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This diploma thesis is aimed to map the development of the companies that have passed the first wave of voucher privatization from 1991 until 2013. Development of 988 companies has not been yet comprehensively examined. The aim is to determine the ownership structure, including the ability to find majority shareholders. The second part is focused on how many companies has been closed over the past twenty years and method of liquidation. Another finding is that two-fifths of companies have changed the form of shares to the documentary. Finally, the research focuses on delisting of shares from czech capital market. The last part is based on comparison of results of the two waves of voucher privatization and the main findings are very similar.

Development of companies from voucher privatization has not been yet comprehensively examined although this information is necessary to evaluation the process of voucher privatization. This thesis is aimed to map the development of the companies that have passed the second wave of voucher privatization from 1993 until 2010. The aim is to determine the ownership structure of the companies, including the determination of how many of them are still under state control. The second area focuses on the economic performance and on finding of how many companies has been closed over the past period, and the comparison of development across industries. The comparison of economic efficiency is based on the information of the ownership structure depending on the size of the share of the largest shareholder. Finally, the research focuses on the marketability of the shares and delisting, changing the form of shares to the documentary, which was used by almost half of the companies.

Idag förekommer det ett ökat tryck på företag att ta ett socialt ansvar, Corporate social responsibility (CSR). För att företag ska uppfattas som legitima måste de överensstämma med samhällets sociala normer, värderingar och förväntningar, vilket enligt legitimitetsteorin tros vara en stark drivkraft till att företag ökar sin omfattning kring frivilliga CSR-upplysningar. Begreppet CSR är nära relaterat till företagens ansvar i samhället som kan delas in i tre områden ekonomiskt-, miljömässigt- och socialt ansvarstagande. Gamerschlag, Möller och Verbeeten (2011) är några av många forskare som har studera varför tyska företag frivilligt ökar omfattningen på hållbarhetsredovisning i sina offentliga rapporter. Genom en kvantitativ undersökning på svenska börsnoterade företag är syftet att undersöka huruvida olika företagsfaktorer påverkar mängden CSR-upplysningar. För att beräkna mängden CSR-upplysningar har antalet nyckelord i företagens hållbarhetsrapportera räknats. Sambandet för den insamlade datan analyserades med en korrelationsanalys och en multipel regressionsanalys. De oberoende variablerna som undersöktes var lönsamhet, synlighet, ägarstruktur samt kontrollvariablerna storlek och branschtillhörighet. I den multipla regressionsanalysen finner vi ett signifikant positivt samband mellan mängden CSR-upplysningar och företagets synlighet samt ägarstrukturen. Denna studie kan inte tillstyrka att lönsamhet har något samband med mängden CSR-upplysningar. / Today there is an increasing amount of pressure on companies to take more social responsibility, often called Corporate social responsibility (CSR). In order for companies to be considered legitimate, they must comply with society's social norms, values ​​and expectations, which, according to the legitimacy theory, is believed to be a strong driving force for companies to increase their scope for voluntary CSR disclosures. The term CSR is closely related to corporate responsibility in society, which can be divided into three areas of economic, environmental and social responsibility. Gamerschlag, Möller and Verbeeten (2011) are some of the many researchers who have studied why German companies voluntarily increase the scope of sustainability reporting in their public reports. Through a quantitative survey of Swedish publicly traded companies, the purpose of this study is to investigate whether different business determinants affect the amount of CSR information. To calculate the amount of CSR information, the number of keywords in the companies sustainability reports has been counted. All the collected data was analyzed by a correlation analysis and a multiple regression analysis. The independent variables investigated were profitability, visibility, ownership structure, and for control variables the study used size and industrial sector. The multiple regression analysis shows a significant positive correlation between the amount of CSR disclosures and the company's visibility as well as the ownership structure. This study can not assure that profitability is related to the amount of CSR information.

