The thesis argues that two ways in which we can consider empathy’s role in ethics are fundamentally flawed because they fail to take into account the myriad ways in which empathy can be affected and influenced by our motivations. I apply what I call ‘the motivation objection’ to these two views. This has three aspects: (1) reliability: because empathy can be affected and influenced by our motivations, empathizing does not always lead to the right results; (2) function: because it can be affected and influenced by our motivations, empathy is not sufficient for various functions; (3) circularity: because it can be affected and influenced by our motivations, empathy cannot be used to define or explain certain aspects of morality in a non-circular way. The two ways of considering empathy’s role in ethics are what I call constitutive views, according to which empathy in some way constitutes, or is the foundation for, morality, and instrumental views, according to which empathy is of instrumental value in morality. I apply the motivation objection to three constitutive views, two historical and one contemporary, each of which is a sentimentalist theory of morality with empathy (or sympathy, in the case of the historical theories) at its heart. These are the sentimentalist moral theories of David Hume, Adam Smith and Michael Slote. I then apply the motivation objection to instrumental views of empathy’s role in ethics, before defending one particular instrumental view, according to which empathy can play a positive role in morality when integrated with virtue, and the virtue of compassion in particular.

My aim in this thesis is to demonstrate that common interpretations of Kant’s theory of respect do not account for the motivation a subject feels to follow the moral law. A large number of interpreters focus on Kant’s early ethical works—such as the Grounding and the Critique of Practical Reason—to justify how the moral law alone motivates a subject to act rightly. However, by the time he published Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant had discovered the problem of radical evil—the fact that people tend to feel more motivated by the inclinations than by the moral law. Kant’s solution to this challenge comes in the form of moral education: the contingent practices of historical institutions (factors that are extraneous to the moral law) are required to learn respect for the law. By the end of the Religion, it will be asked whether duty for duty’s sake is ever achieved.

This thesis is focused on the impact of using soil conditioners in growing grapevine. In the experimental part the effect of Super Hume was evaluated at selected locations. It is impact on the quality and production was evaluated. The results were used to create the economic analysis when using Super Hume.

In this thesis I address the problem of the commentators' interpretations regarding Hume's philosophy of mind. Precisely what theory of mind Hume articulates is the subject of much debate among the commentators although a definitive view has, as yet, not been attributed to Hume. The issue Is, of course, complicated by the fact that Hume says so many things about mind, and these numerous and often conflictlng assertions entirely elude the commentators' endeavours to systematize them into a coherent theory. Through and examination of what I take to be three representative readings, viz., those of R.F. Anderson, C.V. Salmon, and John Bricke, I show that each interpretation cannot but fail as a systematization of Hume's views about mind into a theory, since a positive reading of Hume's philosophy of mind cannot be accomplished without either abandoning aspects of Hume's metaphysics, acknowledging that a preferred interpretation Is unable to account for certain views that Hume propounds, alleging a deeply rooted inconsistency, or all of these possibilities together. Why Hume's work eludes the commentators In this way is a problem that is examined by considering his intentions in A Treatise of Human Nature (and the Enquiries); that is, more specifically, the aim of his sceptical critique of metaphysical concepts and doctrines, his conviction as an epistemologist that our knowledqe claims are confined to the realm of experience, and his project, viz., to set the sciences on a new foundation. The whole discussion calls attention to the difficulty that is encountered in the interpretation of Hume's views about mind and its importance, for Hume scholarship, lies precisely in the endeavour to bring these problems to light via a critique of the accepted readings. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

