Bakgrund: Finansiellt beslutsfattande är en central del i den finansiella rådgivningen gentemot privatpersoner och det gemensamma branschorganet SwedSec har uppmärksammat psykologiska fallgropars roll i den finansiella rådgivningen. Den finansiella rådgivarens roll är att, bland annat, hjälpa sina kunder hantera de psykologiska fallgropar de kan råka ut för vid investeringar. Därför finns incitament att undersöka hur rådgivare i rådgivningsprocessen hanterar den eventuella förekomsten av anchoring och framing, samt hur väl de känner till dem. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka finansiella rådgivares kännedom kring anchoring och framing, samt hur de upplever och hanterar fenomenen som en del av rådgivningsprocessen gentemot privatpersoner med ett placerbart kapital under 2 miljoner kronor. Vidare syftar studien till att analysera hur dessa psykologiska fallgropar kan tydas i den finansiella rådgivningsprocessen. Metod: Studien har genomförts med en kvalitativ metod för att uppfylla studiens syfte. Datainsamlingen har bestått av nio semi-strukturerade djupintervjuer med SwedSeclicensierade finansiella rådgivare. Vidare har en abduktiv ansats antagits, för att kunna bidra med en intressant analys kring det studerade ämnet samt nå en slutsats. Slutsats: Studien finner att rådgivarnas kännedom är låg kring behavioral finance i allmänhet och anchoring och framing i synnerhet, även om förekomsten av de psykologiska fallgroparna uppmärksammats i studien. Trots låg kännedom har ungefär hälften av respondenterna utvecklat medvetna strategier för att hantera anchoring och framing. Hos de rådgivare som inte utvecklat medvetna strategier finner studien stöd för en omedveten hantering. Vidare kan studien inte ge stöd för att anchoring och framing utgör ett problem i rådgivningsprocessen gentemot privatpersoner med ett placerbart kapital under 2 miljoner kronor. / Background: Financial decision making is a central part of the financial advisory process for individuals, and the organization SwedSec has acknowledged the role of biases in the advisory process. The role of the financial advisor is, amongst other things, to protect their customers from biases in investments. Therefore, it is of interest to examine how well the advisors manage any presence of anchoring and framing, and the advisor's knowledge of them. Aim: The purpose of this thesis is to examine the financial advisor's knowledge regarding anchoring as well as framing, and how they handle these factors as part of the advisory process towards clients with funds of no more than 2 million SEK. Furthermore, the thesis aims to analyze how these biases can take shape in the advisory process. Method: The thesis has, to fulfill its purpose, used a qualitative method. Empirical data has been gathered through nine semi-structured interviews with SwedSec-licensed financial advisors. Furthermore, the thesis has taken on an abductive approach, to contribute with an interesting analysis of the subject and to reach a conclusion. Conclusion: The thesis finds that the financial advisor's knowledge about behavioral finance in general, along with anchoring and framing in particular, is low. The thesis, however, supports these biases existence in the advisory process. Regardless of the lack of knowledge, about half of the respondents have developed aware methods to handle the biases. The thesis shows that the advisors without aware methods handle the biases unconsciously. Furthermore, the thesis cannot support that anchoring and framing constitutes a problem in the advisory process towards clients with funds under 2 million SEK.

The extensive literature on financial literacy has sought to explain financial behaviours and decisions. On the asset side of the balance sheet, financial literacy is associated with good financial practice and wealth accumulation. On the liability side, however, the contribution of financial literacy to individuals’ financial decisions is not entirely clear. To add to this literature, as well as that of behavioural finance and alternative financial services, this research develops a conceptual framework based on Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behaviour (TPB). This framework links individuals’ attitudes to financial matters, subjective norms, perceived feasibility, financial knowledge, and behavioural biases that include overconfidence and present bias on the decision to obtain high-interest loans. The empirical tests of the developed framework suggest that individuals in distinct socio-economic groups have different antecedents that lead to borrowing from alternative financial services. For instance, individuals from low-income households are more likely to obtain these loans if they: do not have access to other forms of credit; struggle to pay their bills; are unemployed; or do not have access to advice from finance professionals. In turn, individuals from high-income households are more likely to obtain these loans if they lack financial knowledge or have behavioural biases like overconfidence or present bias. These results suggest the importance of access to professional advice while ensuring access to traditional means of obtaining credit for low-income individuals in order to reduce the negative effects of these high-interest loans. The results also confirm the importance of current policy initiatives to implement basic finance education in public school curriculums, and the urgency to seek effective approaches to address individuals’ cognitive assumptions.

Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Small and medium enterprises have an important role to play in the South African economy. The success of SME’s will lead to economic growth, that will play a major role in reducing unemployment in South Africa. It will also be the main driver for black economic empowerment. As elsewhere in the world one of the main problems that SME’s face is the need for finance and access to finance. Banks play a major role in providing finance to SME’s by providing different forms of finance to SME’s. The finance that the shareholders / directors can access in their personal capacity plays a critical role in the provision of finance to SME’s. Banks will require security when advancing credit facilities and the security that is offered by the shareholders / directors play an important role in the decision of banks to advance credit. The risk that the banks carry when granting credit facilities to SME’s is reduced when personal suretyships of the directors / shareholders are required. The personal assets of the shareholders / directors are used as security to obtain credit facilities for the SME’s. If the SME’s should fail, the banks will liquidate the personal assets of the directors / shareholders to settle the credit facilities that were granted to the SME’s. Customers are not aware of the dangers when signing surety. Banks have fiduciary duties towards their customers to inform them of any risks and what possible solutions might exist that will minimize the adverse financial effect of such risk consequences. If the surety should die, the bank will have the option to liquidate the assets of the sureties to settle the debts of the entities for which the surety has signed personal surety. Life cover can be affected on the lives of the sureties that will provide the necessary liquidity to settle the debts of the entities without the bank having to liquidate the personal assets of the sureties. Consumer protection has become widespread where the phrase caveat emptor has been replaced by caveat vendor – let the seller be aware. In addition to this the South African Government has also enacted legislation that banks have to adhere to that will lead to customers making informed decisions. The National Credit and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Acts have been introduced to afford the customer more protection. The banking industry has adopted the Code of Banking Practice which places responsibility on the banks to fully disclose all risks to their customers. It is especially the surety, the person that provides security for the debts of others that now enjoys increased protection. The National Credit Act affords a surety the same protection as the principal debtor and the Code of Banking Practice also contains very specific references with regards to sureties. Banks have become a business and the traditional notion that holds that business ethics and absolute adherence to legislation, industry codes and its own code of ethics will have an adverse effect on business, no longer holds. Many reasons have been given by ABSA Bank as to why the financial planners of ABSA Brokers should not be part and parcel of each transaction where credit facilities are extended to their customers. The reality however is that the Financial Planners must be made part of the process when credit facilities are extended. The Financial Planners must provide a financial needs analysis to the customer that will enable the customer to make an informed decision as to whether to implement life cover or not. By making the financial planners part of the process ABSA Business Bank will ensure adherence to legislation, industry codes and most importantly, it will fulfill the fiduciary duty that it has towards its customers. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Klein en medium ondernemings (KMO’s) speel ‘n belangrike rol in die Suid-Afrikaanse ekonomie. Die sukses van klein en medium ondernemings sal lei tot ekonomiese groei, wat sal bydra tot ‘n afname in werkloosheid in Suid Afrika. Dit sal ook die hoof drywer wees van swart ekonomiese bemagtiging. Soos elders in die wêreld is een van die hoofprobleme wat deur KMO’s in die gesig gestaar word die behoefte aan finansiering en die toegang tot finansiering. Banke speel ‘n belangrike rol in die verskaffing van finansiering deurdat finansiering in verskeie vorme aan KMO’s beskikbaar gestel word. Die finansiering wat aandeelhouers / direkteure in hulle persoonlike hoedanigheid kan bekom speel ‘n kritieke rol in die verskaffing van finansiering aan KMO’s. Banke vereis sekuriteit wanneer kredietfasiliteite beskikbaar gestel word en die sekuriteit wat deur die aandeelhouers / direkteure aangebied word speel ‘n belangrike rol in die banke se besluit om krediet te verskaf. Die risiko’s wat banke loop wanneer kredietfasiliteite aan KMO’s beskikbaar gestel word, word verminder wanneer persoonlike borgskappe van aandeelhouers / direkteure vereis word. Die persoonlike bates van die aandeelhouers / direkteure word gebruik as sekuriteit om kredietfasiliteite vir KMO’s te bekom. Indien die KMO’s sou misluk, sal die banke die persoonlike bates van direkteure / aandeelhouers te gelde maak om die kredietfasiliteite wat aan die KMO’s beskikbaar gestel was af te los. Kliënte is nie bewus van die gevare wat hulle loop wanneer hulle borgskappe verleen nie. Banke het fidusiêre pligte teenoor hulle kliënte om hulle in te lig aangaande enige risiko’s en watter moontlike oplossings daar bestaan wat enige nadelige finansiële gevolge sal beperk. Indien die borggewer tot sterwe sou kom, het die bank die opsie om die bates van die borggewer te gelde te maak om die skulde te delg van die entiteite waarvoor die borggewers persoonlike sekuriteite verskaf het. Lewensdekking kan aangegaan word op die lewe van die borggewers wat die nodige likiditeit sal verskaf om die skulde van die entiteite te delg sonder dat die persoonlike bates van die borggewers te gelde gemaak hoef te word. Verbruikersbeskerming geniet hedendaags voorrang waar die frase 'caveat emptor' - laat die koper op sy hoede wees - vervang is deur 'caveat vendor' – laat die verkoper bedag wees. Hiermee saam het die Suid-Afrikaanse regering ook wetgewing in plek gestel waaraan banke moet voldoen wat daartoe sal lei dat kliënte ingeligte besluite kan neem. Die Nasionale Kredietwet en die Finansiële Adviseurs- en Tussengangerswet is in werking gestel om meer beskerming aan die verbruiker te verleen. Die bank industrie het ook die Kode van Bankpraktyk aanvaar wat groter verantwoordelikhede op banke plaas om alle risiko’s ten volle aan hulle kliënte te openbaar. Dit is veral die borggewer, die persoon wat sekuriteit verskaf vir die skulde van ander persone / entiteite wat groter beskerming geniet. Die Nasionale Kredietwet bied aan die borggewer dieselfde beskerming as die hoofskuldenaar en die Kode van Bankpraktyk bevat ook spesifieke verwysing na die regte van borggewers. Bankwese het ‘n besigheid geraak en die tradisionele siening dat sake etiek en streng onderworpenheid aan wetgewing, industrie kodes en banke se eie etiese kodes ‘n negatiewe effek op besigheid sal hê, dra nie meer water nie. Verskeie redes is al deur ABSA Bank aangevoer oor hoekom die finansiële beplanners van ABSA Makelaars nie deel moet wees van elke transaksie waar krediet aan kliënte verleen word nie. Die realiteit is egter dat die finansiële beplanners deel van die proses gemaak moet word. Die finansiële beplanners moet ‘n finansiële behoefte ontleding aan die kliënt beskikbaar stel wat die kliënt in staat sal stel om ‘n ingeligte besluit te neem om lewensdekking te implementeer al dan nie. Deur die finansiële beplanners deel van die proses te maak verseker ABSA Besigheidsbank nakoming aan wetgewing en industrie kodes. Wat egter meer belangrik is, is dat die bank dan ook sy fidusiêre plig wat die bank teenoor sy kliënte het, sal nakom.

