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Esta tesis utiliza un enfoque experimental para comprender las interacciones dentro de redes y percibir las decisiones causando inversión de preferencia (IP). El Capítulo 1 experimentalmente introduce comunicaciones no vinculantes a un modelo de producción de un bien costoso, que es no excluible entre personas vinculadas en una red. Los resultados muestran que la comunicación de dirección única no mejora coordinación tanto como la comunicación entre conjuntos máximos independientes. El Capítulo 2 analiza experimentalmente un modelo de conflictos bilaterales integrado en redes, donde los oponentes invierten para ganar recursos. Concluye sobre exceso de inversiones comparado a las predicciones de equilibrio. Por último, el Capítulo 3 mira si el efecto dotación inicial resultado de statu quo conduce IP. Esto es analizado por la interrogación de la buena voluntad de cambiar una lotería dotada para otra o pago seguro. En contrario de las predicciones, resultados demuestra que dotaciones son renunciadas con frecuencia. / This thesis uses an experimental approach in understanding group decisions and interactions in networks and perceiving individual decisions causing preference reversal. Chapter 1 experimentally introduces different communication schemes to a production model of a costly good that is non-excludable among individuals linked within a network. Results show that one-way communication is not as efficient as in earlier literature; yet communication among maximal independent sets enhances coordination. Chapter 2 experimentally analyzes a model of multiple bilateral conflicts embedded in networks where opponents invest in conflict technology to win resources. It concludes on tendency to invest in excess of equilibrium predictions. Finally, Chapter 3 looks at whether preference reversal is driven by an endowment effect explanation originating from status quo bias. This is analyzed through questioning individuals' willingness to exchange their endowed lottery for another lottery or sure money. Contrary to the predictions, results show that individuals most often disclaim their endowments.

The three chapters of this thesis investigate the decision-making processes behind financial and donation behaviour of individuals. Chapter One studies the impact of prior learning and competition on the presence of the disposition effect in a venture capital setting. It reveals that prior learning leads to better venture choices and confirms competition as the most efficient form of resource allocation and management. Chapter Two addresses the empirical finding of a negative relationship between income and charitable giving as a proportion of that income. As the first study to replicate this downward relationship in an experiment, it exposes income rank information as one of the factors causing the relationship. Using a unique dataset from a natural experiment in Chapter Three, I explore the effect of increased publicity via additional visibility and information on the household donation behaviour. The results show that donations increase with public announcements and the announcement order. / Los tres capítulos de esta tesis investigar los procesos de toma de decisiones que describen la conducta financiera y la donación de los individuos. Capítulo I estudia el impacto de la formación previa y la competencia en la presencia del efecto de la disposición en un entorno de capital de riesgo. El estudio confirma que la formación previa favorece el proceso de selección y que la competencia permite la asignación más eficaz de recursos y gestión. Capítulo II investiga la presencia de una relación negativa entre los ingresos y las donaciones (representados en proporción de esos ingresos). El capitulo presenta los resultados del primer estudio que examina esta relación con un experimento y propone que entre los factores que explican esta relación es la información sobre los ingresos personales comparado con los de sus compañeros. Capítulo III utiliza una base de datos única que contiene los resultados de un experimento natural y presenta resultados empíricos sobre el efecto de una mayor publicidad a través de la visibilidad e información adicional sobre el comportamiento de la donación de los hogares. Los resultados muestran que las donaciones aumentan con los anuncios públicos y el orden de estos anuncios.

