This dissertation is a collection of essays (chapters) on behavioral economics. Behavioral economics—arguably one of the most influential innovations in economics over the last 20 years—is a research paradigm introducing psychologically more realistic assumptions into economics. A common theme throughout the dissertation is the focus on either biased beliefs, or heterogeneous preferences, or both. The first chapter serves as an introduction to some themes in behavioral economics and its implications for market outcomes in industrial organization settings. The next two chapters are theoretical papers on entrepreneurial and managerial overconfidence that can also be thought of as contributions to this newly emerging field of behavioral industrial organization. The last chapter is an empirical contribution on gender differences in preferences and economic behavior at a young age. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2011</p>

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No presente trabalho, é realizado um experimento para investigar as escolhas entre distintas distribuições de renda, sob diferentes conjuntos informacionais. Os indivíduos são defrontados com distribuições baseadas nas teorias de John Rawls (2002), Robert Nozick (1991) e duas distribuições mistas, sob dois tratamentos distintos: o primeiro com o véu de ignorância da teoria rawlsiana e, o segundo, sem o véu de ignorância. Os resultados revelaram um maior número de escolhas do modelo rawlsiano sob o véu de ignorância, enquanto no tratamento sem véu a maioria dos participantes escolheu o modelo de Nozick, ainda que sob esse tratamento o padrão de escolhas tenha sido mais homogêneo. Esses resultados indicam a instabilidade de princípios escolhidos sob o véu de ignorância. / This work provides a synthesis of three theories of justice: from Rawls, Nozick and the utilitarian theory. Then an experiment is proposed, aimed to investigate choices of distributive justice based on these theories. The individuals are confronted with different income distributions, under two distinct informational treatments: the first with a veil of ignorance and, the second, with no veil of ignorance. The results point to a majority of choices of the rawlsian principle under the veil of ignorance treatment, while under the non veil of ignorance treatment there is a majority of choices of Nozick’s model of distribution of income. These results indicate the instability of principles of justice chosen under the veil of ignorance.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o poder prescritivo da Behavioral Finance (Shleifer, 2000) para a gestão de ativos financeiros no mercado de capitais, contrastando-a com as implicações da Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes (FAMA, 1970). A meta específica é identificar quais conjuntos de técnicas são apropriados para a precificação de títulos ou ações levando-se em conta a interação dos respectivos modelos teóricos com a evidência empírica do comportamento dos investidores. A presente análise será feita através do mapeamento dos processos decisórios dos investidores segundo a Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes (HME) e a Behavioral Finance (BF), identificando os pressupostos dos aludidos modelos e suas implicações e confrontando-os com a evidência obtida através de experimentos em laboratório que testem determinadas hipóteses sobre o comportamento de investidores. Discute-se a contribuição positiva de uma linha de pesquisa, a BF, que explora a racionalidade limitada dos agentes individuais em suas escolhas e os efeitos que os investidores experimentam ao tomarem decisões de investimentos. Metodologicamente, a BF absorve as conclusões sobre o mundo real obtidas a partir da observação experimental (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993; SMITH, 1987, 1994; MILLER, 2002) para daí elaborar modelos descritivos, contrapondo-se assim ao método econômico dedutivista lógico (POPPER, 1959). Há uma tensão não resolvida acerca da gestão de ativos que envolve a escolha entre dois métodos: a gestão ativa ou a gestão passiva; e isto depende diretamente da possibilidade (ou não) de assegurarmos a HME como base fidedigna e única para a construção das técnicas apropriadas. Além da introdução, o trabalho conta com mais três capítulos. No capítulo 2, abordamos a gestão científica dos investimentos e as proposições do CAPM dentro do paradigma da eficiência de mercado e da precificação de ações e títulos mobiliários. Também se aborda as implicações da BF para a administração de ativos no mercado de capitais. O capítulo 3 apresenta a metodologia experimental que capta a influência da análise técnica (grafista) sobre a avaliação de ativos financeiros. Para isto, replica-se um dos tratamentos