Bakgrund: Den tredje januari 2018 trädde EU-direktivet Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) i kraft. Direktivet ämnar öka investerarskyddet genom att eliminera informationsasymmetri och intressekonflikter på finansmarknaden, och samtidigt harmonisera reglerna mellan EU-länder. Inom investeringsrådgivning innebär det nya regelverket ökad dokumentation, ett större fokus på att försäkra sig om att investerarna förstår risker, hårdare krav på hur avgifter kommuniceras och striktare regler kring incitament. Allt detta för att skydda investerarna, som ofta visat sig ha en bristfällig finansiell kunskap och ett lågt intresse för privatekonomi. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån värdepappersföretagens perspektiv skapa förståelse för vilken påverkan EU-direktivet MiFID II har haft på principal-agent problem som uppstår vid investeringsrådgivning. Genomförande: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ fallstudie. Vidare har ett fenomenologiskt forskningsperspektiv använts, med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med sammanlagt sju respondenter som alla jobbar på värdepappersföretag, vilka valdes ut med ett målstyrt bekvämlighetsurval. Resultat: Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principal-agent problemen inom investeringsrådgivning inte har eliminerats. Informations- asymmetrin är enligt vår tolkning av de traditionella teorierna närmast obefintlig, men utgör fortfarande ett stort problem på grund av investerarnas ointresse och relativt låga förmåga att ta till sig informationen. Vi argumenterar därav att dessa dimensioner bör inkluderas i teorin för vilka trösklar som kan orsaka informationsasymmetrin. Intressekonflikterna har reducerats, men finns till viss mån fortfarande kvar. Motivationen att agera i ett egenintresse har dock inte påverkats. Uppsatsen visar således på att MiFID II inte har förflyttat principal-agent relationen till en stewardship relation. Kunskapsbidrag: Det teoretiska bidraget gällande informationsasymmetri utmanar antagandet om att principalen vill ha information som är relevant för denne. Uppsatsen visar att så inte alltid är fallet. Förutom att det uppstår informationsasymmetri om det är kostsamt eller svårt att ta reda på agentens handlingar, kan det även uppstå i situationer där principalen är ointresserad av, eller oförmögen att ta till sig av informationen enligt vår mening. Vidare har MiFID II inneburit att det är svårare för agenten att tillgodose sitt egenintresse om detta strider mot principalens. Däremot har direktivet inte inneburit att den interna motivationen ändrats och det går därför inte att förutsätta att ett kontraktsförhållande som haft en principal-agent relation övergår till en stewardship relation när dessa problem elimineras. Genom en ökad förståelse för hur tvingande lagstiftningar påverkar principal-agent problem kan det empiriska bidraget hjälpa tillsynsmyndigheter i sitt arbete att hantera principal-agent problem. Uppsatsen skulle således kunna underlätta vidareutveckling av regleringen som finns idag, likväl som utformningen av framtida direktiv och lagar. Med ett utomstående perspektiv på vilka intressekonflikter som kan uppstå vid investeringsrådgivning skulle det empiriska bidraget också kunna vara gynnsamt för värdepappersföretag och deras arbete för att hantera intressekonflikter. / Background: On January 3, 2018, the EU directive Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) came into effect. The directive is intended to expand investor protection through eliminating information asymmetry and conflicts of interest in the financial market, while also harmonizing the regulations between nations within the EU. For investment advising, the directive results in more extensive documentation and stricter regulation of how fees and risks are communicated, as well as how incentives are handled; all with the aim of protecting investors. At the same time, the general public shows low interest in personal finance, as well as inadequate financial knowledge. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of how the introduction of the EU directive MiFID II has affected the principal-agent problem that arises during investment advising, from an investment firm perspective. Completion: This is a qualitative case-study which utilizes a phenomenological research perspective and an abductive approach. The empirical material has been collected through semi-structured interviews at investment firms with a total of seven respondents, whom were selected through goal-oriented convenience sampling.  Conclusion: The study concludes that the principal-agent problems in investment advising have not been eliminated. According to our interpretation of the traditional theories, information asymmetry is nearly non-existent. Yet it remains a significant problem due to lack of interest and an inability to assimilate the information. Thus, we argue that the theoretical framework should be revised to include these barriers, as they may lead to information asymmetry. Conflicts of interest have been reduced, but still remain to some extent. Furthermore, the motivation to act based on self-interest still remain. Hence, the study shows that MiFID II has not turned the principal-agent relationship into a stewardship relationship. Contribution: The theoretical contribution to information asymmetry challenges the assumption that the principal is interested in all the information that is of relevance for them. The study show that this is not always the case. Apart from information asymmetry arising when ascertaining the actions of the agent is expensive or difficult, it can also arise due to the principal’s lack of interest or inability to assimilate the information. Moreover, MiFID II has made it more difficult for the agent to act in their own self-interest, should it deviate from the interest of the principal. The directive has not, however, affected the intrinsic motivation of the agent. Thus, we cannot assume that the elimination of these problems causes a principal-agent relationship to transform into a stewardship relationship. Through an increased understanding of how binding legislation affects principal-agent problems, the empirical contribution can help regulatory bodies in their work to mitigate the aforementioned problems. Hence, the study may help to not only expand existing legislation, but also in the development of future legislation and directives. By providing an outside perspective of what conflicts of interests could arise in investment advising, the empirical contribution could also be of use for investment firms in their work to identify and manage conflicts of interest