Thèse--Sorbonne. / Without thesis statement. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Munich. / Bibliography: p. 211-214.

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit, Utrecht, 1951. / "Stellingen": [2] p. inserted. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit, Utrecht, 1951. / "Stellingen": [2] p. inserted. Includes bibliographical references.

It is required for a theologian, who is committed to both faith and theology, to keep integrity in order to not lose the continuity between them. This may cause two serious inner problems. The first is with the authenticity of one’s personal faith, because the theologian, due to the theological training, no longer see the Bible in the way s/he used to do. And the other is with the vocation of contributing to the faith community, because the theologian, due to the recognition that pious expressions of faith are not technically accurate, may feel uncomfortable with using religious language especially when preaching. The first problem could be solved by establishing hermeneutical perspective on the biblical interpretation, which shows the impossibility of literalist reading of the Bible and the importance of readers’ existential self-understanding in interpretation and thus affirms diverse interpretations to be authentic. Also, one of the most distinct features of Christianity is the translatability—to translate requires interpretation—of the Bible under and into particular contexts. Accordingly, the form of Christian faith does not have to be so universal that an individual believer’s interpretation is seriously prohibited. The latter problem may be deleted if one understands the nature of symbolic language, the use of which is necessary in revealing the truth and thus enables a doubly-committed theologian to help the Church. For something ultimate and infinite can never be gripped by something contingent and finite. In so doing, however, one must bear in mind that the symbolic language also unavoidably distorts that which is symbolized.

The dissertation pursues the thesis that although Karol Wojtyła makes great strides in expanding the notion of subjectivity beyond consciousness and then establishing the other as acting subject as the foundation for ethical personalism, his analysis could be significantly enhanced through engagement with the classical Confucian interpersonal ethical sensibility. After all, Wojtyła reviles both individualistic and collectivistic forms of ethics. With Jean-Paul Sartre functioning as a foil for the purposes of appraisal, we can see how Wojtyła extends the notion of subjectivity into the dimension of action and how he establishes the person and, moreover, the other as subject, that is, as acting subject. Subjectivity understood on the basis of action instead of (as reducible to) consciousness is compatible with the personalistic ethical postulate “to treat the other not as an object but as a subject.” On Wojtyła’s account, ethical action is an interaction ipso facto and implies intersubjectivity insofar as one’s action is guided by the other’s subjectivity. What is more, Wojtyła contends not only that the subject is the person but also that person is act. In so doing, he has set the stage for an interpersonal ethics that is the middle way between individualistic and collectivistic forms of ethics. The trajectory of Wojtyła’s ethics bends toward the interpersonal dimension of the human condition, but, perhaps held back by his metaphysics and soteriology, he never fully or methodically develops this interpersonal ethical sensibility. It is regarding this lack that an appeal to Confucius and classical Confucianism is auspicious. Indeed, there is a somewhat surprising but striking compatibility between Wojtyłan personalist ethics and classical Confucian humanistic ethics. They are both built around the interpersonal dimension. While the interpersonal ethical sensibility of the classical Confucians lacks modern theoretical development, unlike Wojtyła they provide vivid descriptions of interpersonal ethical conduct and a clearer vision for an interpersonal ethical program. What emerges from adapting Wojtyła’s ethics to the classical Confucian interpersonal ethical sensibility is enhancement of the Wojtyłan interpersonal ethos and a comprehensive interpersonalist ethics.

