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41	L'intervention du Conseil de sécurité en matière de sécurité maritime. / Security Council intervention in maritime security Minko Mi Nze, Igor Kevin 17 December 2018 (has links) Les espaces maritimes font l’objet de nombreuses atteintes qui mettent en péril leur sécurité. Les faits illicites des États d’une part, et l’accroissement de la criminalité d’autre part, sont de nature à faire peser des risques dommageables importants pour la sécurité de la navigation, du milieu marin et des utilisateurs de la mer. Le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, qui n’a pas en principe pour vocation la protection de la sécurité maritime, est régulièrement mis en oeuvre par le Conseil de sécurité en mer au cours de ses missions de maintien de la paix. A cet effet, il arrive parfois qu’il participe indirectement par ricochet à la protection des espaces maritimes contre les faits illicites des États à cette occasion. Au cours de cette dernière décennie le Conseil de sécurité utilise également le Chapitre VII pour directement protéger les espaces maritimes contre les actes de criminalité qui s’y produisent. Il se dégage ainsi une pratique ambivalente du Conseil de sécurité de mise à disposition du Chapitre VII au service de la sécurité maritime qui est révélatrice d’une contribution du droit de la sécurité collective à la consolidation du droit de la mer. / Maritime areas are subject to many violations that represent real threats to them. Wrongful Acts of States on the one hand, and the increasing number of crimes on the other hand, contribute to endanger the safety of the navigational system, but also of the marine environment and of the sea users. Although, its main purpose is not to take care of the maritime security, the Chapter VII from the Charter of the United Nations is often used by the Security Council, when they implement peace-keeping missions.Therefore, it can sometimes indirectly participate and protect maritime areas from the wrongful acts committed by some States. During the last ten years, the Security Council has also resorted to Chapter VII in order to protect the maritime areas from the criminal acts that take place there. The impression which emerges from this is that of an ambivalent policy, which is indicative of the collective security’s contribution to the Law of the Sea. Sécurité maritime Sécurité collective Droit de la mer Fait illicite de l'État Due diligence Trafic illicite de migrants Traite des êtres humains Piraterie maritime Régionalisation Maritime security Collective security Law of the sea Wrongful act of a state Due diligence Smuggling of migrants Trafficking in persons Maritime piracy Regionalization 341.45
42	Collective Security and Coalition: British Grand Strategy, 1783-1797 Jarrett, Nathaniel 05 1900 (has links) On 1 February 1793, the National Convention of Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands, expanding the list of France's enemies in the War of the First Coalition. Although British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger had predicted fifteen years of peace one year earlier, the French declaration of war initiated nearly a quarter century of war between Britain and France with only a brief respite during the Peace of Amiens. Britain entered the war amid both a nadir in British diplomacy and internal political divisions over the direction of British foreign policy. After becoming prime minister in 1783 in the aftermath of the War of American Independence, Pitt pursued financial and naval reform to recover British strength and cautious interventionism to end Britain's diplomatic isolation in Europe. He hoped to create a collective security system based on the principles of the territorial status quo, trade agreements, neutral rights, and resolution of diplomatic disputes through mediation - armed mediation if necessary. While his domestic measures largely met with success, Pitt's foreign policy suffered from a paucity of like-minded allies, contradictions between traditional hostility to France and emergent opposition to Russian expansion, Britain's limited ability to project power on the continent, and the even more limited will of Parliament to support such interventionism. Nevertheless, Pitt's collective security goal continued to shape British strategy in the War of the First Coalition, and the same challenges continued to plague the British war effort. This led to failure in the war and left the British fighting on alone after the Treaty of Campo Formio secured peace between France and its last continental foe, Austria, on 18 October 1797. Britain Eighteenth Century French Revolution Napoleon War of the First Coalition William Pitt Pitt Grenville Dundas George III Collective Security Coalition War Diplomacy Grand Strategy Strategy Revolution Ochakov Poland Partition military history First Coalition, War of the, 1792-1797
43	“The Best Possible Time for War?” The USS Panay and American Far Eastern Policy During the Roosevelt Presidency Schnurr, Jeremy 13 December 2011 (has links) This thesis examines American Far Eastern policy from the beginning of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency through the early months of 1938. This study is chiefly concerned with the attack by Japanese aircraft on the USS Panay and its effect on the course of U.S. foreign policy. Particular attention is paid to the Anglo-American dialogue which occurred throughout the Far Eastern Crisis. Prior to the end of 1938, the U.S. administration’s position in Asia was dictated both by policies inherited from preceding administrations and by the extreme isolationism of the American people. This foundation effectively inhibited any cooperation with foreign powers. Relying on a reactive policy in the Far East, Washington remained aloof from entanglement as the President sought a plan which would permit U.S. involvement without inviting isolationist wrath. This paper traces an evolution in American Far Eastern policy, highlighting the Panay incident as a distinctly identifiable turning point whereby isolationism gave way to internationalism. Panay Roosevelt FDR Ladybird Far East Inter-War Anglo-American Inter-War 1937 Ludlow American Asia East Asia Policy Disarmament Washington Conference Brussels Conference London Conference isolationism internationalism Far Eastern Crisis Cordell Hull Sumner Welles Franklin Roosevelt Collective Security Norman Alley Open Door Nine-Power Nine Power 1930s Manny Koginos Hamilton Perry Galen Perras Norman Davis pre-war Yangtze U.S. Navy Ingersoll Neutrality Foreign Policy