experimentais de Mussweiler e Schneller (2003) com uma amostra de estudantes de economia com baixo nível de experiência em investimentos. Também, como forma de analisar a aplicabilidade da análise fundamentalista, utiliza-se os resultados experimentais obtidos por Haruvy, Lahav e Noussair (2007) e do referencial teórico de Camerer e Fehr (2006) e Lo (2004, 2005). O poder prescritivo da teoria financeira é refinado ao incorporar os fenômenos explicados pela pesquisa comportamental na precificação e gestão de ativos. A análise técnica é descrita através dos efeitos dos vieses cognitivos presentes na natureza comparativa humana (KAHNEMAN & MILLER, 1983; MUSSWEILLER, 2003). A análise fundamentalista é justificada pela existência dos graus de antecipação da hierarquia cognitiva (CAMERER, HO & CHONG, 2004). O fenômeno da existência de uma ampla prática de gestão ativa é explicado pela observação de um processo adaptativo de convergência dos preços de mercado aos valores fundamentais dos ativos. A Hipótese dos Mercados Adaptativos proposta por Lo (2004, 2005) concilia a HME com o poder prescritivo da BF estabelecendo a primeira como um caso extremo que serve de referencial para a mensuração da eficiência relativa de determinado mercado. Além disso, a BF permite que a teoria financeira explique um maior número de fenômenos com poucos pressupostos adicionais e sem necessitar a auto-exclusão e a independência dos programas de pesquisa. / The goal of this work is to analyze the prescriptive power of Behavioral Finance (SHLEIFER, 2000) for asset management in capital market, contrasting it with Efficient Markets Hypothesis implications (FAMA, 1970). Specifically, we seek to identify what techniques are appropriate in asset pricing, taking into account the interaction between empirical evidence obtained from empirical data and respective theoretical models. We map investors’ decision process in accordance with Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) and Behavioral Finance (BF), identifying the assumptions and implications, and confront them with laboratorial experimental evidence, which test hypothesis about investors’ behavior. We discuss the positive contribution of Behavioral Finance’s research program, which explores bounded rationality in human choices and the effects experimented by investors in their decision making. Methodologically, Behavioral Finance absorbs the conclusions about real world obtained from lab experiments (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993; SMITH, 1987, 1994; MILLER, 2002) in order to create descriptive models, opposing, in this way, to the logical deductivism (POPPER, 1959) of conventional economics. Asset management has an unresolved tension which involves deciding between two methods: active or passive portfolio management; and this answer depends directly on the possibility (or not) for us to assume EMH as the strongest and only source to build appropriate strategies. Besides the introduction content, the work has three more chapters. In chapter 2, we explore scientific asset management and CAPM (SHARPE, 1964) propositions about market efficiency and security analysis paradigm. We also discuss the BF implications in asset management. Chapter 3 presents the experimental methodology which identifies technical analysis (chartist) influence in valuation process of financial assets. For this, we replicate an experimental treatment presented in Mussweiller and Schneller (2003) in a sample of low experienced Economics students. For the applicability of fundamentalist analysis, we use experimental results obtained by Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair (2007) and Camerer and Fehr (2006) and Lo (2004, 2005) qualitative approaches. The prescriptive power of financial theory is refined when it includes the phenomena explained by behavioral research in asset pricing and portolio managing. Technical analysis can be described using the cognitive bias effects present in human comparative nature (KAHNEMAN & MILLER, 1983; MUSSWEILLER, 2003). Fundamentalist analysis is justified by the cognitive hierarchy degrees of anticipation (CAMERER, HO & CHONG, 2004). The existence of series of active portfolio management practices is explained by the experimental observation that market prices converge to fundamental values in an adaptive process. Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) proposed by Lo (2004, 2005) reconciles BF with EMH, understanding the former as an extreme case which serves as reference point for measuring relative efficiency of a specific market. Besides, BF provides financial theory explanations about a greater range of phenomena, adding few new assumptions and with no need to understand it as an independent and self-excluding approach.