AGUIAR, Eliana Sales Paiva. Conflito e intersubjetividade em o ser e o nada de Sartre. 2003. 115f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2003. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T12:26:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2003-DIS-ESPAGUIAR.pdf: 412299 bytes, checksum: 6c6205b9546a5674cb21d6d64b5dd0f2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-05T12:38:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2003-DIS-ESPAGUIAR.pdf: 412299 bytes, checksum: 6c6205b9546a5674cb21d6d64b5dd0f2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-05T12:38:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2003-DIS-ESPAGUIAR.pdf: 412299 bytes, checksum: 6c6205b9546a5674cb21d6d64b5dd0f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 / This dissertation intends to comprehend the matter over human relations on a philosophical existential perspective as from the point of view of Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness, presenting a constitutive contribution to its dimension of the conflict. Such theme is presented here in four chapters. At the first one, “the pursuit of being”, we deal with the rupture of Sartre towards the substantital and objectives ontologies, as well as with his proposal about a phenomenological existential ontology as a condition of possibility to approach philosophically the category of the other. At the second chapter, “Subjectivity and Conscience”, we set our heart on clarifying the conceptual reach of Sartre about the Dialectical Concept of Being (In-Itself and For-Itself), and about the possibilities of the existential activities (freedom and autonomy of choice) to understand the dichotomy existing in the intersubjective relations. At the chapter three, “Being-For-Other: Alterity”, is revealed the structure of the Being-For-Other, as well as the meaning of being-with-others. On a special way, the theme of looking at points out to the conflictual dimension in which is mixed upo the set of topics of the intersubjectivity of the author we are studying. At the last chapter, “Conflict: The Original Meaning of Intersubjectivity”, we demonstrate the connection with the conflict in the intersubjective relations and the project of the For-Itself expressing plainly and objectively the In-Itself and the For-Other. We also considered about the position of the philosophical occidental tradition, which has solved conflicts and violence, as well as the and the proportion of the problem in Sartre detailing the importance of the acceptation of the conflict as a possibility of the subjectivity to constitute the condition of being, confronting the dilemma of the struggle with the different as a challenge of the human condition. / Essa dissertação objetiva compreender a questão das relações humanas numa perspectiva filosófico-existencial a partir da obra O ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre, cuja contribuição apresenta como constitutiva a sua dimensão de conflito. Tal tema é exposto em quatro capítulos. No primeiro, “Da Existência”, tratamos da ruptura sartreana com as ontologias substancialobjetivas e da sua proposta de uma ontologia fenomenológico-existencial como condição de possibilidade para abordar filosoficamente a categoria do outro. No segundo capítulo, “Subjetividade e Consciência”, ambicionamos esclarecer o alcance conceitual sartreano a propósito das existências diferenciadas (Em-si e Para-si) e das possibilidades das atividades existenciais (liberdade e autonomia de escolha) para compreender a dicotomia presente nas relações intersubjetivas. No capítulo terceiro, “O Ser-Para-Outro: A Alteridade”, é exposto a estrutura do Ser-Para-Outro e o sentido para o existir-com-os-outros. De modo especial, o tema do olhar aponta para a dimensão conflituosa em que está enredada a temática da intersubjetividade no autor em pauta. No último capítulo, “Conflito: O Sentido Original da Intersubjetividade”, demonstramos a relação entre o conflito nas relações intersubjetivas e o projeto do Para-si ensejando objetivar plenamente o Em-si e o Para-outro. Refletimos, também, sobre o posicionamento da tradição filosófica ocidental que equacionou conflito e violência e o redimensionamento do problema em Sartre ao explicitar a importância da aceitação do conflito como possibilidade da subjetividade constituir-se na condição de sujeito, enfrentando o dilema do encontro com o diferente como um desafio da condição humana.

