This thesis examines the transition to democracy in South Africa through the use of case study methodology. The nature of political participation and the form of democracy to emerge at the end of the transition process are the central subjects of inquiry. They are examined through an in-depth study of the African community of Kwazakele, a township in the Nelson Mandela metropolitan area in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. The study covers the period from 1993 to 2000, and uses as a primary data source five surveys conducted among residents of Kwazakele during that period. The emphasis of the study lies on the experience of political participation of ‘ordinary people’ – in particular, the African urban working-class in South Africa who make up the core support base for the governing African National Congress. The primary findings of the thesis are as follows: * Representative democracy has been successfully consolidated in the community under study. * Levels of political participation by urban Africans in the Eastern Cape are consistently high, both in formal political institutions (primarily elections) and in institutions of civil society. * As politics has normalised at the end of the transition period, forms of direct democratic participation have declined. * Despite the structural constraints on development, there is still potential for a high level of participation by citizens in effecting change at local level. * Drawing on the experience of ordinary people in structures of direct democracy, this level of participation can result in a deeper and stronger form of democracy than exists in many established representative democracies.

Two of the post apartheid elections held in South Africa (1994, 1999) have been used as mechanisms to analyse and assess the extent to which the country’s transition from apartheid to a democratic dispensation is succeeding or not. The primary analytical focus of the 1994 and 1999 elections has revolved around the nature of the party system and voting behaviour. Basically, contestation has arisen over two primary and related issues: the dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) weighed against the weakness of opposition parties and the implications that this development has for effective democratic consolidation. Also, whether voting decisions based on divisive racial and ethnic identities that underlie electoral contests are pervasive enough to derail the process of democratisation. Generally, the primary conclusion has been that the unfolding pattern of South African electoral politics indicates sufficient grounds on which to doubt the prospects for effective democratic consolidation. This dissertation engages these debates with particular reference to the 2004 elections. In contrast to this pessimistic view of the prospects of successful democratisation in South Africa it upholds through an analysis of the 2004 elections the view that there is insufficient empirical evidence, to conclude that South Africa’s democratisation process is imperiled. It maintains that although there are problems related to the to the nature of the party system and some elements of voting behaviour there is enough countervailing evidence revealed by the 2004 election results that this does not present a substantially serious threat to the prospects of South Africa attaining a democratic society.

The author explores the traditional approaches to interpretation in a constitutional democracy, with specific emphasis on Bill of Rights interpretation. The approaches adopted by the court in India and Canada, are briefly outlined with a view to gleaning from the experience of these countries, a theory which will inform a proper approach to interpretation in a South African context. He concludes that the value-based approach is most appropriate to concretise the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, and specifically the so-called second and third generation rights. Addressing the fear that this may lead to an undisciplined judiciary, he concludes that there are sufficient disciplinning mechanisms to ensure that the courts do not encroach upon the other branches of government. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Almost fifteen years after democracy, issues of 'race' still hold daily South African life firmly in its grip. Following calls from foremost South African theorists on 'race', such as Sarah Nuttall, this thesis moves beyond a study of crude 'racism', to the more complex consideration of 'race' as an embedded ideological social formation within the spatial context of Rhodes University. Using analytical concepts such as 'silencing' and 'ritual' the thesis weaves an understanding (1) of how particular powerful representations of institutional history are produced and made dominant, and (2) how seemingly innocuous performances of institutional identity are key to reproducing 'racial' dominance within Rhodes' student life. This ultimately manifests in the production of a deeply 'racialized' commonsensical understanding of the 'most' legitimate and authentic representation and ownership of institutional space. The thesis delves into dominant representations of Rhodes University'S history, considering how these help produce and reproduce 'racial' dominance through, for instance, the production of defining apolitical narratives of 'excellence'. Central to the dominant apolitical institutional history is the production of silences about the past. History, I argue, is less compelling in any revelation of 'what happened' than in illustrating the production of silences used to enable the appropriation of a particular history as the sole relevant history. The 'inheritors of the past', those who are able to lay authoritative and representative claim to it, it is argued, ultimately claim ownership over institutional space. I argue too, that the dominant practices and performances of daily institutional life (re)produce the institutional space as a space of 'racial' dominance. Ritualized performance of the dominant institutional identity produces ownership of institutional space through making some articulations of 'Rhodes identity' more acceptable, legitimate and authentic than others. The dominance of 'drinking culture' in Rhodes student life produces a particular 'racialized' institutional identity as most legitimate. 'Racial' dominance is instituted, consecrated and reproduced through the ritualistic performance of 'drinking culture', which ultimately produces a superior claim of ownership over the institutional space through the reiteration of racial domination that these performances of institutional identity powerfully symbolize.