El objetivo de la presente tesis doctoral consiste, en primer lugar, en investigar si la influencia de los accionistas principales sobre el valor de la empresa se encuentra condicionada por la existencia de conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos, de manera que cuanto más alto sea el beneficio público esperado mayor será la disposición del accionista a asumir los costes derivados de la supervisión. Nuestro segundo objetivo consiste en analizar si en el mercado de capitales español la adquisición de bloques accionariales se encuentra condicionada por el beneficio público que puede derivarse de la supervisión o por la ventaja informativa que poseen los adquirentes, que pondría de manifiesto la necesidad de la aplicación estricta de los códigos de conducta y de un seguimiento más exhaustivo de las empresas con mayor asimetría informativa. El análisis empírico realizado, utilizando la metodología de datos de panel y la regresión logística, nos permite establecer las siguientes conclusiones. En primer lugar, el carácter supervisor de la propiedad accionarial es más intenso en aquellas empresas en las que el potencial conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos es mayor. Asimismo, la existencia de mecanismos de gobierno alternativos en la empresa, que garanticen la supervisión de las decisiones directivas, resta significatividad a la función de vigilancia que ejercen determinados inversores. Por último, los inversores principales de la empresa tratan de compensar los costes de supervisión mediante transacciones en el mercado de control parcial, de manera que se observa un comportamiento comprador cuando se anticipa una mejora en la gestión empresarial derivada de un incremento en la supervisión y cuando existe una mayor asimetría informativa de manera que pueden beneficiarse de su posición de inversores mejor informados. / The aim of this thesis is, firstly, to analyse if the influence of majority shareholders over company value depends on the existence of conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Therefore, the higher the expected social benefit is, the higher interest of shareholders to assume the costs derived form monitoring. The second aim of this study is to analyse if the purchase of share blocks in the Spanish capital market is motivated by the value creation derived from monitoring, or by the informative advantage of the acquirers and insider trading, which would highlight the need of an strict application of Governance Codes and vigilance of firms with asymmetric information. The empirical analysis is accomplished using panel data methodology and a logistic regression. Our empirical analysis allow us to conclude that the supervisory role of ownership is more intense in firms where the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is greater, and therefore the value of the firm can be increased through a specific composition of its shareholders. Moreover, the existence of alternative governance mechanisms, that guarantee managerial decisions monitoring, reduce the importance of the investor's supervision role. Lastly, we observe a purchase behaviour when an improvement in managerial running is foreseen as a consequence of the supervision, and when there is more asymmetric information and therefore the acquirers can benefit from their position of better informed investors.

Le pacte d’actionnaires se place dans une forme de dépendance unilatérale au contrat de société qui n’est pas sans rappeler le rapport juridique d’accessoire à principal.En effet, s’il est fondamentalement distinct du contrat de société qu’il complète, tout pacte conclu par certains actionnaires, en dehors des statuts, afin d’organiser leurs relations interindividuelles d’actionnaires, trouve nécessairement sa matière et puise sa raison d’être dans le pacte social. Ainsi, la dépendance du pacte au contrat de société se manifeste-t-elle, de la manière la plus évidente, par la caducité qu’entraîne pour le pacte l’arrivée du terme du contrat de société ou la perte de la qualité d’actionnaire d’un partenaire.Dès lors, par analogie avec la règle selon laquelle l’accessoire a vocation à suivre le sort du principal, cette dimension d’accessoire du contrat de société justifie que le pacte subisse l’influence du cadre juridique auquel le contrat de société est lui-même soumis, à savoir le droit des sociétés et, en particulier, l’ordre public sociétaire.Cette dépendance au contrat de société, par essence commune à tous les pactes d’actionnaires en raison de leur objet matériel et de leur cause, est à géométrie variable. Elle repose en effet sur divers facteurs de rattachement au contrat de société que sont l’exercice du droit de vote, la détention des actions ou la qualité d’actionnaire des partenaires, lesquels impriment, selon qu’ils s’immiscent plus ou moins profondément dans le fondement, la structure ou encore le fonctionnement de la société, différents degrés de dépendance dans la relation pacte - contrat de société.Malgré l’hétérogénéité du régime des pactes d’actionnaires, il