Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit sollte der Übergang von amorphen AlCuLi-Schichten in die quasikristalline Phase untersucht werden. Dafür wurden die atomaren Struktur und der elektrische Widerstand an in-situ hergestellten amorphen (Al[5,5]Cu[1])[100-x] Li[x]- Schichten im Temperaturbereich 2 K < T < 500 K gemessen. Zur Herstellung der hoch reaktiven dünnen Schichten wurde unter Ar-Reinstgasatmosphäre und Ultrahochvakuum präpariert. Die Messergebnisse entstanden ebenfalls unter UHV-Bedingungen. In amorphem (Al[5,5]Cu[1])[100-x] Li[X] positionieren sich die Atome in die Friedelminima des Paarpotentials. Bis ca. 26 at% Li geschieht dies überwiegend über einen Hybridisierungseffekt der Elektronen aus dem Valenzband in die unbesetzten Cu-d-Zustände. Ab 26 at% Li wird das zunehmend durch eine Erhöhung der Atomzahldichte erreicht. Um die Verkleinerung des Atomvolumens zu erreichen, gibt das Li sein äußeres Elektron ab und verringert damit seinen Radius. Das Maximum in der Interferenzfunktion I(K) bei größeren K-Werten verschiebt parallel zum Durchmesser der Fermikugel 2kF und ist dadurch als elektronisch induziert zu erkennen. Es zeigen sich elektronische Transporteigenschaften, die auch schon bei anderen Systemen beobachtet werden konnten (NaSn, AlCuFe). Im Bereich mit mehr als 50at% Li verschwindet die Dichteanomalie wieder und die Atome befinden sich auch ohne Änderung des Volumens nahe den Friedelminima. Allerdings verliert die Legierung dabei an Stabilität. Das System verhält sich hier ähnlich wie vergleichbare Edelmetall-Polyvalentelement-Legierungen.

No description available.

The problem of induction is most famously discussed by David Hume, though he himself has never resorted to the notion of “induction.” As part of Hume’s overall project of identifying the logical fallacy of causal relations, the problem of induction is identified as the problem of “the unobservable matters of fact.“ Hume argues that, as empirical beings, we can believe in two types of knowledge with confidence: relations of ideas and observable matters of facts. We can be certain about the relations of ideas, since by analyzing the relation itself we can come to necessarily true conclusions about such relations. On the other hand, we do not need to question observable matters of fact, since such are the content of our experience, and empirical matters such as “tables” and “chairs” are not subject to truth or falsity: it would be quite meaningless to argue that “it is true that table.” Though our perceptive experience easily invites another interesting philosophical discussion - most famously discusses by Descartes - that is, the external world scepticism, that is not something that this paper would address. Hume’s point, in the end, is to show that when we infer any unobservable matters of fact - that is, inductive inferences - from observable matters of facts, we are committing to a logical fallacy where the true premises of the inference does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