The guiding question of this project is, "Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?" A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger's own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact-value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is that Being and Time is an ethics in the same way Nicomachean Ethics is an ethics: both are based on an understanding of the human ethos and attempt to show what is characteristic of a life that is structured by the "ought." This argument sets the stage for uncovering the underlying presuppositions governing two prominent objections raised against Heidegger: the existentialist and nihilistic critiques. I find that these critiques are grounded on the assumption of "ontological individualism." In contrast to this individualistic ontology of the social world, I argue that, for Heidegger, individuality is not an ontological or biological given; rather, it is a relatively rare accomplishment of members of a linguistic community. What is important, in Heidegger's view, is that the ethos is the ontological bedrock of ethics. The ethos does not offer us universal principles or morals rules of the kind modern morality seeks, but it does provide paths, ways of being, and possibilities for living meaningful lives. In the end, all we have are understandings of life in certain domains (art, religion, love, etc.) that provide character ideals that, together with meaningful goals and projects for the whole of our lives, make possible a flourishing ethos. My secondary goal is to demonstrate that Heidegger undercuts the uncritical presuppositions of much of mainstream moral philosophy and provides an alternative account of ethics that picks up the stick from the other end. I formulate my thesis as an extension of the recent scholarship on Heidegger's work, arguing that Heidegger's emphasis on the human ethos puts forth a proper way of dwelling and Being-at-home within the current of the historical essence of a community. What is original about Heidegger's post-humanist ethics is that it denies the modern Being-Ought distinction and calls us to be ready and prepared to be claimed by Being. Refusing to give an absolute position to anthropomorphism, Heidegger's ethics serves as an attempt to specify what it is to be fully human in the sense of being a respondent who receives an understanding of Being and has to own up to the task of being claimed by Being. If I am correct, then it is a mistake to judge Heidegger's ethics according to whether he succeeds at formulating a list of responsibilities, rights, and obligations of individuals. Whereas modern moral theory is concerned with providing impartial and value-free guidelines and principles for individual behavior, Heidegger is asking about the conditions for the possibility of transforming how one lives. This puts the burden of proof on those who think there is something important about moral theory. The onus of proof rests with those who want to claim that a right way to be human exists and that there is an absolute, unchanging, timeless ground for understanding the right.