No presente trabalho, é realizado um experimento para investigar as escolhas entre distintas distribuições de renda, sob diferentes conjuntos informacionais. Os indivíduos são defrontados com distribuições baseadas nas teorias de John Rawls (2002), Robert Nozick (1991) e duas distribuições mistas, sob dois tratamentos distintos: o primeiro com o véu de ignorância da teoria rawlsiana e, o segundo, sem o véu de ignorância. Os resultados revelaram um maior número de escolhas do modelo rawlsiano sob o véu de ignorância, enquanto no tratamento sem véu a maioria dos participantes escolheu o modelo de Nozick, ainda que sob esse tratamento o padrão de escolhas tenha sido mais homogêneo. Esses resultados indicam a instabilidade de princípios escolhidos sob o véu de ignorância. / This work provides a synthesis of three theories of justice: from Rawls, Nozick and the utilitarian theory. Then an experiment is proposed, aimed to investigate choices of distributive justice based on these theories. The individuals are confronted with different income distributions, under two distinct informational treatments: the first with a veil of ignorance and, the second, with no veil of ignorance. The results point to a majority of choices of the rawlsian principle under the veil of ignorance treatment, while under the non veil of ignorance treatment there is a majority of choices of Nozick’s model of distribution of income. These results indicate the instability of principles of justice chosen under the veil of ignorance.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o poder prescritivo da Behavioral Finance (Shleifer, 2000) para a gestão de ativos financeiros no mercado de capitais, contrastando-a com as implicações da Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes (FAMA, 1970). A meta específica é identificar quais conjuntos de técnicas são apropriados para a precificação de títulos ou ações levando-se em conta a interação dos respectivos modelos teóricos com a evidência empírica do comportamento dos investidores. A presente análise será feita através do mapeamento dos processos decisórios dos investidores segundo a Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes (HME) e a Behavioral Finance (BF), identificando os pressupostos dos aludidos modelos e suas implicações e confrontando-os com a evidência obtida através de experimentos em laboratório que testem determinadas hipóteses sobre o comportamento de investidores. Discute-se a contribuição positiva de uma linha de pesquisa, a BF, que explora a racionalidade limitada dos agentes individuais em suas escolhas e os efeitos que os investidores experimentam ao tomarem decisões de investimentos. Metodologicamente, a BF absorve as conclusões sobre o mundo real obtidas a partir da observação experimental (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993; SMITH, 1987, 1994; MILLER, 2002) para daí elaborar modelos descritivos, contrapondo-se assim ao método econômico dedutivista lógico (POPPER, 1959). Há uma tensão não resolvida acerca da gestão de ativos que envolve a escolha entre dois métodos: a gestão ativa ou a gestão passiva; e isto depende diretamente da possibilidade (ou não) de assegurarmos a HME como base fidedigna e única para a construção das técnicas apropriadas. Além da introdução, o trabalho conta com mais três capítulos. No capítulo 2, abordamos a gestão científica dos investimentos e as proposições do CAPM dentro do paradigma da eficiência de mercado e da precificação de ações e títulos mobiliários. Também se aborda as implicações da BF para a administração de ativos no mercado de capitais. O capítulo 3 apresenta a metodologia experimental que capta a influência da análise técnica (grafista) sobre a avaliação de ativos financeiros. Para isto, replica-se um dos tratamentos experimentais de Mussweiler e Schneller (2003) com uma amostra de estudantes de economia com baixo nível de experiência em investimentos. Também, como forma de analisar a aplicabilidade da análise fundamentalista, utiliza-se os resultados experimentais obtidos por Haruvy, Lahav e Noussair (2007) e do referencial teórico de Camerer e Fehr (2006) e Lo (2004, 2005). O poder prescritivo da teoria financeira é refinado ao incorporar os fenômenos explicados pela pesquisa comportamental na precificação e gestão de ativos. A análise técnica é descrita através dos efeitos dos vieses cognitivos presentes na natureza comparativa humana (KAHNEMAN & MILLER, 1983; MUSSWEILLER, 2003). A análise fundamentalista é justificada pela existência dos graus de antecipação da hierarquia cognitiva (CAMERER, HO & CHONG, 2004). O fenômeno da existência de uma ampla prática de gestão ativa é explicado pela observação de um processo adaptativo de convergência dos preços de mercado aos valores fundamentais dos ativos. A Hipótese dos Mercados Adaptativos proposta por Lo (2004, 2005) concilia a HME com o poder prescritivo da BF estabelecendo a primeira como um caso extremo que serve de referencial para a mensuração da eficiência relativa de determinado mercado. Além disso, a BF permite que a teoria financeira explique um maior número de fenômenos com poucos pressupostos adicionais e sem necessitar a auto-exclusão e a independência