The Pariah Party Influence on Local Government Formation in Swedish Municipalities 2002-2018 This paper studies the correlation between the rise of the radical right party The Sweden Democrats and the rise of minority governments and bloc transcending/cross-partisan coalitions in Swedish local governments; the role of the Sweden Democrats in this development is studied and further its impact in the relation between right/left-wing governments. Taking off in classical coalition- and government formation theory together with the concept of pariah parties, I also continue to discuss the setting of local government in Sweden and its implication on local government studies in general. Regression analysis of formed government in the 290 Swedish municipalities over the last five local elections, 2002-2018, is used to answer the question of how the pariah party that is the Sweden Democrats, have affected the types of local government in Sweden. The study finds that the rise of the Sweden Democrats in Swedish municipal parliaments to a large extent can explain both an increase of cross-partisan coalitions and of minority governments. This can however only be said when the party holds the balance of power; just the size or sheer presence of the party in local parliaments does not seem to have a significant impact on government type. When the party does hold the power of balance, one can observe a significant shift in favour of right-wing governments over left-wing governments. Albeit not participating in government and being considered a pariah party, or perhaps because of this fact, the rise of the Sweden Democrats has significantly affected the character of Swedish local governments.

This thesis examines the effects of economic and political turbulence on coalition-formation across 37 EU and OECD democracies. Utilizing the existing potential-coalitions research, it analyzes how increases in turbulence affect common variables predicted to determine which coalitions are chosen of all potential cabinets following an election. These variables drawn from the coalition-formation field are examined using a conditional logit regression model with interaction effects, and results indicate that both political and economic turbulence highly affect the way coalition formation is carried out, although the effects of the two turbulence types vary. During economic turbulence larger coalitions appear to be warranted, although results simultaneously suggest that ideological cohesion is hard to achieve during turbulent times. During political turbulence, instead, results suggest ideologically wide coalitions are more common but that minority cabinets are still more likely to appear. Despite the varying results, this analysis finds support that coalition formation is greatly affected by both economic and political turbulence. While the effects of some coalition-formation variables utilized by previous researchers appear to withstand the addition of turbulence, other effects change greatly when levels of instability are considered.

This study starts with two theoretical puzzles within the rational choice oriented literature on government formation in parliamentary democracies: the relative importance of constitutional rules and the existence of multiple party goals. From these puzzles stem the research questions that guide the study: First, what is the theoretical and empirical link between constitutional arrangements (including rules) and party goals? Second, what are the goals of political parties and how can these be studied? Third, relative to the goals of political parties and other constitutional arrangements, what is the importance of government formation rules for the empirical record of minority and majority governments?Coalition theory provides the theoretical starting point from which the research questions stem. The historical-institutional strand of new institutionalism is used to guide the general understanding of the importance of institutional context. The rational choice oriented strand is used for a detailed study of the design of the Swedish government formation rules and an analysis of how the formation rules affect the goal seeking (micro-logic) of actors.Based on both cross-national data and an in-depth study of Swedish coalition and government formation, the analysis shows that the answer to research question number one is that the link between constitutional arrangements and party goals is one of co-determination. The answer to research question number two is that party leaders pursue four main goals and that this should be an explicit model assumption. The answer to research question number three is that the government formation rules help determine the parties' bargaining positions and for that reason they are of significant importance for the formation of minority and majority governments. / digitalisering@umu

This thesis generally focuses on the president's role in the formation of the first government of Andrej Babiš after the 2017 parliamentary elections. As this government ruled for several months without the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, the key part of the thesis further concerns the issue of the investiture vote. In the context of the post-election period, the thesis examines specific steps taken by the president in the government formation process in order to evaluate whether the manifestations of the president's influence are in line with the basic preconditions for the functioning of the executive power. The issue of confidence is assessed with respect to whether it is necessary for the government to rely on the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, both in terms of relations between the executive and the legislature, but also regarding the government performance. Emphasis is therefore placed on the complex problematization of the investiture vote and the issue of confidence is then analysed primarily at the level of government's accountability to the Chamber of Deputies. Furthermore, the thesis confronts the first cabinet of Andrej Babiš with the basic prerequisites for effective government and aims to prove whether its appointment created a cabinet with the potential to govern...

The presented dissertation dealed with the process of forming the goverments on the regional level. On the example of the Czech Republic it analysed forming of the executive coalitions in the regions - the upper regionally autonomous units. The text is focused on four electoral periods: 2000-2004, 2008-2008, 2008-2012 and after the elections in 2012. The endeavour of the dissertation was to answer the question which factors are important for constitution of the governments on the regional level and what particularities belong to this process in comparison with the national level. On the level of the national governance the forming process of the government is compiled relatively extensively, however on the regional level, respectively sub-national level, the application of the theoretical information is difficult and the rules are not the same . The theoretical part is described in details. During the analysis it is necessary to bear in mind the theory of the second order elections. The electors prefer various political parties than in the first order election. The theories of games and racional choice are the second level of the theoretical base. Because of these two it is possible to think about a payoff of the individual participants who gain their utility. The theory of coalitions is principal as it...