Much of the criticism Heidegger has drawn from realism, from postmodernism and even existentialism, as well from the anti-Nazi protests on his philosophy, could be diluted if a defaulted connection was made between Heidegger's metaphysics and the Greeks. Being and Time drafted the blueprint of the origin of predication and world-disclosure from the primordial intuition of the limitations of action in the face of human finitude. This existential reprioritization forced a radical reversal of primacy from nature to culture, having assumed the absolute objectivity of some original world determinacy, the phenomenological structure of which, nevertheless, was never produced in Heidegger’s seminal work or thereafter. Existentialism has thus been downplayed as a counterintuitive, fanciful hypothesis, and will remain so for as long as horizontal temporality has not made itself available to itself as a negated object of perception in the horizon of disclosure. The objectified subjectivity of Dasein’s cultural bias should be demonstrable, if there is indeed a determinant even firmer and “causally prior” to the object of perception in reified nature. And the theory of freedom that is existentialism will remain a “theory” with a private definition of the term, if both the phenomenological structures of the “objectification” of subjectivity have not appeared: first as the objectivity of freedom that is absolute and universal, but no less than as the object that frees made up from nothing other than the absolute and universal objectivity of freedom. Heidegger must have felt this most pressing shortcoming in his metaphysics, because in a later monumental work, The Origin of the Work of Art, he avowed of such an object that is both the programmatic manifesto of freedom, and frees, pointing to the Greek Doric temple. He must have realized that the highest objectification of Dasein’s volatile subjectivity was somehow of “Greek” origin, and as I will argue, in this assumption alone he was right. But his proof was premised therein in an incomplete, trivial and self-contradictory way that left exposed to counter-entrenchment his arguments over both the attribution of the origin of reality, and consequently also its subjective constitution. From this point on, existentialism has remained doggedly problematic, if not inconsequential, in being unconnected to its bloodline, that is, phenomenology, and inasmuch as Heidegger’s incomplete metaphysics has remained unconnected to his miscued art theory. My hermeneutic method seeks this elusive, twofold objectification of subjectivity, in order to justify existentialism by simultaneously making the missing connections between Heidegger and the Greeks, and between Being and Time and The Origin of the Work of Art. The connections I am suggesting are both necessary and possible, provided that Heidegger’s theory of art is modified to grant monumental statuary its due hermeneutic primacy. Heidegger attributed the disclosure of world in truth-as-untruth to poetry and architecture, while Gadamer, who advanced Heidegger’s phenomenology to the currently predominant hermeneutic theory, also gave primacy to poetry and architecture. Their mistake is critical, because, as I will argue, Greek statuary is the patent twofold objectification of Dasein’s existential analytic, it is the convergence point of evidence to infer Heidegger’s missing theory of embodiment, and it is the ultimate origin of Western metaphysics. Current theories of embodiment, including Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological case from where a missing dialogue has been attempted to derive Heidegger's theory of embodiment, typically confine themselves to Dasein’s ontological and ontic corporeality. I suggest that such theories should have addressed the necessity of the structures of Reason to incarnate themselves as the fundamental ontological prescriptions of perception. To address the necessity of this incarnation in monumental art as a primordial world disclosure, is to explore in this work a previously untapped tripartite hermeneutic conjecture, where theory of art and theory of embodiment are already theories of perception. My hermeneutic hypothesis adheres to, corroborates and advances basic phenomenological principles, to show how Dasein’s embodied structures in the exclusivity of Greek statuary have so far been misunderstood, decontextualized, and begged the question, accordingly as a “mystery” (Hegel), as “godly” (von Humboldt), as a “misunderstanding” (Buschor), or as “Greek naturalism” (art historians). Special attention will be paid to works such as the Laokoön Group, the Ptoan Apollo, the Blond Youth, the Zeus of Artemision and the Gigantomachy. I argue that these cultural fossils provide the most reliable grounds for a thorough commentary to Heidegger’s implied theory of embodiment, because they manifest as the art which relates most intimately to the instrumental modality through which the being-towards-death makes itself phenomenologically available to itself as the negation of the negation to live. Additionally, and in a postmodern world of academic wars that have claimed every aspect of Greek culture as stolen from other great civilizations, such solely uncontested cultural fossils are arguably the unsolicited proof classicists have been unable to produce regarding the exclusively Greek origin of Western metaphysics. The most consequential thrust of this work seeks to revitalize Heidegger’s claim regarding the origin and the chronology of world against competing alternatives such as Christian metaphysics, science’s Big Bang Theory, or the emasculated feminist case regarding the metaphysical primacy of the womb. The ultimate contribution this work aspires to, is the empowering of a presently stalled paradigm shift from the scientific to an existential-phenomenological world view. This shift would be akin to the one which procured with the advent of the Enlightenment between science and religion - a clash still raging in education – where further progress now demands that humanity leaves behind the disguised alienation which Heidegger himself coined as “the dictatorship of science.”

The war novel is a significant genre in twentieth-century Canadian fiction. Central to that genre has been the soldier’s narrative. Canadian war novelists have often situated the soldier’s story in opposition to how war has functioned in Canadian cultural memory, which usually posits war as a necessary, though brutal, galvanizing force. This dissertation on how novelists depict the Canadian soldier represents a crucial opportunity to examine Canadian cultures of militarization and how Canadian identity has been formed in close identification with the mutable figure of the soldier. The most sophisticated Canadian war novels engage with how militarism functions as a grand narrative in Canadian society, while enabling Canadians to speak about issues related to war that tend to be over-simplified or elided. This dissertation examines emblematic Canadian war novels – The Imperialist by Sara Jeanette Duncan, Generals Die in Bed by Charles Yale Harrison, Turvey by Earle Birney, Execution by Colin McDougall, The Wars by Timothy Findley, Broken Ground by Jack Hodgins, The Stone Carvers by Jane Urquhart, etc. – in order to trace how the representation of the Canadian soldier has shifted throughout the twentieth-century. Canadian war novels are culturally cathartic exercises wherein received notions of Canadian moral and military superiority can be safely questioned. The Canadian soldier, often characterized in official discourse as the personification of duty and sacrifice, has been reimagined by war novelists throughout the twentieth century as a site of skepticism and resistance. In many Canadian war novels, the soldier affords the opportunity to claim counter-histories, reject master narratives, and posit new originary myths.