This is a series of daily writings. Each day consists of a new topic and is closed at the end of the day. The ideas presented are philosophical, humorous, rambling, lamentations, incantations, doubt-ridden, aesthetic pep talks which combine into an affective representation of my studio practice’s becoming. There will be little congruency, some stories, and a lot of parallels because that is who I am.

Risken för att vara med om en fysisk arbetsrelaterad olycka är något som arbetare inom bland annat industri och byggarbeten ofta är utsatta för. Denna studies fokus är att finna en grundkategori hos yrkesaktiva inom fem olika riskrelaterade yrkesområden inom bygg och industri och undersöka riskens omfång. Med en Grundad teoretisk metod så utarbetas en teori från analys av empiriskt material bestående av en intervju vardera med fem individer som är yrkesaktiva inom olika riskrelaterade yrkesområden. Resultatet visar en kärnkategori: Riskerfarenhet som resurs. Den grundade teorin presenterad i denna studie omfattar en kärnkategori och även sju olika tillhörande kategorier med respektive egenskaper och variationer. Dessa sju tillhörande kategorier är: Låg Risk, Hög Risk, Arbetsplatsutrustning, Chefer & Skyddsombud, Arbetsfria vardagen, Utökat Säkerhetsansvar och Organisation. Denna teori är generaliserbar och besvarar frågeställningen och forskningsfrågan inom problemområdet i relation till en individuell och organisationell nivå.

A investigação a que se propõe o presente trabalho volta-se à possibilidade de se alcançar uma noção existencial de amor, a partir da análise do percurso fenomenológico trilhado pelo filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger, bem como ponderar a sua importância para a busca do justo. Apartando-se de toda interpretação psicossubjetiva e do âmbito axiológico das apreciações e, portanto, distanciando-se de toda sentimentalidade e comodidade dos sentimentos, tal como recomendara Heidegger nas preleções do semestre de inverno entre 1928 e 1929, o amor enquanto fenômeno é, aqui, perquirido com vistas a uma determinação ontológico-fundamental do Dasein. Todavia, para que esta busca se desenvolva de modo coeso ao pensamento do filósofo, é imprescindível que se lance o olhar ao caminho que levara a constituição de seu pensamento. Dessa forma, não se pode ignorar a proveniência teológica de seu pensar, sobretudo no que tange à interpretação da antropologia agostiniana greco-cristã, por Heidegger redirecionada às bases essenciais da ontologia aristotélica. Com efeito, fora a partir de uma passagem de Agostinho, reproduzida por Heidegger em uma carta endereçada à Hannah Arendt, que o filósofo alemão assinalara o amor como um volo, ut sis, um modo de abertura que libera e deixa-ser o que é no movimento mesmo de seu por-vir. Ademais, a pergunta pelo amor deve estabelecer-se de modo a lançar-nos ao que é mais próprio ao amor, e será no retorno à experiência do pensamento grego arcaico e pré-socrático, não como mera recuperação histórica, mas como um salto retroativo para onde provém o pensar do ser como presença constante, que o termo recobrará a sua essência. Como um deixar-ser o que é, o amor, então, revelar-se-á como um modo originário de acesso à verdade, e como tal sobressairá a sua importância, enquanto caminho hermenêutico, para a investigação do justo. / The research that proposes this work back to the possibility of reaching an existential notion of love, from the analysis of the phenomenological path trodden by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger and consider its importance to the search of the fair. Detaching itself from all psycho-subjective interpretation and axiological framework of assessments and thus distancing itself from all sentimentality and comfort of feelings, as recommended Heidegger in the lectures of winter semester between 1928 and 1929, love as a phenomenon is, here, investigated with a view to a fundamental ontological-determination of the Dasein. However, for this search develop into the cohesive way to the thought of the philosopher, it is essential to move the eye to the path that led him to build his thinking. Thus, one can not ignore the theological origin of your thinking, especially regarding the interpretation of the greek-christian augustinian anthropology, redirected by Heidegger to the essential foundations of Aristotelian ontology. Indeed, it was from a passage of Augustine, remembered by Heidegger in a letter to Hannah Arendt, that the German philosopher pointed out love as a volo, ut sis, a way of opening that frees and let-be which is the same movement of your to-come. Moreover, the question of love should be established in order to drive us to what is most proper to love, and will be through the return to the experience of ancient greek and pre-socratic thought, not as mere historical recovery, but as a retroactive jump where comes the thought of being as constant presence, that the term return to his essence. As a letting-be what is, love, then, will prove to be an original way of access to the truth, and as such will raise its importance, while hermeneutical way, to research the fair.

