No description available.

Ce mémoire analyse l'impact du droit commercial international sur les politiques et pratiques commerciales en matière de boissons alcooliques au Québec. Plus spécifiquement, il examine leur conformité aux obligations contenues au GATT et aux autres accords commerciaux. Le premier chapitre présente le régime juridique applicable au commerce de l'alcool, dans le contexte particulier du partage constitutionnel canadien et de la délégation du pouvoir provincial à la Société des alcools du Québec (« SAQ »). Le second chapitre retrace l'évolution historique du marché québécois de l'alcool et étudie sa structure actuelle, divisée entre un monopole d'État (vins, spiritueux et bières importées) et l'industrie privée (bières domestiques). Le troisième chapitre traite des pratiques de la SAQ jugées incompatibles avec le GATT, soit les majorations de prix discriminatoires, les procédures d'inscription et de radiation des produits au catalogue et les restrictions d'accès aux points de vente. Cette partie aborde les accords bilatéraux subséquemment négociés par le gouvernement fédéral et acceptés par les monopoles provinciaux pour résoudre ces conflits. Le dernier chapitre discute de la compatibilité des pratiques actuelles de la SAQ, en particulier sa méthode de fixation de prix par rapport à l'article II:4 du GATT (monopoles d'importation) et son nouveau concept de gestion par catégorie en regard de l'article XVII (entreprises commerciales d'État) et de l'article XI (restrictions quantitatives). / This thesis analyses the impact of international trade law on Quebec's commercial policies and practices relating to alcoholic beverages. More specifically, it examines their conformity with GATT's obligations and other bilateral agreements. The first chapter presents the legal framework pertaining to alcohol trade in the context of the constitutional powers prevailing in Canada and the delegation of Quebec's authority to its liquor board, Société des alcools du Québec. The second chapter reviews the historical evolution of Quebec's a1cohol market and studies its actual structure, which is divided between a state monopoly on one side (wine, spirits and imported beer) and the private sector on the other side (domestic beer). The third chapter outlines how SAQ's practices were declared inconsistent with GATT, namely discriminatory mark-ups, listing and delisting procedures and restrictions on access to points of sale. This section also covers the bilateral agreements subsequently negotiated by the federal govemment and accepted by the provincial monopolies to resolve these conflicts. The final chapter examines the compliance of today's SAQ's policies with GATT's requirements. Particularly, it looks at its practice ofpricing method with respect to Article II:4 (import monopoly) and at its new concept of category management in relation with Article XVII (state trading) and Article XI (quantitative restrictions). / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en Droit (LL.M.)"

No description available.

國際經濟的發展已從傳統的撤除邊界措施演變至以國際競爭為重心的市場開放。「市場可競爭性」的政策理論顯出貿易政策與競爭政策之衝突，為後鳥拉圭回合時期全球市場亟須面對的重要議題，尤以反傾銷法為然。 本論文旨在以競爭法之角度，探討反傾銷法與競爭法之互動關係與其調和之道。首先，反傾銷法的正當性基礎將自經濟學、法律學及政策面的層次予以檢視。其次，反傾銷措施的反競爭效果及其與反托拉斯法的緊張關係為論述重點。再者，反傾銷程序對競爭因素之考量、區域性貿易協定以競爭法取代反傾銷法之實證及多邊貿易體系下的整合方案，皆將依序加以分析與評估。末則就我國反傾銷法與公平交易法之調和及反傾銷政策之定位提出個人建議。

Univ., Diss.--Passau, 2007. / Literaturverz. S. 295 - 319.

Univ., Diss.--Düsseldorf, 2000. / Literaturverz. S. 257 - 285.

Diss. Univ. Bremen, 2007. / Im Anhang engl. Vorschriftensammlung.

Submitted by Alice Rocha (rochaalice@yahoo.com.br) on 2012-08-29T15:33:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AliceRocha.pdf: 1315485 bytes, checksum: 71d0a771e82eda43361c8be0e1fc0815 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-08-29T15:33:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AliceRocha.pdf: 1315485 bytes, checksum: 71d0a771e82eda43361c8be0e1fc0815 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-09T21:50:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 AliceRocha.pdf.txt: 426917 bytes, checksum: bb81205e87744af8101261f0745c4669 (MD5) license.txt: 346 bytes, checksum: 6440c47a50909adf871d5cc0caf0b4f9 (MD5) AliceRocha.pdf: 1315485 bytes, checksum: 71d0a771e82eda43361c8be0e1fc0815 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-29 / A Cláusula da Nação mais Favorecida (CNMF) estabelecida no âmbito da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) é preceito legal válido e vigente no mesmo contexto de desenvolvimento e proliferação de acordos comerciais bilaterais, qual seja, o sistema multilateral de comércio. A CNMF representa a concretização do princípio da nãodiscriminação, uma das bases da OMC. No exercício desta importante função, a CNMF dispõe que todas as vantagens e privilégios acordados a um Membro da OMC devem ser estendidos a todos os demais Membros da organização, imediatamente e sem imposição de condições. Entretanto, tendo sido criada dentro de um contexto que agrega parceiros com características econômicas, sociais e políticas bastante díspares e temas nem sempre passíveis de um tratamento multilateral, como os investimentos estrangeiros e os temas não-comerciais, a aplicação absoluta da CNMF e o estabelecimento de um tratamento igualitário nem sempre é possível, tendo que admitir exceções, refletindo um viés ora de flexibilidade, ora de rigidez. Todavia, não se pode afirmar que a importância e o papel da CNMF dentro do sistema OMC diminuiu. O que deve ser considerado é que diante do inevitável fenômeno de proliferação do uso de acordos bilaterais no estabelecimento de trocas comerciais internacionais, restou a esta organização o importante desafio de ajuste de seus dispositivos. Enfim, o que se verifica é um sistema mundial de trocas antagônico e ao mesmo tempo harmonioso, agregando instrumentos que, apesar de possuírem lógicas contrárias, não necessariamente se excluem.

