the goals - not punishment. The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional, and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary Aboriginal society. Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice component and concomitant Charter values. This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its reconciliation-mediation strength. This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty.

Nous entamons notre étude par l'examen de cinq justifications avancées au soutien de la liberté de religion: la tolérance, la rationalité, l'utilitarisme, le perfectionnisme et la neutralité. Ensuite, nous exposons de façon générale le droit relatif à liberté de religion tel qu'il est mis en oeuvre au Canada. Ces deux étapes préliminaires nous amènent à analyser de façon critique l'interaction entre la liberté de religion et les droits et intérêts des enfants. La thèse générale que nous développons est la suivante: lorsqu'une situation met en présence la liberté de religion ainsi que les droits et intérêts fondamentaux d'un enfant qui n'est pas assez mature et intellectuellement indépendant pour pouvoir faire des choix éclairés, nous sommes d'avis que le test de proportionnalité n'est pas appliqué par la Cour suprême et que généralement, il ne devrait pas l'être. Nous concluons que l'intérêt et les droits fondamentaux de l'enfant ont un poids prépondérant. / First, the author analyses five reasons that may be advanced to justify freedom of religion: tolerance, rationality, utilitarianism, perfectionism and neutrality. Then, the author generally sets out the mechanisms by which freedom of religion is interpreted in Canada. These two preliminary steps lead to a critical analysis of the interaction between freedom of religion and children's rights and interests. The author submits that when a legal situation involves freedom of religion and the fundamental interests or rights of children that are not capable of autonomous choices, the Supreme Court does not apply a proportionality test and, generally, courts should not apply it. The author concludes that the fundamental rights and interests of children are preponderant. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en droit option recherche"

This dissertation analyses the use of the word “religion” in Canadian law and theorises the consequences of its use for the legal protection of religious movements in Canada. Chapter One establishes the problems of the word “religion” in academic discourse by providing an overview of work in the field of critical religion. This dissertation considers whether the critiques of the term “religion” by scholars working within critical religion are equally relevant when considering the role of religion in human rights law. Chapter Two turns an investigative eye toward Canadian case law using the word “religion”, from Chaput v Romain (1959) to Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (2009). The analysis highlights how the use of “religion” in Canadian law does indeed reflect academic concerns. Chapter Three uses queer theory to speculate the consequences of an unstable concept of religion for the protection of religious freedom, especially as it pertains to new religious movements. Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and drag are applied to theorise the performance of “religion” and its outcomes. Some suggestions for how to proceed conclude the dissertation.

Despite being similarly concerned with the legitimacy of law under conditions of diversity, political and legal theorists currently seem to differ significantly in the role they would reserve for religious reasons in public decision-making processes. Religious arguments that would generally be considered inappropriate if not inadmissible in a courtroom are increasingly viewed as acceptable and even desirable contributions to debate in the political public sphere. The author argues that the existence of this disconnect can be explained by the special challenges that religion poses for constitutional adjudication which in turn should inform our understanding of the judicial decision-making function. Constraints inherent to constitutional courts that make them effective institutions for concrete dispute resolution significantly limit their ability to engage seriously with the normative challenges posed by religious diversity. We should thus properly understand the role of constitutional adjudication as peripheral in matters of public policy that intersect with questions of religious difference. / Graduate

The imminent recognition of an inherent Aboriginal right to selfgovernment signals the beginning of the reversal of a colonization process which threatened the cultural survival of a people. The Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba , hereinafter referred to as the Inquiry, advocates an autonomous Aboriginal criminal justice system as a significant component of this cultural revitalization. This Aboriginal criminal justice system would differ markedly from the conventional system in giving priority to collective rights over conflicting individual rights. The Inquiry rejects the Charter as alien to Aboriginal values and advocates a “tailor-made” Aboriginal charter that would incorporate “only those fundamental freedoms and civil liberties that do not violate the beliefs and paramount collective rights of the Aboriginal peoples.” The conventional justice system’s paramount concern for individual rights is premised on the potential of punishment. The Inquiry’s starkly contrasting paramount emphasis on collective rights is premised on an Aboriginal view of justice which this thesis refers to as the “harmony ethos”: The underlying philosophy in Aboriginal societies in dealing with crime was the resolution of disputes, the healing of wounds and the restoration of social harmony… Atonement and restoration of harmony were the goals - not punishment. The tension between individual and collective rights apparent in the proposal of the Inquiry is the specific focus of this thesis. The colonization process may justify a separate Aboriginal justice system. However, the harmony ethos premise, while appropriate to the mediation-reconciliation communitarian model of justice advocated by the Inquiry, blinds the Inquiry to the additional, and crucially different, adjudicative-rights imperatives of the contemporary Aboriginal society. Actually existing Indianism reveals conflict-generating fault lines in the harmony premise which challenge the sufficiency of the Inquiry’s group-based justice paradigm and indicate a need and desire for an adjudication justice component and concomitant Charter values. This adjudication hiatus in the Inquiry position is a reflection of a similar void in historical Aboriginal justice which challenges the asserted rationale of cultural survival for the paramountcy of collective rights in the contemporary Aboriginal justice system. This historical adjudication hiatus does not preclude a separate Aboriginal justice system, but favours the inclusion of Charter values to strengthen an adjudication cultural foundation which is frail relative to its reconciliation-mediation strength. This thesis is a modest attempt to address the interface between two systems; one mature, but in need of change, the other, fledging and in need of assistance. The Charter provides a ready and flexible framework to join the Aboriginal community both to the larger society and to the unlanded Aboriginal diaspora by principled standards of justice. These fundamental indicia of fairness, recognized by all civilized self-governing units, constitute no significant threat to the cultural survival of the Aboriginal mediation justice heritage, while buttressing its inherent adjudication frailty. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

