This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume&#039 / s philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo / s &ldquo / science of man&rdquo / attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo / s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo / being-human&rdquo / , the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo / s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.

This thesis evaluates David Hume&rsquo / s notion of justice by examining the coherence in his legal, moral, and political philosophy. It is argued that on the whole, Hume&rsquo / s use of the concept justice is coherent in his theories of law, ethics, and politics. To this end, firstly, Hume&rsquo / s moral thought is examined in detail. Secondly, his legal theory and his position in legal philosophy are considered with references to its moral aspects. Next, Hume&rsquo / s notion of justice is examined in its relation with the state. It is observed that Hume&rsquo / s conception of justice has moral, legal, and political foundations, and that all of these subjects depend on the same principles. It is shown that the laws of justice constitute an ethical, legal, and political issue in Hume&rsquo / s philosophy. According to Hume, although obeying the rules of justice is a moral topic, the laws of justice are guaranteed by the state in large societies.

Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticism / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-07-05 16:42:43.601

This work, the Nature and Value of Scepticism, shows that the metaphilosopby arising from what David Hume calls "true scepticism," is of use and value, refuting three standard objections to sceptical philosophy: the charges of unlivability, of idleness and of being dangerous and destructive. / The unlivability charge is refuted with an examination of the work of a self-proclaimed extreme sceptic, Sextus Empiricus. The idleness charge is answered by questioning its assumption that if scepticism does not lead to an extreme conclusion, it must be idle and without philosophical interest. The destructive charge, that the acceptance of scepticism would result in the death of rationality, is countered in reviewing the work of Hume and Ludwig Wittgenstein, showing that their outlook is not against philosophy but only a particular type of philosophy, namely dogmatic philosophy. / Chapter 1 argues that two reasonable interpretations of Sextus's writings yield a scepticism that is livable and philosophically important. Chapter 2 shows Hume's philosophy is livable and not destructive. Chapter 3 examines the connection between Hume's philosophy and his sceptical approach, arguing that his true scepticism informs his philosophical outlook. Chapter 4 argues that Wittgenstein shares much with Hume's "true scepticism," and that his work is not anti-philosophical as widely supposed. Chapter 5 provides examples of how a sceptically informed metaphilosophy can help address questions in epistemology and metaethics.

This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc. / Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."

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The concept of age has undergone a shift from a non-specific measure of chronological age, to an identification of underlying biological, psychological and functional factors leading to age-related changes over time. Loss of neurons (atrophy) and cognitive decline in healthy aging fit well in to this age paradigm. The aging brain is thought to undergo functional shifts in information processing in response to atrophy, which is conceptualised as a “Compensation Hypothesis” of cognitive aging. Using behavioural (reaction time, variability measures, and accuracy on the n-back task of working memory), structural (stereological cortical volume estimates) and functional (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) approaches, this study documents decreased whole brain, prefrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex volumes in older individuals. Further, slower, less accurate, and more variable performance on the n-back task in older participants was accompanied by a posterior-to-anterior shift in processing, confirming the Compensation Hypothesis of cognitive aging. The behavioural data combined with structural and functional findings, suggest an aging brain that neuropsychologically compensates over time by paradoxically placing further processing demands on a structurally compromised dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This produces adequate but slower, more variable, and less accurate performance compared to younger brains; compensation occurs in age, but is not complete. Decision making research has pointed to the important role of emotion in judgement, and has implicated the orbitofrontal cortex as critical for this processing modality. The structural data in this study showed preferentially less volume in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but maintained cortical volume in the orbitofrontal cortex with age. Younger individuals took longer and maintained their accuracy with increasing complexity during the n-back task, with older participants decreasing their accuracy but not to the level of chance with increasing task complexity. As such, decision making on the n-back task may have shifted with age from the pure processing power of the structurally compromised dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to increasing reliance on emotionally-guided decision making inputs mediated by the intact orbitofrontal cortex resulting in adequate but not fully compensated performance in older people. These findings are discussed in relation to evolutionary pressures on the human working memory system, Hume’s concepts of reason and the passions, and to the emerging field of neuroeconomics. / Graduate

Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät I--Zürich--Universität, 1989. / Résumés en anglais, en français et en italien. Bibliogr. p 173-201. Index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2009. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 247-252). Issued in print and online. Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations.

Chemnitz, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2000.