Understanding the behavior of those who start--or intend to start--a business is vital for a country of entrepreneurs such as Peru, which registered the third highest rate of active entrepreneurship worldwide in 2011, according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). However, Peru also registered, in 2011, one of the highest business discontinuation rates among efficiency-based and resource-based economies. This study represents the first effort to analyze certain behavioral characteristics (risk aversion, joy of winning, overconfidence and tax collection) of a sample of necessity-driven entrepreneurs in Lima, Peru. These features might help explain, in the first place, the decision to become entrepreneurs, but also the decision to leave the market. In particular, wefind that entrepreneurs are risk averse, tend to overestimate their abilities and are willing to work harder when the gross pay is higher (and are taxed) than when it is lower (and are not taxed). Altogether, these traits may explain the high discontinuation rate of businesses in Peru, one of the highest in efficiency-based and resource-based economies. / Entender el comportamiento de aquellos que empiezan —o pretenden empezar— un negocio es vital para un país de emprendedores así como el Perú, el cual registró la tercera tasa más alta de emprededeurismo activo a nivel mundial en 2011, de acuerdo con el Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). Sin embargo, el Perú también registró, el año 2011, una de las tasas más altas de descontinuación de negocios entre las economías basadas en la eficiencias y recursos. Este estudio representa el primer intento en analizar ciertas características de conducta (aversión al riesgo, alegría por el triunfo, confianza excesiva y el pago de impuestos) de una muestra de emprendedoresmotivados por la necesidad en Lima, Perú. Estas características puede que ayuden a explicar, en primer lugar, la decisión de devenir emprendedores, pero también la decisión de dejar el mercado. En particular, nos encontramos con que los emprendedores son adversos al riesgo, tienden a sobrestimar sus habilidades y están dispuestos a trabajar más duro cuando el pago bruto es mayor (y está sujeto a impuestos) que cuando es menor (y no está sujeto a impuestos). En suma, estas características pueden explicar la alta tasa de descontinuación de negocios en el Perú, una de las más altas en economías basadas en la eficiencia o en recursos.

La tesi presenta alcuni dei risultati di un esperimento longitudinale condotto in due carceri statunitensi tra settembre 2015 e giugno 2016. L’obiettivo dell’analisi è testare lo studio delle preferenze sociali nella cornice dell’Economia Comportamentale e della teoria dei giochi (osservazione diretta del comportamento dei soggetti chiamati a compiere delle scelte in alcune situazioni selezionate), piuttosto che attraverso risposte a questionari auto valutativi. Infatti vengono messe in relazione i comportamenti osservati nei giochi e le spiegazioni che i soggetti intervistati danno di essi. Attraverso analisi statistica si può arrivare a dire che i comportamenti osservati nei giochi non sono sempre sufficienti per evidenziare le preferenze sociali dei soggetti, così come, del resto, non lo sono le risposte narrative. La conclusione che viene tratta dall’elaborato è che osservazione diretta dei comportamenti e analisi delle narrative personali dei soggetti sono due elementi ugualmente importanti per la comprensione delle preferenze sociali e che, lungi dall’escludersi a vicenda, si completano. / The thesis presents some of the results of a longitudinal experiment conducted in two U.S. prisons between September 2015 and June 2016. The objective of the analysis is to test the efficacy of studying social preferences in the framework of behavioral Economics and game theory (direct observation of the behaviour of the subjects asked to make choices in real situations), rather than through self-evaluative questionnaires and surveys. In fact, the analysis links the behaviors observed in the games and the explanations given by the subjects. In general it can be said that the behaviors observed in the games are not always sufficient to highlight the social preferences of the subjects, as well as, moreover, are not the narrative answers. The conclusion that comes from the elaborate is that direct observation of the behaviors and analysis of the personal narratives of the subjects are two equally important tools in the study social preferences and that, far from being mutually exclusive, they complement each other.