dos programas de pesquisa. / The goal of this work is to analyze the prescriptive power of Behavioral Finance (SHLEIFER, 2000) for asset management in capital market, contrasting it with Efficient Markets Hypothesis implications (FAMA, 1970). Specifically, we seek to identify what techniques are appropriate in asset pricing, taking into account the interaction between empirical evidence obtained from empirical data and respective theoretical models. We map investors’ decision process in accordance with Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) and Behavioral Finance (BF), identifying the assumptions and implications, and confront them with laboratorial experimental evidence, which test hypothesis about investors’ behavior. We discuss the positive contribution of Behavioral Finance’s research program, which explores bounded rationality in human choices and the effects experimented by investors in their decision making. Methodologically, Behavioral Finance absorbs the conclusions about real world obtained from lab experiments (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993; SMITH, 1987, 1994; MILLER, 2002) in order to create descriptive models, opposing, in this way, to the logical deductivism (POPPER, 1959) of conventional economics. Asset management has an unresolved tension which involves deciding between two methods: active or passive portfolio management; and this answer depends directly on the possibility (or not) for us to assume EMH as the strongest and only source to build appropriate strategies. Besides the introduction content, the work has three more chapters. In chapter 2, we explore scientific asset management and CAPM (SHARPE, 1964) propositions about market efficiency and security analysis paradigm. We also discuss the BF implications in asset management. Chapter 3 presents the experimental methodology which identifies technical analysis (chartist) influence in valuation process of financial assets. For this, we replicate an experimental treatment presented in Mussweiller and Schneller (2003) in a sample of low experienced Economics students. For the applicability of fundamentalist analysis, we use experimental results obtained by Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair (2007) and Camerer and Fehr (2006) and Lo (2004, 2005) qualitative approaches. The prescriptive power of financial theory is refined when it includes the phenomena explained by behavioral research in asset pricing and portolio managing. Technical analysis can be described using the cognitive bias effects present in human comparative nature (KAHNEMAN & MILLER, 1983; MUSSWEILLER, 2003). Fundamentalist analysis is justified by the cognitive hierarchy degrees of anticipation (CAMERER, HO & CHONG, 2004). The existence of series of active portfolio management practices is explained by the experimental observation that market prices converge to fundamental values in an adaptive process. Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) proposed by Lo (2004, 2005) reconciles BF with EMH, understanding the former as an extreme case which serves as reference point for measuring relative efficiency of a specific market. Besides, BF provides financial theory explanations about a greater range of phenomena, adding few new assumptions and with no need to understand it as an independent and self-excluding approach.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o poder prescritivo da Behavioral Finance (Shleifer, 2000) para a gestão de ativos financeiros no mercado de capitais, contrastando-a com as implicações da Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes (FAMA, 1970). A meta específica é identificar quais conjuntos de técnicas são apropriados para a precificação de títulos ou ações levando-se em conta a interação dos respectivos modelos teóricos com a evidência empírica do comportamento dos investidores. A presente análise será feita através do mapeamento dos processos decisórios dos investidores segundo a Hipótese dos Mercados Eficientes (HME) e a Behavioral Finance (BF), identificando os pressupostos dos aludidos modelos e suas implicações e confrontando-os com a evidência obtida através de experimentos em laboratório que testem determinadas hipóteses sobre o comportamento de investidores. Discute-se a contribuição positiva de uma linha de pesquisa, a BF, que explora a racionalidade limitada dos agentes individuais em suas escolhas e os efeitos que os investidores experimentam ao tomarem decisões de investimentos. Metodologicamente, a BF absorve as conclusões sobre o mundo real obtidas a partir da observação experimental (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993; SMITH, 1987, 1994; MILLER, 2002) para daí elaborar modelos descritivos, contrapondo-se assim ao método econômico dedutivista lógico (POPPER, 1959). Há uma tensão não resolvida acerca da gestão de ativos que envolve a escolha entre dois métodos: a gestão ativa ou a gestão passiva; e isto depende diretamente da possibilidade (ou não) de assegurarmos a HME como base fidedigna e única para a construção das técnicas apropriadas. Além da introdução, o trabalho conta com mais três capítulos. No capítulo 2, abordamos a gestão científica