David Hume argues that reflections upon public utility explain the psychological foundations of justice and the moral feelings attendant on it. Adam Smith objects that Hume’s theory of justice is psychologically implausible. A just punishment attracts the approval of every citizen on Hume’s alleged view. Not every citizen can consider the abstract public interest every time, Smith observes, so Hume can’t have explained all of justice. I argue, in response, that Smith’s objection has not accounted for all of the causal processes that Hume draws upon in support of reflections upon public utility. Conventions establish the very possibility of public interest, and socializing processes lend the public interest its moral salience. Human nature includes a species-general passion for acquiring property for the sake of family. The motivational centrality and universal scope of this passion, coupled with the dramatic psychological power of sympathy, generates the first moral feelings. Social conditioning develops those feelings into attitudes about reward and punishment. Hume’s theory of justice, with his conjectures about sociocultural processes, is both psychologically plausible and more complex than commentators tend to appreciate.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 426333.pdf: 479070 bytes, checksum: 3b9dab1b30f46509f30147a4068fa0eb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-20 / Neste estudo nos propusemos a uma investiga??o das cr?ticas de David Hume ao Argumento do Des?gnio, existente em seu livro Di?logos sobre a Religi?o Natural. Cr?ticas essas que t?m por finalidade apontar as fragilidades do referido argumento, como fundamento da teoria que defende a cria??o do mundo a partir de Deus. Objetivamos tamb?m, explicitar o caminho dial?tico e argumentativo humeano, que a partir de uma perspectiva empirista, prop?e que todo o conhecimento pode, somente, provir da experi?ncia sens?vel. Se Hume consegue ou n?o refutar e destruir esse argumento e, se prop?e ou n?o alguma alternativa para substitui??o, ? o que examinaremos no presente. De um total de quatro cap?tulos, come?aremos por apresentar o Argumento do Des?gnio, na forma em que ficou conhecido. A seguir entraremos, efetivamente em contato com o livro Di?logos sobre a Religi?o Natural, passando ent?o ? abordagem da constru??o das cr?ticas elaboradas por Hume (Filo) para, finalmente demonstrarmos que, apesar de parecer ter Filo, sido vencido no di?logo - num feito que s? corrobora a maestria lingu?stica humeana - ratifica, sob um v?u de discri??o, a posi??o assumida durante todo o di?logo.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 28 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Meu objetivo é apresentar uma descrição naturalizada do fenômeno moral. Defenderei esse posicionamento apresentando uma possível relação existente entre a aptidão social de certas espécies animais, dentre elas, o ser humano, e a sua capacidade de realizar distinções de cunho moral. Parto do problema central da filosofia prática humeana, que é o de determinar qual o princípio pelo qual são realizadas as distinções morais. David Hume, nas obras Tratado da Natureza Humana e Investigações sobre os Princípios da Moral, coloca o princípio da utilidade como o que se encontra no fundamento das distinções desta natureza, sendo bom aquilo que é útil para a sociedade e ruim o que lhe é prejudicial. Aqui está o ponto central para se compreender porque, para Hume, os sentimentos, influenciados pela qualidade natural da simpatia, são centrais à moralidade, uma vez que eles constituem o elemento norteador para definir o que é ou não útil ao convívio social. No momento em que o sentimento constitui um elemento central dentro

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:40:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariel Rosauro Zasso.pdf: 735888 bytes, checksum: b4e98a2bb7429588cbba159468fa5130 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-05 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This essay talks about theoretical devices with which we can operate relations of sympathy in clinical encounters. We propose to highlight the complexity of the issue through a brief overview of what happened with the idea of sympathy throughout the history of Western thought. From the viewpoint of conceptual connections, we rely especially to David Hume, for whom, in the eighteenth century, the issue that influences the theme of sympathy is that of relations between humans. Because sympathy is a passion, and like all passion, in Hume, is characterized by its partiality, the difficulty to consider, in the social point of view, is the sympathy's intensity reduccion as it extends. A sympathy's clinic is thematized in resonance with this problem, discussed with help of Gilles Deleuze's book Empirisme et subjectivité (1953). This clinical practice should promote the intensification of sympathy without recreate the relational limitation that it suffers from restricted groups, like family, and be able to establish itself as a nomadic place of relations of sympathy's extent, in favor of an affirmation of differential life / Esta dissertação discorre acerca de dispositivos teóricos com os quais podemos operar relações de simpatia em encontros clínicos. Propomonos a evidenciar a complexidade do tema através de um breve apanhado daquilo que se passou com a idéia de simpatia ao longo da história do pensamento ocidental. Do ponto de vista das conexões conceituais, recorremos especialmente a David Hume, para quem, no séc XVIII, a problemática que influencia o tema da simpatia é o das relações entre os humanos. Como a simpatia é uma paixão, e como toda paixão, em Hume, se caracteriza por sua parcialidade, a dificuldade a ser levada em conta, do ponto de vista social, é a redução da intensidade da simpatia à medida que ela se estende. Uma clínica da simpatia é tematizada em ressonância com esse problema, discutido com ajuda do livro de Gilles Deleuze (19251995) Empirisme et subjectivité, de 1953. Tal clinicar deve possibilitar a intensificação da simpatia sem recriar a limitação relacional que ela sofre em grupos restritos, como a família; e ser capaz de constituirse como lugar nômade de uma extensão das relações de simpatia, em favor de uma afirmação diferencial da vida

