This study is to research the ¡§Corruption Prevention and Profits Promotion of Corporate Governance in our country¡¨. Recently, companies have encountered the corporate governance problems globally and indicate that corporate governance have not been fulfilled exactly. It not only failed to maximize the profit of shareholders and stakeholders, and even worse, unable to make the investment money get back. Furthermore, it will also cause bad effects that associate with the social instability and weaken the economic development. In view of the reasons that contribute to the occurrence of company scandals, most of people will think it¡¦s due to lack of monitoring and supervision of companies. But this should be merely the direct reasons. Apart form this, it has to be added with indirect causes of inability of company strategy leadership and cause financial problems to occur consequently. It¡¦s obvious that monitoring with corruption prevention and leadership work to profit promotion are two essential features of corporate governance. In the aspect of monitoring system enhancement, this paper has investigated the current supervision problems of corporate governance and provided improvement suggestions accordingly. To the issue of evaluating these two systems regarding independent directors and existing supervisors, several fundamental but important points have been reviewed and recommendations have been provided. In consideration of increasing leadership management performance and building a multi-purposes board, we recommend taking British mode of a balancing board as a good reference example. It¡¦s recommended that both characteristics of independent monitoring and excellent ability of promoting company¡¦s profit should be taken into account simultaneously when choosing directors. It¡¦s expected that the board can fulfill the duties of monitoring the company efficiently and playing the role as excellent navigator successfully to lead the company going forward continuously. It¡¦s all wish that owing to these dual functions have been stressed and developed; it can bring a new era to our corporate governance.

Abstract The "System of Mediation", which plays an important role in autonomy is a judiciary alternative for the purpose of seeking a practical and prompt solution to disputes among people. In conformity with sensible and fair practices, its function can be marked by providing multiple choice of feasible arrangement over emotionally unpleasant behavior and misdeeds so that advice will be put into use and favorable negotiation can be reached by those who are involved. To have the best of both worlds will give free reign to the nature of mediation. In this monographic study, there are separate descriptions of arbitrated occurrences concerning districts of county and town along with comparative research about arbitral structure between domestic organization and foreign countries. Related complementary assignments are also mentioned in this paper, such as the qualification, ways of election and procedure of appointment of arbitral committee in autonomous districts. Improvement is also taken into consideration with a view to the optimizing of the arbitral system. Findings of study: (1) Superfluous arbitral staff results in unsuccessful mediation. (2) Dubiety exists in the failed arbitral certificates. (3) The identity, rights and obligations of committee members aren't guaranteed specirically. Suggestions: (1) Professional expertise and deliberation should be the critical requirements for the election of mediatory committee and secretary. (2) Appropriate reward or extra compensation should be paid to the arbitral committee as they are qualified public officials. (3) Skilled mediator should be exclusively responsible for the task of mediation. (4) Advance in juristic knowledge and training for the arbitral committee and reliable secretary involved are required to bring about a available agreement. (5) Reform in the operation of arbitral organization may promise better service for the public.

I conduct experiments to investigate how episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an auditor or a manager affects audit committee members' judgment in supporting the auditor in a disagreement with management. This paper sheds light on the advantage of first-hand accounting-related experience in the important oversight task. It also brings to bear the potential benefit from direct manager experience as claimed by researchers and regulators. I find that the episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an auditor, especially the experience of having been a diligent auditor, strengthens the degree of auditor support of participants in the role of an audit committee member. By contrast, the effect of episodic knowledge from first-hand experience as a manager on the likelihood of auditor support varies with the manager type. While the episodic knowledge acquired from direct experience as an aggressive manager augments the level of auditor support, such knowledge attained by prior experience as a conservative manager has no significant effect.

<p>In order to have some say and to scrutinise the government all member states of the EU today has established an institution within their national parliaments, the Committee of European Affairs. This institution, however, has very different rights and regulations depending on the country it is established in. This study uses two rather similar countries, Sweden and Denmark, and investigates what differences and similarities the two committees show.</p><p>By constructing a comparative case study of four units of analysis, the governments and committees of European Affairs in Sweden and Denmark, the formal and informal power relationship between government and committee in each country were studied in order to determine similarities and differences and whether the committee had an impact on the governments’ EU policies. Further they were compared, assessing whether the Danish Committee of European Affairs was more powerful than its Swedish counterpart because of its legal basis in an EU document.</p><p>The theoretical framework was built on empirical institutionalism and Lukes’ first and second dimension of power. The similarities and differences were accounted for and compared. In conclusion, the Danish Committee of European Affairs has more formal power than its Swedish counterpart but regarding informal power the Swedish Committee of European Affairs has a slight advantage. Both committees have an impact on the way their government handle negotiations with the EU.</p><p>Keywords: formal power, informal power, the Committee of European Affairs, Sweden, Denmark</p>

<p><strong>Författare:                   </strong>Marcus Davidsson, Camilla Johansson och Johanna Nilsson</p><p><strong>Handledare:                 </strong>Ola Nilsson</p><p><strong>Titel:                             </strong>Hur hanterar företagen kravet på revisionsutskott? – <em>en studie av fem svenska börsföretag</em></p><p><strong>Bakgrund:                   </strong>Under sommaren 2008 blev Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning obligatorisk för samtliga svenska företag som är noterade på den svenska börsen. Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning stadgar bland annat att företagens styrelser skall inrätta ett revisionsutskott. Företagen kan dock välja att inte inrätta ett revisionsutskott och då förklara varför, enligt principen ”följ eller förklara”.</p><p><strong>Syfte:                            </strong>Syftet med studien är att öka kunskapen kring hur företag hanterar Svensk kod för bolagsstyrnings krav kring revisionsutskott samt vilken nytta revisionsutskottet upplevs tillföra i styrelsearbetet.</p><p><strong>Metod:                          </strong>En kvalitativ intervjustudie har genomförts. Studien omfattade fem styrelseledamöter från fem börsnoterade företag på OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm.</p><p><strong>Slutsats:                        </strong>Studien visar att fyra av de fem företagen som ingått i studien har valt att inrätta revisionsutskott. Majoriteten av dessa har inrättat revisionsutskotten som ett resultat av strävan att följa Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Vidare har studien visat att styrelserna har satt samman revisionsutskott på olika sätt, både vad gäller ekonomisk kompetens och oberoende. Merparten av företagen i studien ställer höga krav på vad revisionsutskotten skall utföra för uppgifter och upplever att utskotten tillför nytta i styrelsearbetet.</p>

Thesis (M.A.)--Boise State University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-108).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Konstanz, 2001.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, November, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

In 2004, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) issued a paper that defined internal auditors’ role in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as a role that relates to measuring and monitoring performance. The present study examines how high internal audit involvement in ERM-related activities and a strong relationship between internal auditors and senior management influence internal auditors’ objectivity and independence. The present study replicates the experimental design used by de Zwaan, Stewart and Subramaniam (2011) with the manipulation of the variables of (i) internal audit’s involvement in ERM and (ii) the strength of the relationship between internal audit and senior management. Similarly to de Zwaan et al. (2011), objectivity and independence are measured by examining internal audit’s willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures to the audit committee. The results show that internal auditors are somewhat influenced by a high involvement in ERM-related activities when reporting a breakdown in risk procedures and that internal auditors consider the guidelines issued by the IIA important to follow. Further, the results do not indicate that a strong relationship between internal auditors and senior management influences internal audit’s willingness to report a breakdown in risk procedures.

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