The history of economic thought is ‘flooded’ with neo-classical accounts despite the fact that neoclassical economics did not occupy history alone. This has caused the discourses on ‘lost alternatives’ to be relegated as the deterministic ‘straight line’ neo-classical historical discourses are elevated. Globally hegemonic neo-classical discourse aided this phenomenon as it served to subordinate any counterhegemonic local discursive processes towards alternatives. This study is premised on the theme of non-neoclassical ‘lost alternatives’ using the post-apartheid South Africa as a case study. Emerging from the apartheid regime, the impetus towards non-neoclassical redistributive policies was strong in South Africa but this did not gain traction as the ANC’s ‘growth through redistribution’ was replaced by globally hegemonic discourse which favoured ‘redistribution through growth’. This thesis postulates the idea of two waves of ‘internal’ discursive formations; capturing the transition to democracy up to 1996 as the first wave and the period from 2005 to about 2009 as the second wave. The developmental state paradigm (DSP) emerged as the central heterodox paradigm with ideas such as industrial policy, welfare, and social dialogue/compacts being main elements. The DSP was expressly chosen in the early 1990s, the first period of strong internal discursive formation, but faded as neo-classical policies, epitomised through GEAR, dominated the policy space. The DSP discourse gained vitality in the second wave of internal discursive formation (2005-2009) and it was associated with the subsequent Zuma’s administration. The study illustrates that the DSP has failed to be fully developed into a practical framework but remained only at rhetorical level with the phrase ‘developmental state’ inserted into government policy documents and documents of ANC as a ruling party. The thesis further illustrates that the DSP fared well ideologically because of its inclination to the ideology of ‘developmentalism’ tended to trump any socialist inclined policies such as a generous welfare regime. The thesis rebuts the notion of the DSP in South Africa which has only been amorphously developed with the phrase ‘developmental state’ becoming a mere buzzword. The thesis argues that the DSP in the 21st century is much more complex and the growing ‘tertiarisation’ of the economy makes the Social Democratic Paradigm SDP’s capability centric approach much more relevant for South Africa. The study goes further to argue that a (SDP) is much more suitable alternative for addressing South African colonial/apartheid legacies and consolidation of democracy.

Kenya and South Africa can be described as dominant party systems, under the dominance of the Kenya African National Union CKANU) and the African National Congress CANC) respectively. A dominant party system is in essence a democracy. The spirit of democracy may, however, apparently be contradicted by the weight of party dominance, thus questioning the content of and prospects for democracy under party dominance in both Kenya and South Africa. The study is a comparative analysis of party dominance in Kenya and South Africa. The main objective is to exan1ine the relationship between party dominance and democracy in both countries. It seeks to find out how party dominance is reproducing itself and surviving the post 1990 transition processes in Kenya and South Africa. More importantly, the study also seeks to find out how party dominance impacts upon institutions that support or uphold democratization and subsequently democracy. The findings of the study demonstrate that party dominance has reproduced itself and survived the post-1990 period, and is also impacting upon democratization and democracy. The dominant parties take a similar trajectory in pursuit of dominance over the state and its apparatuses. However, they differ when it comes to their relationship with the civil society. That between KANU and civil society is antagonistic, as the ruling party seeks to augment political power through authoritarian dominance of the latter to, while that of the ANC and civil society is responsive, as the former seeks to enhance political stability in the country. The impact of party dominance upon institutions that support democracy takes similar and different trajectories in both countries. Similarities arise with respect to the detrimental impact upon institutions of the Executive that ensure accountability and transparency, evident in the increasing cases of corruption, nepotism and political patronage appointments. Similarly, there has been a detrimental impact upon the Legislature regarding parliamentary proceedings. Parliamentary committees and opposition parties are being rendered ineffective as organs of ensuring transparency and accountability, and are often subject to delegitimation. The impact of party dominance on the Judiciary, however, differs in both countries. In Kenya, the judiciary continues to suffer from excessive interference from the Executive and the ruling party, whereas in South Africa the judicial system remains largely independent with regard to the application of justice, despite constant criticisms from the dominant party. The study