Les développements récents de la recherche en sciences cognitives ont établi que les individus détectent fréquemment qu'ils sont en train de commettre certaines erreurs de raisonnement, alors même qu'ils n'identifient pas, et peut-être ne peuvent pas identifier, la source de ces erreurs. Jusqu'à maintenant, ce programme de recherche a principalement visé à démontrer que même les individus aux raisonnements les plus biaisés faisaient preuve de tendances à la détection de conflits. Le présent travail s'appuie sur ces résultats et analyse trois domaines d'enquête connexes et encore inexplorés : (1) les sous-types de détection de conflits ; (2) les différences individuelles quant à la détection ; (3) le caractère de généralité ou de spécificité au domaine des sensibilités pour la détection de conflits. En identifiant des sous-types de détection de conflits de plus en plus spécifiques, ce projet a pour objectif d'examiner les corrélations entre, d'une part, certaines sensibilités pour la détection de conflits, et des prédicteurs cognitifs, d'autre part. Il s'agit, fondamentalement, d'un travail préparatoire en vue d'une analyse différentielle complète des sensibilités particulières de détection de conflits parmi les individus en train de raisonner. / Recent state of the art research into cognitive biases has revealed that individuals often detect that they are making certain reasoning errors even when they themselves do not, perhaps cannot, articulate the source of the error. Until now, this research has focused primarily on demonstrating the existence of conflict detection tendencies among even the most biased reasoners. This thesis builds on this research by analyzing three related and unexplored areas of inquiry: (1) subtypes of conflict detection; (2) individual-specific differences among detectors; and (3) the domain generality or specificity of conflict detection sensitivities. By identifying increasingly fine-tuned detection subtypes, the project aims to explore correlations between particular conflict detection sensitivities and other cognitive predictors. It is, essentially, preparatory work for a complete differential analysis of conflict detection sensitivities among reasoners.

This diploma thesis deals with the topic of individual differences in susceptibility to framing effects. While some people respond sensitively to changes in the wording of decision problems, other people remain consistent in their decision-making regardless of a problem formulation. The goal of this thesis is to describe the current state of research evidence about these differences. The thesis first introduces main theoretical concepts of framing effect, focusing particularly on Prospect Theory, Dual-Process Theory and Fuzzy-Trace Theory. The thesis also elaborates on a framing effect typology, describes the main moderators of the effect, and summarizes the most important meta-analyses and replication studies. In the next part, the thesis introduces the main empirically described predictors of resistance to framing among cognitive styles, cognitive abilities, numeracy, personality dispositions and developmental factors. In the empirical part of the thesis, a pre- registered quantitative online study on a convenience sample from a Czech adult population (N = 584) was conducted with the goal of testing whether numeracy predicts resistance to framing above and beyond fluid intelligence, need for cognition and faith in intuition. For the purpose of the study, adapted two-factor Resistance to Framing scale and...

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Behavioral adaptation and cognitive control are crucial for goal-reaching behaviors. Every creature is ubiquitously faced with choices between behavioral alternatives. Common sense suggests that errors are an important source of information in the regulation of such processes. Several theories exist regarding cognitive control and the processing of undesired outcomes. However, most of these models focus on the consequences of an error, and less attention has been paid to the mechanisms that underlie the commissioning of an error. In this article, we present an integrative review of neuro-cognitive models that detail the determinants of the occurrence of response errors. The factors that may determine the likelihood of committing errors are likely related to the stability of task-representations in prefrontal networks, attentional selection mechanisms and mechanisms of action selection in basal ganglia circuits. An important conclusion is that the likelihood of committing an error is not stable over time but rather changes depending on the interplay of different functional neuro-anatomical and neuro-biological systems. We describe factors that might determine the time-course of cognitive control and the need to adapt behavior following response errors. Finally, we outline the mechanisms that may proof useful for predicting the outcomes of cognitive control and the emergence of response errors in future research.