La thèse traite du débat sur l'origine et la nature du polythéisme qui anima la pensée française au XVIIIe siècle. Depuis le début du siècle, ce débat commence à déborder le périmètre théologique auquel il se limitait auparavant. Le polythéisme cesse d’être une question d’exégèse scripturaire et devient un problème historique, puis philosophique. La thèse a pour objet d'éclaircir les différentes étapes de cette évolution. On montre en particulier que le remplacement progressif du modèle du monothéisme originel par celui du polythéisme primitif provoque un changement du statut de la question : d'enquête principalement antiquaire sur un sujet spécifique, elle devient une réflexion philosophique sur l'origine et la nature de la croyance religieuse tout court. La première des deux parties de la thèse est consacrée aux recherches sur les religions païennes des érudits, des antiquaires et des historiens : on y examine les principales théories sur l'origine du paganisme nées dans ce contexte (évhémérisme, allégorisme, théories de l'origine de l'idolâtrie des arts visuels et des signes de l'écriture) afin de montrer qu'elles préparèrent la réflexion des philosophes, en proposant un nouveau regard historique sur le polythéisme. La deuxième partie porte sur les aspects plus proprement philosophiques du débat ; l'attention est concentrée sur les deux figures-clés de Pierre Bayle et de David Hume et sur deux axes théoriques principaux : un axe logique ou gnoséologique, touchant à ce que signifie penser la divinité en tant que plurielle ; et un axe anthropologique ou psychologique sur l'origine de la croyance en plusieurs dieux. / The subject of this thesis is the debate on the origin and nature of polytheism, which took place in France in the Eighteenth century. From the beginning of the century, this debate started to unfold outside of the theological frame within which it had been confined earlier. Polytheism stopped being an issue of biblical exegesis to become a question of historical and then philosophical nature. This thesis aims to shed light on the steps of this change. In particular, it is shown that the gradual substitution of the orthodox model of original pure monotheism with that one of primitive polytheism changed the nature of the issue: from a specific question mainly of antiquarians' interest, it became a philosophical inquiry on the origin and nature of religious belief in general. The first part of the thesis is about the researches on pagan religions conducted by antiquarians and historians: the main theories on the origin of paganism which arose in this context are examined (Euhemerism, allegorism, theories of the origin of idolatry from visual arts and writing signs), aiming to show that these theories paved the way to the reflection of philosophers, proposing a new historical approach to polytheism. The second part of the thesis deals with more strictly philosophical aspects of the debate, focusing on two key figures ‒ Pierre Bayle and David Hume ‒ and on two fundamental theoretical lines: a logical or gnoseological one, about what it means to conceive divinity as multiple; and an anthropological or psychological one, on the origin of the belief in several divinities.

This thesis explores the historical imaginations exhibited by the key political architects of the Northern Ireland Peace Process: Gerry Adams, John Hume and David Trimble. It compares and contrasts ways in which each has engaged the ideological resource of history throughout their respective biographies, exploring the various visions of history, both Irish and otherwise, that have intrigued them, and the environments and experiences that moulded their view of the past. Exploiting a wide range of archival sources, along with original interviews and conversations with the ‘peacemakers’ themselves, it considers how Adams, Hume and Trimble learnt about history; how they subsequently imagined and wrote about it, and how they ultimately applied it within their influential political thinking. It is a study of the relationship between historical and political imagination, delivering fresh and revealing intellectual profiles of the ‘peacemakers’. Significantly, it demonstrates how ideas and visions of history, commonly perceived as somehow to blame for conflict in Northern Ireland, were put to positive use by Adams, Hume and Trimble. It therefore considers how visions of history contributed to the ideological evolution of peace and political stability on the island.

This thesis introduces pathogenesis as methodology for a vitalist metaphysics, where life is understood as emerging and developing through functioning and grounding. This methodology is defined in an analysis of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, whose work is used as central resource alongside the work of historical figures – Plato, Hume, Kant, Bergson and Nietzsche – and contemporary writings on Deleuze as secondary resources. The analysis proceeds by problematising the related concepts of function and ground in relation to Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy and in relation to the supplementary material indicated.