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WiFi networks are susceptible to statistical traffic analysis attacks. Despite encryption, the metadata of encrypted traffic, such as packet inter-arrival time and size, remains visible. This visibility allows potential eavesdroppers to infer private information in the Internet of Things (IoT) environment. For example, it allows for the identification of sleep monitors and the inference of whether a user is awake or asleep. WiFi eavesdropping theoretically enables the identification of IoT devices without the need to join the victim's network. This attack scenario is more realistic and much harder to defend against, thus posing a real threat to user privacy. However, researchers have not thoroughly investigated this type of attack due to the noisy nature of wireless channels and the relatively low accuracy of WiFi sniffers. Furthermore, many countermeasures proposed in the literature are inefficient in addressing side-channel leakage in WiFi networks. They often burden internet traffic with high data overhead and disrupt the user experience by introducing deliberate delays in packet transmission. This dissertation investigates privacy leakage resulting from WiFi eavesdropping and proposes efficient defensive techniques. We begin by assessing the practical feasibility of IoT device identification in WiFi networks. We demonstrate how an eavesdropper can fingerprint IoT devices by passively monitoring the wireless channel without joining the network. After exploring this privacy attack, we introduce a traffic spoofing-based defense within the WiFi channel to protect against such threats. Additionally, we propose a more data-efficient obfuscation technique to counter traffic analytics based on packet size without adding unnecessary noise to the traffic.

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In October 2001 , President George W. Bush issued an executive order authorizing the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct secret wiretapping of telephone communications between U.S. citizens and terrorist suspects overseas in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. The program, later called the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), remained secret until December 2005, when the New York Times revealed the existence of the TSP. In January 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, claiming that the NSA's surveillance program violated the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the separation of powers doctrine. The government argued that the program met constitutional scrutiny under the "special needs" doctrine warrant exception. Additionally, the Bush administration asserted that Congress specifically gave the President permission to authorize the program by its passing the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). This thesis analyzes the constitutionality of the domestic surveillance program by discussing the constitutional questions that the NSA's program elicits under the Fourth Amendment. Also, this thesis reviews the legality of the TSP under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). After an analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Fourth Amendment, privacy, and eavesdropping cases, this thesis concludes that the NSA' s warrantless eavesdropping program most likely violates the Fourth Amendment and the separation of powers doctrine. Further, this thesis asserts that the TSP is illegal under the FISA and that the Executive lacks statutory authorization.

Abstract—This dissertation investigates the privacy implications of WiFi communication in Internet-of-Things (IoT) environments, focusing on the threat posed by out-of-network observers. Recent research has shown that in-network observers can glean information about IoT devices, user identities, and activities. However, the potential for information inference by out-of-network observers, who do not have WiFi network access, has not been thoroughly examined. The first study provides a detailed summary dataset, utilizing Random Forest for data summary classification. This study highlights the significant privacy threat to WiFi networks and IoT applications from out-of-network observers. Building on this investigation, the second study extends the research by utilizing a new set of time series monitored WiFi data frames and advanced machine learning algorithms, specifically xGboost, for Time Series classification. This extension achieved high accuracy of up to 94\% in identifying IoT devices and their working status, demonstrating faster IoT device profiling while maintaining classification accuracy. Furthermore, the study underscores the ease with which outside intruders can harm IoT devices without joining a WiFi network, launching attacks quickly and leaving no detectable footprints. Additionally, the dissertation presents a comprehensive survey of recent advancements in machine-learning-driven encrypted traffic analysis and classification. Given the challenges posed by encryption for traditional packet and traffic inspection, understanding and classifying encrypted traffic are crucial. The survey provides insights into utilizing machine learning for encrypted network traffic analysis and classification, reviewing state-of-the-art techniques and methodologies. This survey serves as a valuable resource for network administrators, cybersecurity professionals, and policy enforcement entities, offering insights into current practices and future directions in encrypted traffic analysis and classification.