Como produto da prática mercantil, a cláusula da nação mais favorecida (CNMF) é um fenômeno jurídico complexo. Enquanto sua estrutura variante não é passível de padronização, por se adaptar às necessidades da sociedade internacional em cada momento histórico, seu núcleo funcional permanece imutável. Na ordem econômica internacional, a descentralização do poder político provoca desconfianças nos agentes econômicos, resultando em um permanente estado de guarda e competitividade predatória. Para assegurar maior estabilidade às expectativas normativas, os Estados celebram tratados, a fim de alterar tais percepções, conferindo durabilidade às relações econômicas internacionais. Resultado da configuração contemporânea da governança econômica internacional, a Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) simboliza a consolidação das expectativas normativas dos atores internacionais em torno do sistema multilateral de comércio (SMC). A OMC tem a função de consolidar o SMC, garantindo a posição de autoridade para corrigir as numerosas lacunas e antinomias jurídicas e reforçar a eficácia social, mediante a atuação de seu Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC). O SMC é um ordenamento jurídico, com lógica própria e princípios e regras específicos, que disciplina o mercado globalizado, cuja origem remonta à celebração do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT) em 1947. Prevista no artigo I:1 do GATT, a CNMF positiva o princípio da não discriminação, tendo por finalidade sistêmica desempenhar um papel dinâmico e integrado, ao: (i) assegurar transparência e dispersão de conhecimento; (ii) promover a cooperação internacional, a fim de eliminar ou reduzir, reciprocamente, as barreiras às trocas comerciais; (iii) vedar as práticas e instrumentos discriminatórios e protecionistas, tendo por função estender, automática, multilateral e incondicionalmente, as vantagens concedidas; e (iv) conservar as expectativas normativas, mediante a incorporação dos compromissos negociados ao SMC. Contudo, a proliferação de acordos preferenciais de comércio e de medidas protecionistas e discriminatórias pelos Estados-membros tem ameaçado o SMC de desautorização. Por recorrerem a exceções válidas à CNMF, esses fenômenos permitem a formação de relações discriminatórias e protecionistas, o que impacta negativamente as expectativas normativas dos agentes econômicos, ameaçando a função unificadora de sentido da CNMF, cujo resultado é a erosão da ideia de livre-mercado mundial. As reiteradas quebras de expectativas implicam problemas de coesão e eficácia normativa ao SMC, os quais são denominados desafios sistêmicos. Com efeito, o SMC sofre um processo de desestruturação, causado pela tensionada interação das dimensões ideacional e fática. Isso exige um controle de legalidade e de licitude dos atos jurídicos e das práticas dos Estados-membros. Em face desses desafios sistêmicos, a dissertação verifica se o artigo I:1 permanece como regra determinante para a decidibilidade do OSC. Para responder adequadamente, empregam-se os métodos analítico, hermenêutico e argumentativo, com um enfoque essencialmente dogmático, dentro de um ângulo crítico zetético. Ao fim da investigação, constata-se que a CNMF vem se consolidando como regra determinante para a construção do discurso jurídico-decisório pelo OSC. A confirmação jurisprudencial da imperatividade e da eficácia normativa do artigo I:1 reverbera reflexamente sobre os desafios sistêmicos, tendo o poderoso efeito de simbolizar a preferibilidade da incidência da CNMF sobre as relações econômicas internacionais. / As a product of commercial practice, the most-favored-nation clause (\"MFN\") is a complex legal phenomenon. While its variable structure is not subject to standardization, since it adapts to the needs of international society in each historical moment, its functional core remains unchanged. In the international economic order, the decentralization of political power leads to distrust of the economic agents, resulting in a permanent state of awareness and predatory competition. To ensure greater stability to the normative expectations, States enter into treaties in order to change such perceptions, providing durability to international economic relations. Result of the contemporary configuration of international economic governance, the World Trade Organization (\"WTO\") symbolizes the consolidation of the normative expectations of international actors around the multilateral trading system (\"MTS\"). The WTO has the mission of consolidating the MTS, ensuring a position of authority to correct the many shortcomings and antinomies of law and strengthen the social effectiveness through its Dispute Settlement Body (\"DSB\"). The MTS is a legal system, with its own logic and specific principles and rules, which regulates the globalized market, and has its origins in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. Set forth in Article I:1 of the GATT, the MFN establishes the principle of non-discrimination and has the systemic purpose of playing an integrated and dynamic role as it: (i) ensures transparency and dissemination of knowl edge,(ii) promotes international cooperation, by eliminating or reducing reciprocal barriers to trade, (iii) deters discriminatory and protectionist practices and instruments, being its function to extend, automatically, multilaterally and unconditionally, the benefits provided, and (iv) maintains the normative expectations, through the incorporation of negotiated concessions to the MTS. However, the proliferation of preferential trade agreements and protectionist and discriminatory measures by the member states has threatened the MTS of disempowerment. By resorting to MFNs valid exceptions, these phenomena allow the formation of discriminatory and protectionist relationships, which negatively impacts the normative expectations of economic agents, and threatening the harmonizing function of MFN; the result of which is the erosion of the global free market idea. Repeated breaches of expectations result in problems of cohesion and normative effectiveness of the MTS, which are called systemic challenges. Indeed, the MTS undergoes a process of disintegration, caused by the tensioned interaction of ideational and factual dimensions. This requires a control of legality and legitimacy of legal acts and practices of the member States. Given these systemic challenges, the dissertation verifies if Article I:1 remains the rule for determining the decidability of the DSB. In order to properly answer that, analytical, hermeneutic and argumentative methods are employed, with a primarily dogmatic focus, within a zetetic critical angle. By the end of the investigation, its stated that the MFN is becoming the consolidated rule for determining the construction of the legal and decision making discourse of the DSB. The confirmation from case law of the imperative nature and of the normative effectiveness of Article I:1 reverberates reflexively on the systemic challenges, having the powerful effect of symbolizing the desirability of MFN impact on international economic relations.

