Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [205]-211).

<p>Upravljanje promenama u projektu je nova i specijalizovana menadžment disciplina koja je malo izučavana u svetu a posebno u na&scaron;oj zemlji. Predmet izučavanja ove discipline jeste upravljanje složenim naučnim, tehničkim, građevinskim, energetskim, finansijskim i organizacionim projektima koji se realizuju u okolini podložnoj uticaju velikih i brzih promena. Teži&scaron;te rada je usmereno na definisanje koncepta upravljanja promenama, koje mogu biti rezultat uticaja iz okruženja ili promena na samom projektu tokom njegove realizacije. Osnovni cilj upravljanja projektom jeste efikasna realizacija projekta u planiranom vremenu i sa planiranim tro&scaron;kovima u uslovima značajnih eksternih i internih promena. Upravljanje promenama na projektu podrazumeva definisanje takve organizacuione forme koja će omogućiti blagovremeno uočavanje i klasifikaciju relevantnih promena koje mogu nastati u projektu, primenom raspoloživih metoda i resursa u ostvarivanju osnovnih ciljeva projekta. Uzroci promena u projektu proizilaze iz neravnoteže između projekta i okoline ili neravnoteže unutar samog projekta. Upravljanje promenama u projektu odvija se kroz pocese planiranja, uvodjenja i kontrole. U radu je prikazan jedinstven model za upravljanje promenama u projektu koji se uz manje korekcije može primeniti u realizaciji ma kog projekta. Posebnost rada ogleda se u prikazu promena koje su u toku ili koje mogu nastati tokom restruktuiranja elektroprivrednog sistema Srbije.</p> / <p>Change management in project is a new and specialized management discipline that have been studied a little in the world, particularly in our country. The subject of research of this discipline is managing of a complex scientific, technical, civil engineering, energy, financial and organizational projects that are realized in the surrounding liable to the influence of a big and fast changes. The centre of work is directed towards the defining of concept of change management, that can be the result of the surrounding influence or the changes of the project during its realization. The basic aim of project management is an effective project realization in the planned time and expences in the conditions of important external and internal changes. Change management on the project means defining of such organizational form that provides timely observation and classification of relevat change that can appear in the project, applying the avaible methods and resource in the realization of the basic project aims. The causes of project changes appears from the disbalance between the project and surrounding or disbalance in the project itself. Change project management have been done through the processes of planning, introducting and control. The unique model for change management in project is presented in the paper that can be applied with a little changes in realization of any other project. The individuality office work is prezented in the description of changes that are under way or that can appear during the reconstruction of the power plant system in Serbia.</p>

El objetivo de la presente tesis doctoral consiste, en primer lugar, en investigar si la influencia de los accionistas principales sobre el valor de la empresa se encuentra condicionada por la existencia de conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos, de manera que cuanto más alto sea el beneficio público esperado mayor será la disposición del accionista a asumir los costes derivados de la supervisión. Nuestro segundo objetivo consiste en analizar si en el mercado de capitales español la adquisición de bloques accionariales se encuentra condicionada por el beneficio público que puede derivarse de la supervisión o por la ventaja informativa que poseen los adquirentes, que pondría de manifiesto la necesidad de la aplicación estricta de los códigos de conducta y de un seguimiento más exhaustivo de las empresas con mayor asimetría informativa. El análisis empírico realizado, utilizando la metodología de datos de panel y la regresión logística, nos permite establecer las siguientes conclusiones. En primer lugar, el carácter supervisor de la propiedad accionarial es más intenso en aquellas empresas en las que el potencial conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos es mayor. Asimismo, la existencia de mecanismos de gobierno alternativos en la empresa, que garanticen la supervisión de las decisiones directivas, resta significatividad a la función de vigilancia que ejercen determinados inversores. Por último, los inversores principales de la empresa tratan de compensar los costes de supervisión mediante transacciones en el mercado de control parcial, de manera que se observa un comportamiento comprador cuando se anticipa una mejora en la gestión empresarial derivada de un incremento en la supervisión y cuando existe una mayor asimetría informativa de manera que pueden beneficiarse de su posición de inversores mejor informados. / The aim of this thesis is, firstly, to analyse if the influence of majority shareholders over company value depends on the existence of conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Therefore, the higher the expected social benefit is, the higher interest of shareholders to assume the costs derived form monitoring. The second aim of this study is to analyse if the purchase of share blocks in the Spanish capital market is motivated by the value creation derived from monitoring, or by the informative advantage of the acquirers and insider trading, which would highlight the need of an strict application of Governance Codes and vigilance of firms with asymmetric information. The empirical analysis is accomplished using panel data methodology and a logistic regression. Our empirical analysis allow us to conclude that the supervisory role of ownership is more intense in firms where the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is greater, and therefore the value of the firm can be increased through a specific composition of its shareholders. Moreover, the existence of alternative governance mechanisms, that guarantee managerial decisions monitoring, reduce the importance of the investor's supervision role. Lastly, we observe a purchase behaviour when an improvement in managerial running is foreseen as a consequence of the supervision, and when there is more asymmetric information and therefore the acquirers can benefit from their position of better informed investors.