Our world of people and objects is on the verge of transforming to a world of highly-interconnected wireless devices. Incredible advances in wireless communications, hardware design, and power storage have facilitated hasty spread of wireless technologies in human life. In this new world, individuals are often identified and reached via one or multiple wireless devices that they always carry (e.g., smartphones, smart wearable, implantable medical devices, etc.), and their biometrics identities are replaced by their digital fingerprints. In near future, vehicles will be controlled and monitored via wireless monitoring systems and various physical objects (e.g., home appliance and retail store items) will be connected to the Internet. The list of these changes goes on. Unfortunately, as different aspects of our lives are being immerged in and dependent to wireless devices and services, we will become more vulnerable to wireless service/connection interruptions due to adversarial behavior and our privacy will become more potent to be exposed to adversaries. An adversary can learn the procedures of a wireless system and analyze its stages, and accordingly, launch various attacks against the operations of the system or the privacy of the people. Existing data confidentiality and integrity services (e.g., advanced encryption algorithms) have been able to prevent the leakage of users' messages. However, in wireless networks, even when upper-layer payloads are encrypted, the users' privacy and the operation of a wireless network can be threatened by the leakage of transmission attributes at the physical (PHY) layer. Examples of these attributes are payload size, frequency offset (FO), modulation scheme, and the transmission rate. These attributes can be exploited by an adversary to launch passive or active attacks. A passive attacker may learn about the interests, sexual orientation, political views, and patentable ideas of the user through analyzing these features, whereas an active attacker exploits captured attributes to launch selective packet jamming/dropping and disrupt wireless services. These call for novel privacy preserving techniques beyond encryption. In this dissertation, we study the vulnerability of current wireless systems to the leakage of transmission attributes at the PHY layer and propose several schemes to prevent it. First, we design and experimentally demonstrate with USRPs an energy-efficient and highly disruptive jamming attack on the FO estimation of an OFDM system. OFDM is the core multiplexing scheme in many modern wireless systems (e.g., LTE/5G and 802.11a/n/ac) and is highly susceptible to FO. FO is the difference in the operating frequencies of two radio oscillators. This estimation is done by the receiver using the publicly-known frame preamble. We show that the leakage of FO value via the preamble can facilitate an optimally designed jamming signal without needing to know the channel between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver. Our results show that the jammer can guarantee a successful attack even when its power is slightly less than the transmitter's power. We then propose four mitigation approaches against the proposed FO attack. Next, we consider certain transmission attributes that are disclosed via unencrypted PHY/MAC headers. Example of these attributes are payload size, transmission rate, and MAC addresses. Beyond unencrypted headers, the adversary can estimate the frame size and transmission rate through identifying the payload's modulation scheme and measuring the transmission time. To prevent the leakage of these attributes, we propose Friendly CryptoJam scheme, which consists of three components: First, a modulation-aware encryption scheme to encrypt the headers. Second, an efficient modulation obfuscation techniques. Specifically, the proposed modulation obfuscation scheme embeds the modulation symbols of a frame's payload into the constellation of the highest-order modulation scheme supported by the system. Together with effective PHY/MAC header encryption at the modulation level, the proposed obfuscation scheme hides the transmission rate, payload size, and other attributes announced in the headers while avoiding any BER performance loss. Compared with prior art, Friendly CryptoJam enjoys less complexity and less susceptibility to FO estimation errors. The third component is a novel PHY-level identification method. To facilitate PHY/MAC header encryption when a MAC layer sender identifier cannot be used (e.g., due to MAC address encryption), we propose two preamble-based sender identification methods, one for OFDM and one for non-OFDM systems. A sender identifier is special message that can be embedded in the frame preamble. The extent of the applications of our embedding scheme goes beyond identifier embedding and include embedding part of the data frame, the sender's digital signature, or any meta-data that the sender provides. Our message embedding method can further be used to mitigate the FO estimation attack because the jammer can no longer optimize its jamming signal with respect to a fixed preamble signal. In addition, we considered friendly jamming technique in a multi-link/hop network to degrade the channels of the eavesdroppers and prevent successful decoding of the headers, while minimizing the required jamming power by optimally placing the friendly jamming devices.

De nombreux animaux évoluent dans un environnement social où les individus peuvent réaliser de l'écoute/observation clandestine, c'est-à-dire, obtenir des informations sur des compétiteurs ou partenaires sexuels potentiels en observant les interactions de leurs congénères. À l’inverse, les animaux engagés dans une interaction peuvent exprimer un effet d'audience: modifier leurs comportements en présence d’observateurs (audiences). Ce doctorat s'intéresse à la flexibilité et aux conséquences de ces comportements et recherche des stratégies individuelles dans leur utilisation chez le canari domestique. Les résultats indiquent que l'écoute clandestine influence les préférences sexuelles et l'investissement reproducteur des femelles. Ce dernier dépend également des statuts hiérarchiques et de la personnalité. Les effets d'audience sont mis en évidence chez les deux sexes et semblent complexes et flexibles. Leur expression dépend de la situation, du type d'audience, de la dominance et de la familiarité des individus impliqués mais pas de la personnalité. Ces résultats posent la question des bases cognitives impliquées dans l'écoute clandestine et les effets d'audience. / Many animals live in social environments where individuals can eavesdrop: get information on competitors or potential sexual partners by observing interactions between conspecifics. In such environments, interacting individuals might express an audience effect: they can change their behavior in the presence of eavesdroppers (i.e. an audience). This Ph.D. thesis focuses on the flexibility and the consequences of these behaviours and searches for individual strategies in their expression in domestic canaries. Results show that eavesdropping drives sexual preferences and reproductive effort in females. The latter is also influenced by dominance and personality. The existence of complex and flexible audience effects is demonstrated in males and females. Their expression depends on the situation, the type of audience, the dominance and familiarity of the interacting individuals but not on personality. Results raise the question of the cognitive foundations of eavesdropping and audience effects.

Arbetet utvärderar Ikea TRÅDFRI rörelsesensors kommunikationsprotokoll utifrån ett säkerhetsperspektiv. Internet of Things expanderar och i takt med utvecklingen är det viktigt att granska produkter på marknaden för att se hur säkerhet är implementerat. I rapporten utforskas flera olika sätt att utvärdera produkten för att få en god helhetsbild. Detta innefattar metoder kring hur en obehörig kan få tillgång till information genom avlyssning, ifall en obehörig skulle kunna ta över kommunikationen genom att parkoppla till en ljuskälla på ett långt avstånd samt en bedömning av sårbarhetsgrad utifrån Totalförsvarets forskningsinstituts kartläggning. Resultatet påvisar möjligheten att utnyttja enheten genom en sidokanalsattack samt hur parkoppling kan ske på ett längre avstånd än vad som enligt specifikationen ska vara möjligt. / This report evaluates the Ikea TRÅDFRI motion sensor communication protocol from a security point of view. Internet of Things is constantly expanding and with its growth it is important to examine products on the market to see how security is implemented. Different options on ways to evaluate the product is explored in the report. That includes methods of how an unauthorized person could gain access to information through eavesdropping, if they could take over the communication by pairing to a light source from a long distance, and an assessment of the degree of vulnerability by Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut. The results show that it is possible to exploit the device through a side-channel attack and also how pairing is enabled on a longer distance than what is specified.

Under 2017 hittades sårbarheten Blueborne som gjorde att en person kunde ta sig in i mobiltelefoner eller datorer helt obemärkt genom att enheten endast ha igång bluetooth. Bluetoothsäkerheten behövs tas på minst lika stort allvar som alla andra enheter som tillexempel wifi eller annan trådlös utrustning som kan äventyra att information hamnar i orätta händer, för skulle felaktig information nå en person med ont uppsåt så skulle konsekvenserna vara förödande för privatpersoner eller för företag. Denna uppsats behandlar frågor genom att intervjua personer på företag och genom enkätundersökning, det har påvisats att majoriteten av företag har bristande kunskap eller saknar någonting som kan varna en användare eller administratör vid en attack. Diskussion kring attackers potentiella förödelse mot företag när det kommer kring information och drift och hur det går att skydda sig.

<p>This doctoral thesis summarizes research in quantum cryptography done at the Department of Electronics and Telecommunications at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) from 1998 through 2007.</p><p>The opening parts contain a brief introduction into quantum cryptography as well as an overview of all existing single photon detection techniques for visible and near infrared light. Then, our implementation of a fiber optic quantum key distribution (QKD) system is described. We employ a one-way phase coding scheme with a 1310 nm attenuated laser source and a polarization-maintaining Mach-Zehnder interferometer. A feature of our scheme is that it tracks phase drift in the interferometer at the single photon level instead of employing hardware phase control measures. An optimal phase tracking algorithm has been developed, implemented and tested. Phase tracking accuracy of +-10 degrees is achieved when approximately 200 photon counts are collected in each cycle of adjustment. Another feature of our QKD system is that it uses a single photon detector based on a germanium avalanche photodiode gated at 20 MHz. To make possible this relatively high gating rate, we have developed, implemented and tested an afterpulse blocking technique, when a number of gating pulses is blocked after each registered avalanche. This technique allows to increase the key generation rate nearly proportionally to the increase of the gating rate. QKD has been demonstrated in the laboratory setting with only a very limited success: by the time of the thesis completion we had malfunctioning components in the setup, and the quantum bit error rate remained unstable with its lowest registered value of about 4%.</p><p>More than half of the thesis is devoted to various security aspects of QKD. We have studied several attacks that exploit component imperfections and loopholes in optical schemes. In a large pulse attack, settings of modulators inside Alice's and Bob's setups are read out by external interrogating light pulses, without interacting with quantum states and without raising security alarms. An external measurement of phase shift at Alice's phase modulator in our setup has been demonstrated experimentally. In a faked states attack, Eve intercepts Alice's qubits and then utilizes various optical imperfections in Bob's scheme to construct and resend light pulses in such a way that Bob does not distinguish his detection results from normal, whereas they give Bob the basis and bit value chosen at Eve's discretion. Construction of such faked states using several different imperfections is discussed. Also, we sketch a practical workflow of breaking into a running quantum cryptolink for the two abovementioned classes of attacks. A special attention is paid to a common imperfection when sensitivity of Bob's two detectors relative to one another can be controlled by Eve via an external parameter, for example via the timing of the incoming pulse. This imperfection is illustrated by measurements on two different single photon detectors. Quantitative results for a faked states attack on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) and the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocols using this imperfection are obtained. It is shown how faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a phase-time encoding, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols. Furthermore we have attempted to integrate this imperfection of detectors into the general security proof for the BB84 protocol. For all attacks, their applicability to and implications for various known QKD schemes are considered, and countermeasures against the attacks are proposed.</p><p>The thesis incorporates published papers [J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2023 (2001)], [Appl. Opt. 43, 4385 (2004)], [J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691 (2005)], [Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006)], and [quant-ph/0702262].</p>