BACKGROUND: Today’s societal changes, including high rate of change and increasing information flows, are increasing the demand on the individual mental capacity. It becomes increasingly difficult to analytically process all the different dilemmas and everyday decisions as individuals have a limited mental capacity available to make these decisions. Thus, it has been suggested that ego-depleted relies more heavily on intuition, which is less burdensome, when making decision. However little is known about to what extent intuitive decisions differ from analytic. Are ego-depleted individuals more or less likely to maximize outcome in moral dilemmas involving conflicting values? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less willing to cooperate? Do ego depleted individuals become more or less altruistic? Is our intuition more or less in accordance with Homo Economicus?AIM: Starting from a Dual Process perspective on decision-making the aim of this study is to examine how ego depletion affects moral judgment and pro-social decisions.METHOD: A laboratory experiment involving 115 subjects, using real monetary incentives, was conducted among students at Linköping University. Subjects were randomized into one of two treatments. Everything was identical across treatments except for the initial ego-depletion manipulation. Using a standard paradigm for ego-depletion subjects in treatment 1 were put under high cognitive load while subjects in treatment two were put under low cognitive load. Subjects faced 16 questions divided into four different decision tasks: Moral dilemmas, Public Goods game, two types of Dictator Game where the type of sacrifice subjects could make in order to contribute money to charity was varied.RESULTS: Subjects in the high cognitive load treatment made fewer consequentialists moral judgments compared to other subjects (p = 0.075). The effect is especially strong when looking only at high-conflict dilemmas such as Crying Baby. No difference between treatments was found for the public goods games. In the dictator game involving monetary sacrifice subjects donated less money to charity when put under high cognitive load. However the finding was not significant (p = 0.292). No difference was found in the dictator game involving effort as personal sacrifice since almost everyone chooses to donate to charity.CONCLUSION: According to The Dual Process perspective this essay shows that intuitive thinking does not evidently lead to that they makes decision that more or less is in accordance with Homo Economicus. The connection between ego depletion and pro-social decisions is more complex. Further research needs to investigate which different mental shortcuts that individuals uses in various types of pro-social decisions and why intuitive and analytical decision-making differ between different decisions. Further research within the area can identify potential mechanisms and policies that can support individuals’ capacity to make decisions in accordance with their own and society’s preferences.

Den här studien syftade till att undersöka om mental arbetsbelastning kan påverka benägenhetenatt begå konjunktionsfelet vid sannolikhetsbedömningar, trots att man fått ledtrådarsom synliggjort konjunktionsregeln. Detta undersöktes med en experimentell mellangruppsdesign.I studien deltog 57 deltagare, varav 27 i experimentgruppen och 30 i kontrollgruppen.Deltagarna var i huvudsak studenter på universitetsnivå. Grupperna hade en jämn könsfördelning.Vad gäller ålder så var medelvärdet i kontrollgruppen 24.8 och medelvärdet i experimentgruppenvar 30.7. Samtliga deltagare fick utföra ett datorbaserat test. Båda gruppernastest bestod av sannolikhetsbedömningsuppgifter, felstavningsuppgifter, samt en tilläggsuppgiftdär deltagarna ombads ange om ett visst ord förekommit i tidigare fråga eller ej. Experimentbetingelseninnehöll dessutom en visuospatial arbetsminnesuppgift. Resultatet visade attmental arbetsbelastning inte ökade antalet konjunktionsfel vid sannolikhetsbedömningar dådeltagarna fått ledtrådar som synliggjort konjunktionsregeln. Slutsatsen visar att det inte behövervara mer resurskrävande för arbetsminnet att göra normativa bedömningar och att tillgodogörandetav konjunktionsregeln är robust mot mental arbetsbelastning. Framtida forskningskulle kunna undersöka vilken betydelse ett visst antal ledtrådar har för om tillgodogörandetav konjunktionsregeln påverkas av mental arbetsbelastning. / The aim of this study was to investigate whether mental workload can affect the tendency tocommit the conjunction fallacy in probability assessments, despite having read clues that exposethe conjunction rule. This was investigated with an experimental between-group design.In total, the study had 57 participants, whereof 27 in the experiment group and 30 in the controlgroup. The groups were equally balanced concerning sex. The average age in the controlgroup was 24.8 years compared to 30.7 years in the experiment group. All participants performeda computer-based test. Both groups’ test consisted of tasks with probability assessments,discovering misspelled words and an additional task about estimating whether a certainword had occurred during the previous task. The experimental condition also consisted ofa visuo-spatial working memory task. The result indicated that mental workload did not increasethe number of conjunction fallacies committed in probability assessments, given thatthe participants had read clues that expose the conjunction rule. From this result, the conclusionis drawn that normative judgments are not necessarily more demanding for the workingmemory, also that the utilization of the conjunction rule is resistant to mental workload. Futureresearch might investigate what impact a certain number of clues has for whether theutilization of the conjunction rule is affected by mental work load.