Par sa nature prototypique, chaque bien musical, et par extension chaque bien culturel, est un bien nouveau. Cette thèse a pour objectif d’étudier la consommation et le financement de la nouveauté musicale en adoptant deux approches de l’économie expérimentale : les expériences en laboratoire (première partie) et l’interprétation des données de terrain à partir de mesures expérimentales (seconde partie). La première partie explore les déterminants et les caractéristiques de la demande de nouveauté musicale. Dans un premier chapitre, nous étudions l’effet de l’information et du prix sur la concentration de la demande lorsque les consommateurs peuvent choisir entre des artistes établis sur le marché et des nouveaux entrants. Le second chapitre propose une estimation de systèmes complets de demande pour quatre genres musicaux. La seconde partie de cette thèse s’intéresse aux comportements de contributeurs sur une plateforme de financement participatif avec récompenses. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous proposons un modèle rendant compte de la décision de contribuer à un projet musical à partir du constat que les contributeurs font face à deux types de risque : le risque d’échec de la coordination et le risque de non livraison du produit. Dans ce contexte, l’illusion de contrôle permet d’expliquer la dynamique de contribution. L’étude du rôle des préférences face au risque montre que lorsque le risque d’échec de la coordination disparaît, l’aversion au risque est corrélée négativement au niveau des contributions. Cependant, en début de campagne, cette corrélation est positive. Le dernier chapitre se concentre sur la nature hybride du financement participatif. Les résultats suggèrent que la décision de contribution relève d’une logique de don tandis que le niveau de ces contributions relève d’une logique de consommation. / By its prototypical nature, each musical good, and by extension each cultural good, is new. The aim of this thesis is two study the consumption and the funding of musical novelty, using two experimental approaches : the use of in-lab experiments to study demand (part I) and the use of experimental measures to understand field behaviors (part II). The first part explores the determinants and characteristics of demand for novelty. In the first chapter, we study the demand concentration when consumers can choose between established artists and new entrants. The second chapter presents estimations of an almost ideal demand system for four musical genres. The second part of this thesis focuses on contributors’ behaviors of a reward-based crowdfunding platform. In a third chapter, we propose a model of decision to contribute to a musical project, based on the observation that contributors are exposed to two types of risk : a risk of coordination failure and a risk of non delivery. With this in mind, illusion of control allows to understand the timing of decision. A closer look at the role of risk preferences shows that risk aversion is negatively correlated with contributions when coordination is ensured. On the contrary, the correlation becomes positive at the beginning of a campaign. In the last chapter, we investigate the mixed nature of crowdfunding. Results suggest that the decision to contribute falls within a donation logic while the decision on how much to contribute falls within a consumption logic.

Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Verhalten auf Produktmärkten, welche durch eine asymmetrisch verteilte Information zwischen Anbietern und Nachfragern über die Qualität gekennzeichnet sind. Die Arbeit untersucht experimentell, ob Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal und Reputation als Anreizmechanismus auf solchen Märkten verstanden werden. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden dazu zwei Experimente durchgeführt, mit deren Hilfe untersucht wird, ob das Problem adverser Selektion mit Hilfe von Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal überwunden werden kann. Die Ergebnisse der beiden Experimente, welche sich durch ein unterschiedliches Design auszeichnen, unterscheiden sich stark. Während bei direkter Interaktion Werbeausgaben nicht als Qualitätssignal verstanden werden, werden bei indirekter Interaktion Werbeausgaben von einem Teil der Probanden als Qualitätssignal verstanden. Die Ergebnisse des zweiten Experiments zeigen darüber hinaus, dass von ein Verhalten, welches von dem theoretisch vorhergesagten abweicht, oftmals mit Hilfe der Erwartungen der Probanden über das Verhalten der anderen Marktseite erklärt werden kann. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird untersucht, ob erkannt wird, dass die Höhe des drohenden Reputationsverlusts einen kritischen Anreiz auf das Verhalten der Anbieter hat, wenn diese unbeobachtet von den Käufern die Qualität wählen können. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments zeigen, dass mit Hilfe von potentiellen Reputationsinvestitionen nicht, wie theoretisch vorhergesagt, das Problem des moralischen Risikos überwunden werden kann. Allgemein wird ein zu hohes Vertrauen der Käufer beobachtet, welches dazu führt, dass die Anbieter keinen Anreiz haben, Reputationsinvestitionen zu tätigen. / The dissertation studies individual behavior in product markets, in which information about product quality is asymmetrically distributed between sellers and buyers. It is studied experimentally, whether individuals understand advertising spending as quality signal and reputation as incentive mechanism. In the first part, two experiments are conducted in order to study whether the problem of adverse selection can be overcome with advertising spending as quality signal. The results of the experiments which differ in the experimental design are very different. While in case of direct interaction between sellers and buyers individuals do not understand advertising spending as quality signal, they do in case of indirect interaction. Furthermore, the results of the second experiment show, that behavior not in line with the theoretical expectations can be explained with individuals' expectations about the other market side's behavior. In the second part it is studied whether individuals recognize that sellers' behavior in situations with endogenous quality depends critically on the amount of reputation loss at risk. The experimental results show that contrary to the theoretical expectations moral hazard problems are not solved by investments into reputation. In general, it is observed that there is too much trust on the buyer side. As a result of this behavior sellers have no incentive to invest into reputation.