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / Per Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, existentialism is the profound truth that the world lacks inherent meaning and thus, we are radically free to choose, to live life as we please. While these assertions are both true and liberating and the theoretical level, these axioms leave individuals disoriented. They never answer the question: how does one live within an absurd world? Thus, these authors never give us a way of coping with the harsh repercussions of absurdity. To answer this question, this project turns to intersubjectivity and the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas’s theory of the other demonstrates that we are not merely beings in a vacuum; the world is conditioned by the interpersonal. Relating to the Other allows us to see that we are not alone in our suffering, for the Other and the individual mutually witness one another. Such connections provide a means of coping with absurdity, allowing us both solidarity and insight into the truly absurd nature of the world. Thus, the application of Levinas’s intersubjectivity to existentialism serves to save Camus’s notion of absurdity from its more nihilistic tendencies, allowing us to accept and apprehend absurdity without falling into despair or ignorance. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: John Michalczyk / Despite a long affiliation with film dating back to the French New Wave, existentialism has remained a fascination reserved for art film producers and intellectual viewers for decades. In the early twenty-first century, director Christopher Nolan’s Batman trilogy marked the first time existentialism bubbled over from niche art films into the most blatant form of popular culture: the summer blockbuster. This analysis explores Batman Begins and The Dark Knight as up-to-date pictures of modern existentialism, embodied by Bruce Wayne’s journey through fear, chaos and rebirth, mirroring the existentialist advancement through uncertainty to freedom and self-creation. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Written within an existentialist mode, Nakamura Fuminori’s early fictional works lend themselves to be read as therapeutic technologies reaching out to Japanese youth whose lives are marked by anxiety, isolation, and precariousness. Because English-language scholarship on Nakamura is lacking, this thesis analyzes two of his novels – Child of Dirt and Evil and the Mask – in order to introduce how Nakamura understands the human, how his texts function formally as therapeutic technologies, and how, in the final analysis, they exhibit a nascent sexism that borders on misogyny.

As Moscas (Les Mouches, 1943) representa o início da carreira de Jean-Paul Sartre como dramaturgo e o de seu \"teatro de situações\". Do mesmo ano de O Ser e o Nada - obra-prima do existencialismo sartriano-, a peça é uma versão existencialista da lenda grega de Orestes. Este é o filho do rei Agamêmnon - comandante das tropas gregas na Guerra de Tróia - que, com a irmã Electra, se vinga dos assassinos de seu pai, Egisto e a rainha Clitemnestra, esposa de Agamêmnon e mãe deles. O episódio foi revisitado pelos três grandes poetas da tragédia clássica, Ésquilo, Sófocles e Eurípides. Em As Moscas Sartre transforma a vingança de Orestes em metáfora para os temas da liberdade e da má - fé e para a crítica à idéia tradicional de \"destino\" como em voga, no governo autoritário de Vichy, durante a Ocupação nazista da França (1940-44). Esse governo, apoiado pela hierarquia da Igreja Católica francesa, difundia uma ideologia \"religiosa\" de culpa e resignação diante da derrota militar frente a Hitler. A peça de Sartre pode, assim, ser lida como apologia ao movimento da Resistência antifascista dos franceses. Neste trabalho realizamos avaliação dos significados do mito em As Moscas. Considerando mas também indo além de seu sentido mais imediato de alegoria política, procuramos, à luz do ensaio clássico de Mircea Eliade de O Mito do Eterno Retorno, esclarecer as bases de um possível diálogo implícito da peça