本文主要探討公司治理體系下控制權市場所發揮之功能，內容大致上分為四個部分。第一部分先就公司治理理論以及不同體系加以介紹，從Ronald H. Coase交易成本理論、Berle & Means五種公司類型，以及代理理論說明公司治理的理論基礎，再分別介紹OECD以及World Bank的公司治理架構，而控制權市場則是公司治理體系下，外部治理機制的一項重要工具，最後就美國、日本與我國的公司治理體系加以介紹。 第二部分則是說明企業併購促使控制權市場發揮治理成效之主要活動，因此，分別就美國、日本與我國企業併購之概況加以闡述。美國歷經了五次併購風潮，有其經濟、文化等結構性因素，而日本與我國過去並未發生併購風潮，然而隨著結構性因素的改變，再加上全球化的浪潮，日本與我國併購活動有逐漸加溫之趨勢。 視敵意併購為控制權市場之主要利器，這是因為企業雖然有可能因為善意併購後，改善效率進而增加股東權益，有助於公司治理，但敵意併購活動更兼具威嚇現任經營者之效果，因此，敵意併購活動於公司治理體系上，一方面可汰換不適任經營者，另一方面亦可對現任經營者造成威嚇使其不敢進行有礙於股東權益之情事。而主併者進行敵意併購，主要可行的途徑有二：一為收購股權，另一為委託書徵求。就法制面而言，則見諸公開收購以及委託書管理相關規定。 第三部分開始探討敵意併購法制，本文分別介紹了美國、日本以及我國公開收購制度，目前我國已從事先核准制修正為事先申報制，與美國、日本之申報制相近。但對於公開收購定義則大相逕庭，美國採八項要素判斷，日本與我國則加以明確定義。另外股東平等原則部份，美國、日本與我國同採「比例分配制」，關於禁止變更收購條件的範圍，則是美國最寬鬆因此有利於主併者，而日本最嚴格。至於美國州法下的反併購條款在我國與日本並未出現。而關於我國引進強制公開收購制度，本文分別引述支持與反對者之意見，並基於促進併購活動發生有利於公司治理此一面向，說明強制公開收購制度可能之影響。 第四部份探討美國、日本與我國關於委託書徵求相關制度，就資訊公開的內容而言，美國、日本與我國相關規定大同小異，但徵求人資格限制以及徵求股份總數限制為我國獨有，況且因公司派掌握紀念品的製作權以及發放權，加上相關規定使投信事業必須支持符合持股成數之之公司董事會提出之議案或董事、監察人候選人，且又就使用股東名冊的難易程度而言，我國委託書徵求相關規定實對現任經營者較有利。 而關於委託書價購與否之爭論，本文分別就正反兩方之理由加以介紹，後從公司治理之角度出發，認為收購委託書可能使管理者有更多經濟上誘因進行舞弊，有礙於公司治理，故應禁止之。 最後比較公開收購制度與委託書徵求制度二者，分別從所需資金、成本風險控制、實施之便宜性以及公司治理角度，希冀我國未來公開收購制度能善加運用，發揮公司治理之功效。文末並提出相關建議，以供將來之研究或主管機關作為參考。 / This dissertation mainly discusses the role of control market in the framework of corporate governance. It is composed of four parts. The first part introduces relevant theories of corporate governance, including Ronald H. Coase’s “transaction cost theory”, Berle & Means’ “five types of corporation”, and agency theory. Then the diverse frameworks of corporate governance including OECD, World Bank, in which control market is indicated as a significant external mechanism, are illustrated. At last, the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan's frameworks of corporate governance are introduced respectively. The second part explains that the merges & acquisitions (M&A) is one of the major activities that make control market operate effectively. Then the general situations of the M&A in the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Taken as a main mechanism of control market, hostile takeover not only strikes inefficient managers but menaces the incumbent from fraud. Two major feasible approaches of hostile takeover are purchasing stocks and soliciting proxies. The rules of tender offer and proxy contest are relevant. The third part discusses the legal institution of hostile takeover. The rules of tender offer of U.S., Japan, and Taiwan are introduced. Then the similarities and dissimilarities between the rules from the definitions of tender offer, equal treatment to shareholders, and anti-takeover strategies are detailed. At the end of this part, different points of view about mandatory tender offer and its relation with corporate governance are discussed. The fourth part explores (investigates) the rules of proxy contest of the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. They are similar in the disclosure principle, but only Taiwan set limitations on the qualification of solicitors and the amount of proxies. In addition, the incumbent in Taiwan have the control over the manufacturing and delivery of the tokens for shareholders in annual meetings. What’s more, regulations force the institute-investors to support the incumbent. In conclusion, the proxy rules in Taiwan favor the incumbent. Also, the arguments over proxy purchase and its relation with corporate governance is mentioned. At last, this paper compares tender offer with proxy soliciting in several aspects: the fund needed, risk control, convenience, and corporate governance. In the end, the conclusion provides some suggestions for legislators and future studies.