Ausgangspunkt dieser Dissertation ist, dass mit stabilen Präferenzen unvereinbares Verhalten für die Standardökonomik eine Herausforderung darstellt. Eines der sich stellenden Probleme ist, dass sich wandelnde Präferenzen der normativen Analyse abträglich sind: Wenn nicht vorhersagbar ist, ob und wie Präferenzen abhängig von der Situation und von institutionellen Arrangements variieren, lässt sich keine optimale Wirtschaftspolitik bestimmen. Es wird argumentiert, dass die Ökonomik daher auch in Betracht ziehen muss, wie Präferenzen evolvieren und wie ökonomische Akteure Informationen - z. B. Wahrscheinlichkeiten und Auszahlungen -verarbeiten. In den folgenden Kapiteln werden zwei Studien vorgestellt, die dieses Ziel verfolgen, indem sie den Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung experimentell untersuchen. Die erste Studie, "Kognitive Last erhöht Risikoaversion", zeigt, dass eine spezifische Änderung des Entscheidungsumfelds - nämlich eine Erhöhung der kognitiven Last - einen messbaren Einfluss auf die Risikoeinstellungen der Versuchspersonen hatte. Zudem werden die beobachteten Verhaltensänderungen in Verbindung zu existierenden Mehr-System-Modellen der Entscheidungsfindung gesetzt. Die ebenfalls gemessenen Reaktionszeiten bestätigt die Interpretation, dass die Entscheidungsfindung unter Risiko das Produkt interagierender Systeme im menschlichen Hirn ist. Die zweite Studie, "Soziales Lernen auf Finanzmärkten", verfolgt das Ziel, die normalerweise verborgenen Komponenten Präferenzen und Überzeugungen beobachtbar zu machen. Zu diesem Zweck absolvierten Versuchspersonen ein Experiment, während ihre Hirnaktivierung per funktioneller Magnetresonanztomografie gemessen wurde. Dies erweitert den analysierbaren Datensatz über die getroffenen Entscheidungen hinaus um Maße der Hirnaktivierung. Dadurch trägt diese Studie zur Identifizierung der Faktoren bei, die bestimmen, in welchem Umfang wir aus der Beobachtung der Entscheidungen anderer lernen. / The point of departure of this dissertation is that behavior which is inconsistent with stable preferences poses a challenge for mainstream economics. One of the issues that arise is that changing preferences are detrimental to the objective of normative economics: If one cannot predict whether and how people’s preferences vary across situations or institutions, one cannot determine which economic policy would be optimal. Based on this, it is argued that economics has to take into account how preferences evolve and how information - e.g., probabilities and payoffs - is processed by economic agents. In the following two chapters, two experimental studies are presented that pursue this goal by investigating the process by which people make decisions. The first study, "Cognitive load increases risk aversion," shows that a specific change in the environment - in this case, an increase in cognitive load - had a measurable impact on subjects’ risk attitudes. Importantly, it also relates the observed changes to existing dual-system models of decision making. The response times which were recorded in addition to subjects’ choices contribute to the interpretation of the study’s findings, since they support the view that decision making under risk is the product of interacting systems in the human brain. The second study, "Social learning in asset markets," has the objective of making the latent components preferences and beliefs observable. To this end, subjects participated in a social-learning experiment while their brain activation was recorded via functional magnetic-resonance imaging. This enlarges the analyzable dataset through measures of subjects’ brain activation in addition to subjects’ choices. In doing so, the study contributes to identifying the factors that shape to what extent we learn from observing the choices of other human beings.