The following inquiry pursues two interlinked aims. The first is to understand Wittgenstein's idea of non-foundational certainty in the context of a reading of On Certainty that emphasizes its Pyrrhonian elements. The second is to read Wittgenstein's remarks on idealism/radical skepticism in On Certainty in parallel with the discussion of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations in order to demonstrate an underlying similarity of philosophical concerns and methods. I argue that for the later Wittgenstein, what is held certain in a given context of inquiry or action is a locally transcendental condition of the inquiry or action in question. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein's analysis of the difference between knowledge and certainty forms the basis of his critique of both Moore's "Proof" and radical skepticism. This critique takes the shape of rejection of a presupposition shared by both parties, and utilizes what I identify as a Pyrrhonian-style argument against opposed dogmatic views. Wittgenstein's method in this text involves describing epistemic language-games. I demonstrate that this is consistent with the rejection of epistemological theorizing, arguing that a Wittgensteinian "picture" is not a theory, but an impressionistic description that accomplishes two things: (i) throwing into relief problems with dogmatic theories and their presuppositions, and (ii) describing the provenance of linguistic and epistemic practices in terms of norms grounded in convention. Convention, in turn, is not arbitrary, but grounded in the biological and social natures of human beings--in what Wittgenstein calls forms of life. Thus there is a kind of naturalism in the work of the later Wittgenstein. It is a naturalism that comes neatly dovetailed with Pyrrhonism--a combination of strategies traceable to Hume's work in the Treatise. I read Hume as someone who develops the Pyrrhonian method to include philosophy done "in a careless manner," and argue that Wittgenstein adopts a similar method in his later works. Finally, I explain the deference to convention in the work of both Hume and Wittgenstein by reference to a passage in Sextus' Outlines, on which I provide a gloss in the final chapter of this work.

No description available.

In the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas developed two models for how humans may speak of God - either by the analogy of proportion or by the analogy of proportionality. Aquinas's doctrines initiated a theological debate concerning analogy that spanned several centuries. In the 18th century, there appeared two closely related arguments for atheism which both utilized analogy for their own purposes. In this thesis, I show that one argument, articulated by the French materialist Paul-Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, is successful in showing that God-talk, as conceived of using the analogy of proportion, is unintelligible non-sense. In addition, I show that another argument, articulated by Anthony Collins (Vindication of Divine Attributes), George Berkeley (chapter IV of Alciphron), and David Hume (chapter XII of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion) can be restructured into an argument for the position that the analogy of proportionality makes the distinction between atheism and theism merely verbal. Since both of these are undesirable consequences for the theist, I conclude that Aquinas's doctrine of analogy does not withstand the assault of 18th century atheists. / Master of Arts

Il est courant de reconnaître en Hume un philosophe empiriste et un critique de la raison. Cette étude s’attache à examiner le lien unissant ces deux caractérisations, et à mettre en évidence le geste d’extension de l’empirisme par lequel, sous la plume de Hume, l’entendement en vient à être pensé selon un modèle empirico-sceptique. Contrairement à l’idée reçue qui voudrait que la théorie humienne de la raison s’énonce à l’encontre de conceptions «métaphysiques» ou «rationalistes» de cette dernière, il s’agit de montrer que c’est à des auteurs couramment désignés comme empiristes que Hume se confronte lorsqu’il prend la raison pour objet, en tant que ces auteurs seraient restés prisonniers d’une compréhension superficielle de l’expérience. En explorant différents champs (connaissance, passions, morale, histoire, sciences constituées, telle la mécanique), cette étude souligne que la critique humienne de la raison naît d’un approfondissement de l’empirisme, approfondissement qui vient interroger l’idée traditionnelle d’une continuité vis-à-vis des philosophes «empiristes» (notamment Locke et Hutcheson) et d’une mise à distance des auteurs «rationalistes» (notamment Leibniz et Malebranche). Ces positionnements à première vue surprenants s’enracinent dans une exigence d’analyse de l’expérience : c’est seulement en analysant l’expérience immédiate et ordinaire que nous faisons de notre raison qu’il est possible de parvenir à une juste idée de ses pouvoirs, et de poser à nouveaux frais la question de sa légitimité à gouverner notre croyance. / Hume is commonly seen as an empiricist philosopher and as a critic of reason. The project of this thesis is to examine the relation between these two characterizations, and to highlight the way that Hume expands empiricism into the faculty of reason, resulting in a new conception of the understanding, which is both empirical and skeptical. In opposition to the generally accepted idea, which states that Hume's theory of reason is set against "metaphysical" or "rationalist" conceptions of this faculty, the thesis argues that, in his account of reason, Hume mainly critiques "empiricist" philosophers. These thinkers are critiqued for being confined to a superficial view of experience. Through an exploration of several fields (theory of experience, theory of the passions, theory of morals, history, contemporary sciences, such as mechanics), it is shown that Hume's critique of reason stems from an extension and intensification of empiricism. This demonstration challenges the traditional view of Hume, as the heir to the "empiricist" tradition (particularly Locke and Hutcheson) and as a mere critic of the "rationalist" philosophers (particularly Leibniz and Malebranche). These positions, which seem at first sight surprising, are rooted in the demand that experience be analysed : it is only through analysing the immediate and ordinary experience we have of our reasoning that we can arrive at a true account of the powers of reason, and give new ground to the question of the legitimacy of reason to govern our beliefs.