The Non-Agricultural Market Access Negotiations (NAMA) are being undertaken as part of the Doha Round of negotiations. NAMA negotiations are aimed at the trade liberalisation of industrial goods. Pursuant to the ‘development agenda’ adopted for the Doha Round, the NAMA negotiations also emphasise the development component. Particular emphasis is be made on tariff reductions in products of export interest to developing countries and the negotiations are to take special account of the needs and interests of developing countries, including through less than full reciprocity in accordance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provisions on special and differential treatment (SDT). This research attempts to determine this ‘development agenda’ through the prism of special and differential treatment as provided for in the NAMA mandate. An analysis of the SDT provisions in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and their application within the multilateral trading system reveals that SDT is a very controversial concept. Developing countries have used SDT to escape the strictures of multilateral trading rules and developed countries have used it as a ‘carrot and stick’ tool, to gain concessions from developing countries in other areas. SDT has further been revealed as a concept whose meaning and content is not very precise. While the provisions in the GATT as well as the Enabling Clause make good political and economic sense, they are not really actionable. This is because the concept is characterised by best-endeavour provisions that lack any legal force and cannot be adjudicated in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Developed countries have thus not been called and cannot be called, legally, to account for lack of delivery on their commitments and obligations with regard to SDT. This has effectively constrained the use of SDT as a development tool within the WTO, and, being the only tool being utilised, there needs to be found an alternative way to address development needs in the WTO. The WTO has sought to address this through efforts to amend SDT to make it more precise, effective and operational. The content and meaning of the ‘development agenda’ itself in the Doha Round is very elusive and an effort is made in this paper to determine the appropriate meaning of development in relation to the multilateral trading system. Development as an objective in the WTO is not novel to the Doha Round. The WTO is littered with references to development and the betterment of the human condition in its preamble to agreements and other provisions. Development has to be considered in al its three dimensions: social, political and economical. While this paper does not advocate that the WTO become a fully fledged development institution, it can shape its development agenda in such a way that benefits on the economic front are designed to stimulate socio-economic development as well. An analysis of the NAMA modalities reveals that mercantilist objectives have triumphed in the negotiations and SDT has been lost by the wayside. Developed countries have sought for radical tariff reductions on the part of developing countries, with meagre flexibilities that are further constrained by requirements that no full sector be excluded from the formula cuts. SDT has not been considered and the commitments are not proportional to the development capacity of most developing countries. This is in direct contradiction to the SDT provisions in the GATT that are supposed to guide the negotiations as well as the provision on tariff negotiations. However, the modalities are not legally contestable because the SDT provisions do not hold any legal suasion. The NAMA negotiations reveal a development vacuity within the WTO that needs to be resolved by other means other than the traditional SDT. Taking into consideration the evolving power bases and the politics of the membership of the WTO, this is an imperative. This paper proposes that Aid for Trade is the best option available to the WTO system. The concept does find support in GATT/WTO provisions on SDT and can be modified to be more predictable and sustainable. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted