A saúde faz parte da agenda de preocupações permanentes do governo e também de entidades não-governamentais de todo o mundo. A saúde do trabalhador, como assunto de interesse coletivo, está inserida dentro desse contexto. No Brasil, onde o índice de acidentes e doenças ocupacionais é significativo, tem-se exigido cada vez mais atenção das autoridades competentes para promover políticas públicas, que reforçem a prevenção e a segurança no meio ambiente do trabalho. Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar o sistema de incentivos, da Teoria Econômica e aplicá-los no Direito do Trabalho como instrumento de auxilio na prevenção ou diminuição dos infortúnios laborais, através da Análise Econômica do Direito. Observar o Direito não só como um sistema de coerção, mas também como um sistema de incentivos com preços implícitos permite que se direcionem as escolhas dos indivíduos aos objetivos propostos pela legislação. / Submitted by Marcelo Teixeira (mvteixeira@ucs.br) on 2014-05-23T17:39:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Barbara Bedin.pdf: 599045 bytes, checksum: d75c54cc890ca82cb677917d1d98b8e8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-23T17:39:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Barbara Bedin.pdf: 599045 bytes, checksum: d75c54cc890ca82cb677917d1d98b8e8 (MD5) / The health is a part of the government´s permanent concerns agenda and also of non-governmental entities at the entire world. The worker´s health as collective interest subject is inserted inside of this context. In Brazil, where the occupational diseases and accidents is significant, it accounts itself demanded more and more attention from the competent authorities to promote public politics that they strengthen the prevention and the security in the environment of the labor. This work has as objective to identify the Economic Theory´s incentives system and apply them in the Labor Law as instrument of help in the prevention or reduction of the labor misfortunes, through the Economic Analysis of the Law. To observe the Law not only as a coercion system, but also as a incentives system with implicit prices it allows that the individuals´ choices are directed to the proposed objectives by the legislation.

A presente dissertação analisa como a ausência de incentivos adequados no seguro saúde ocasiona o surgimento do fenômeno conhecido como risco moral e suas conseqüências na determinação da demanda de serviços médicos. O trabalho envolve a revisão da literatura e a estimação de um modelo econométrico que avalia a efetividade dos mecanismos de regulação no controle do risco moral por parte do paciente. A principal conclusão é que o risco moral por parte do paciente é importante para os serviços ambulatoriais, mas não ocorre nos serviços hospitalares. / This dissertation analyses how the lack of appropriate incentives motivates the emergence of moral hazard in health insurance and its consequences in the determination of medical services demand. The involves the literature review and the estimation of a econometric model, which evaluates the effectiveness of rationing mechanisms in the control of moral hazard motivated by the patient. The main conclusion is that moral hazard motivated by the patient is significant for ambulatory care, but it does not occur for inpatient care.

A saúde faz parte da agenda de preocupações permanentes do governo e também de entidades não-governamentais de todo o mundo. A saúde do trabalhador, como assunto de interesse coletivo, está inserida dentro desse contexto. No Brasil, onde o índice de acidentes e doenças ocupacionais é significativo, tem-se exigido cada vez mais atenção das autoridades competentes para promover políticas públicas, que reforçem a prevenção e a segurança no meio ambiente do trabalho. Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar o sistema de incentivos, da Teoria Econômica e aplicá-los no Direito do Trabalho como instrumento de auxilio na prevenção ou diminuição dos infortúnios laborais, através da Análise Econômica do Direito. Observar o Direito não só como um sistema de coerção, mas também como um sistema de incentivos com preços implícitos permite que se direcionem as escolhas dos indivíduos aos objetivos propostos pela legislação. / The health is a part of the government´s permanent concerns agenda and also of non-governmental entities at the entire world. The worker´s health as collective interest subject is inserted inside of this context. In Brazil, where the occupational diseases and accidents is significant, it accounts itself demanded more and more attention from the competent authorities to promote public politics that they strengthen the prevention and the security in the environment of the labor. This work has as objective to identify the Economic Theory´s incentives system and apply them in the Labor Law as instrument of help in the prevention or reduction of the labor misfortunes, through the Economic Analysis of the Law. To observe the Law not only as a coercion system, but also as a incentives system with implicit prices it allows that the individuals´ choices are directed to the proposed objectives by the legislation.

The article presents a selective review of the literature that exposes and analyzes the results of ten empirical studies on the consequences of the application of economic incentives in academia in a context of global transformation of the university. The first part presents a brief description of incentive systems known as merit pay plans, their main characteristics and the objectives of their implementation. The second part presents the main research findings developed in the USA, Germany, Australia, Estonia, Pakistan, Argentina and Mexico, and the reported effects on productivity, motivation and teacher satisfaction. Concludes with the discussion of critical aspects in the implementation and evaluation of merit-based payment systems. / El estudio presenta una revisión selectiva de la literatura que expone y analiza los resultados de diez investigaciones empíricas sobre las consecuencias de la aplicación de incentivos económicos en la academia, en un contexto de transformación de la organización universitaria a nivel global. La primera parte presenta una breve descripción de los sistemas de incentivos denominados pago por méritos, sus principales características y los objetivos de su implementación.La segunda parte expone los principales hallazgos de investigaciones desarrolladas en EUA, Alemania, Australia, Estonia, Pakistán, Argentina y México, y los efectos reportados en la productividad, la motivación y la satisfacción del profesorado.Concluye con la discusión de los aspectos críticos en la implementación y evaluación de los sistemas de pago por mérito.

Les agroécosystèmes font face à un déclin des services écosystémiques (SE) de régulation, non-marchands. Nous l’interprétons via deux concepts économiques : les biens publics qui appellent une régulation, et la production jointe qui souligne les conséquences des interactions entre SE dans leur régulation.Cette thèse étudie comment accroître la fourniture de SE non-marchands par des incitations économiques, en prenant en compte la multiplicité des SE et les interactions entre eux.Nous étudions d’abord la régulation des biens publics joints à l’aide de microéconomie théorique. Ensuite, nous menons une analyse appliquée avec des données agroécologiques simulées et des méthodes numériques pour définir les solutions coût-efficientes et les incitations pour leur mise en œuvre. Nous comparons plus particulièrement les incitations basées sur les actions et sur les résultats.Nous montrons théoriquement que les interactions entre SE rendent leur régulation plus complexe, notamment avec des incitations basées sur les résultats, et quand le coût varie selon les bouquets de SE. Dans l’analyse appliquée, nous montrons que prendre en compte le coût de la fourniture des SE est crucial pour maximiser leur fourniture avec un budget limité. Nous montrons que les incitations basées sur les résultats sélectionnent les solutions coût-efficientes mais induisent un budget plus élevé que les incitations basées sur les actions, à cause des interactions entre SE. Enfin, nous montrons que l’analyse à l’échelle du paysage et l’hétérogénéité modifient les solutions qui maximisent les SE, mais pas les propriétés des deux types d’incitations.Nos résultats soulignent que les politiques agro-environnementales doivent cibler les services écosystémiques de manière intégrée, si possible à l’échelle de la ferme ou du paysage et considérer le coût de leur fourniture. Les incitations basées sur les résultats ne sont pas la solution à tous les problèmes des politiques agroenvironnementales. / Agroecosystems show a decline in regulating, non-marketed ecosystem services (ES). We interpret this decline through two economic concepts: public goods, which call for regulation, and joint production, which underlines the role of interactions among ecosystem services in their regulation.This thesis studies how to increase the provision of non-marketed ES through the implementation of economic incentives, while accounting for their multiplicity and the complex interactions among them.We first study the regulation of joint public goods with microeconomic theory. We then carry an applied analysis with simulated agroecological data and numerical methods to define cost-efficient solutions and simulate the implementation these solutions with economic incentives. We especially compare result-based and action-based incentives.We show theoretically that interactions among ES make their regulation more complex, especially with result-based incentives and when the production cost varies among bundles of ES. In the applied analysis, we show that accounting for the cost is crucial to maximise ES with a limited budget. We show that result-based incentives select cost-efficient bundles of ES but lead to higher policy budgets than action-based ones, due to interactions among ES. Eventually, we show that considering the landscape scale and heterogeneity plays on the solutions maximising ES, but not on the comparison between result-based and action-based incentives.Our results underline that agri-environmental policies need to target ES in a integrative way, at the farm or landscape scale, and consider the cost of providing non-marketed ES. Result-based incentives don’t solve all issues of agri-environmental policies.

Efficient waste management enables the protection of human health, reducing environmental pollution, saving of natural resources, and achieving sustainable and profitable management of energy. In many countries, the general guidelines for waste management are set by national or local waste management plans. Various models provide local authorities with decision-making tools in planning long-term waste management scenarios.This study aims at providing a special model framework for the evaluation of ecological–economic efficiency (ECO-EE) of waste management. This will serve as an information support tool for decision making by actors of a solid waste management (SWM) scheme, primarily at the municipal and regional levels. The objective of this study is to apply the waste management’s efficient decision (WAMED) model along with the company statistical business tool for environmental recovery indicator (COSTBUSTER) model to SWM and municipal solid waste (MSW) schemes in general in order to evaluate and improve their ECO-EE. COSTBUSTER is a mathematical indicator for the size and extent of implementation costs of a certain SWM scheme, compared with the total size of the average financial budget of a SWM actor of a certain kind. In particular, WAMED is proposed for evaluating the suitability to invest in baling technology. Baling of solid waste is an emerging technology which is extensively used worldwide to temporarily store waste for either incineration or recovery of raw materials. The model for efficient use of resources for optimal production economy (the EUROPE model) is for the first time applied to emissions from baling facilities. It has been analysed how cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and full cost accounting (FCA) can facilitate environmental optimisation of SWM schemes. The effort in this work represents a continuation of such ambitions as an enlargement of the research area of CBA based modelling within SWM. In the thesis, certain theoretical and economic aspects of SWM were analysed as case studies. A shift of viewpoints within the field of waste management is presented. This shift is in accordance with the prevailing concept of sustainable development, as commonly understood. It is concluded that in the practical SWM context, the findings of the study point at the possibilities to modify the common CBA- and FCA-based methods by WAMED, COSTBUSTER, and EUROPE. Therefore, it can be said that estimations in a SWM scheme can be carried out by using certain economic model, if properly modified in a logical and plausible way. New principles for cost allocation to SWM residual products are presented in the current work. They imply strong industrial cost saving incentives through promoting the introduction of new and improved processing technologies for rest-waste. Such incentives then strongly promote investments that are likely to improve both the environment and the corporate profitability. Thereby, the occurrence of non-commercialised, and hence not utilized, wastes is reduced. This improves the short term corporate economy through saving raw materials such as solid waste fuel, spending less time for administrating waste flows, and less wear and tear of the plant machinery. Additional environmental advantages which affect the balance sheets in a favourable way are related to the long-term business economy and extended environmental goodwill. This is due to the recently introduced way of considering solid waste as regular goods in financial terms - the equality principle. If waste is seen as goods, and not wasted in landfills, the environment will improve. This, in turn, leads to an improved quality of life. Based on the current study, it is recommended to apply WAMED to SWM schemes in order to evaluate their ECO–EE to justify decision making and investments. Also, it is recommended to apply COSTBUSTER, based on the current WAMED outcome, to SWM schemes to determine their relative size and extent. It is recommended to apply EUROPE to the emissions in case of accidental burning, treatment of leachate, andabatement with odours at any SWM scheme, based on the induced economic incentives, in order to reduce unwanted substances and phenomena.

Les politiques de confidentialité définissent comment les services en ligne collectent, utilisent et partagent les données des utilisateurs. Bien qu’étant le principal moyen pour informer les usagers de l’utilisation de leurs données privées, les politiques de confidentialité sont en général ignorées par ces derniers. Pour cause, les utilisateurs les trouvent trop longues et trop vagues, elles utilisent un vocabulaire souvent difficile et n’ont pas de format standard. Les politiques de confidentialité confrontent également les utilisateurs à un dilemme : celui d’accepter obligatoirement tout le contenu en vue d’utiliser le service ou refuser le contenu sous peine de ne pas y avoir accès. Aucune autre option n’est accordée à l’utilisateur. Les données collectées des utilisateurs permettent aux services en ligne de leur fournir un service, mais aussi de les exploiter à des fins économiques (publicités ciblées, revente, etc). Selon diverses études, permettre aux utilisateurs de bénéficier de cette économie de la vie privée pourrait restaurer leur confiance et faciliter une continuité des échanges sur Internet. Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons un modèle de politique de confidentialité, inspiré du P3P (une recommandation du W3C, World Wide Web Consortium), en élargissant ses fonctionnalités et en réduisant sa complexité. Ce modèle suit un format bien défini permettant aux utilisateurs et aux services en ligne de définir leurs préférences et besoins. Les utilisateurs ont la possibilité de décider de l’usage spécifique et des conditions de partage de chacune de leurs données privées. Une phase de négociation permettra une analyse des besoins du service en ligne et des préférences de l’utilisateur afin d’établir un contrat de confidentialité. La valeur des données personnelles est un aspect important de notre étude. Alors que les compagnies disposent de moyens leur permettant d’évaluer cette valeur, nous appliquons dans ce mémoire, une méthode hiérarchique multicritères. Cette méthode va permettre également à chaque utilisateur de donner une valeur à ses données personnelles en fonction de l’importance qu’il y accorde. Dans ce modèle, nous intégrons également une autorité de régulation en charge de mener les négociations entre utilisateurs et services en ligne, et de générer des recommandations aux usagers en fonction de leur profil et des tendances. / Privacy policies define the way online services collect, use and share users’ data. Although they are the main channel through which users are informed about the use of their private data, privacy policies are generally ignored by them. This is due to their long and vague content, their difficult vocabulary and their no standard format. Privacy policies also confront users to a dilemma. Indeed, they must agree to all their content in order to use the service or reject it, and in this case they do not have access to the service. No other alternative is given to the user. Online services process data collected from users to provide them a service, but they also exploit those data for economic purposes (targeted advertising, resale, etc.). According to various studies, allowing users to benefit from the use of their data could restore their trust towards online services and facilitate data exchanges on the Internet. In this work, we propose a new model of privacy policy, inspired by the P3P (a World Wide Web Consortium - W3C Recommendation) but increasing its functionalities and reducing its complexity. This model defines a specific structure allowing users and online services to define their preferences and needs. Users have the opportunity to decide for each of their private data, specifying how it will be used and shared. A negotiation phase will allow a needs analysis of the online service and preferences of the user to establish a confidentiality agreement. The value of personal data is also an important aspect of our study. While companies have resources allowing them to rate this value, we apply in this thesis, a hierarchical multi-criteria method. This method will allow each user to give value to his personal data according to the importance he attaches to it. In this model, we also integrate a regulation authority. It is in charge of conducting negotiations between users and online services, and generate recommendations to users based on their profile and current trends.