concludes that South Africa is, gradually, going the Kenyan way. If this condition is left unchecked there is the possibility that South Africa could eventually end up a psuedo-democracy like Kenya, where formal democratic political institutions such as multiparty elections, exist to mask the reality of authoritarian dominance. The thesis recommends that strengthening civil society organizations, opposition political parties, and state institutions in both countries to ensure greater accountability and transparency, will reverse this detrimental effect of party dominance. It also recommends meaningful constitutional reforms that will guarantee greater independence of these institutions, and the decentralization of governmental and political power to check and limit the powers of the dominant party. Also recommended are areas for further research. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

This booklet is intended to serve as a report-back to those organisations which were party to the Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF) and to those who were unable to be present. It is also intended to act as a guide to action for 1990 and beyond. The CDF was a historic gathering of the forces for change represented by 4600 delegates from over 2100 organisations. These range form Bantustan parties on the one end of the political spectrum to ultra leftist groups on the other end. But perhaps the most significant presence was from organisations like Five Freedoms Forum, NAFCOC, the Hindu Seva Samaj, that of traditional leaders and the hundreds of other community organisations which are rapidly becoming an active component of the mass struggle for change. Also significant was the strong worker representation from a range of trade unions, including eight affiliates of NACTU whose leadership had turned down the invitation to be part of the Conference. The Conference for a Democratic Future was a major step in the overall process of building unity in action and maximising the isolation of the regime. It was, in this sense, not an isolated event. The year 1989 had taken unity in action to new heights with the Defiance Campaign and the mass marches. The process leading up to the CDF was intended td be more important then the Conference itself. Likewise, in the post-Conference period, the follow-up process should be given the importance it deserves. At the end of the day, it is this follow-up process which would determine the actual success or failure of the CDF exercise. The Declaration adopted at the Conference represents the strategic orientation of the broad forces for change. It calls for the intensification of the struggle and for the placing of the question of political power on the agenda of our united mass action. The Conference resolutions collectively contain the elements of a programme of action. Without exception, each resolution is a call to action. The task of all participants of the Conference is to translate these resolutions into Mass United Action. The adoption of the Harare Declaration should act as the starting point of a process which takes its content to the masses of our people in all comers of the country. The demand for the Constituent Assembly should become a popular demand of the people. By adopting the resolution on international pressure, the Conference sends an unambiguous signal to the world community on how the people of South Africa view their role in the struggle to end apartheid. The follow-up to the Conference should also be a continuing search for whatever common ground exists between the broad forces for change. This search must take place not only at a national level, but mere importantly at a regional and local level. Let us bear in mind the words of the Declaration: “The moral appeal of the Democratic Movement has never been greater”. by an MDM delegate on the CDF Convening Committee. / Includes the Harare Declaration: declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the Question of South Africa (Harare, Zimbabwe, August 21, 1989)

Thesis (Ph.D. (History)) -- University of Limpopo, 2020 / The subject of traditional leadership has been, and will always be, the subject of academic debate in various disciplines and varying objectives throughout the years. However, it is in South Africa to a large extent, but Venḓa specifically, that this study focuses on the discussion on the controversial subject of vhuhosi (traditional leadership) within the homeland system. This study specifically identifies vhuhosi and institutions of Vhavenḓa as a topic for research given its muddied history during the dark days of colonial subjugation and apartheid oppression and suppression. It is for this reason that this study explores South Africa’s homeland policy with specific reference to vhuhosi of Vhavenḓa and institutions (1898-1994). In order to do this the study starts by describing the nature of the relationship between the South African government and vhuhosi of Vhavenḓa on the eve of homeland policy as a way of setting the tone of the Afrocentric exploratory paradigm. The objective is to expose the gradual political and socio-economic changes that vhuhosi and institutions of Vhavenḓa were subjected to during South Africa’s political