com o \"pensamento mítico\" universal, diálogo o qual é constituído por um movimento de crítica e de re-apropriação existencialista do valor \"arquetípico\" das narrativas míticas. O que se pretende mostrar é, sobretudo, que a peça de Sartre opera uma destruição e recriação do que Eliade chama de ontologia arcaica, estrutura de pensamento \"mítica\" porque calcada em arquétipos ou modelos transcendentes de significação e legitimação das ações e instituições humanas e do mundo em geral. A destruição se dá no contexto do ateísmo de Sartre e de sua crítica ao cristianismo; Sartre denuncia valores morais e religiosos ligados ao que chama de má- fé, tipo de conduta que, na situação específica de Vichy, trai a liberdade humana ao atrelar o poder e a história a certos arquétipos \"celestiais\" e deterministas. Por outro lado, a recriação se deve ao fato de As Moscas representar uma espécie de \"mito fundador\" da liberdade. Concluímos que, ao contrário do que seria de se esperar da perspectiva eliadiana, o existencialismo de As Moscas, anunciando a liberdade como horizonte fundamental da condição humana, não implica necessariamente o esvaziamento da possibilidade da experiência mítica, e sim sua renovação, já não como fuga - senão como revelação - da historicidade radical do homem. / The Flies (Les Mouches, 1943) represents the beginning of the dramaturgic career of Jean- Paul Sartre and of his \"theatre of situations\". Of the same year that Being and Nothingness - the masterpiece of Sartrian existentialism - this play is an existentialist version of Orestes\' Greek legend. Orestes is the king Agamemnon\'s son -the leader of Greek troops for the Trojan War - which, together with his sister Electra, takes revenge against their father\'s murderers, Aegisthus and Clytemnestra, Agamemnon\'s wife and their mother. The story was retold by the main Greek tragedians, Aesquylus, Sophocles and Euripides. In The Flies Sartre transforms Orestes\' revenge into a metaphor for the themes of liberty and bad faith, and into a critic against the traditional idea of \"destiny\", in the shape as it had a good run in the authoritarian govern of Vichy, during Nazi Occupation of France (1940-44). This government, supported by the French Catholic Church\'s hierarchy, disseminated a \"religious\" ideology of guilty and resignation for the defeat against Hitler. Sartre\'s play can, thus, be read as an apology for the anti- fascist Resistance of French people. In this work we study the significations of \"myth\" in The Flies. Considering but also going beyond its more immediate sense as a political allegory, we try, with the aid of Mircea Eliade\' classical essay The Myth of Eternal Return (1949), clarify the basis of a possible, implicit dialogue of the play with the universal \"mythical thought\", dialogue which is constituted by both a movement of critics and existentialist re-appropriation of \"arquetypical\" value of mythical narratives. We intend to show that Sartre\'s play operates some destruction and recreation of what Eliade calls \"archaic ontology\", structure of thought which is \"mythical\" once is based upon archetypes or transcendent models of meaning and legitimacy for human actions and institutions and of the World in general. The destruction happens in the context of Sartrian atheism and his critics of Christianity; Sartre denounces moral and religious values associated to what he calls \"bad faith\", a kind of conduct which, as in the specific situation of Vichy, betrays the human liberty tiding up the power and the History to certain deterministic, \"celestial\" arquetypes. On the other hand, the recreation is linked to the fact that The Flies represents a kind of \"founding myth\" of liberty. Our conclusion is that, in opposition to what would be expectable from Eliade\'s point of view, the existentialism of The Flies, announcing liberty as the fundamental horizon of the human condition, does not represent, necessarily, an impossibility of mythical experience, but its renovation, not as an escape from - but as a revelation of - the radical historicity of Man.