Title from second page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-154).

Cette thèse s’intéresse à plusieurs questions posées par l’introduction et la généralisation, en France, d’incitatifs économiques de type P4P appliqués à la médecine générale. Ces schémas incitatifs (CAPI, ROSP) ont pour objectif d’améliorer la qualité des soins, mais ils sont débattus en termes d’efficience et d’effets indésirables potentiels. Dans un premier temps, nous évaluons l’impact du CAPI sur différents indicateurs de la qualité des soins : la durée de la consultation et le dépistage des cancers. Puis, nous étudions les modalités d’une meilleure implication du médecin généraliste (MG) dans le dépistage des cancers, en appliquant la méthodologie des choix discrets. Enfin, nous analysons la relation entre motivations intrinsèques et extrinsèques des MGs français. Nous montrons que le CAPI n’a pas eu d’impact significatif sur les indicateurs de qualité considérés et que les MGs seraient sensibles à d’autres dispositifs non monétaires potentiellement moins coûteux. Enfin, nous mettons en évidence une relation de substituabilité entre motivations intrinsèques et extrinsèques. Ces résultats invitent à davantage de prudence dans la définition des incitatifs économiques en médecine générale. / This thesis addresses several issues raised by the introduction in France of economic incentives such as pay-For-Performance applied to general practice. These incentive schemes are designed to improve the quality of care, but they are discussed both in terms of effectiveness and potential side effects. Initially, we assess the impact of the CAPI scheme on various indicators of quality of care: the consultation length and cancers screening. Then, using the discrete choice experiment methodology, we reveal general practitioners (GPs) preferences for devices aimed at improving the early detection of cancers. Finally, we analyse empirically the relationship between French GPs' intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. We show that the CAPI has not had a significant impact on the selected quality indicators. In addition, GPs would be sensitive to potentially less costly nonmonetary devices. Eventually, we highlight a negative relationship between GPs' intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Our results call for greater caution in the definition of economic incentives in general practice.

This work delves into the modalities of Chinese economic incentives and their reception in Kyrgyzstan. After tracing the rise of China as the main economic power in Central Asia since 2000, it uses Blanchard's and Ripsman's theory of economic statecraft to evaluate Kyrgyzstan's level of stateness and its susceptibility to economic inducements during president Atambayev's era. The objective is to address the issue of economic statecraft from the perspective of the target state and explain why Kyrgyzstan's co-operation with China has been less successful than in the case of other Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan's overall level of stateness was low but it did not result in compliance with Chinese demands. Instead, the low level of stateness prevented the government from overcoming domestic resistance to Chinese projects and implementing compliant behavior. Developmental aid and investment designed to favor the expansion of Chinese enterprises failed to gain the support of public opinion and contributed to the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment due to their involvement in corruption affairs and public scandals. Russia as a third-party actor represented an alternative for Kyrgyz policymakers and might have supported the resistance to Chinese endeavors.