development. The study then analyses the development of ethnicity vis-à-vis the influence of ethnic identity during the period surrounding the establishment of Vhavenḓa homeland. Given this background it then describes the changing power relations between the South African government and mahosi within the Venḓa homeland. Significantly, the study examines the impact of Vhavenḓa homeland on the internal relations among mahosi of Vhavenḓa as well as Vhavenḓa’s cultural conception of royalty and governance. The current researcher identifies the Afrocentric theory as a vehicle to embark on the explorative nature of this study. Unlike other theoretical paradigms that conducted research on vhuhosi and institutions for colonial and apartheid objectives, the Afrocentric approach was preferred as it puts African values at the centre. Therefore the Afrocentric theory was preferred as a way of debunking the Eurocentric/Western and liberal research on African subjects such as vhuhosi and institutions. Hence oral interviews played an important role to complement the written and archival material available.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: During the so-called third wave of democratisation, South Africa experienced a transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule in 1994. This transition was coupled with a transformation process, which saw the establishment and introduction of democratic principles and norms, as well as democratic institutions. All these make South Africa a democracy in theory but do not necessarily mean that it is a democracy in practice. Moreover, democracy, unlike authoritarian rule, depends on the support of the populace. Lack of support for democratic rule renders the regime illegitimate, since it does not have enough support to continue as the authority of the country. Against the theoretical point of departure (i.e. support for democracy is closely tied to legitimacy of the authority), it is imperative to evaluate these types of support for democracy as well as their changing levels in the country. This will shed some light on whether the populace in the country embrace democracy as a form of governance – that is, whether the populace perceive democracy as a political regime that is entrenched not only in theory, but also in practice. This will be highlighted by their level of support, which determines whether the regime is perceived as legitimate or illegitimate. It will further shed some light on the degree or level of support for the political system governing the country. Support for democracy may be evaluated by using two models or types of support, i.e. diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support consists of three levels of support, namely, political community, regime principles and regime performance, whilst specific support consists of two levels of support, namely regime institutions and political actors. For this study, these models and levels of support are evaluated amongst the supporters of the ruling party, namely the ANC. For comparative purposes, however, support patterns for democracy, as measured in the World Values Surveys from 1995 to 2006, amongst the ANC supporters will be evaluated in relation to non-ANC supporters. These patterns are crucial, since they will highlight whether support for democracy is support for democratic rules and norms, i.e. democracy per se, or whether support for democracy is closely tied to party support and position. The study reveals that there are relatively high levels of support for political community, regime principles and regime performance amongst both the ANC supporters and non-ANC supporters, when compared to levels of support for regime institutions and political actors, meaning that there are high levels of diffuse support when compared to specific support. Moreover, the ANC supporters have higher levels of both diffuse and specific support for democracy when compared to non-ANC supporters. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die 1990‟s gedurende die derde golf van demokratisering in die wêreld, het Suid Afrika ook „n transformasie van „n outoritêre stelsel na „n demokrasie ondergaan. Hierdie transformasie het op die vestiging van demokratiese beginsels en norme sowel as demokratiese instellings uitgeloop. Hoewel dit Suid-Afrika ‟n demokrasie in teorie gemaak het, het dit die stelsel nie noodwendig ‟n demokrasie in die praktyk gemaak nie. Dit is belangrik om in ag te neem dat „n demokrasie, anders as „n outokrasie, die ondersteuning van die bevolking moet geniet. ‟n Gebrek aan genoegsame steun kan daartoe lei dat ‟n regering gesag op ‟n onlegitieme wyse uitoefen. Teen hierdie teoretiese agtergrond is dit dus belangrik om die tipes sowel as die veranderende vlakke van ondersteuning vir demokrasie te evalueer. Sodoende word ‟n insig verkry of die bevolking demokrasie as ‟n vorm van regering nie net in teorie aanvaar nie, maar ook in die praktyk. Die vlak van ondersteuning sal bepaal of die regime as legitiem of onlegitiem beskou word. Dit kan ook verder lig werp op die vlak van ondersteuning vir die politieke selsel wat in plek is. Ondersteuning vir demokrasie kan bepaal word deur gebruik te maak van twee modelle of tipes van