This dissertation analyses the use of the word “religion” in Canadian law and theorises the consequences of its use for the legal protection of religious movements in Canada. Chapter One establishes the problems of the word “religion” in academic discourse by providing an overview of work in the field of critical religion. This dissertation considers whether the critiques of the term “religion” by scholars working within critical religion are equally relevant when considering the role of religion in human rights law. Chapter Two turns an investigative eye toward Canadian case law using the word “religion”, from Chaput v Romain (1959) to Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (2009). The analysis highlights how the use of “religion” in Canadian law does indeed reflect academic concerns. Chapter Three uses queer theory to speculate the consequences of an unstable concept of religion for the protection of religious freedom, especially as it pertains to new religious movements. Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and drag are applied to theorise the performance of “religion” and its outcomes. Some suggestions for how to proceed conclude the dissertation.

En s’inspirant de l’exemple des défis corporatifs, c’est-à-dire, des initiatives déployées par les sociétés pour rendre le marché de l’emploi plus accessible aux membres de groupes perçus comme marginalisés, ce mémoire cherche à analyser le conflit qui pourrait surgir au Québec entre le droit à la vie privé, protégé notamment par la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels dans le secteur privé et la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et des documents électroniques et le besoin croissant de l’entreprise d’utiliser les données privées de leurs employés pour vendre leurs biens et services. Dans un premier temps, ce mémoire effectue un survol des régimes de protection de la vie privée des pays qui ont le plus influencé le droit québécois et canadien soit l’Europe, les États-Unis et le Royaume Uni en soulignant leur influence sur le régime en vigueur au Québec. Dans un second temps, il soulève les entraves que posent la LPRPS et la LPRPDE à la participation de l’entreprise aux défis corporatifs. Dans un troisième temps, il explore des pistes possibles à la fois interprétatives, législatives et contentieuses afin de rendre ces lois plus accommodantes aux besoins de l’entreprise. / This essay uses the example of Industry Challenges - a technique deployed by companies to promote the hiring and advancement of certain members of society - to explore a conflict that could arise in Quebec between the individual’s right to privacy as protected by An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information In the Private Sector and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act , and that of an organisation to use personal information relating to its workforce to market itself. It briefly reviews privacy protection in jurisdictions with the greatest legal influence on Quebec and Canada: the European Union, the United States and the United Kingdom (Chapter 2). It demonstrates how a blend of these influences is reflected in the Quebec and Canadian approaches to privacy and how existing privacy legislation might prevent a company from effectively and efficiently responding to Industry Challenges (Chapter 3). Finally, the last two chapters respectively explore the interpretive and legislative amendments that could be made to PPIPS and PIPEDA to enable companies to respond to Industry Challenges (Chapter 4) as well as the possible legal action a company could take on the ground that Quebec’s privacy legislation violates its right to express itself commercially under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Chapter 5).

Dans Suresh c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration) (2002), la Cour suprême du Canada en vient à la conclusion que les principes de justice fondamentale prévus à l'm1icle 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés autorisent, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, l'expulsion d'une personne vers la torture. La Cour nous indique que l'identification des principes de justice fondamentale doit se fonder sur une démarche contextuelle et sur un consensus dans la société canadienne. Le fondement factuel dans le raisonnement de la Cour est pourtant inexistant. Elle ne traite ni du contexte en matière d'immigration, ni du contexte en matière de sécurité nationale entourant cette décision. La Cour prescrit un haut degré de retenue pour le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration d'expulser une personne vers la torture. Cette retenue explique en partie le traitement déficient des faits. La Cour conclut qu'il y aurait un consensus dans la société canadienne sur le principe de justice fondamentale qui autorise l'expulsion d'une personne vers la torture sans fournir la preuve de ce fait social. L'absence de traitement des faits et de la preuve affecte la légitimité – la force persuasive - de la décision de la Cour suprême dans Suresh. / In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), the Supreme Court of Canada concludes that the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom allow, in exceptional circumstances, to deport a person facing a risk of torture. The Court writes that principles of fundamental justice must be determined by a contextual approach and based on a significant societal consensus. There is however no factual basis in the Court's reasoning. There is no discussion of the immigration context or the national security context surrounding this decision. The Court chooses a highly deferencial standard of review for the judicial review in administrative law of the Citizenship and Immigration Minister's decision to deport a person facing a risk of torture. This choice partly explains the deficient treatment of facts in the Court's decision. The Court concludes that there is a societal consensus on the principles of fundamental justice allowing deportation of a person facing a risk of torture without providing any evidence of this societal facto The absence of a proper examination of the facts and the evidence at the basis of conclusions in Suresh, reduces the legitimacy – the persuasiveness – of the Court's decision.