est alors possible de dégager,à l’aune de cette dimension d’accessoire, une tendance fondamentale qui anime, en droit positif, la jurisprudence relative aux pactes. Cette ligne directrice réside dans la variabilité du degré d’emprise des règles qui encadrent le contrat de société sur le régime des pactes d’actionnaires.La jurisprudence se révèle être, en effet, d’une manière générale et par-delà la casuistique, en cohérence avec cette influence proportionnelle de l’environnement sociétaire à l’intensité du degré de dépendance que présente chaque type de pacte en fonction du facteur qui le rattache au contrat de société. Les pactes caractérisés par une dépendance marquée au contrat de société bénéficient ainsi d’une marge de liberté à la mesure de celle dont bénéficie le contrat de société pour l’aménagement de l’exercice du droit de vote ou de la perte de la qualité d’actionnaire. Au contraire, les pactes caractérisés par une dépendance modérée au contrat de société, qui organisent des cessions ou des acquisitions d’actions,sont plus largement libérés des contraintes auxquelles est soumis le contrat de société au regard du principe de libre négociabilité des actions. Quant à l’influence sur les pactes de certains autres principes d’ordre public sociétaire, tels que la prohibition des clauses léonines ou l’expertise de l’article 1843-4 du Code civil, elle demeure incertaine en droit positif. Toutefois, la jurisprudence tend à reconnaître le particularisme de ces règles et à leur retirer, en conséquence, tout caractère impératif en dehors du cadre des relations entretenues collectivement par les actionnaires avec la société. / Shareholders’ agreement falls into a form of unilateral dependence to the companyagreement that is reminiscent of the legal relationship between the incidental and itsprincipal.Indeed, although it is fundamentally separate from the company agreement, which itsupplements, any agreement concluded by certain shareholders apart from the articles ofassociation, in order to organise their inter-individual shareholders relationships, is,nevertheless, necessarily based on and permitted by the company agreement. Thus, thecontractual dependency of the shareholders’ agreement to the company agreementmanifests itself, in the most obvious way, through the obsoleteness of the shareholders’agreement caused by the termination of the company agreement or by the loss ofshareholder status by a partner.Therefore, by analogy with the rule according to which the incidental is inclined to yield to theprincipal, such kinship to the quality of accessory to the company agreement justifies the factthat the shareholders’ agreement would be under the influence of the legal framework towhich the company’s memorandum and articles of association are submitted, that is to saycorporate law and, in particular, corporate law and order.This dependence to the company agreement, which is in essence common to allshareholders’ agreements due to their material object and cause, turns out to be flexible. Itrests indeed on different connecting factors to the company agreement, such as using thevoting right, shareholding or shareholder status of partners, which imprint, according to howdeep they work into the company foundation, structure or functioning, different degrees ofdependence in the relationship between the shareholders’ agreement and the companyagreement.In spite of the heterogenic regime of the shareholders’ agreements, it is possible to outline, inrespect to this type of accessory status to the company agreement, a crucial tendency thatleads, in positive law, agreements-related case law. This guideline lies in the variability of thehold on shareholders’ agreements regime by the rules that frame the company’smemorandum and articles of association.Indeed, case law proves to be, generally speaking and beyond casuistry, consistentwith this proportional influence of the company environment to the degree of dependenceeach type of shareholders’ agreement is subject to, according to the factor connecting it tothe company agreement. The shareholders’ agreements that show a strong dependence tothe company agreement are given a leeway commensurate with the one the company’smemorandum and articles of association benefit from regarding voting right or loss ofshareholder status arrangements. By contrast, the moderately dependant shareholders’agreements, organising transfer or acquisition of shares, are more widely released from therestrictions that govern the company’s articles of association regarding the principle of freetransferability of shares. Furthermore, the influence on shareholders’ agreements of someother principles of corporate law and order, such as the leonine clause prohibition or theexpertise of Article 1843-4 of the French Civil Code, remain uncertain in positive law.However, case law tends to recognize the distinctive identity of these rules and,consequently, to clear them from any imperative property beyond the frame of therelationships that the shareholders have collectively with the company.