dos investimentos e as proposições do CAPM dentro do paradigma da eficiência de mercado e da precificação de ações e títulos mobiliários. Também se aborda as implicações da BF para a administração de ativos no mercado de capitais. O capítulo 3 apresenta a metodologia experimental que capta a influência da análise técnica (grafista) sobre a avaliação de ativos financeiros. Para isto, replica-se um dos tratamentos experimentais de Mussweiler e Schneller (2003) com uma amostra de estudantes de economia com baixo nível de experiência em investimentos. Também, como forma de analisar a aplicabilidade da análise fundamentalista, utiliza-se os resultados experimentais obtidos por Haruvy, Lahav e Noussair (2007) e do referencial teórico de Camerer e Fehr (2006) e Lo (2004, 2005). O poder prescritivo da teoria financeira é refinado ao incorporar os fenômenos explicados pela pesquisa comportamental na precificação e gestão de ativos. A análise técnica é descrita através dos efeitos dos vieses cognitivos presentes na natureza comparativa humana (KAHNEMAN & MILLER, 1983; MUSSWEILLER, 2003). A análise fundamentalista é justificada pela existência dos graus de antecipação da hierarquia cognitiva (CAMERER, HO & CHONG, 2004). O fenômeno da existência de uma ampla prática de gestão ativa é explicado pela observação de um processo adaptativo de convergência dos preços de mercado aos valores fundamentais dos ativos. A Hipótese dos Mercados Adaptativos proposta por Lo (2004, 2005) concilia a HME com o poder prescritivo da BF estabelecendo a primeira como um caso extremo que serve de referencial para a mensuração da eficiência relativa de determinado mercado. Além disso, a BF permite que a teoria financeira explique um maior número de fenômenos com poucos pressupostos adicionais e sem necessitar a auto-exclusão e a independência dos programas de pesquisa. / The goal of this work is to analyze the prescriptive power of Behavioral Finance (SHLEIFER, 2000) for asset management in capital market, contrasting it with Efficient Markets Hypothesis implications (FAMA, 1970). Specifically, we seek to identify what techniques are appropriate in asset pricing, taking into account the interaction between empirical evidence obtained from empirical data and respective theoretical models. We map investors’ decision process in accordance with Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) and Behavioral Finance (BF), identifying the assumptions and implications, and confront them with laboratorial experimental evidence, which test hypothesis about investors’ behavior. We discuss the positive contribution of Behavioral Finance’s research program, which explores bounded rationality in human choices and the effects experimented by investors in their decision making. Methodologically, Behavioral Finance absorbs the conclusions about real world obtained from lab experiments (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993; SMITH, 1987, 1994; MILLER, 2002) in order to create descriptive models, opposing, in this way, to the logical deductivism (POPPER, 1959) of conventional economics. Asset management has an unresolved tension which involves deciding between two methods: active or passive portfolio management; and this answer depends directly on the possibility (or not) for us to assume EMH as the strongest and only source to build appropriate strategies. Besides the introduction content, the work has three more chapters. In chapter 2, we explore scientific asset management and CAPM (SHARPE, 1964) propositions about market efficiency and security analysis paradigm. We also discuss the BF implications in asset management. Chapter 3 presents the experimental methodology which identifies technical analysis (chartist) influence in valuation process of financial assets. For this, we replicate an experimental treatment presented in Mussweiller and Schneller (2003) in a sample of low experienced Economics students. For the applicability of fundamentalist analysis, we use experimental results obtained by Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair (2007) and Camerer and Fehr (2006) and Lo (2004, 2005) qualitative approaches. The prescriptive power of financial theory is refined when it includes the phenomena explained by behavioral research in asset pricing and portolio managing. Technical analysis can be described using the cognitive bias effects present in human comparative nature (KAHNEMAN & MILLER, 1983; MUSSWEILLER, 2003). Fundamentalist analysis is justified by the cognitive hierarchy degrees of anticipation (CAMERER, HO & CHONG, 2004). The existence of series of active portfolio management practices is explained by the experimental observation that market prices converge to fundamental values in an adaptive process. Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) proposed by Lo (2004, 2005) reconciles BF with EMH, understanding the former as an extreme case which serves as reference point for measuring relative efficiency of a specific market. Besides, BF provides financial theory explanations about a greater range of phenomena, adding few new assumptions and with no need to understand it as an independent and self-excluding approach.