Interactions involving multiple parties and necessitating their agreement are pervasive in both market and non-market settings. As the number of participants increases, these situations become progressively complex to describe and analyze. Despite the prolific nature of such scenarios, a comprehensive conceptual framework addressing such settings is often lacking. The focus of this dissertation lies in a distinct type of multilateral interaction, where a commitment of a group, or a coalition, of participants is required for achieving a positive surplus. The analysis encompasses three scenarios, namely, government formation in parliamentary democracies, bilateral trading on a market with multiple buyers and sellers, and resource allocation in the US presidential campaign. This dissertation proposes an approach that provides axiomatic foundations for a theory of coalition formation in these settings, and, for two of these scenarios, simultaneously provides an empirically accurate forecast methodology.

We propose a model to study government formation by a legislative body composed by parties elected with a proportional representation rule. Once the legislative configuration is determined, the elected parties must form a government, choose a government policy and a distribution of legislative resources and benefits among the elected parties through a bargaining game. A mass of voters is assumed capable of voting strategically. Our goal is to study how a limitation on the available resources among legislators may affect the behavior of the agents involved in this system, both voters and legislators. We show that a decrease in the relative distance between ideologies increases the social welfare and decreases the necessary amount of resources to keep the optimal agreement. Moreover, there is an upper limit to this amount when the ideological distance increases / Propõe-se um modelo teórico para estudar a formação de governo por um corpo legislativo, composto por partidos eleitos em representação proporcional. Uma vez que a configuração do Legislativo é definida, os partidos eleitos devem formar um governo, escolher uma política de governo e uma distribuição de recursos e benefícios legislativos entre os partidos presentes na casa através de um jogo de barganha. Uma massa de eleitores é assumida capaz de votar estrategicamente. Nosso objetivo é estudar como uma limitação nos recursos disponíveis entre os legisladores pode afetar o comportamento dos agentes envolvidos no sistema, tanto eleitores quanto legisladores. Mostra-se que uma queda da distância relativa entre as ideologias aumenta o bem-estar social e diminui a quantia necessária de recursos que mantem o acordo legislativo ótimo. Ademais, há um limite superior para essa quantia quando a distância ideológica aumenta.

We propose a model to study government formation by a legislative body composed by parties elected with a proportional representation rule. Once the legislative configuration is determined, the elected parties must form a government, choose a government policy and a distribution of legislative resources and benefits among the elected parties through a bargaining game. A mass of voters is assumed capable of voting strategically. Our goal is to study how a limitation on the available resources among legislators may affect the behavior of the agents involved in this system, both voters and legislators. We show that a decrease in the relative distance between ideologies increases the social welfare and decreases the necessary amount of resources to keep the optimal agreement. Moreover, there is an upper limit to this amount when the ideological distance increases / Propõe-se um modelo teórico para estudar a formação de governo por um corpo legislativo, composto por partidos eleitos em representação proporcional. Uma vez que a configuração do Legislativo é definida, os partidos eleitos devem formar um governo, escolher uma política de governo e uma distribuição de recursos e benefícios legislativos entre os partidos presentes na casa através de um jogo de barganha. Uma massa de eleitores é assumida capaz de votar estrategicamente. Nosso objetivo é estudar como uma limitação nos recursos disponíveis entre os legisladores pode afetar o comportamento dos agentes envolvidos no sistema, tanto eleitores quanto legisladores. Mostra-se que uma queda da distância relativa entre as ideologias aumenta o bem-estar social e diminui a quantia necessária de recursos que mantem o acordo legislativo ótimo. Ademais, há um limite superior para essa quantia quando a distância ideológica aumenta.

The diploma thesis Minority coalitions and governments in the Danish kingdom focuses on questions concerning government formation process, especially minority governments - the main issue or topic deal with main influences on government formation in Denmark after 1953 (the last change of the anish constitution) and why so many minority governments (one-party or coalitions) or minimal winning coalitions in Denmark have been formated in this period. It is counted with historical experiences, traditions but the main attention is given to comparison between theoretical approach (political coalition theories) and historical approach (formatting and functioning of Danish governments after 1953). This thesis is working with three main theoretical coalition typologies: Office seeking, Cooperative Policy seeking and Government formation by median party. The conclusion are two models: historical and median party government model (Laver and Schofield). By conjunction of these two models I specified main variables or aspects of the Danish government formation which inluence essentially the Danish political scene as well (issue policy, ad hoc coalitions etc.): 1) importance and advantage of median party 2) adherence of parties to their programs/ideology (policy seeking) 3) office capacity of political parties.