[pt] Esta dissertação discute, a partir de uma leitura dos trabalhos de Adam Smith em história intelectual e ética, a visão deste filósofo escocês do século XVIII sobre a natureza da atividade humana. Sugere-se que esta filosofia seja profundamente marcada por uma consciência aguda da imperfeição e finitude humanas. Intenta-se, porém, mostrar que o pensamento de Smith é também um esforço de reconciliação com esta imperfeição essencial. Toda a reflexão smithiana está voltada para a tarefa de demonstrar de que maneira é possível ao homem, a despeito de suas limitações, manter uma existência regular e harmoniosa e avançar do ponto de vista cognitivo, moral e material. De acordo com a visão de Smith, o espírito humano é mobilizado por um impulso espontâneo e desinteressado para a realização de ordem, harmonia e beleza nas diferentes esferas de sua atividade. No entanto, embora o espírito tenda naturalmente à regularidade, uma situação absolutamente simétrica nunca se realiza, em função da própria imperfeição do Homem. E é certo que assim seja, pois uma tal situação não seria nem mesmo suportável por criaturas humanas. O primeiro capítulo tem seu foco analítico em um texto de juventude de Smith, The History of Astronomy, pondo-o em diálogo com o pensamento de David Hume. Discute-se de que maneira Smith, assumindo a teoria da imaginação de Hume, se insere também no projeto humeano de uma ciência da natureza humana. O segundo capítulo envolve uma discussão da obra de Smith em ética, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, e de seu conceito central, a simpatia. / [en] This dissertation deals with Adam Smith`s view on the nature of human activity, proposing an interpretation of this eighteenth century Scottish philosopher`s works on intellectual history and ethics. It is suggested that his philosophy is marked by a keen awareness of human imperfection and finitude. It demonstrates that Adam Smith`s thought is also, however, an effort of reconciliation with this essential imperfection. Smith`s reflection is directed to the task of showing how it would be possible for mankind, notwithstanding its limitations, to maintain a regular and harmonious existence and to advance from a cognitive, moral and material point of view. According to Adam Smith`s view, the human spirit is moved by a spontaneous and disinterested impulse to the realization of order, harmony and beauty in the different spheres of its activity. Nonetheless, although the spirit is naturally order- seeking, an absolutely symmetrical situation is never actualized because of the very imperfection of mankind. Such a situation wouldn`t even be bearable to human creatures. The first chapter has its analytical focus on an early text from Adam Smith`s called The History of Astronomy, and puts it into dialogue with the thought of David Hume. The subject here is how Smith, adopting Hume`s theory of imagination, partakes in the Humean project of a science of human nature. The second chapter discusses Adam Smith`s work on ethics, The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, and its central concept, sympathy.