The advent of experimental methodologies have led to decisive progress in the study of corrupt behaviour in the last two decades. Since they can complement survey data and perception indexes with controlled experimental data, scholars and policy makers have reached a better understanding of decision-making in bribery situations and are able to design innovative anticorruption policies.In this thesis, I use experimental and empirical data to contribute to the field of the economics of corruption. The first two chapters of this PhD dissertation use experimental methodologies to study decision-making in a bribery scenario. The first chapter tests an anti-corruption strategy with a lab in the field experiment in Burundi. The second chapter studies the fairness concerns that might arise when dealing with redistribution in a bribery situation. The third chapter uses an empirical analysis to explore the controversial issue of political moonlighting, i.e. having outside activities while holding public office. It investigates "double-hat politicians", who combine mayor and parliamentary positions in Wallonia.In a first chapter, written with Jean-Benoit Falisse, we explore the effect of anti- corruption messages on corrupt behavior and public service delivery. In a novel lab-in-the-field experiment, 527 public servants from Burundi were asked to allocate rationed vouchers between anonymous citizens; some of these citizens attempted to bribe the public servants to obtain more vouchers than they were entitled to. Two groups of public servants were randomly exposed to short messages about good governance or professional identity reminders. Participants in these two groups behaved in a fairer manner than those of a third group who were not exposed to any message. The result is more robust in the case of the group exposed to the professional identity reminder. The underlying mechanisms seem to be that when a public servant reflects upon governance values and her professional identity, the moral cost increases, prompting more equal service delivery. Bribe-taking was not impacted by the messages. The experiment provides new insights into the design of anti-corruption strategies.The second chapter, written with Lena Epp, investigates the impact of a public officials’ fairness considerations towards citizens in a petty corruption situation. Other-regarding preferences, and, more particularly, fairness concerns are widely acknowledged as crucial elements of individual economic decision-making. In petty corruption contexts, public officials are to a large extent aware of differences between citizens. Here, we experimentally investigate how fairness considerations may impact on corrupt behaviour. Our novel bribery game reveals that bribes are less frequently accepted when bribers are unequal in terms of endowments. These results suggest that fairness considerations can influence corrupt behaviour.In the last chapter, I focus on political moonlighting in Wallonia. Activities outside of public office or combining specific public offices simultaneously is a topic of ongoing heated debates. An element crucial to these discussions is whether moonlighting is detrimental for politicians’ performance. In Belgium, the combination of local executive and regional legislative offices, i.e. double hat politicians, is a frequent habit for a majority of politicians. This accumulation of activities might lead to (un-)desirable outcomes in terms of political achievements. This chapter investigates the impact of holding several remunerated and honorary positions on regional MPs parliamentary activities and mayor’s municipality performance in Wallonia. I use a database of all public and private positions held by Belgian politicians in Wallonia since the disclosure of positions became compulsory for those holding at least one public position, i.e. from 2004 to 2016. For members of Parliament, wearing a double hat reduces global parliamentary activity. For mayors, it seems that holding more remunerated positions is associated with less efficient municipality management. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The diploma thesis deals with analysis of risks in relation to various focus (or types) of economic experiments. On the basis of background research suggests entirely new classification of economic experiments and subsequently examines general structure of economic experiment. Performed analysis then identifies major risks of experimental economics, analyses them and proposes possible countermeasures. Outputs of the work substantially enrich and extend current theory. Their utilization is expected in theory and practice, for purpose of scientific research or specific objectives of companies and institutions.