A investigação a que se propõe o presente trabalho volta-se à possibilidade de se alcançar uma noção existencial de amor, a partir da análise do percurso fenomenológico trilhado pelo filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger, bem como ponderar a sua importância para a busca do justo. Apartando-se de toda interpretação psicossubjetiva e do âmbito axiológico das apreciações e, portanto, distanciando-se de toda sentimentalidade e comodidade dos sentimentos, tal como recomendara Heidegger nas preleções do semestre de inverno entre 1928 e 1929, o amor enquanto fenômeno é, aqui, perquirido com vistas a uma determinação ontológico-fundamental do Dasein. Todavia, para que esta busca se desenvolva de modo coeso ao pensamento do filósofo, é imprescindível que se lance o olhar ao caminho que levara a constituição de seu pensamento. Dessa forma, não se pode ignorar a proveniência teológica de seu pensar, sobretudo no que tange à interpretação da antropologia agostiniana greco-cristã, por Heidegger redirecionada às bases essenciais da ontologia aristotélica. Com efeito, fora a partir de uma passagem de Agostinho, reproduzida por Heidegger em uma carta endereçada à Hannah Arendt, que o filósofo alemão assinalara o amor como um volo, ut sis, um modo de abertura que libera e deixa-ser o que é no movimento mesmo de seu por-vir. Ademais, a pergunta pelo amor deve estabelecer-se de modo a lançar-nos ao que é mais próprio ao amor, e será no retorno à experiência do pensamento grego arcaico e pré-socrático, não como mera recuperação histórica, mas como um salto retroativo para onde provém o pensar do ser como presença constante, que o termo recobrará a sua essência. Como um deixar-ser o que é, o amor, então, revelar-se-á como um modo originário de acesso à verdade, e como tal sobressairá a sua importância, enquanto caminho hermenêutico, para a investigação do justo. / The research that proposes this work back to the possibility of reaching an existential notion of love, from the analysis of the phenomenological path trodden by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger and consider its importance to the search of the fair. Detaching itself from all psycho-subjective interpretation and axiological framework of assessments and thus distancing itself from all sentimentality and comfort of feelings, as recommended Heidegger in the lectures of winter semester between 1928 and 1929, love as a phenomenon is, here, investigated with a view to a fundamental ontological-determination of the Dasein. However, for this search develop into the cohesive way to the thought of the philosopher, it is essential to move the eye to the path that led him to build his thinking. Thus, one can not ignore the theological origin of your thinking, especially regarding the interpretation of the greek-christian augustinian anthropology, redirected by Heidegger to the essential foundations of Aristotelian ontology. Indeed, it was from a passage of Augustine, remembered by Heidegger in a letter to Hannah Arendt, that the German philosopher pointed out love as a volo, ut sis, a way of opening that frees and let-be which is the same movement of your to-come. Moreover, the question of love should be established in order to drive us to what is most proper to love, and will be through the return to the experience of ancient greek and pre-socratic thought, not as mere historical recovery, but as a retroactive jump where comes the thought of being as constant presence, that the term return to his essence. As a letting-be what is, love, then, will prove to be an original way of access to the truth, and as such will raise its importance, while hermeneutical way, to research the fair.

Ma, Chun Fai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 210-221). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.5 / 摘要 --- p.6 / Acknowledgements --- p.7 / Introduction A phenomenological study of Being and Nothingness --- p.8 / Chapter §1 --- Explanation of the title of thesis --- p.8 / Chapter §2 --- The historical background: Sartre the existentialist and phenomenologist --- p.9 / Chapter §3 --- Structure of the present research --- p.12 / Chapter (i) --- Scope of research: Being and Nothingness --- p.12 / Chapter (ii) --- Methodology --- p.14 / Chapter (iii) --- Themes and structure of the research --- p.15 / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Sartre´ةs phenomenological method --- p.18 / Chapter §1.1 --- Sartre's project: a “phenomenological ontology'' --- p.18 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- The difficulties for a phenomenological re-interpretation of BN --- p.18 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- Sartre´ةs concept of phenomenon --- p.21 / Chapter § 1.2 --- The Husserlian moment: intentional and eidetic analysis --- p.26 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- Abschattung and essence --- p.27 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- The percipere: consciousness as the directedness of intentions --- p.31 / Chapter § 1.3 --- The Heideggerian moment: the question of the meaning of Being --- p.34 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- The question of the meaning of Being: Heidegger´ةs ontological difference --- p.34 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Phenomenon of being and being of phenomenon --- p.37 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- A phenomenological anthropology --- p.42 / Chapter §2.1 --- A new motive for phenomenological research --- p.42 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- A follower of the old path? --- p.42 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Husserl and his quest for foundational science --- p.44 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Heidegger and his pursuit of fundamental ontology --- p.47 / Chapter § 2.2 --- A project of phenomenological anthropology --- p.51 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Sartre and his anthropological concern --- p.51 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The ontology of human reality and its ethical implication --- p.54 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Existential psychoanalysis as a moral description --- p.56 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Human reality versus Dasein? --- p.59 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Being-for-itself and being-in-itself --- p.66 / Chapter §3.1 --- A preliminary sketch of being-for-itself and being-in-itself --- p.66 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The wrestling between the Husserlian and Heideggerian elements in BN --- p.66 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Two regions of being: their eidetic and ontological implications --- p.69 / Chapter §3.2 --- Being-for-itself as the origin of nothingness (I 'origine du neant) --- p.74 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The meaning of nothingness (neant) --- p.74 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Consciousness as nihilation (neantis ation) --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Consciousness (of) self and pre-reflective cogito --- p.84 / Chapter §3.3 --- Being-in-itself as transcendent object --- p.90 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- The transcendent object and its transphenomenality --- p.91 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- World and instrumentality --- p.94 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- "Human ekstasis: Facticity, Transcendence and Temporality" --- p.100 / Chapter §4.1 --- From nihilation to human ekstasis --- p.100 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- The under-thematized aspects of the For-itself --- p.100 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- The inadequacy of our preceding analysis --- p.102 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- The phenomenological concept of human ekstasis --- p.104 / Chapter §4.2 --- The human ekstasis (1): Facticity --- p.106 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- The For-itself and its pre-destined situation --- p.106 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- "The engagement in projects, tasks and instruments" --- p.108 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Facticity and reality --- p.111 / Chapter §4.3 --- Human ekstasis (2): Transcendence --- p.114 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Transcendence as the ekstasis of the For-itself --- p.114 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Transcendence as projection and surpassing --- p.116 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- The self of For-itself --- p.119 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- The radical undeterminedness of the For-itself --- p.123 / Chapter 4.3.5 --- Possibles and the possibility of being --- p.127 / Chapter 4.3.6 --- Choice and reality: the Transcendence in Facticity --- p.130 / Chapter 4.3.7 --- Value as the being of For-itself --- p.133 / Chapter §4.4 --- Human ekstasis (3): Temporality --- p.138 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- "A naturalistic conception of time, and time as a holistic structure" --- p.138 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- The concreteness of time --- p.141 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Time as the mode of being of For-itself --- p.143 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- The presence of the For-itself: the temporal dimension of Present --- p.145 / Chapter 4.4.5 --- The possibilities of the For-itself: the temporal dimensions of Past and Future --- p.148 / Chapter 4.4.6 --- The primary structure of time --- p.157 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- The phenomenon of bad faith (mauvaise foi) --- p.160 / Chapter §5.1 --- The existential psychoanalysis --- p.160 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- The necessity of an existential psychoanalysis --- p.160 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- A lie to oneself and a lie to the other --- p.162 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- The “anti-ethical´ح character of bad faith --- p.166 / Chapter §5.2 --- The descriptive examination on concrete instances of bad faith --- p.168 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- The dating woman (1): the confinement of human Transcendence and Temporality --- p.169 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The dating woman (2): the disintegration of human Transcendence and Facticity --- p.176 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- The homosexual: the manipulation and disintegration of human Temporality --- p.181 / Chapter §5.3 --- The “ideal´ح mode of being: on sincerity and authenticity --- p.188 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Sincerity as the opposite of bad faith? --- p.188 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Descriptive analysis on concrete instances of sincerity --- p.190 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- An examination unfinished: authenticity as the “ideal´ح mode of being --- p.196 / Conclusion --- p.202 / Chapter §1 --- The phenomenological and anthropological-ethical contribution of Being and Nothingness --- p.202 / Chapter §2 --- "The limitation of this thesis, and possible directions for further investigation" --- p.205 / Bibliography --- p.210 / Chapter 1 --- Works by Sartre --- p.210 / Chapter 2 --- English/ French materials --- p.210 / Chapter 3 --- Chinese materials --- p.221

In the life of Søren A. Kierkegaard “the instant” had two distinct meanings. The first use of the phrase “the instant” is the point of intersection of time and eternity. It is the split second of decision, and the flash of a personal revolutionizing vision: a decisive “glint of an eye” to live in the existential moment. However, The Instant was also the title of a broadsheet Kierkegaard published at the end of his life that directly attacked “Christendom” and the idea of a Christian Nation. Through a layered account using narrative vignettes, I examine how “instants” and Kierkegaard's The Instant impacted my ideas of identity, community, and Christianity, leading me to a place of exile.