Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 400-422).

The purpose of this thesis is to find out how the Swedish authorities comply with international law by studying the protection of asylum-seeking children that are apprehended by Swedish authorities according to the legislation of LVU because of abuse or neglect and thereafter are deported together with their parents. The aim of this thesis is to find out if Swedish legislation and praxis is consistent with international law through the Convention on the Rights of the Child and EKMR. Would it be possible to increase the protection of these children through incorporating the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Swedish law, through a wider interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement or through more morality in the law? The thesis has been conducted as a literature study where the right-dogmatic method has been used to compare Swedish and international law. The theories by Dworkin about morality and law have been compared to Peczeniks right-dogmatic theories. The review shows that Swedish authorities are infringing article 2, 3, 12 and 19 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, when it comes to the protection of asylum-seeking children. The best way to increase the protection is to incorporate the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Swedish law. By interpreting the principle of Non-refoulement in a wider manner the protection will also increase. However, the use of more morality in the judgements will not ensure the asylum-seeking children a reliable protection. Keywords: Asylum-seeking children, LVU, Convention on the Rights of the Child, EKMR, Non-refoulement, Dworkin, Peczenik.

There is no abstract available for this thesis.

The international human rights instruments recognise the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the human family and that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. The thesis explores the use of the phrase “inherent dignity” in the context of the catalogue of rights said to be derived from it. (For complete abstract open document)

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, Dept. of Philosophy, 2001. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 259-275).

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, 2008. / Submitted by Suelen Silva dos Santos (suelenunb@yahoo.com.br) on 2009-09-15T18:26:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) / Rejected by Gomes Neide(nagomes2005@gmail.com), reason: Su, vc esqueceu de preencher um dos campos de informações adicionais. Me avise quando corrigir! Beijinhos! Kell ♥ on 2010-06-29T19:40:21Z (GMT) / Submitted by Suelen Silva dos Santos (suelenunb@yahoo.com.br) on 2010-06-30T17:38:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Daniel Ribeiro(daniel@bce.unb.br) on 2010-06-30T18:32:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-06-30T18:32:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02 / O problema a ser enfrentando pelo trabalho é o da possibilidade de aplicação da justiça diante do reconhecimento do caráter estruturalmente indeterminado do direito moderno, tendo-se em vista o esgotamento da força explicativa das teorias positivistas. Face à crença irracional de que textos racionalmente elaborados poderiam reduzir a complexidade da tarefa interpretativa e ao ceticismo decisionista, Ronald Dworkin buscou resgatar a crença na força normativa dos direitos virando do avesso a pureza epistemológica pretendida pelo positivismo e restaurando a plausibilidade do conceito de justiça em termos pós-metafísicos e pós-convencionais, defendendo que a postura a ser adotada pelo aplicador do direito deve ser a de buscar a única resposta correta no ordenamento jurídico em sua integridade. O resgate reflexivo do conteúdo normativo da modernidade e da própria idéia de razão se mostra fundamental para a compreensão do papel dos princípios na argumentação jurídica contemporânea, na fundamentação da democracia e no desenvolvimento de eticidades reflexivas. A teoria de Ronald Dworkin será o fio condutor da análise a ser empreendida, por sua abordagem que busca fazer valer simultaneamente as pretensões à justiça e à segurança jurídica. A compreensão da tensão existente entre normas fundamentais, e o debate travado com teorias que vêem os princípios como incompatíveis será de fundamental importância para as conclusões do trabalho, que buscará então demonstrar que mesmo em decisões onde se procura afirmar explicitamente um balanceamento de valores a busca por correção, no sentido apontado, se faz presente e desempenha um papel decisivo na compreensão das exigências normativas dos princípios jurídicos. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The problem confronted in this work is that of the possibility of application of justice in face of the recognition of the structurally indeterminate character of the modern law, having in sight the exhaustion of the explaining force of the positivist theories. Challenging both the irrational belief that rationally elaborated legal texts could reduce the complexity of the interpretative task and the decisionist skepticism, Ronald Dworkin aims at rescuing the belief in the normative force of rights, turning upside down the epistemic pureness intended by the positivism and restoring the plausibility of the concept of justice in post-metaphysical and post-conventional terms, defending that the attitude to be adopted by those who apply the law must be that of searching the one right answer required by the legal system in its integrity. The reflective rescue of the normative content of the modernity and the proper idea of reason is considered essential for the understanding of the role of principles in contemporary legal reasoning, in the legitimate basis of democracy and in the development of reflexive ethics. The theory of Ronald Dworkin will be the conducting wire of the analysis undertaken, for its approach that seeks simultaneously to validate both the claim to justice and to legal certainty. The understanding of the existing tension between basic norms, and the debate with theories that comprehend principles as being essentially incompatible will be of great importance for the conclusions of the work, that it will then try to demonstrate that even in decisions where a balancing of values is explicitly defended, the search for rightness, in the sense described, is present and plays a decisive role in the understanding of the normative requirements of legal principles.