L’objet général de notre thèse est, d’une part, d’étudier l’influence de la légitimité du manager sur la motivation de son employé à l’effort et, d’autre part, d’analyser la manière dont le manager intègre cette influence potentielle dans ses comportements, et ce afin de renforcer son autorité. Enfin, nous nous intéressons aux stratégies que la firme peut mettre en place pour renforcer la légitimité de ses dirigeants en choisissant parmi plusieurs procédures de sélection des dirigeants. Notre approche est à la fois théorique, en nous appuyant sur la théorie des jeux, et empirique en utilisant l’économie expérimentale. Tout d’abord, nous définissons une légitimité procédurale qui consiste a considérer un dirigeant légitime si il a été promu à l'issue d'une compétition sans favoritisme. Ensuite nous définissons une légitimité méritocratique qui est acquise s’il maitrise les taches de son employé. Enfin, nous définissons une légitimité aristocratique qui est la compétence d’un individu à maitriser des taches de direction.Dans un premier chapitre, nous montrons que l’effort du futur dirigeant pendant la compétition n’est pas forcément un bon moyen de renforcer une légitimité procédurale car une très forte performance peut justement trahir le fait d’avoir bénéficié d’un avantage. Par ailleurs nous montrons que le perdant de la compétition sera toujours un « mauvais perdant » car sa croyance sur le fait qu’il ait été défavorisé pendant la compétition sera toujours renforcée. L’enjeu pour la firme est alors de déléguer à une entité externe la gestion de la sélection des dirigeants pour que tout traitement inéquitable présupposé pendant la compétition n’apporte aucune information concernant un potentiel traitement inéquitable à l’avenir. Dans un deuxième chapitre, nous montrons que sélectionner sur les compétences de direction permet d’augmenter le salaire des dirigeants quand bien même ces compétences sont moins difficiles à maitriser. La raison en est que cela neutralise les problèmes de rivalité entre employés et dirigeant et préserve ainsi la confiance en lui de celui qui a échoué à être promu (le rendant ainsi moins couteux à motiver). Le troisième chapitre est quant à lui un travail expérimental qui montrer qu’une procédure méritocratique incite les perdants du tournoi à demander une rémunération plus grande pour compenser leur découragement suite à leur échec. / The general purpose of our thesis is, on the one hand, to study the influence of legitimacy of the manager on the motivation of his employee to exert effort and, on the other hand, to analyze how the manager integrates this potential influence into his behavior in order to bolster his authority. Finally, we are interested in strategies that the firm can design to bolster the legitimacy of its managers by choosing between several procedures of selection. Our approach is both theoretical, based on game theory, and empirical using experimental economics.First, we define a procedural legitimacy that consists in considering an executive as legitimate if he was promoted through a competition with no unfair treatment. Then, we define a meritocratic legitimacy that is the ability to master the operational task exerted by the employee. Finally, we define an aristocratic legitimacy, which is the ability of an individual to master managerial tasks.In a first chapter, we show that the future leader's effort during the competition is not necessarily a good way to bolster a procedural legitimacy because a very strong performance can just betray the fact that he has benefited from an advantage. Moreover, we show that the loser of the competition will always be a "bad loser" because his belief that he was disadvantaged during the competition will always be reinforced if he behaves with Bayesian rationality. The stake for the firm is then to delegate to an external entity the management of the selection of leaders to ensure that any unfair treatment presupposed during the competition does not provide any information regarding a potential unfair treatment in the future. In a second chapter, we show that to select on managerial abilities allows to increase the salary of executives even though these skills are less difficult to master. The reason is that it neutralizes the problems of rivalry between employees and executives and thus preserves the self-confidence of the one who has failed to be promoted (thus making it less costly to incentivize). The third chapter is an experimental work that aims to show that a meritocratic procedure incites the losers to actually ask for higher wage to compensate their discouragements following their failure.