ondersteuning, naamlik, verspreide (“diffuse”) en spesifieke (“specific”) ondersteuning. Verspreide ondersteuning bestaan uit drie vlakke van ondersteuning, naamlik, steun vir die politieke gemeenskap, regime beginsels en regime optrede. Spesifieke ondersteuning in teenstelling, bestaan uit twee vlakke van ondersteuning, naamlik steun vir regime instellings en vir die politieke akteurs. Vir hierdie studie is die modelle en vlakke van ondersteuning ge-evalueer met spesifieke verwysing na die ondersteuners van die ANC - die regerende party. Vir ‟n vergelykingsbasis is hierdie ondersteuningspatrone met die nie-ANC ondersteuners soos dit voorkom in die World Values opnames van 1995 tot 2006 gebruik. Hierdie patrone is van kardinale belang omdat dit vir ons ‟n aanduiding gee of ondersteuning vir demokrasie ook die ondersteuning vir demokratiese reëls en norme behels. Die bevindinge dui op relatiewe hoër vlakke van ondersteuning vir die politieke gemeenskap, regime beginsels en regime werkverrigting onder ANC ondersteuners sowel as nie-ondersteuners as dit vergelyk word met vlakke van ondersteuning vir regime instellings en politieke akteurs. Dit beteken dat daar hoër vlakke van verspreide ondersteuning bestaan in vergelyking met spesifieke ondersteuning. Verder is bevind dat ANC ondersteuners hoër vlakke van verspreide sowel as spesifiek ondersteuning vir demokrasie vertoon in vergelyking met nie-ondersteuners van die ANC.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--Stellenbosch University, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study explores public opinion on land reform in South Africa using data gathered by Ipsos-Markinor in nationally representative public opinion surveys conducted in 2004 and 2007, and by an elite survey conducted by Centre for International and Comparative Politics in 2007. This study explores whether public opinion on land reform reveals distinct trends that correlate with the selected socio-demographic variables of race, language, party affiliation and social status. It is hypothesised that there is an identifiable correlation between these independent variables and the opinions of respondents on land reform, with specific groups tending to support land reform whilst other groups tend to reject it. The data analyses yielded results that highlight distinct trends in public opinion on land reform. Responses are clustered around specific characteristics of the independent variables and point towards distinct groups having specific views on land reform. From this set of findings it is inferred that public opinion on land reform illustrates that certain groups of South Africans have contrasting views of how the rule of law and transformation should find expression in a democratic society. These fundamentally differing opinions on key elements of democracy illustrate that South Africans hold diverging opinions of what constitutes democracy, through adherence to either the liberal or the liberationist model of democracy. These models were previously identified as two distinct and diverging interpretations of democracy in South Africa and were labelled as such. These two models uphold sharply divergent normative prescriptions of democracy, as well as contrasting prescriptions for various policies of democratic consolidation, including that of land reform. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Openbare mening oor grondhervorming in Suid-Afrika word in hierdie studie ondersoek. Die ondersoek maak gebruik van data ingewin deur Ipsos-Markinor in nasionaal verteenwoordigende openbare meningsopnames uitgevoer in 2004 en 2007, asook ‘n elite opname wat in 2007 uitgevoer is deur die Sentrum vir Internationale en Vergelykende Politiek (CICP). Hierdie studie ondersoek die moontlikheid dat openbare mening ten opsigte van grondhervorming met geselekteerde sosio-demografiese veranderlikes (ras, taal, politieke affiliasie en sosiale status) korreleer. Die hipotese is dat daar ‘n identifiseerbare korrelasie is tussen hierdie onafhanklike veranderlikes en die menings van die respondente ten opsigte van grondhervorming en dat daar spesifieke groepe is wat grondhervorming ondersteun en ander nie. Analise van die data toon duidelike tendense in openbare mening oor die kwessie van grondhervorming. Menings korreleer wel met die onafhanklike veranderlikes en wys daarop dat bepaalde sosiale groepe uiteenlopende standpunte het oor grondhervorming. Uit hierdie stel bevindinge maak die navorser die afleiding dat daar, binne die Suid- Afrikaanse bevolking, groepe is met uiteenlopende menings oor hoe die oppergesag van die reg en transformasie binne ‘n demokrasie uitgeleef moet word. Hierdie fundamenteel kontrasterende menings ten opsigte van hierdie sleutelelemente van demokrasie, illustreer dat Suid-Afrikaners uiteenlopende menings oor demokrasie het in die vorm van ondersteuning van hetsy die liberale- of bevrydingsmodelle van demokrasie. Hierdie modelle is as twee duidelike en afsonderlike interpretasies van demokrasie voorgestel en beskryf. Hierdie twee modelle verteenwoordig skerp uiteenlopende normatiewe beskouinge oor demokrasie, en bied daarmee saam, botsende beleidsvoorskrifte aan vir demokratiese konsolidering, insluitende beleid oor grondhervorming.