En este trabajo se presentan las características de la interpretación en Ronald Dworkin, a través de su puesta en perspectiva con la hermenéutica gadameriana y la hermenéutica trascendental de Apel. Esto posibilita dar cuenta de una tensión interna al pensamiento de Dworkin que se da en el peso que tienen en la interpretación la dimensión pragmática y la dimensión semántica del signo. La no asunción de la dimensión pragmática, y su intención de brindar un criterio para la mejor interpretación le llevan a caer en una posición realista.

Esta dissertação narra o debate entre R. Dworkin e S. Fish, ocorrido em uma troca direta de artigos entre os autores na década de 80. A leitura desta discussão, bem como de discussões correlatas, foca nas temáticas da Objetividade e da Interpretação, as quais perpassam o pensamento de ambos. Este debate ainda possui poucos estudos no Brasil, de forma que a escolha por este objeto pretende trazer mais à luz os ricos argumentos desenvolvidos neste embate, os quais, devido a sua importância, precisam ser detalhadamente analisados, percorrendo-se cada movimento, com a finalidade de surtirem efeitos cada vez mais pungentes em nosso pensamento e prática jurídica. O caminho trilhado nesta dissertação se inicia com o artigo Direito como Interpretação (1982), de Dworkin, e finda com o artigo Ainda errado após todos esses anos (1987), de Fish. Curiosamente, essa linha de artigos seguida neste trabalho terminou por levar essa dissertação à conclusão de que, se compreendermos bem os ensinamentos de Dworkin e Fish, compreenderemos que tais autores, na verdade, não estão discordando entre si como imaginam. Ao contrário, as teorias de ambos são harmônicas entre si. Há uma discordância no âmbito existencial-moral, mas não em um âmbito teórico, conforme julgavam. Para além destes resultados, a feitura desta dissertação mostrou que ela mesma é inevitavelmente uma teoria sobre a interpretação na medida em que se comenta um debate sobre teoria da interpretação. A própria escrita desta pesquisa é, pois, também, ela mesma, um exemplo de como a interpretação ocorre e de como podemos melhor compreendê-la e compreender o Outro. O escopo foi adentrar no debate entre um Crítico Literário e um Teórico Jurídico e pensar sobre os aprendizados que fruiríamos para o modo de olharmos a Interpretação, a Linguagem e a empreitada do Direito. Porém, para além destes aprendizados, a desenvoltura dos estudos e ponderações acerca deste tema específico contribuíram para uma maior percepção tanto sobre do que se trata este debate quanto do que se trata estar no mundo constantemente interpretando: as nossas ações estão fatalmente integradas em uma postura existencial e moral no mundo. Compreender o porquê das incompreensões entre Dworkin e Fish é compreender o porquê das incompreensões em geral; e tal compreensão é um passo importante para melhor conseguirmos nos entendermos e sermos mais sensíveis ao discurso do Outro. / This dissertation narrates the debate between R. Dworkin e S. Fish, occurred in a direct exchange of articles between the authors in the 80s. The reading of this discussion, as well as related discussions, focuses on Objectivity and Interpretation, which pervade the thought of both. This debate has yet few studies in Brazil, so that the choice of this object is willing to bring to light the rich arguments developed on this debate, which, given its importance, must be particularly analyzed, covering up every movement, with the purpose of rising effects increasingly poignant in our thought and legal practice. The path trodden in this dissertation begins with Dworkins article Law as Interpretation (1982) and ends with Fishs article Still wrong after all these years (1987). Curiously, this line of articles followed in this piece of work finally lead this dissertation to the conclusion that, if we comprehend well the teachings of Dworkin and Fish, we will comprehend that these authors indeed are not disagreeing among themselves as they imagine. On the contrary, both theories are harmonic between themselves. There is a disagreement within the existencial-moral sphere, but not in a theoretical, as they thought. In addition to these results, the writing of this dissertation has shown that this thesis is itself inevitable a theory about interpretation insofar it comments a debate about a theory of interpretation. The writing itself of this research is, therefore, also itself an example of how interpretation occurs and how we can better understand it and understand the Other. The scope was entering the debate between a Literally Critic and a Legal Theorist and think about the learnings we would make towards the way we look Interpretation, Language and the enterprise of Law. But, in addition to these learnings, the development of these studies and ponderings about this specific theme contributed to a greater perception on what is this debate about as well as what is being in the world constantly interpreting: our actions are fatally integrated in an existencial and moral posture within the world. Comprehend the why of the incomprehensions between Dworkin and Fish is comprehend the why of the incomprehensions in general; and that comprehension is an important step for us to better understand ourselves and to be more sensible to the discourse of the Other.