Behavioral adaptation and cognitive control are crucial for goal-reaching behaviors. Every creature is ubiquitously faced with choices between behavioral alternatives. Common sense suggests that errors are an important source of information in the regulation of such processes. Several theories exist regarding cognitive control and the processing of undesired outcomes. However, most of these models focus on the consequences of an error, and less attention has been paid to the mechanisms that underlie the commissioning of an error. In this article, we present an integrative review of neuro-cognitive models that detail the determinants of the occurrence of response errors. The factors that may determine the likelihood of committing errors are likely related to the stability of task-representations in prefrontal networks, attentional selection mechanisms and mechanisms of action selection in basal ganglia circuits. An important conclusion is that the likelihood of committing an error is not stable over time but rather changes depending on the interplay of different functional neuro-anatomical and neuro-biological systems. We describe factors that might determine the time-course of cognitive control and the need to adapt behavior following response errors. Finally, we outline the mechanisms that may proof useful for predicting the outcomes of cognitive control and the emergence of response errors in future research.

博士(心理学) / Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

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This dissertation describes the credibility judgment process using social psychological theories of dual-processing, which state that information processing outcomes are the result of an interaction “between a fast, associative information- processing mode based on low-effort heuristics, and a slow, rule-based information processing mode based on high-effort systematic reasoning” (Chaiken & Trope, 1999, p. ix). Further, this interaction is illustrated by describing credibility judgments as a choice between examining easily identified peripheral cues (the messenger) and content (the message), leading to different evaluations in different settings. The focus here is on the domain of the Web, where ambiguous authorship, peer- produced content, and the lack of gatekeepers create an environment where credibility judgments are a necessary routine in triaging information. It reviews the relevant literature on existing credibility frameworks and the component factors that affect credibility judgments. The online encyclopedia (instantiated as Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica) is then proposed as a canonical form to examine the credibility judgment process. The two main claims advanced here are (1) that information sources are composed of both message (the content) and messenger (the way the message is delivered), and that the messenger impacts perceived credibility; and (2) that perceived credibility is tempered by information need (individual engagement). These claims were framed by the models proposed by Wathen & Burkell (2002) and Chaiken (1980) to forward a composite dual process theory of credibility judgments, which was tested by two experimental studies. The independent variables of interest were: media format (print or electronic); reputation of source (Wikipedia or Britannica); and the participant’s individual involvement in the research task (high or low). The results of these studies encourage a more nuanced understanding of the credibility judgment process by framing it as a dual-process model, and showing that certain mediating variables can affect the relative use of low-effort evaluation and high- effort reasoning when forming a perception of credibility. Finally, the results support the importance of messenger effects on perceived credibility, implying that credibility judgments, especially in the online environment, and especially in cases of low individual engagement, are based on peripheral cues rather than an informed evaluation of content. / text