44	“The Best Possible Time for War?” The USS Panay and American Far Eastern Policy During the Roosevelt Presidency Schnurr, Jeremy 13 December 2011 (has links) This thesis examines American Far Eastern policy from the beginning of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency through the early months of 1938. This study is chiefly concerned with the attack by Japanese aircraft on the USS Panay and its effect on the course of U.S. foreign policy. Particular attention is paid to the Anglo-American dialogue which occurred throughout the Far Eastern Crisis. Prior to the end of 1938, the U.S. administration’s position in Asia was dictated both by policies inherited from preceding administrations and by the extreme isolationism of the American people. This foundation effectively inhibited any cooperation with foreign powers. Relying on a reactive policy in the Far East, Washington remained aloof from entanglement as the President sought a plan which would permit U.S. involvement without inviting isolationist wrath. This paper traces an evolution in American Far Eastern policy, highlighting the Panay incident as a distinctly identifiable turning point whereby isolationism gave way to internationalism. Panay Roosevelt FDR Ladybird Far East Inter-War Anglo-American Inter-War 1937 Ludlow American Asia East Asia Policy Disarmament Washington Conference Brussels Conference London Conference isolationism internationalism Far Eastern Crisis Cordell Hull Sumner Welles Franklin Roosevelt Collective Security Norman Alley Open Door Nine-Power Nine Power 1930s Manny Koginos Hamilton Perry Galen Perras Norman Davis pre-war Yangtze U.S. Navy Ingersoll Neutrality Foreign Policy
45	“The Best Possible Time for War?” The USS Panay and American Far Eastern Policy During the Roosevelt Presidency Schnurr, Jeremy 13 December 2011 (has links) This thesis examines American Far Eastern policy from the beginning of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency through the early months of 1938. This study is chiefly concerned with the attack by Japanese aircraft on the USS Panay and its effect on the course of U.S. foreign policy. Particular attention is paid to the Anglo-American dialogue which occurred throughout the Far Eastern Crisis. Prior to the end of 1938, the U.S. administration’s position in Asia was dictated both by policies inherited from preceding administrations and by the extreme isolationism of the American people. This foundation effectively inhibited any cooperation with foreign powers. Relying on a reactive policy in the Far East, Washington remained aloof from entanglement as the President sought a plan which would permit U.S. involvement without inviting isolationist wrath. This paper traces an evolution in American Far Eastern policy, highlighting the Panay incident as a distinctly identifiable turning point whereby isolationism gave way to internationalism. Panay Roosevelt FDR Ladybird Far East Inter-War Anglo-American Inter-War 1937 Ludlow American Asia East Asia Policy Disarmament Washington Conference Brussels Conference London Conference isolationism internationalism Far Eastern Crisis Cordell Hull Sumner Welles Franklin Roosevelt Collective Security Norman Alley Open Door Nine-Power Nine Power 1930s Manny Koginos Hamilton Perry Galen Perras Norman Davis pre-war Yangtze U.S. Navy Ingersoll Neutrality Foreign Policy
46	“The Best Possible Time for War?” The USS Panay and American Far Eastern Policy During the Roosevelt Presidency Schnurr, Jeremy January 2012 (has links) This thesis examines American Far Eastern policy from the beginning of the Franklin Roosevelt presidency through the early months of 1938. This study is chiefly concerned with the attack by Japanese aircraft on the USS Panay and its effect on the course of U.S. foreign policy. Particular attention is paid to the Anglo-American dialogue which occurred throughout the Far Eastern Crisis. Prior to the end of 1938, the U.S. administration’s position in Asia was dictated both by policies inherited from preceding administrations and by the extreme isolationism of the American people. This foundation effectively inhibited any cooperation with foreign powers. Relying on a reactive policy in the Far East, Washington remained aloof from entanglement as the President sought a plan which would permit U.S. involvement without inviting isolationist wrath. This paper traces an evolution in American Far Eastern policy, highlighting the Panay incident as a distinctly identifiable turning point whereby isolationism gave way to internationalism. Panay Roosevelt FDR Ladybird Far East Inter-War Anglo-American Inter-War 1937 Ludlow American Asia East Asia Policy Disarmament Washington Conference Brussels Conference London Conference isolationism internationalism Far Eastern Crisis Cordell Hull Sumner Welles Franklin Roosevelt Collective Security Norman Alley Open Door Nine-Power Nine Power 1930s Manny Koginos Hamilton Perry Galen Perras Norman Davis pre-war Yangtze U.S. Navy Ingersoll Neutrality Foreign Policy

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